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The Radical Right
THE CONTRIBUTORS

DANIEL BELL is Professor of Sociology at Columbia University and chairman of the department in Columbia College. He was formerly managing editor of The New Leader, labor editor of Fortune Magazine, and director of the international-seminar program of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Paris). He has taught at the University of Chicago, the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, and was a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences. He is the author, among other works, of The Background and Development of Marxian Socialism in the United States and The End of Ideology.

RICHARD HOFSTADTER is De Witt Clinton Professor of American History at Columbia University. He has been the Pitt Professor in American History at Cambridge University and the Harmsworth Professor at Oxford. He is the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning The Age of Reform, and, among other books, Social Darwinianism in American Thought, The American Political Tradition, and (with Walter Metzger) Academic Freedom in the United States.

DAVID RIESMAN is Henry Ford II Professor of Social Science at Harvard University. He was Professor of Social Science at the University of Chicago, and a visiting professor at Yale and Johns Hopkins. He is the author of half a dozen books, including The Lonely Crowd, Individualism Reconsidered, Thorstein Veblen, and Variety and Constraint in American Education.

NATHAN GLAZER, a sociologist, has taught at the University of California at Berkeley, Smith College, and Columbia University. He is a co-author of The Lonely Crowd and has written American Judaism and The Social Basis of American Communism.

PETER VIERECK, historian and Pulitzer Prize-winning poet, is Professor of Modern History at Mount Holyoke College. Among his writings in the history of ideas are Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler, Conservatism Revisited, The Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals, and The Unadjusted Man.

TALCOTT PARSONS is Professor of Sociology at Harvard University. Among his major works are The Structure of Social Action, The Social System, and Toward a General Theory of Action (with Edward Shils).
ALAN F. WESTIN is Associate Professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia University. He is a member of the bar in the District of Columbia and a member of the national board of directors of the American Civil Liberties Union. He is the author of *The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case*, *The Supreme Court: Views from the Inside*, and *The Uses of Power*.

HERBERT H. HYMAN is Professor of Sociology and Associate Director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. He is past President of the American Association for Public Opinion Research and recipient of its Julian Woodward Memorial Award for Distinguished Achievement. He has been visiting professor at the University of Oslo and the University of Ankara. Among his books are *Survey Design and Analysis*, *Interviewing in Social Research*, and *Political Socialization*.

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. He has taught at Columbia University, was visiting Ford Professor at Yale, and was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences. He is the author of *Political Man*, *Agrarian Socialism*, *Union Democracy* (with James Coleman and Martin Trow), *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (with Reinhard Bendix), and other books.
To
SAMUEL M. LEVITAS
(1896–1961)
Executive Editor of The New Leader
In Memoriam
this book is personally dedicated
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Preface

The idea for the original edition of this volume, which appeared under the title *The New American Right*, arose in 1954 in a faculty seminar on political behavior, at Columbia University. The subject was McCarthyism, and we sought to bring to bear on this question whatever sophistication the social sciences had achieved. One thing soon became clear: the standard explanations of American political behavior—in terms of economic-interest-group conflict or the role of the electoral structure—were inadequate to the task. (See Chapter 2.) The most fruitful approaches seemed to be those worked out by Richard Hofstadter and Seymour Martin Lipset.

Hofstadter, from a historian's vantage point, argued that a preoccupation with status has been a persistent element in American politics and that McCarthyism as a social phenomenon could best be explained as a form of "status anxiety" in groups that have been "tormented by a nagging doubt as to whether they are really and truly and fully American." He called the individuals in such positions "pseudo-conservatives" because, while claiming to uphold tradition, they were in reality projecting their own fears and frustrations onto society.

Lipset, a sociologist, distinguished between "class politics," which seemed applicable during periods of depression and "status politics," which seemed to predominate during periods of prosperity, when groups were concerned to defend their newly won positions. McCarthyism, he argued, was a species of status politics, and McCarthy's followers were the "radical right"—a term coined by Lipset and used for the first time in the original edition of this book—because they represented a form of extremism, rather than a genuine effort to bespeak the conservative point of view.

A number of essays appearing about this time—by David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, Peter Viereck, and Talcott Parsons—indicated that other writers had independently been engaged in the same kind of analysis, although each with a different emphasis. The
congruence was striking enough to suggest a book that would bring together these essays as illustrations of this new conceptual analysis. Hence, *The New American Right*.

When the book appeared in 1955, McCarthy was already sliding toward his downfall. But as the introductory essay noted at that time, "McCarthyism, or McCarthywasm, as one wit put it, may be a passing phenomenon. This book is concerned not with these transiencies, but with the deeper-running social currents of a turbulent mid-century America." The re-emergence of the "radical right" in 1961–62 has justified these fears while confirming our analysis. This is not to say that Birchism, and other aspects of the present radical right, are exactly the same as McCarthyism. As a number of the following essays make clear, there are some distinct dissimilarities as well as some common features. McCarthy was a wrecker—what the Germans call an *Umstürzmensch*, a man who wants to tear up society but has no plan of his own. The radical right of the nineteen-sixties is a movement that fears not only Communism but "modernity," and that, in its equation of liberalism with Communism, represents a different challenge to the American democratic consensus.

In bringing out this new, enlarged edition of *The New American Right*, the authors felt that, rather than rewrite the original essays, they would prefer to let these stand as their judgments at the time, and to add supplementary essays. In American social science, there is a valuable tendency, initiated by Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton in their follow-up volume on "The American Soldier," to create "continuities" in research by allowing participants in the original efforts, and others, to comment on that research and to extend the initial analysis. In that sense, this volume represents a "continuity" in which the authors can assess their own work and, at the same time, contribute analyses of the radical right, circa 1962. Thus, the original essays carry the notation "1955" after the title, while the new essays bear the legend "1962."

From the original volume, one essay, "The Polls on Communism and Conformity," by S. M. Lipset and Nathan Glazer, has been eliminated, primarily because it was methodological, while its substantive material, a report on the volume *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, by Samuel Stouffer, is summarized in the new essay by Herbert H. Hyman.
In addition to the supplementary chapters by the original authors, we have added two new essays to this volume. One, by Alan Westin, is an intensive examination of the ideology and operations of the John Birch Society, which Westin locates in the context of extremist politics, both left and right, in the United States. The second, by Herbert H. Hyman, is a comparison of the climates of political intolerance in England and America. Any general explanation of a social movement has to be rooted in comparative analysis, and Hyman's pioneering work in that direction provides a useful corrective to some of the parochial aspects of the original analyses.

The volume opens with a new chapter by the editor, which seeks to explain the emergence of the radical right of 1961–62 both in its immediate political context and as a reflection of more pervasive social changes in American life; this is followed by the editor's original essay of 1955, which deals with the standard interpretations of political behavior in America. In all other instances, the original essay precedes each author's supplementary chapter.

The stimulus to several of these essays came initially from the Fund for the Republic, and we again acknowledge, gratefully, its courageous and early help. Mr. Lipset's long, supplementary contribution—a monograph in its own right—was aided by a grant from the Anti-Defamation League which is sponsoring, at the University of California at Berkeley, an extended survey of the relationship of political extremism to ethnic prejudice in the United States.

DANIEL BELL

*Columbia University*

*June, 1962.*
The American has never yet had to face the trials of Job. . . . Hitherto America has been the land of universal good will, confidence in life, inexperience of poisons. Until yesterday, it believed itself immune from the hereditary plagues of mankind. It could not credit the danger of being suffocated or infected by any sinister principle. . . .

GEORGE SANTAYANA,
Character and Opinion
in the United States

IN THE WINTER of 1961–62, the “radical right” emerged into quick prominence on the American political scene. The immediate reasons for its appearance are not hard to understand. The simple fact was that the Republican Party, now out of power, inevitably began to polarize (much as the Democrats, if they were out of power, might have split over the civil rights and integration issue), and the right wing came to the fore. The right-wing Republicans have an ideology—perhaps the only group in American life that possesses one today—but during the Eisenhower administration they had been trapped because “their” party was in power, and the American political system, with its commitment to deals and penalties, does not easily invite ideological—or even principled—political splits. An administration in office, possessing patronage and prestige, can “paper over” the inherent divisions within a party. But out of office, such conflicts are bound to arise, and so they did within the G.O.P.

Clearly there is more to all this than merely a contest for power within a party. Something new has been happening in American life. It is not the rancor of the radical right, for rancor has been a

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recurrent aspect of the American political temper. Nor is it just the casting of suspicions or the conspiracy theory of politics, elements of which have streaked American life in the past. What is new, and this is why the problem assumes importance far beyond the question of the fight for control of a party, is the ideology of this movement—its readiness to jettison constitutional processes and to suspend liberties, to condone Communist methods in the fighting of Communism.

Few countries in the world have been able to maintain a social system that allows political power to pass peacefully from one social group to another without the threat of hostilities or even civil war. In the mid-twentieth century, we see such historical centers of civilization as France, let alone states just beginning to work out viable democratic frameworks, torn apart by ideological groups that will not accept a consensual system of politics. The politics of civility, to use Edward Shils' phrase, has been the achievement of only a small group of countries—those largely within an Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian political tradition. Today, the ideology of the right wing in America threatens the politics of American civility. Its commitment and its methods threaten to disrupt the "fragile consensus" that underlies the American political system.

I believe that the radical right is only a small minority, but it gains force from the confusions within the world of conservatism regarding the changing character of American life. What the right as a whole fears is the erosion of its own social position, the collapse of its power, the increasing incomprehensibility of a world—now overwhelmingly technical and complex—that has changed so drastically within a lifetime.

The right, thus, fights a rear-guard action. But its very anxieties illustrate the deep fissures that have opened in American society as a whole, as a result of the complex structural changes that have been taking place in the past thirty years or so. And more, they show that the historic American response to social crisis, the characteristic American style, is no longer adequate to the tasks.

I

The Emergence of the Radical Right

Social groups that are dispossessed invariably seek targets on whom they can vent their resentments, targets whose power can serve to
The Dispossessed—1962

explain their dispossession. In this respect, the radical right of the early 1960s is in no way different from the Populists of the 1890s, who for years traded successfully on such simple formulas as “Wall Street,” “international bankers,” and “the Trusts,” in order to have not only targets but “explanations” for politics. What lends especial rancor to the radical right of the 1960s is its sense of betrayal not by its “enemies” but by its “friends.”

After twenty years of Democratic power, the right-wing Republicans hoped that the election of Dwight Eisenhower would produce its own utopia: the dismantling of the welfare state, the taming of labor unions, and the “magical” rollback of Communism in Europe. None of this happened. Eisenhower’s Labor Secretary courted the unions, social-security benefits increased, and, during the recession, unemployment benefits were extended, while the government, in good Keynesian style, ran a twelve-billion-dollar budgetary deficit. In foreign policy, Secretary of State Dulles first trumpeted a “liberation policy,” and then retreated, talked brinkmanship but moved cautiously, announced a policy of “massive retaliation,” and, toward the end of his tenure, abandoned even that, so that the subsequent Eisenhower moves toward summitry were no different from, or from a “hard” right line were “softer” than, the Truman-Acheson containment policy. Thus eight years of moderation proved more frustrating than twenty years of opposition.

Once the Democrats were back in office, the charge of softness in dealing with Communism could again become a political, as well as an ideological, issue. And the radical right was quick to act. The abject failure in Cuba—the name of the landing place for the abortive invasion, the Bay of Pigs, itself became a cruel historical joke—seemed to reinforce the picture of the United States that emerged out of the stalemate in Korea a decade ago—of a lurching, lumbering power, lacking will, unsure of its strength, indecisive in its course, defensive in its posture. The theme of the radical right was voiced by Rear Admiral Chester Ward (ret.), the Washington director of the American Security Council, who declared, “Americans are tired of defeats. They are tired of surrenders covered up as ‘negotiated settlements.’ They are, indeed, tired of so much talk and little action by our leaders. For the first time in sixteen years of the cold war, a demand for victory is beginning to roll into Washington.”

Thus the stage was set.

The factors that precipitated the radical right into quick notoriety
in early 1961 were the rancor of their attacks and the flash spread of the movement in so many different places. McCarthyism in the mid-1950s was never an organized movement; it was primarily an atmosphere of fear, generated by a one-man swashbuckler cutting a wide swath through the headlines. In some localities—in Hollywood, on Broadway, in some universities—individual vigilante groups did begin a drumbeat drive against Communists or former fellow-travelers, but by and large the main agitation was conducted in government by Congressional or state legislators, using agencies of legislative investigation to assert their power. In contrast, the radical right of the 1960s has been characterized by a multitude of organizations that seemingly have been able to evoke an intense emotional response from a devoted following.

Three elements conjoined to attract public attention to the radical right. One was the disclosure of the existence of the John Birch Society, a secretive, conspiratorial group obedient to a single leader, Robert Welch, who argued that one could combat the methods of Communism only with Communist methods. Thus, membership lists were never disclosed, fronts were organized to conduct campaigns (such as the one to impeach Chief Justice Warren, which turned, with heavy-handed jocularity, into calls to “hang” him), and a symbol of patriotism was put forth in the name of an Army captain who had been shot in China by the Communists.

The second was the fashionable spread of week-long seminars of anti-Communist “schools,” conducted by evangelist preachers who adapted old revivalist techniques to a modern idiom, which swept sections of the country, particularly the Southwest and California. These schools promised to initiate the student into the “mysteries” of Communism by unfolding its secret aims, or unmasking the philosophy of “dialectical materialism.” And, third, there was the disclosure of the existence of extreme fanatic groups, such as the Minutemen, who organized “guerrilla-warfare seminars,” complete with rifles and mortars, in preparation for the day when patriots would have to take to the hills to organize resistance against a Communist-run America. Such fringe movements, ludicrous as they were, illustrated the hysteria that had seized some sections of the radical right.

To a surprising extent, much of the radical-right agitation—and the spread of the seminar device—was unleashed by the Eisenhower
administration itself. In 1958, the National Security Council issued a directive, as yet still unpublished, which stated that it would be the policy of the United States government, as Senator Fulbright cited it, "to make use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public to the menace of Communism."\(^1\) Following this directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National War College entered into consultation with the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Institute of American Strategy (a creation of the Richardson Foundation), to plan curriculum and seminars for reserve officers and local businessmen. A basic text was adopted, *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, edited by Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, of the University of Pennsylvania group. An equally influential text was the book *Protracted Conflict*, by Robert Strausz-Hupe and Colonel William Kintner, which argues that no negotiations with the Russians leading to a stable settlement are really possible. The Strausz-Hupe group is neither part of, nor should it be identified with, the lunatic fringes of the right. Its arguments are serious and subject to the debate and rival assessments of other scholars. But the actions initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff did lead to a large number of Projects Alert and indoctrination seminars, carried out by official Navy and Army spokesmen, that went far beyond the original scope of the National Security Council directive, and that brought into these sessions the pitchmen of the radical right.

In August, 1960 (as detailed in the Fulbright memorandum), the United States Naval Air Station, at Glenview, Illinois, sent out invitations to community leaders and businessmen, inviting them to a seminar on “Education for American Security.” The announced purpose of the seminar was to stimulate an active force against “moral decay, political apathy and spiritual bankruptcy,” and to teach the participants how to create similar schools in other Midwestern communities. The conference was addressed by a number of high-ranking naval officers. But it also included Dr. Fred C. Schwarz, the organizer of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade; E. Merrill Root, author of *Brainwashing in the High Schools* and *Collectivism on the Campus*, and an endorser of the John Birch Society; and Richard Arens, former research director of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and a member of Schwarz’s Christian Crusade. The speeches during the sessions, according to the *Christian Century*, the liberal Protestant weekly published in Chicago, not only attacked
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Communism but condemned as well "liberals, modernists, John Dewey, Harvard students, the New York Times, the American Friends Service Committee, pacifists, naïve ministers," and so on.

It was this same mixture of official military sponsorship and propagandists of the radical right that characterized dozens of similar seminars around the country. On April 21, 1961, the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Pittsburgh sponsored a Fourth-Dimensional Warfare Seminar, with the coöperation of the commanding general of the 2nd U. S. Army, Lieutenant General Ridgely Gaither, and his staff, at whose sessions the House Un-American Activities Committee film *Operation Abolition* was shown, and the principal speaker, Admiral Chester Ward (ret.), attacked Adlai Stevenson and George Kennan, as advisers to the President whose "philosophies regarding foreign affairs would chill the typical American." A Strategy for Survival conference held on April 14th and 15th in Fort Smith, Fayetteville, and Little Rock, Arkansas, sponsored by the local Chamber of Commerce and promoted by Major General Bullock, the area commander, heard speakers from Harding College, a small Baptist institution in Searcy, Arkansas, which has been the source of much extreme right-wing material. And on the program was the film *Communism on the Map*, prepared by Harding College, which equates Socialism with Communism. A Project Alert was organized at the Pensacola Naval Air Training station, in Florida, based on Harding College materials, and the program was repeated in similar "alerts" in Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas. Dr. Fred C. Schwarz held a seminar at the headquarters of the 8th Naval District, in New Orleans, which was endorsed by the Commandant, Rear Admiral W. G. Schindler. A Houston Freedom Forum was held by Schwarz's Christian Anti-Communism Crusade at which Admiral F. W. Warder gave the keynote address.

And so it went. In almost every area of the country, seminars, schools, and projects, organized by the military or by business groups in coöperation with the military, spread the propaganda of the radical right and gave a broad aura of authority and legitimacy to such propaganda and to such pitchmen of the radical right as the Reverend Dr. Schwarz and the Reverend Billy Hargis.
III

The Crisis in National Style

Every country has a "national style," a distinctive way of meeting the problems of order and adaptation, of conflict and consensus, of individual ends and communal welfare, that confront any society. The "national style," or the characteristic way of response, is a compound of the values and the national character of a country. As anyone who has read travelers' accounts knows, there has long been agreement on the characteristics of the American style.

The American has been marked by his sense of achievement, his activism, his being on the move, his eagerness for experience. America has always been "future-oriented." Europe represented the past, with its hierarchies, its fixed statuses, its ties to antiquity. The American "makes" himself, and in so doing transforms himself, society, and nature. In Jefferson's deism, God was not a transcendental being but a "Workman" whose intricate design was being unfolded on the American continent. The achievement pattern envisaged an "endless future," a life of constant improvement. Education meant preparation for a career rather than cultivation. When Samuel Gompers, the immigrant labor leader, was asked what labor's goal was, he gauged the American spirit shrewdly in answering, simply, "More."

Hand in hand with achievement went a sense of optimism, the feeling that life was tractable, the environment manipulable, that anything was possible. The American, the once-born man, was the "sky-blue, healthy-minded moralist" to whom sin and evil were, in Emerson's phrase, merely the "soul's mumps and measles and whooping cough." In this sense the American has been Graham Greene's "quiet American" or, to Santayana, "inexperienced of poisons." And for this reason Europeans have always found America lacking in a sense of the esthetic, the tragic, or the decadent.

American achievement and masculine optimism created a buoyant sense of progress, almost of omnipotence. America had never been defeated. America was getting bigger and better. America was always first. It had the tallest buildings, the biggest dams, the largest cities. "The most striking expression of [the American's] materialism," remarked Santayana, "is his singular preoccupation with quantity."
And all of this was reflected in distinctive aspects of character. The emphasis on achievement was an emphasis on the individual. The idea that society was a system of social arrangements that acts to limit the range of individual behavior was an abstraction essentially alien to American thought; reality was concrete and empirical, and the individual was the moral unit of action. That peculiar American inversion of Protestantism, the moralizing style, found its focus in the idea of reform, but it was the reform of the individual, not of social institutions. To reform meant to remedy the defects of character, and the American reform movement of the nineteenth century concentrated on sin, drink, gambling, prostitution, and other aspects of individual behavior. In politics, the moralistic residue led to black-and-white judgments: if anything was wrong, the individual was to blame. Since there were good men and bad men, the problem was to choose the good and eschew the bad. Any defect in policy flowed from a defect in the individual, and a change in policy could begin only by finding the culprit.

All of this—the pattern of achievement, of optimism and progress, and the emphasis on the individual as the unit of concern—found expression in what W. W. Rostow has called the "classic" American style. It was one of ad-hoc compromise derived from an implicit consensus. In the American political debates, there was rarely, except for the Civil War, an appeal to "first principles," as, say, in France, where every political division was rooted in the alignments of the French Revolution, or in the relationship of the Catholic Church to the secular state. In the United States, there were three unspoken assumptions: that the values of the individual were to be maximized, that the rising material wealth would dissolve all strains resulting from inequality, and that the continuity of experience would provide solutions for all future problems.

In the last fifteen years, the national self-consciousness has received a profound shock. At the end of World War II, American productivity and American prodigality were going to inspire an archaic Europe and a backward colonial system. But the American century quickly vanished. The fall of China, the stalemate in Korea, the eruption of anti-colonialism (with the United States cast bewilderingly among the arch-villains), the higher growth rates in the western European economies at a time when growth in this country has slowed considerably, and the continued claims of Khrushchev
that Communism is the wave of the future have by now shattered the earlier simple-minded belief Americans had in their own omnipotence, and have left almost a free-floating anxiety about the future. In a crudely symbolic way, the Russian sputniks trumped this country on its own ground—the boastful claim of always being first. Getting to the moon first may be, as many scientists assert, of little scientific value, and the huge sums required for such a venture might be spent more wisely for medical work, housing, or scientific research, but having set the "rules of the game," the United States cannot now afford to withdraw just because, in its newly acquired sophistication, it has perhaps begun to realize that such competitions are rather childish.

But these immediate crises of nerve only reflect deeper challenges to the adequacy of America's classic national style. That style, with its ad-hoc compromise and day-to-day patching, rather than consistent policy formation, no longer gives us guides to action. The classic notion was that rights inhered in individuals. But the chief realization of the past thirty years is that not the individual but collectivities—corporations, labor unions, farm organizations, pressure groups—have become the units of social action, and that individual rights in many instances derive from group rights, and in others have become fused with them. Other than the thin veil of the "public consensus," we have few guide lines, let alone a principle of distributive justice, to regulate or check the arbitrary power of many of these collectivities.

A second sign that the classic style has broken down appears in the lack of any institutional means for creating and maintaining necessary public services. On the municipal level, the complicated political swapping among hundreds of dispersed polities within a unified economic region, each seeking its own bargains in water supply, sewage disposal, roads, parks, recreation areas, crime regulation, transit, and so on, makes a mockery of the ad-hoc process. Without some planning along viable regional lines, local community life is bound to falter under the burdens of mounting taxes and social disarray.

And, third, foreign policy has foundered because every administration has had difficulty in defining a national interest, morally rooted, whose policies can be realistically tailored to the capacities and the constraints imposed by the actualities of world power.
The easy temptation—and it is the theme of the radical right—is the tough-talking call for "action." This emphasis on action—on getting things done, on results—is a dominant aspect of the traditional American character. The moralizing style, with its focus on sin and on the culpability of the individual, finds it hard to accept social forces as a convincing explanation of failure, and prefers "action" instead. Americans have rarely known how to sweat it out, to wait, to calculate in historical terms, to learn that "action" cannot easily reverse social drifts whose courses were charted long ago. The "liberation" policy of the first Eisenhower administration was but a hollow moralism, deriving from the lack of any consistent policy other than the need to seem "activist"—again part of the classic style—rather than from a realistic assessment of the possibility of undermining Soviet power in eastern Europe. Until recently, there has been little evidence that American foreign policy is guided by a sense of historical time and an accurate assessment of social forces.

Styles of action reflect the character of a society. The classic style was worked out during a period when America was an agrarian, relatively homogeneous society, isolated from the world at large, so that ad-hoc measures were a realistic way of dealing with new strains. As an adaptive mechanism, it served to bring new groups into the society. But styles of action, like rhetoric, have a habit of outliving institutions. And the classic style in no way reflects the deep structural changes that have been taking place in American life in the past quarter of a century.

IV

The Sources of Strain

Although the crisis in national style can be detected most forcefully in the realm of foreign policy, there have been, in the past thirty years, deep changes taking place in the social structure that are reworking the social map of the country, upsetting the established life-chances and outlooks of old, privileged groups, and creating uncertainties about the future which are deeply unsettling to those whose values were shaped by the "individualist" morality of nineteenth-century America.

The most pervasive changes are those involving the structural relations between class position and power. Clearly, today, political
position rather than wealth, and technical skill rather than property, have become the bases from which power is wielded. In the modes of access to privilege, inheritance is no longer all-determining, nor does "individual initiative" in building one's own business exist as a realistic route; in general, education has become the major way to acquire the technical skills necessary for the administrative and power-wielding jobs in society.

In the older mythos, one's achievement was an individual fact—as a doctor, lawyer, professor, businessman; in the reality of today, one's achievement, status, and prestige are rooted in particular collectivities (the corporation, being attached to a "name" hospital, teaching at a prestigious university, membership in a good law firm), and the individual's role is necessarily submerged in the achievement of the collectivity. Within each collectivity and profession, the proliferation of tasks calls for narrower and narrower specializations, and this proliferation requires larger collectivities, and the consequent growth of hierarchies and bureaucracies.

The new nature of decision-making—the larger role of technical decision—also forces a displacement of the older elites. Within a business enterprise, the newer techniques of operations research and linear programming almost amount to the "automation" of middle management, and its displacement by mathematicians and engineers, working either within the firm or as consultants. In the economy, the businessman finds himself subject to price, wage, and investment criteria laid down by the economists in government. In the polity, the old military elites find themselves challenged in the determination of strategy by scientists, who have the technical knowledge on nuclear capability, missile development, and the like, or by the "military intellectuals" whose conceptions of weapon systems and political warfare seek to guide military allocations.

In the broadest sense, the spread of education, of research, of administration, and of government creates a new constituency, the technical and professional intelligentsia, and while these are not bound by some common ethos to constitute a new class, or even a cohesive social group, they are the products of a new system of recruitment for power (just as property and inheritance represented the old system), and those who are the products of the old system understandably feel a vague and apprehensive disquiet—the disquiet of the dispossessed.
Many of the political changes that have transformed American society originated in measures taken thirty and more years ago. In many instances, the changes have been irrevocably built into the structure of American society. Why then have the consequences of these changes—and the reactions to them—become so manifest, and produced such rancor, at this time?

It was Walter Bagehot who said that the Reform Bill of 1832 was "won" in 1865—that political reforms are secured largely through generational change. New legislation may stipulate a set of reforms, but the administration of the law, its judicial interpretation, and its enforcement are in the hands of an older political generation which may hinder the changes. Only when the new generation comes of age are the judiciary and the bureaucracy taken over, and men educated in the "new spirit of the time" come into the established framework of power.

In this sense, the social enactments of the New Deal came to fruition thirty years later. While the Roosevelt administration created a host of new regulatory agencies, the judiciary, in its values and social outlook, largely reflected the ancien régime, and even though there was no entrenched bureaucracy, like those of Germany, France, or Britain, that would impede or distort these reforms, the lack of a broad intelligentsia made it difficult to staff the regulatory agencies without drawing in the business community, the trade associations, and the like. Thus, while the enactments of the Roosevelt administration seemed to many conservatives to be startlingly revolutionary, the business community—the main group whose power was abated—could, through the courts, Congress, and often the administrative agencies, modify substantially the restrictions of the regulations.

The paradoxical fact is that while the New Deal has lost much of its meaning on the ideological or rhetorical level, the fabric of government, particularly the judiciary, has been rewoven with liberal thread so that on many significant issues—civil rights, minority-group protection, the extension of social welfare—the courts have been more liberal than the administrations. Only Congress, reflect-
ing the disproportionate power of the rural areas and the established seniority system, has remained predominantly under conservative control.

In identifying "the dispossessed," it is somewhat misleading to seek their economic location, since it is not economic interest alone that accounts for their anxieties. A small businessman may have made considerable amounts of money in the last decade (in part because he has greater freedom than a large corporation in masking costs for tax purposes), and yet strongly resent regulations in Washington, the high income tax, or, more to the point, his own lack of status. To the extent that any such economic location is possible, one can say that the social group most threatened by the structural changes in society is the "old" middle class—the independent physician, farm owner, small-town lawyer, real-estate promoter, home builder, automobile dealer, gasoline-station owner, small businessman, and the like—and that, regionally, its greatest political concentration is in the South and the Southwest, and in California. But a much more telltale indicator of the group that feels most anxious—since life-styles and values provide the emotional fuel of beliefs and actions—is the strain of Protestant fundamentalism, of nativist nationalism, of good-and-evil moralism which is the organizing basis for the "world view" of such people. For this is the group whose values predominated in the nineteenth century, and which for the past forty years has been fighting a rear-guard action.

The present upsurge of American nativism—one aspect of the radical right—is most directly paralleled in the 1920s, in the virulent assaults on teachers' loyalty by the fundamentalist churchmen in the name of God, and by patriotic organizations like the American Legion in the name of country. These conflicts—expressed most directly in the Scopes trial on the teaching of evolution in Tennessee, and the bellicose efforts of Mayor Big Bill Thompson in Chicago to expunge favorable references to Great Britain from the school textbooks—were between "fundamentalists" and "modernists," between "patriots" and "internationalists."

These skirmishes of the 1920s were the first defensive attacks of the nativist and the old middle-class elements. They arose in reaction to the entry into society of formerly "disenfranchised" elements, particularly the children of immigrants and members of minority
ethnic groups—an entry made through the urban political machines, the only major route open to them. In short, it was a reaction to the rise of a mass society.

Until the mid-1920s, America in its top and middle layers had been, politically and culturally, a fairly homogeneous society. As Walter Lippmann pointed out in 1928, in a neglected but prescient account of the times, American Inquisitors, "those who differed in religion or nationality from the great mass of the people played no important part in American politics. They did the menial work, they had no influence in society, they were not self-conscious and they produced no leaders of their own. There were some sectarian differences and some sectional differences within the American nation. But by and large, within the states themselves, the dominant group was like-minded and its dominion was unchallenged.”

But in time its dominion was challenged, and principally from the cities. The year 1920 was the first in American history when a majority of persons lived in "urban territory." The children and the grandchildren of the immigrants began to come of political age. The movement to the cities and the gradual cultural ascendancy of metropolitan life over rural areas, accentuated by the rise of the automobile, motion pictures, and radio—creating, for the first time, a national popular culture—began to threaten established customs and beliefs. Thus, there was no longer, as Lippmann pointed out at the time, "a well-entrenched community, settled in its customs, homogeneous in its manners, clear in its ultimate beliefs. There is great diversity, and therefore there are the seeds of conflict."

Faced with the rise of "heretical" beliefs, the religious fundamentalists in Tennessee put forth the argument, self-evident to them, that teaching in the schools ought to conform to the views of the majority. If the people of Tennessee did not believe in evolution, they had a right to demand that it be stopped. And as Lippmann wryly commented, there was warranty for such a populist demand in Jefferson’s bill for the establishment of religious freedom in Virginia, in 1786, which declared that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."

Intellectually, the fundamentalists were defeated and the modernists won; their views came to predominate in the country. But the fundamentalist temper of the 1920s still holds strong sway in rural-
dominated states. As David Danzig has pointed out, "the States that repudiated Darwinianism and Al Smith are today prominent among those nineteen that have passed 'Right to Work' laws since 1950." And, paradoxically, although they have become intellectually and socially dispossessed, the fundamentalist "regions" have risen to new wealth in the last fifteen years or so. The industrialization of the South and Southwest, the boom in real estate, the gushing wealth of oil in Texas and Oklahoma have transformed the fundamentalist churches and the Southern Baptist movement into a middle-class and upper-middle-class group. Small wonder that, possessing this new wealth, the fundamentalist groups have discovered the iniquity of the income tax.

The social ideas of fundamentalism are quite traditional—a return to the "simple" virtues of individual initiative and self-reliance. In political terms, this means dismantling much of the social-security program, eliminating the income tax, reducing the role of the federal government in economic life, and giving back to the states and local government the major responsibilities for welfare, labor, and similar legislation.

Until now, much of the political strength of the right has stemmed from its ability to block the reapportionment of seats in the state legislatures (and to gerrymander seats for Congress), resulting in a heavily disproportionate representation of the small-town and rural areas in both assemblies. In Tennessee—whose flagrant failure to act precipitated the Supreme Court decision in April, 1962, ordering the reallocation of seats—although the state constitution specified that a reapportionment be made every ten years, the state legislature, since 1901, had rejected all bills attempting to carry out that mandate. As a result, in the voting for the Tennessee State Senate, one-third of the electorate nominated two-thirds of the legislators. In almost every state of the Union one could point to similarly glaring disproportions—though none so astounding as in California, where the single state senator from Los Angeles represents 6,038,771 persons, while a colleague from a rural area represents 14,294 persons, a ratio of 422.5 to 1. In forty-four states, less than forty per cent of the population can elect a majority of the state legislators; in thirteen states, fewer than a third of the voters can elect a majority. How quickly this will change, now that the federal courts are empowered to act, remains to be seen.
VI

The Managerial Dispossessed

To list the managerial executive class as among the dispossessed may seem strange, especially in the light of the argument that a revolution which is undermining property as the basis of power is enfranchising a new class of technical personnel among whom are the business executives. And yet the managerial class has been under immense strain all through this period, a strain arising in part from the status discrepancy between their power within a particular enterprise and their power and prestige in the nation as a whole.

The old family firm was securely rooted in the legal and moral tradition of private property. The enterprise “belonged” to the owner, and was sanctioned, depending on one’s theological tastes, by God or by Natural Law. The modern manager lacks the inherited family justifications, for increasingly he is recruited from the amorphous middle class. He receives a salary, bonus, options, expense accounts, and “perks” (use of company planes, memberships in country clubs), but his power is transitory, and he cannot pass on his position to his son.15

In order to justify his position, the manager needs an ideology. In no other capitalist order but the American—not in England, or Germany, or France—has this drive for ideology been so compulsive. This ideology is no longer derived from private property but from enterprise, the argument being that only the American corporate system can provide for economic performance. But if performance is the test, then the American manager more and more finds himself in a sorry position. The growth rate of the American economy in the past decade has been surprisingly small. And the “legitimacy” of the manager—the question of who gives him the right to wield such enormous economic power—has been challenged in a series of powerful arguments by Berle, Galbraith, and others.

Within the enterprise, the new corporation head often finds himself with the vexing problem of trying to “downgrade” the importance of the trade-union leader—in order to raise his own status. In an age when management is deemed to be a great and novel skill, involving the administration of production, research, finance, merchandising, public relations, and personnel, the company president feels that there is little reason now to treat union leaders as equals—
especially when labor is, after all, only one of a large number of the "co-ordinates of administration." Labor relations, he feels, should be reduced to their proper dimension, as a concern of the personnel manager.

Yet the corporation head is often unable to obtain even this satisfaction—as has been evident in the steel industry. For years the industry smarted at the union's power, particularly at U. S. Steel, where in 1957 a new management team, headed by Roger Blough, a lawyer with no experience in production, took over. Blough's predecessor, Ben Fairless, an old production hand who had come up through the mill, had cleverly sought to assuage the vanity of Dave McDonald, the steel-union president, by joint "walking tours" through the plant. There was talk of "mutual trusteeship" by the managers of capital and the managers of labor. But Blough would have none of this charade, and when it was evident that because of slack demand the industry could take a strike, it did so.

The strike lasted three months and ended only with the intervention of Vice-President Nixon and Labor Secretary Mitchell (after Blough and McDonald met secretly at the Vice-President's home), who feared the political consequences in the 1960 campaign of such a long-drawn-out struggle. The strike proved in this, as in a dozen other areas, that the industry could not escape the checkrein of government—not even in a Republican administration. This was demonstrated even more dramatically by Roger Blough's comeuppance in 1962. In the spring of 1962 the Kennedy administration, in an effort to maintain the wage-price line, brought pressure on the steel union to sign an early contract that provided some small fringe benefits but, for the first time in the union's history, no direct wage increase. Shortly afterward, however, U. S. Steel, followed by most of the industry, announced an immediate price rise. In a burst of fury, the colossal weight of the federal government was mobilized against the big steel firms—through threats of prosecution, cancellation of government purchase orders, and the cajoling of the business community—and in short order the industry gave in.

It is unlikely that the business community will take this crashing demonstration of governmental power without making some countervailing efforts of its own on the political level. Already in 1960 the efforts of a number of corporations, led by General Electric, to go "directly" into politics, in imitation of the unions—by taking a
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public stand on political issues, by sending out vast amounts of propaganda to their employees and to the public, by encouraging right-to-work referendums in the states—indicated the mood of political dispossession in many corporations. Since then, a significant number of corporations have been contributing financially to the seminars of the radical-right evangelists. Despite the black eye General Electric—the most vocal defender of free enterprise—received when the government disclosed that G.E. as well as a dozen other electrical manufacturing companies had been guilty of illegal price-rigging and cartelization, it is likely that the Kennedy-Blough imbroglio of 1962 will provide an even greater impetus for corporations to finance right-wing political activity in the coming years.

VII

The Military Dispossessed

The irony for the American military establishment is that at a time when, in the new states, the military has emerged as the ruling force of the country (often because it is the one organized group in an amorphous society), and at a time in American history when the amount of money allocated to military purposes—roughly fifty per cent of the federal budget—is the highest in peacetime history, the military is subject to challenges in its own bailiwick. The problems of national security, like those of the national economy, have become so staggering in complexity that they can no longer be settled simply by common sense or past experience. As a writer in the Times Literary Supplement recently put it, "The manner in which weapons systems are likely to develop; the counters which may be found to them; the burdens which they are likely to impose on the national economy; the way in which their possession will affect international relations or their use the nature of war; the technical problems of their control or abolition; all these problems are far beyond the scope of the Joint Planning Staff study or the Civil Service brief."

The fact is that the military establishment, because of its outmoded curriculum, its recruitment and promotion patterns, the vested interests of the different services, and the concentration at the top levels of officers trained in older notions of strategy, is ill equipped to grasp modern conceptions of politics, or to use the tools
There is little in the curriculum to prepare the officer for the realities of participating in the management of politico-military affairs. While the case-study and war-games approaches give the officer a direct understanding and “feel” for the logistics and organizational apparatus that must be “moved” for military operations, there is no equivalent training for the political dimensions of international relations. . . .

All evidence indicates that both absolutists and pragmatists—in varying degree—overemphasize the potentials of force. The realistic study of international relations involves an appreciation of the limits of violence. Military education does not continually focus on these issues, as it relates both to nuclear and limited conventional warfare. Paradoxically, military education does not emphasize the potentialities of unconventional warfare and political warfare, since these are at the periphery of professionalization.10

In the last decade, most of the thinking on strategic problems, political and economic, has been done in the universities or in government-financed but autonomous bodies like the Rand Corporation. A new profession, that of the “military intellectual,” has emerged, and men like Kahn, Wohlstetter, Brodie, Hitch, Kissinger, Bowie, and Schelling “move freely through the corridors of the Pentagon and the State Department,” as the T.L.S. writer observed, “rather as the Jesuits through the courts of Madrid and Vienna three centuries ago.”

In structural terms, the military establishment may be one of the tripods of a “power elite,” but in sociological fact the military officers feel dispossessed because they often lack the necessary technical skills or knowledge to answer the new problems confronting them. Since the end of World War II, the military has been involved in a number of battles to defend its elite position, beginning in 1945 with the young physicists and nuclear scientists, down to the present action against the “technipols” (the technicians and political theorists, as the military derisively calls them), whom Secretary McNamara has brought into the Department of Defense.

The first challenge came from the scientists over the issue of continuing military control of atomic energy. In a burst of almost H. G. Wellsian messianism, the scientists moved into the political arena.
And, as a result of skillful lobbying by enthusiastic young scientists from Los Alamos, Chicago, and Brookhaven, Congress passed the McMahon Bill, which set up the Atomic Energy Commission under civilian control. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific head of the Manhattan District project, which constructed the atom bomb, became a leading adviser to the State Department and was one of the principal authors of the Baruch plan.

The advent of the Cold War, in 1947-48, raised a number of issues that divided the scientists and the military even further, and for the next four years a "hidden struggle" between the two elites went on in the labyrinthine corridors of Washington. The chief issue was whether or not to build an H-bomb. The scientists in the General Advisory Committee to the A.E.C., in overwhelming majority—including Oppenheimer, Conant, Rabi, duBridge—opposed the construction of the H-bomb, but lost out. A different issue was raised about the need for defense. The Strategic Air Command, the big-bomber striking arm of American power, argued that no defense against atomic attack was possible and claimed that the only effective deterrent against the Russians would be the threat of massive retaliation. In strategy, this would mean reliance solely on heavy atomic bombs. Against the S.A.C., the scientists claimed that continental defense was possible—if the United States could be made invulnerable to attack, negotiations with the Russians could be opened from strength—and, furthermore, that western Europe could be defended with limited, tactical atomic weapons, so that the United States was not wholly dependent upon "big-bomb" deterrents.

To test their arguments, the scientists got support—in some cases surreptitiously—from backers in the National Security Council for a series of "games." Project Lincoln was set up at M.I.T. to study the problems of defense, which resulted later in the radar net of the D.E.W., or early-warning system, in the Arctic. Project Vista, which enlisted some five score scientists from different universities, was set up at the California Institute of Technology to study the use of tactical atomic weapons.

The S.A.C. pooh-poohed both projects, deriding continental defense as a Maginot Line of the air. And it sought to block the distribution of both projects' findings. Eventually, the results from the two laboratories were adopted. An early-warning system was created, and the N.A.T.O. strategy was revised, which meant, in effect, that the S.A.C. monopoly of atomic policy was broken.
Although Robert Oppenheimer had not been the prime instigator of these moves—except in the case of Project Vista—he became the symbol of the scientific opposition to the big-bomber command. In November, 1953, when Lewis Strauss was appointed by President Eisenhower to the chairmanship of the Atomic Energy Commission, Oppenheimer was charged with being a security risk. The basis of the charge—that Oppenheimer had in the later 1930s been sympathetic to a number of Communist fronts—had long been known to the security agencies. But the real inspiration for the A.E.C. action, as is evident from testimony before its special panel, came from men who believed fervently in the theory of strategic air power, who resented Oppenheimer’s influence, and could draw only sinister conclusions from his stands on policy.

The Oppenheimer case is now almost a decade behind us, and a shameful instance of national folly; the specific strategic issues regarding the role of manned bombers as the major weight of military power have by now been outmoded by the work on missiles. The originally small scientific community, whose members, drawn from a few university centers, knew each other intimately, has greatly expanded, and with the rise of space exploration, missile technology, and the like, it is no longer dominated by the small group of nuclear physicists who charted the new atomic age. Nor does it any longer, needless to say, have the rough unanimity of outlook that characterized it in the immediate postwar decade. And yet, though the military won the first round of their fight with the nuclear scientists, in the present decade its position as the shaper, as well as the executor, of strategic policy has been consistently eroded. For in present-day decision-making, the nature of strategy involves a kind of analysis for which experience is insufficient. If one takes the complex problem of the choice of “weapons systems,” the long lead time that is necessary in the planning and testing, let alone the production, of weapons forces an analyst to construct mathematical models as almost the only means toward rational choices. The recent controversy over the desirability of the RS-70 bomber is a case in point. The systems analysts in the office of the Secretary of Defense, led by Charles Hitch, an economist from Rand who has become the comptroller in the Pentagon, decided on the basis of computer analysis that the manned RS-70 bomber would long be outmoded by the time it could come into full production, and that it would be wiser to concentrate on missiles. Dismayed by this decision, the Strategic
Air Command and its allies in the aircraft industry invoked Congressional support, and the House Military Affairs Committee voted money for the bomber.

But the "technipols," with McNamara at their head, have gone far beyond the use of linear programming or other planning devices for making more rational choices in the allocation of military resources. The entire Pentagon has been almost completely reorganized so as to reduce the importance of the traditional service arms—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—and to introduce "functional" groupings, whereby missions from each of the services are grouped together for budget and strategic purposes in order to test their effectiveness.

The point of all this is that such reorganization means more than the introduction of modern management practice into a top-heavy bureaucratic structure. For the reorganization on program and mission lines stemmed from a new conception of the strategic distribution of the armed forces—a political conception of the role of limited wars and nuclear capabilities, most of which came from the "technipols," rather than from the military establishment.

The traditional services, and their chiefs, have reacted to all this with dismay. As an article in Fortune put it, "It was at this point that the military professionals began to exhibit real alarm. McNamara did not ignore them; they had their say, as usual, in defense of their service budgets. But his drive, his intense preoccupation with figures and facts, left the Chiefs and their staffs with the feeling that the computers were taking over." And the Fortune article, reflecting the dismay of the service Chiefs, was also a veiled attack on McNamara's penchant for "quantification"; for his failure to respect "the uncomputable that had made Curtis Le May [the head of the big-bomber command] the world's finest operational airman"; for his "inexperience" in military strategy and for his reliance on the technipols, "the inner group of lay experts who were dispersed through State, the White House and Defense." The import of the article was clear: the traditional military professionals were being dispossessed.22

On any single set of political or strategic issues, it is an exaggeration, of course, to speak of "the military," or "the scientists," or "the military intellectuals," as if these were monolithic entities. On any particular set of issues, or even on fundamental values, members of the scientific community are often sharply at odds (for example,
Edward Teller and Hans Bethe), as are the political strategists, from the "protracted-conflict" line of the University of Pennsylvania group (Strausz-Hupe and Kintner) to the various arms-control and bargaining or negotiation schemes advanced by Thomas Schelling and Hans Morgenthau.

But the main point is that the military community is no longer the only, or even the dominant, source from which the strategists are drawn, and the older military leaders particularly, with vested interests in military doctrines and weapons systems derived from their own by now parochial experiences, find themselves in danger of being ignored or shelved. A few—Major General Walker is an example—may feel that all intellectuals are involved in a plot against the nation. No doubt most of the military men will be forced, as is already happening, into the more complex and bureaucratic game of recruiting particular groups of scientists for their own purposes (in part through the power of the purse), or attempting to make alliances. In the long run, the military profession may itself become transformed through new modes of training, and a new social type may arise.

But one can already see, in the behavior of retired military officers, the rancor of an old guard that now finds its knowledge outdated and its authority disputed or ignored, and that is beginning to argue, bitterly, that if only "their" advice had been followed, America would not be on the defensive. A surprising number of high-ranking officers on active duty as well as high-ranking retired officers have become active in extreme-right organizations. The Institute of American Strategy, which is financed by the Richardson Foundation—a foundation set up by the late Sid Richardson, who, along with H. L. Hunt, was among the richest of the new Texas oil billionaires—has on its board, and among its members, Rear Admiral Rawson Bennett, Chief of Naval Research; Lieutenant General E. C. Itschner, Chief of Engineers; Rear Admiral H. Arnold Karo; Lieutenant General George W. Mundy, Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and General E. W. Rawlings (U.S.A.F., ret.), the executive vice-president of General Mills, Inc. The American Security Council, for example, lists on its national strategy committee such retired officers as Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been one of the leading exponents of "massive retaliation"; General Albert C.
Wedemeyer, who served in China; Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond; Admiral Felix B. Stump; Admiral Ben Moreell (now head of the Republic Steel Corporation); and Rear Admiral Chester Ward.

More active as anti-Communist entrepreneurs are some lesser lights who have held Army posts, often in Intelligence work, and who seek political status accordingly. Thus Brigadier General Bonner Fellows (ret.), a wartime aide to General MacArthur, is the national director of a group called For America, and chairman of the Citizens Foreign Aid Committee, which, despite its name, seeks to reduce foreign aid. Lieutenant Colonel Gunther Hartel (ret.), a former Intelligence officer in Europe and the Far East, heads an organization called American Strategy, Inc. These and other retired officers are active in the various "seminars" and public meetings organized by the radical-right groups.

The stock in trade of almost all these individuals is the argument, reinforced by references to their experiences, that negotiation or co-existence with Communists is impossible, that anyone who discusses the possibility of such negotiation is a tool of the Communists, and that a "tough policy"—by which, _sotto voce_, is meant a preventive war or a first strike—is the only means of forestalling an eventual Communist victory.

**VIII**

*The Polarities of American Politics and the Prospects of the Radical Right*

A meaningful polarity within the American consensus has always been part of the American search for self-definition and self-identity: Jefferson versus Hamilton, Republicanism versus Federalism, Agrarianism versus Capitalism, the frontier West versus the industrial East. However significant such polarities may have been in the past, there seems to be little meaningful polarity today. There is no coherent conservative force—and someone like Walter Lippmann, whose *The Public Philosophy* represents a genuine conservative voice, rejects the right, as it rejects him—and the radical right is outside the political pale, insofar as it refuses to accept the American consensus. Nor does a viable left exist in the United States today. The pacifist and Socialist elements have been unable to make the peace issue salient. The radicals have been unable to develop a comprehensive
critique of the social disparities in American life—the urban mess, the patchwork educational system, the lack of amenities in our culture. Among the liberals, only the exhaustion of the “received ideas,” such as they were, of the New Deal remains. It is a token of the emptiness of contemporary intellectual debate that from the viewpoint of the radical right, the Americans for Democratic Action constitutes the “extreme left” of the American political spectrum, and that Life, in order to set up a fictitious balance, counterposes the tiny Councils of Correspondence, a loosely organized peace group led by Erich Fromm and David Riesman, as the “extreme left,” to the “extreme right” of the John Birch Society.

The politics of conflict in any country inevitably has some emotional dimension, but in the United States, lacking a historically defined doctrinal basis—as against the ideological divisions of Europe—it takes on, when economic-interest-group issues are lacking, a psychological or status dimension. In this psychological polarity, the right has often been splenetic, while the mood of the left has traditionally been one of ressentiment. Today the politics of the radical right is the politics of frustration—the sour impotence of those who find themselves unable to understand, let alone command, the complex mass society that is the polity today. In our time, only the Negro community is fired by the politics of resentment—and this resentment, based on a justified demand for equity, represents no psychological polarity to the radical right. Insofar as there is no real left to counterpoise to the right, the liberal has become the psychological target of that frustration.

One of the reasons why psychological politics can flare up so much more easily here than, say, in Great Britain is the essentially “populist” character of American institutions and the volatile role of public opinion. In the ill-defined, loosely articulated structure of American life, public opinion rather than law has been the more operative sanction against nonconformists and dissenters. Though Americans often respond to a problem with the phrase “there ought to be a law,” their respect for law has been minimal, and during periods of extreme excitement, whether it be the vigilante action of a mob or the removal of a book from a school library, the punitive sanctions of opinion quickly supersede law. The very openness or egalitarianism of the American political system is predicated on the right of the people to know, and the Congressional committees, whether searching into the pricing policies of corporations or the political
beliefs of individuals, have historically based their investigative claims on this populist premise.

It has always been easier to "mobilize" public opinion on legislation here than it is in England, and in the United States the masses of people have a more direct access to politics. The Presidential-election system, (as against a ministerial system), with the candidates appealing to every voter and, if possible, shaking every hand, involves a direct relation to the electorate. And in the Congressional system, individual constituents, through letters, telephone calls, or personal visits, can get through immediately to their representatives to affect his vote. The Congressional system itself, with its elaborate scaffolding of Senatorial prerogative, often allows a maverick like Borah, Norris, or Robert La Follette to dominate the floor, or a rogue elephant like Huey Long or Joseph McCarthy to rampage against the operations of the government.

But while the populist character of the political institutions and the sweeping influence of public opinion allow social movements to flare with brush-fire suddenness across the political timberland, the unwieldy party system, as well as the checks and balances of the Presidential and judicial structures, also act to constrain such movements. In a few instances, notably the temperance crusade, a social movement operating outside the party system was able to enforce a unitary conception of social behavior on the country; and even then prohibition was repealed in two decades. Until recently, the party and Presidential system have exerted a "discipline of compromise" that has put the maverick and the rogue elephant outside the main arena of the political game.

Within this perspective, therefore, what are the prospects of the radical right? To what extent does it constitute a threat to democratic politics in the United States? Some highly competent political observers write off the radical right as a meaningful political movement. As Richard Rovere has written, "The press treats the extreme Right as though it were a major tendency in American politics, and certain politicians are as much obsessed with it as certain others are with the extreme Left. If a day arrives when the extreme Right does become a major movement, the press and the obsessed politicians may have a lot to answer for. For the time being, there seems no reason to suppose that its future holds anything more than its present. There is no evidence at all that the recent proliferation of radical, and in some cases downright subversive, organizations of a
Rightist tendency reflects or has been accompanied by a spread of ultraconservative views. On the contrary, what evidence there is suggests that the organizations are frantic efforts to prevent ultra-conservatism from dying out.”

In his immediate assessment, Rovere is undoubtedly right. In the spring of 1962, both former Vice-President Nixon and Senator Goldwater had moved to dissociate themselves from the extremist right. Nixon quite sharply repudiated the Birchites, on the premise that they are already a political liability, and Goldwater did so more cautiously in expressing his concern that, if not the Birchites, then its leader, Robert Welch, may have gone too far. Yet the future is more open than Rovere suggests. It is in the very nature of an extremist movement, given its tensed posture and its need to maintain a fever pitch, to mobilize, to be on the move, to act. It constantly has to agitate. Lacking any sustained dramatic issue, it can quickly wear itself out, as McCarthyism did. But to this extent the prospects of the radical right depend considerably on the international situation. If the international situation becomes stable, it is likely that the radical right may run quickly out of steam. If it were to take a turn for the worse—if Laos and all of Vietnam were to fall to the Communists; if, within the Western Hemisphere, the moderate regimes of Bolivia and Venezuela were to topple and the Communists take over—then the radical right could begin to rally support around a drive for “immediate action,” for a declaration of war in these areas, for a pre-emptive strike, or similar axioms of a “hard line.” And since such conservatives as Nixon and Goldwater are committed, at least rhetorically, to a tough anti-Communist position, they would either be forced to go along with such an extreme policy or go under.

Yet, given the severe strains in American life, the radical right does present a threat to American liberties, in a very different and less immediate sense. Democracy, as the sorry history of Europe has shown, is a fragile system, and if there is a lesson to be learned from the downfall of democratic government in Italy, Spain, Austria, and Germany, and from the deep divisions in France, it is that the crucial turning point comes, as Juan Linz has pointed out, when political parties or social movements can successfully establish “private armies” whose resort to violence—street fightings, bombings, the break-up of their opponents’ meetings, or simply intimidation—cannot be controlled by the elected authorities, and whose use of
violence is justified or made legitimate by the respectable elements in society.

In America, the extreme-right groups of the late 1930s—the Coughlinites, the German-American Bund, the native fascist groups—all sought to promote violence, but they never obtained legitimate or respectable support. The McCarthyite movement of the early 1950s, despite the rampaging antics of its eponymous leader, never dared go, at least rhetorically, outside the traditional framework in trying to establish loyalty and security tests. The Birchers, and the small but insidious group of Minutemen, as the epitome of the radical right, are willing to tear apart the fabric of American society in order to instate their goals, and they did receive a temporary aura of legitimacy from the conservative right.

Barbarous acts are rarely committed out of the blue. (As Freud says, first one commits oneself in words, and then in deeds.) Step by step, a society becomes accustomed to accept, with less and less moral outrage and with greater and greater indifference to legitimacy, the successive blows. What is uniquely disturbing about the emergence of the radical right of the 1960s is the support it has been able to find among traditional community leaders who have themselves become conditioned, through an indiscriminate anti-Communism that equates any form of liberalism with Communism, to judge as respectable a movement which, if successful, can only end the liberties they profess to cherish.

1 "Memorandum Submitted to the Department of Defense on Propaganda Activities of Military Personnel," by Senator Fulbright, Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13436–13442. As the New York Times summarized this N.S.C. directive on June 17, 1961, "President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda. Rather, it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be used to reinforce the cold-war effort."

2 I am following here the account of Murray Kempton in the New York Post, October 26, 1961.

3 Typical of this line is the question constantly reiterated by the Reverend Billy Hargis: "How can you explain the mistakes of our leaders for the last 30 years if there aren't Communists giving them advice?" Hargis is one of the more flamboyant evangelists of the radical right. He publishes The Weekly Crusader, which contains a Foreign Intelligence Digest Section, written by Major General Charles A. Willoughby (ret.). Willoughby was General Douglas MacArthur's Intelligence chief in the Pacific.

4 For a technical elaboration of this psychological mechanism, see Leon
Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Row, Peterson; Chicago, 1957), especially Chapter 10, which reports the study of the rumor. Festinger's theory seeks to explain how individuals try to reconcile—or, technically, "to reduce the dissonance" of—the holding of two inconsistent beliefs at the same time; e.g., the belief that smoking reduces tension and the fear that smoking may produce cancer. When beliefs are specific, denial may be one simple means, conversion to an opposite view follows under certain specifiable conditions, or, if the apprehensions are vague, the creation of "fear-justifying" threats becomes another mechanism.

In the light of Festinger's theory, it would be interesting to confront a sample of the radical right with the problem of explaining the belief in the rising internal threat of Communist infiltration into government with the continued presence of J. Edgar Hoover—the one figure who seems to be sacrosanct to the right—as director of the F.B.I. Since Hoover has been in office all through the years when Communism was allegedly growing as an internal threat, how explain the inability of the F.B.I. to cope with it? One could say that the Communists were cleverer than Hoover, but that would tarnish his image. Or one could say that Hoover had been shackled by the successive administrations—even a Republican one. But if that were the case, why would such a stalwart anti-Communist accept such shackles? One could retort that Hoover felt his role in office to be more important than a grand gesture of renunciation (such as General Walker's). But if the Communist infiltration has been so enormous as to extend almost to, if not into, the White House, why would he not step out and unmask the plot? But then, since the Communist threat may grow even greater, he would still be needed in office—or, horrors to admit the thought, it may well be that, reversing G. K. Chesterton's *The Man Who Was Thursday*, J. Edgar Hoover is himself the chief agent of the Communist conspiracy in America, and that could explain the protection the conspiracy has received so far. The possibilities of such a thought are clearly quite provoking, and it may well be that Robert Welch, in the privacy of his office, has entertained them. But if that were so, who, then, is immune from the plague?

5 The "style" of a country, or of an organization, is in this sense a literary counterpart of the idea of an "operational code"—the do's and don'ts that implicitly prescribe and proscribe permissible modes of action for an organization or a group. For an explicit, technical application of this concept, see Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951).

6 One viewpoint argues that national character is rooted in the language system of each society. Thus, as an old joke has it, the Englishman *earns* his living; the Frenchman *gagne* (gains); the German *verdient* (earns—with the connotation of serving); the American *makes* his livelihood; and the Hungarian *keretznenni* (looks for and finds) his living.

7 The forms of murder and the styles of pornography mirror a society, for they disclose ways in which, actually and vicariously, the society satisfies forbidden desires. Death in the American mode is impersonal, sudden, and violent, rather than a lingering disease, as, say, in *The Magic Mountain*. Pornography in Mickey Spillane (in contrast with the French *L'Histoire d'O*, with its complex account of slavish female submission to sinister erotic wants) is a slashing, compulsive emphasis on brute masculinity—which betrays its own fear of castration or impotence.

The moral of the memorandum attacked or on the virtues, "rural" in Co., among United population. These contents programs and Abstract right-wing movement produce York, the an function lived county, those Chemical, the the Rich- discussion for help lived M. city, free at Newcomer, million the of farm Mabel many program Steel changes the give "urban" more the pro- Hofstadter that If population, of retardated of casual Fund of the Americans moral has Com- task. moralizing Lippmann, One 1950 Company Catholic the Right subrubs compensation the anti-Communism meaning least of demand, Jewish the the half the see rationalizations inhabit- Laughlin these States 1955, are operation idea has the of communism 1955). operation idea has the of communism 1955). the income year, for "small town," for the Ku Klux Klan, is still alive among the extreme right.


13. As for the actual meaning of these ideas, as Richard Hofstader pointed out in a memorandum for the Fund for the Republic in 1955, "A casual survey of the contents of some of the right-wing periodicals will show that the fear of modernity which inspired the fundamentalist crusades of the 1920s and the dislike of the polyglot life of the city, and of Jewish and Catholic immigrants, which inspired the Ku Klux Klan, is still alive among the extreme right."

14. The rationalizations for the farm programs of the various administrations—which support farm prices and give the farmer money not to produce—offer a fascinating example of the ideological moralizing of the right. For those reared on fundamentalist virtues, the idea of being paid not to produce creates considerable moral queasiness. Yet, given the overproduction in agriculture, the operation of a free market would serve only to wipe out thousands of farmers immediately. The function of the acreage restrictions is to adjust supply to demand, and farm-price supports provide an "income cushion" in order to ease the lot of the farmer. These programs, costing billions of dollars a year, are defended ideologically on the ground of protecting private property. But the effort—which has the same protective function—to help workers through unemployment compensation is attacked as weakening moral fiber, and the suggestion that technological changes which disrupt the established lives of thousands be retarded is attacked as impeding progress.


16. The National Education Program, at Harding College in Arkansas, which prepares films on communism and materials on free enterprise, has been used extensively by General Electric, U. S. Steel, Olin Mathieson Chemical, Monsanto Chemical, Swift & Co., and others. Boeing Aviation and the Richfield Oil Company have sponsored many of the anti-Communism seminars on the West Coast. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Company has a widespread propaganda program for its employees. One of the most active firms is the
Allen Bradley Company, of Milwaukee, which makes machine tools and electrical equipment. The Allen Bradley Company advertises in the John Birch Society magazine and reprinted Dr. Fred Schwarz's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee, a reprint which Schwarz claims had "wider distribution than any other government document in the history of the United States, with the possible exception of the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution." The Allen Bradley Company, which constantly extols the virtue of free enterprise, was one of the companies convicted of collusive bidding and illegal price-rigging.

17 One of the factors that has acted to safeguard democracy in England and the United States is that both countries have never had any permanently large standing armies. The insularity of England made it place its protection in the Navy, whose forces were always far from shore, and the continental isolation of the United States made it unnecessary to build up any permanent military force. Where large armies have existed, the military, because it has represented an organized bloc whose control over the means of violence could be decisive, has almost invariably been pulled into politics. Thus the German Army in one crucial situation, in 1920, defended the Weimar Republic (against the Putschists of the right), but in a second crucial instance, in 1932 (the machinations of von Schleicher), contributed to its downfall. In Spain in 1936, in France in 1960, and more recently in Argentina, Turkey, Korea, Pakistan, Burma, and so on, the armed forces have been the decisive political element in the society.


20 Major General Roscoe C. Wilson, the former chief of the Air War College, testified that he once "felt compelled to go to the Director of Intelligence to express my concern over what I felt was a pattern of action that was simply not helpful to the national defense." The items cited in this pattern included Oppenheimer's interest in the "internationalizing of atomic energy," his insistence that it was technically premature to build nuclear-powered aircraft, and his conservatism on thermonuclear weapons. (United States Atomic Energy Commission, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer," Transcript of Hearings Before the Personnel Security Board, Government Printing Office [Washington, 1954], pp. 684–85.)

The decision of the special A.E.C. panel was a curious one. Its chairman, Gordon Gray, president of the University of North Carolina, noted that if the board could use common sense rather than apply the stringent rules of the security regulations, its decision might have been different. But in the light of those regulations, while Oppenheimer's "loyalty" was affirmed, he had to be declared a security risk. The full A.E.C. board, by a four-to-one vote, rendered an even harsher judgment in forbidding Oppenheimer access to all classified material. See also, Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Policy (Princeton University Press, 1962), Chap. IV, for a discussion of Project Vista and Project Lincoln.

21 Much of the newer economic thinking is reflected in the study by Charles Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Harvard University Press, 1961), completed at Rand before Hitch was appointed comptroller in the Pentagon.

22 See "The Education of a Defense Secretary," by Charles J. V. Murphy, Fortune, May, 1962. Murphy, the military correspondent of Fortune, has consistently reflected the views of the military establishment in its battles
with the scientists and other critics of the military. Murphy's comprehensive story of the reorganization of the Pentagon is the first account of the "hidden" conflicts between the traditional services and McNamara that has resulted from the introduction of long-range programming in the Defense Department. As Murphy writes, "So swiftly did he move that the high brass again and again found itself confronted by a McNamara decision while it was still mulling over his initial direction for action. . . .

"In two months McNamara produced blueprints for the Kennedy line of action for both the strategic and the conventional forces. The new requirements in the first area was drawn up by a task force under a former Rand economist, Charles J. Hitch, the Defense Department comptroller. Those for the limited-war forces were developed by another task force under Paul H. Nitze, a former investment banker and State Department planner who was and remains the Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Affairs.

"The job was pretty much over and done before the military had more than grasped that something unusual was going on. By tradition, the military services had generated their own requirements. It was they who proposed, the civilians who disposed. Under McNamara, however, the system was suddenly turned upside down. Now it was McNamara and his lay strategists who were saying what weapons and what forces in what numbers were needed; the service Chiefs found themselves in the strange position of reviewing weapon systems and force structures they had never formally considered."

23 In the elite structure of British politics, control is not in the constituencies (or, as here, among the hundreds of local political bosses who have to be dealt into the game), but in the small parliamentary caucuses, which have a legal as well as historic independence from mass party control. The British elite, wedded to a "politics of civility," tends to dampen any extremism within the top political structure, while the control system keeps the masses outside and makes it difficult for them to be mobilized for direct pressure on the government.

Interpretations of
American Politics—1955

DANIEL BELL

This book presents a series of novel essays on some recent political history, notably an examination of the "new American right" which had concentrated for a time around the leadership of Senator McCarthy, and which continues today in large, if inchoate, form. This is not, however, a book about Senator McCarthy, although two of the essays, by Talcott Parsons and S. M. Lipset, offer some fresh insights into the flash-fire spread of McCarthyism. McCarthyism, or McCarthywasm, as one wit put it, may be a passing phenomenon. This book is concerned not with these transiencies, but with the deeper-running social currents of a turbulent mid-century America.

This is a turbulence born not of depression, but of prosperity. Contrary to the somewhat simple notion that prosperity dissolves all social problems, we see that prosperity brings in its wake new social groups, new social strains and new social anxieties. Conventional political analysis, drawn largely from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American experience, cannot fathom these new social anxieties not explain their political consequences.

This book, by establishing a new framework, attempts to provide an understanding of these new social problems. This framework is derived from an analysis of the exhaustion of liberal and left-wing political ideology, and by an examination of the new, prosperity-created "status-groups" which, in their drive for recognition and respectability, have sought to impose older conformities on the American body politic. This framework, drawn from some of the more recent thought in sociology and social psychology, represents a new
and original contribution which, we feel, extends the range of conventional political analysis. To an extent, this is a "thesis book." It does not present a "total" view of politics nor does it supplant the older categories of political analysis, but it does add a new and necessary dimension to the analysis of American society today. Equally important, and of more immediate relevance perhaps, the application of these concepts may allow us not only to understand some puzzling aspects of the last decade, but also to illuminate the sub-rosa political forces of 1956 and beyond.

Politics in the United States has been looked at, roughly, from three standpoints: the role of the electoral structure, of democratic tradition, and of interest groups, sectional or class.

Perhaps the most decisive fact about politics in the United States is the two-party system. Each party is like some huge bazaar, with hundreds of hucksters clamoring for attention. But while life within the bazaars flows freely and licenses are easy to obtain, all trading has to be conducted within the tents; the ones who hawk their wares outside are doomed to few sales. This fact gains meaning when we consider one of the striking facts about American life: America has thrown up countless social movements, but few political parties; in contradiction to European political life, few of the social movements have been able to transform themselves into political parties. Here is one source of apparent flux that yet makes for stability in American life.

"It is natural for the ordinary American," wrote Gunnar Myrdal, "when he sees something that is wrong to feel not only that there should be a law against it, but also that an organization should be formed to combat it,"—and, we might add, to change it. American reform groups have ranged from Esperantists to vegetarians, from silver-money advocates to conservationists, from trust-busters to Socialists of fifty-seven varieties. These groups, intense and ideologically single-minded, have formed numerous third parties—the Greenback Party, Anti-Monopoly Party, Equal Rights Party, Prohibition Party, Socialist Labor Party, Union Labor Party, Farmer-Labor Party, Socialist Party. Yet none succeeded.

The wheat farmers of the north central plains have a homogeneity of cultural outlook and a common set of economic problems which national boundary lines cannot bisect. Yet in Canada, the wheat farmers formed a Social Credit Party in Alberta and a Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan, while their brothers in North Dakota could only, at best, form a Non-Partisan League within the Republican Party in order to press their interests.¹

These factors of rigid electoral structure have set definite limits on the role of protest movements, left and right, in American life. ("Let me make the deals, and I care not who makes the ideals," an American politician has said.) They account in significant measure for the failure of the Lemke-Coughlin movement in 1936, and the Wallace-Progressive Party in 1948. They account for the new basic alliance between the unions and the Democratic Party. Whatever lingering hopes some trade unionists may have held for a labor party in the United States were dispelled by Walter Reuther at the C.I.O. convention in November 1954 when, in answering transport leaders such as Mike Quill, he pointed out that a third party was impossible within the nature of the United States electoral system. This is a lesson that every social movement has learned. And any social movement which hopes to effect or resist social change in the United States is forced now to operate within one or the other of the two parties. This factor alone will place an enormous strain on these parties in the next ten years.

The democratic tradition, the second of the interpretive categories, has played an important role in shaping American political forms. The distinctive aspect of the political tradition in the United States is that politics is the arena of the hoi polloi. Here the "common man" becomes the source of ultimate appeal if not authority. This was not so at the beginning. The "founding fathers," with the Roman republic, let alone the state of affairs under the Articles of Confederation, in mind, feared the "democratic excesses" which the poor and propertyless classes could wreak against those with property. Whatever the subsequent inadequacies of the economic interpretation of history in a complex society, it is clear that in 1787 self-consciousness of property, and a desire to limit the electoral role of the people, were uppermost in the minds of the "four groups of personality interests which had been adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping."² This was reflected in the precautions written into the Constitution: a non-popular Senate, selected by the States; an appointive judiciary holding office for life, and a President elected through the indirect and cumbersome means of an electoral college.

But these barriers soon broke down. The victory of the Jefferso-
nians was the first step in the establishment of a "populist" character for the American democracy. The Federalists, seeing the success of the Jeffersonian methods, realized the necessity of imitating those "popular, convivial and charitable techniques." As early as 1802, Hamilton, in a letter to Bayard, outlined a plan for a "Christian Constitutional Society," which would appeal to the masses "through a development of a 'cult' of Washington and benevolent activities." A Washington Benevolent Society was formed in 1808, but it was too late, the Federalists had already lost. Thirty years later their spiritual descendants, the Whigs, beat the Democrats at their own game. Casting aside Henry Clay, whose "Hamiltonian" views were too well-established, the Whigs nominated General William Henry Harrison, the hero of the battle of Tippecanoe, against Andrew Jackson's successor, Martin Van Buren.

"If General Harrison is taken up as a candidate," said Nicholas Biddle, the former head of the National Bank, in some direction to party managers (which might not have echoed so strangely in 1952), "it will be on account of the past. . . . Let him say not one single word about his principles, or his creed—let him say nothing—promise nothing. Let no Committee, no convention—no town meeting ever extract from him a single word about what he thinks or will do hereafter. Let the use of pen and ink be wholly forbidden." The "cider election" of 1840 was a turning-point in American political life. Harrison traveled from place to place in a large wagon with a log cabin on top, and a barrel of hard cider on tap for the crowds. Daniel Webster, with the fustian of the demagogue, expressed deep regret that he had not been born in a log cabin, although his elder siblings had begun their lives in a humble abode. Whig orators berated Van Buren for living in a lordly manner, accusing him of putting cologne on his whiskers, eating from gold plate, and of being "laced up in corsets such as women in town wear and if possible tighter than the best of them."

The lesson was clear. Politics as a skill in manipulating masses became the established feature of political life, and the politician, sometimes a front-man for the moneyed interests, but sometimes the manipulator in his own right, came to the fore. Increasingly, the upper classes withdrew from direct participation in politics. The lawyer, the journalist, the drifter, finding politics an open ladder of social mobility, came bounding up from the lower middle classes.
The tradition of equality had been established. The politician had to speak to "the people" and in democratic terms.

If the politician spoke to the people, he acted for "interests." The awareness of the interest-group basis of politics, the third of the categories, goes far back to the early days of the republic. Madison, in the oft-quoted Number Ten of the Federalist Papers, had written, "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society." James Harrington's maxim that "power always follows property," "I believe to be as infallible a maxim in politics, as that action and reaction are equal in mechanics," said John Adams, the outstanding conservative of the time. The threat to property on the part of the small farmer and the landless formed the basis of the first disquiet in American politics. The Shaysites in Massachusetts and other insurgents, General Henry Knox complained to George Washington, "believe that the property of the United States has been protected from the confiscations of Britain by the joint exertions of all." Madison, looking to the future, anticipated that "a great majority of the people will not only be without land, but any other sort of property." When this has occurred, he predicted, the propertyless masses will "either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case the rights of property and the public liberty will not be secure in their hands; or what is more probable," he continued, with the lessons of the Roman demagogues in mind, "they will become tools of opulence and ambition, in which case, there will be equal danger on the other side."

The early factional struggles in American political life, rustic in form because of the agrarian weight of the population, soon became sectional. This was inevitable since the different regions developed different interests: the rice, tobacco and cotton of the South; the fishing, lumber, commerce of New England. National parties came into being when the Federalists succeeded at first in combining the large planters of the upper and lower South with the commercial interests of the North Atlantic region, and when Jefferson challenged this combination by uniting the grain growers and other small farmers both North and South into a rival party. Since then, the national parties have been strange alliances of heterogeneous sectional groups: Midwest farmers with the populist, Democratic and Republican parties; the urban immigrant North with the backward,
nativist South. Ethnic and functional groups have, often by historic accident, flowed into one of the two parties: the Negroes, because of the Civil War, for sixty years or so voted Republican; the Irish, because of their original relation to Tammany Hall, became Democrats; the Germans, settling in the Midwest, became Republican; the urban Italians, in reaction to their exclusion by the Irish, became Republican.

Within the sectionalism of American political life, arose the narrower, more flexible tactic of the pressure group standing outside the particular party, committed to neither, giving support or winning support on the basis of allegiance to the single issue alone. One of the first skillful innovators of this tactic was George Henry Evans, a confrère of Robert Owen and a leading figure for a time in the reform politics of the 1830s and '40s. Evans had been one of the leaders of the Workingmen's Party in 1829, a New York party that began with moderate success but which faded when ideological differences inflamed a latent factionalism, and when the Democrats "stole their thunder" by adopting some of their immediate demands. Evans who believed that free land would solve the class tensions and plight of the propertyless workers, organized an Agrarian League in the 1840s. His experience had taught him that a minority party could not win by its own votes and that politicians, interested primarily in "deals not ideals," would endorse any measure advocated by a group that could hold the balance of power. Evans "therefore asked all candidates to support his 'sliding measures.' In exchange for such a pledge, the candidate would receive the votes of the workingmen." While the Agrarian League itself met with middling success, its tactics paid off in the later passage of the Homestead acts.

In 1933, with the arrival of the New Deal, the feeling arose that a new era was emerging. In a widely-quoted book, Professor Arthur N. Holcombe of Harvard wrote: "The old party politics is visibly passing away. The character of the new party politics will be determined chiefly by the interests and attitudes of the urban population. . . . There will be less sectional politics and more class politics." The emergence of "functional" groups, particularly labor, and the growing assertion of ethnic groups, seemed to underscore the shift. The fact that Franklin Roosevelt was able to weave together these groups, some of whom like the farmers had been allied with the G.O.P., seemed to indicate that some historic realignments were
taking place. Some have. The trade union movement, politically articulate for the first time, is outspokenly Democratic; but the working-class vote has usually been Democratic. Ethnic groups which have played a role in politics have, by and large, retained their loyalty to the Democratic Party; but there are many indications that, as a result of rising prosperity and higher social status, significant chunks of these nationality and minority groups are beginning to shift their allegiance. The farmers, despite the enormous supports voted by the New Deal, have returned to the Republican fold.

While sectional politics have somewhat diminished, class politics have not jelled. Elements of both are reflected in the rise of pressure groups and the lobbies. The most spectacular use of the seesaw pressure group tactic was the Anti-Saloon League, which, starting in 1893, was able in two and a half decades to push through a Constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor in the United States. Since then, the pressure group device has been adopted by thousands of organizations, whether it be for tariff reform, opposition to Federal medical programs, or political aid to the state of Israel. In 1949, the Department of Commerce estimated that there were 4000 national trade, professional, civic and other associations. Including local and branch chapters there were probably 16,000 businessmen's organizations, 70,000 local labor unions, 100,000 women's clubs and 15,000 civic groups carrying on some political education. The enormous multiplication of such groups obviously cancels out many of the threats made to candidates defying one or the other interests. But it makes possible, too, a dextrous art of logrolling, which itself makes it possible for small interest to exert great political leverage. Thus, when peanuts were eliminated from a farm subsidy program in 1955, over one hundred Southern congressmen held up a crop support bill until the subsidy was restored. (Although Georgia peanuts account for less than one half of one per cent of farm income, subsidizing this crop has cost the U.S. 100 million dollars in the past decade.)

The multiplication of interests and the fractioning of groups make it difficult to locate the sources of power in the United States. This political fractioning, occurring simultaneously with the break-up of old property forms and the rise of new managerial groups to power within business enterprises, spells the break-up, too, of older ruling classes in the United States. A ruling class may be defined as a power-holding group that has both an established community of in-
terest and continuity of interest. One can be a member of the "upper class" (i.e. have greater privilege and wealth and be able to transmit that wealth) without being a member of the ruling group. The modern ruling group is a coalition whose modes of continuity, other than the political route as such, are still ill-defined. More than ever, government in the United States has become in John Chamberlain's early phrase, "the broker state." To say this is a broker state, however, does not mean that all interests have equal power. This is a business society. But within the general acceptance of corporate capitalism, modified by union power and checked by government control, the deals and interest-group trading proceed.

Granting the usefulness of these frames of political analysis—the role of electoral structure in limiting social movements and social clashes; the tradition of popular appeal; and the force of interest-groups in shaping and modifying legislative policy—in understanding "traditional" political problems, they leave us somewhat ill-equipped to understand the issues which have dominated political dispute in the last decade. These categories do not help us understand the Communist issue, the forces behind the new nationalism of say Bricker and Knowland, and the momentary range of support and the intense emotional heat generated by Senator McCarthy.

For Europeans, particularly, the Communist issue must be a puzzle. After all, there are no mass Communist parties in the U.S. such as one finds in France and Italy; the Communist Party in the U.S. never, at any single moment, had more than 100,000 members. In the last five years, when the Communist issue appeared on the national scene, the Communists had already lost considerable political influence and were on the decline—the Communists had been expelled from C.I.O.; the Progressive Party, repudiated by Henry Wallace, had fizzled; the Communists were losing strength in the intellectual community.

It is true that liberals have tended to play down the issue. And some rational basis for its existence was present. There was the surprise of the aggression in Korea and the emotional reaction against the Chinese and Russian Communists which carried over to domestic Communists. The disclosures, particularly by Whittaker Chambers, of the infiltration of Communists into high posts in government and the existence of espionage rings, produced a tremendous shock in a nation which hitherto had been unaware of such machinations. People began realizing, too, that numbers alone were no criteria of
Communist strength; in fact, thinking of Communist influence on the basis of statistical calculation itself betrayed an ignorance of Communist methods; in the United States the Communists by operating among intellectual groups and opinion leaders have had an influence far out of proportion to their actual numbers. And, finally, the revelations in the Canadian spy investigations, in the Allan Nunn May trial in Britain and in the Rosenberg case that the Soviets had stolen United States atom secrets, themselves added fuel to the emotional heat against the Communists.

When all of this is said, it still fails to account for the extensive damage to the democratic fabric that McCarthy and others were able to cause on the Communist issue—and for the reckless methods disproportionate to the problem: the loyalty oaths on the campus, the compulsive Americanism which saw threats to the country in the wording of a Girl Scout handbook, the violent clubbing of the Voice of America (which under the ideological leadership of such anti-Communists as Foy Kohler and Bertram Wolfe had conducted intelligent propaganda in Europe), the wild headlines and the senseless damaging of the Signal Corps radar research program at Fort Monmouth—in short the suspicion and the miasma of fear that played so large a role in American politics. Nor does it explain the unchallenged position held so long by Senator McCarthy.

McCarthy himself must be a puzzle to conventional political analysis. Calling him a demagogue explains little; the relevant questions are, to whom was he a demagogue, and about what. McCarthy's targets were indeed strange. Huey Long, the last major demagogue, had vaguely attacked the rich and sought to "share the wealth." McCarthy's targets were intellectuals, Harvard, Anglophiles, internationalists, the Army.

His targets and his language do, indeed, provide important clues to the "radical right" that supported him, and the reasons for that support. These groups constituted a strange mélange: a thin stratum of soured patricians like Archibald Roosevelt, the last surviving son of Teddy Roosevelt, whose emotional stake lay in a vanishing image of a muscular America defying a decadent Europe; the "new rich"—the automobile dealers, real estate manipulators, oil wildcatters—who needed the psychological assurance that they, like their forebears, had earned their own wealth, rather than accumulated it through government aid, and who feared that "taxes" would rob them of that wealth; the rising middle-class strata of the ethnic
groups, the Irish and the Germans, who sought to prove their Americanism, the Germans particularly because of the implied taint of disloyalty during World War II; and finally, unique in American cultural history, a small group of intellectuals, many of them cankered ex-Communists, who, pivoting on McCarthy, opened up an attack on liberalism in general.

This strange coalition, bearing the “sword of the Lord and Gideon,” cannot be explained in conventional political terms. These essays do provide some frame, particularly one to explain the “new rich” and the “rising ethnic” groups. One key concept is the idea of “status politics” advanced by Richard Hofstadter. His central idea is that groups that are upwardly mobile (i.e. that are advancing in wealth and social position), are often as anxious and as politically febrile as groups that have become déclassé. Many observers have noted that groups which have lost their social position seek more violently than ever to impose on all groups the older values of a society which they once bore. Hofstadter demonstrates that groups on the rise may insist on a similar conformity in order to establish themselves. This rise takes place in periods of prosperity, when class or economic interest group conflicts have lost much of their force. The new, patriotic issues proposed by the status groups are amorphous and ideological. This theme is elaborated in the essay by Riesman and Glazer, with particular reference to the new rich. But these groups are able to assert themselves, the two sociologists point out, largely because of the exhaustion of liberal ideology—a collapse not from defeat but from “victory.” The essay by Peter Viereck traces some of the historical roots of the peculiar rhetoric of the right, showing the sources of the anti-intellectualism and Anglophobia in the egalitarian populism of the last century. Professor Parsons, discussing the nature of social change in the United States, demonstrates how the resultant social strains foster the emergence of the new right. Glazer and Lipset, analyzing the recent study by Professor Stouffer on “Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties,” deal with limitations of “survey methods” in elucidating social attitudes. The long concluding essay by Professor Lipset provides a detailed analysis of the social groups identified with the new right and assesses their strength.

These essays were not written for this volume. All but the reviews of the Stouffer book appeared about the same time, and quite independently. And yet they showed a remarkable convergence in
point of view. This convergence itself indicates that some of the recent concepts of sociology and social psychology—the role of status groups as a major entity in American life and status resentments as a real force in politics—were being applied fruitfully to political analysis.

Whether the groups analyzed in this volume form a political force depends upon many factors. Certainly McCarthy himself is, at the moment, at the nadir. By the logic of his own political position, and by the nature of his personality, he had to go to an extreme. And he ended, finally, by challenging Eisenhower. It was McCarthy's great gamble. And he lost, for the challenge to a Republican President by a Republican minority could only have split the party. Faced with this threat, the party rallied behind Eisenhower, and McCarthy himself was isolated. In this respect, the events prove the soundness of the thesis of Walter Lippmann and the Alsops in 1952 that only a Republican President could provide the necessary continuity of foreign and domestic policy initiated and maintained by the Fair Deal. A Democratic President would only have polarized the parties, and given the extreme Republican wing the license to lead the attack; the administration of a moderate Republican could act as a damper on the extreme right.

The lessening of international tensions may confirm McCarthy's defeat, just as a flare-up of war in Asia, particularly Chinese Communist action over Formosa, might give him a platform to come back. Yet McCarthy has to be understood in relation to the people behind him and the changed political temper which these groups have brought. He was the catalyst, not the explosive force. These forces still remain.

The essays in this volume identify and deal with the emergence of the "status groups." Their emergence raises some further questions regarding the political theory and political temper of American democracy.

Throughout our history, Americans have had an extraordinary talent for compromise in politics and extremism in morality. The most shameless political deals (and "steals") have been rationalized as expedient and realistically necessary; yet in no other country were there such spectacular attempts to curb human appetites and brand them as illicit—and nowhere else such glaring failures. From the start America was at one and the same time the frontier com-
munity where "everything goes," and the fair country of the restrictive Blue Laws (to the extent, for example, of barring theatrical performances on Sunday). At the turn of the century the cleavage developed between the big city and the small town conscience: crime as a growing business was fed by the revenues from prostitution, liquor and gambling that a cynical urban society encouraged, and which a middle-class Protestant ethos sought to suppress with a ferocity unmatched in any other civilized country. Even in prim and proper Anglican England, prostitution is a commonplace of Piccadilly night life, and gambling one of the largest and most popular industries. But in America, the enforcement of public morals has been a continuing feature of our history.

The sources of this moralism are varied. This has been a middle-class culture, and there may be considerable truth to the generalization of Svend Ranulf that moral indignation is a peculiar fact of middle-class psychology and represents a disguised form of repressed envy. One does not find moral indignation a feature of the temper of aristocratic cultures. Moralism and moral indignation are characteristic of religions that have largely abandoned other-worldly preoccupations and have concentrated on this-worldly concerns. Religions, like Catholicism, which are focused on heaven are often quite tolerant of man's foibles, weaknesses, and cruelties on earth; theft, after all, is only a venial sin, while pride bears the stain of venality. This is a country, and Protestantism a religion, in which piety has given way to moralism, and theology to ethics. Becoming respectable represents "moral" advancement, and regulating conduct, i.e. being "moral" about it, is a great concern of the Protestant churches in America.

This moralism, itself not unique to America, is linked to an evangelicalism that was largely unique. There has long been a legend, fostered for the most part by literary people, and compounded by sociologists, that America's has been a "puritan" culture. For the sociologists this has arisen out of a mistaken identification of the Protestant ethic with puritan code. The literary critics have been seduced by the myth of New England, and the literary revolt initiated by Van Wyck Brooks which sought to break the hold of puritanism in literature. While puritanism, and the "New England mind," have indeed played a large intellectual role in American life, in the habits and mores of the masses of people, the peculiar evangelicalism of Methodism and Baptism, with its high emotionalism, its fervor, en-
thusiasm and excitement, its revivalism, its excesses of sinning and of high-voltage confessing, has played a much more important role in coloring the moral temper of America. Baptism and Methodism have been the American religious creed because they were the rustic and frontier religions. In his page on "Why Americans Manifest a Sort of Fanatical Spiritualism," de Tocqueville observes: "In all states of the Union, but especially in the half-peopled country of the Far West, itinerant preachers may be met with who hawk about the word of God from place to place. Whole families, old men, women and children, cross rough passes and untrodden wilds, coming from a great distance, to join a camp-meeting, where, in listening to these discourses, they totally forget for several days and nights the cares of business and even the most urgent wants of the body."17

The Baptist and Methodist churches grew while the more "respectable" Protestant bodies remained static, precisely because their preachers went on with the advancing frontier and reflected its spirit. "In the camp meeting and in the political gathering logical discourse was of no avail, while the 'language of excitement' called forth an enthusiastic response," observed H. Richard Niebuhr.18

This revivalist spirit was egalitarian and anti-intellectual. It shook off the vestments and the formal liturgies and preached instead the gospel and roaring hymn. This evangelicalism was reflected in the moralism of a William Jennings Bryan, a religious as well as an economic champion of the West, and in the urban revivalism of a Dwight Moody and the Y.M.C.A. movement that grew out of his gospel fervor.19 In their espousal of social reform, the evangelical churches reflected the peculiar influence of moralism. They were the supreme champions of prohibition legislation and Sabbath observance. Reform, in their terms, meant, not as in the New Deal, a belief in welfare legislation, but the redemption of those who had fallen prey to sin—and sin meant drink, loose women and gambling.

This moralism, so characteristic of American temper, had a peculiar schizoid character: it would be imposed with vehemence in areas of culture and conduct—in the censorship of books, the attacks on "immoral art," etc., and in the realm of private habits; yet it was heard only sporadically regarding the depredations of business or the corruption of politics. And yet, this has had its positive side. To the extent that moral indignation—apart from its rhetorical use in political campaigns—played so small a role in the actual political arena, the United States has been able to escape the intense ideolog-
ical fanaticism—the conflicts of clericalism and class—which has been so characteristic of Europe.

The singular fact about the Communist problem is that an ideological issue was raised in American political life, with a compulsive moral fervor only possible because of the equation of Communism with sin. A peculiar change, in fact, seems to be coming over American life. While we are becoming more relaxed in the area of traditional morals (viz., the Supreme Court ruling against censorship in the case of the movie, The Miracle), we are becoming moralistic and extreme in politics. The fact that Senator McCarthy could seek to pin a Communist label on the Democratic Party, and tie it with a tag of "treason"—and be abetted for a time by Attorney General Brownell and the Republican Party is a reflection of a new political temper in America.

The tendency to convert politics into "moral" issues is reinforced by a second fact, the activities of the McCarthyite intellectuals—James Burnham, William Schlamm, Max Eastman, and their minor epigoni. The rise of intellectual apologists for a reactionary right is, too, a new phase in American life. The quixotic fact is that many of these men, ex-Communists, repudiated at first not the utopian vision of Communism, but its methods. In the thirties, the crucial intellectual fight was to emphasize, against the liberal piddlers who sought to excuse the harshness of Stalinism by reference to the historic backwardness of Russia, or the grandeur of the Soviet dream, that in social action there is an inextricable relation between "ends and means," and that consistently amoral means could only warp and hideously distort an end. Yet these men have forgotten this basic point in their defense of McCarthy. Schlamm, the author of a fine book about Stalinism, Die Diktatur der Lüge (The Dictatorship of the Lie), applauds McCarthy as a man who is seriously interested in ideas. John T. Flynn, the old muckraker, denies McCarthy has ever made use of the lie. Max Eastman, slightly critical at times, worries most not about McCarthy but that the liberals by attacking McCarthy might be playing "the Communist game"; as if all politics were only two-sided, in this case McCarthy or the Communists.

How explain this reversal? Motivations are difficult to plumb. Some of these men, as George Orwell once pointed out in a devastating analysis of James Burnham,\(^2^0\) slavishly worship power images.
The Freeman, the old-maidish house organ of the intellectual right, coyly applauded McCarthy as a tough hombre.

Yet one significant fact emerges from this bile: the hatred of the ex-Communist is not so much of the Communist, but of the "liberals," and the root of the problem goes back to the political situation of the thirties. In recent years there has been a growing myth that in the 1930s the Communist dominated the cultural life of America, its publishing houses, Broadway, Hollywood, and the colleges. The myth is a seductive one which grows more plausible with revelation of different "name" personages who the public now discover were once open or covert fellow-travelers. Yet, as Granville Hicks points out, only one anti-Communist book is ever cited as having been suppressed in those years, while anti-Communist authors such as Eugene Lyons, Max Eastman, Freda Utley, Jan Valtin all published anti-Soviet books. The Communists, in fact, felt that the shoe at times was on the other foot. "In the autumn of 1934," says Hicks, "I wrote an article for the New Masses in which I argued that the New York Times Book Review assigned almost all books on Russia to anti-Communists." The Nation book section under Margaret Marshall in those years was anti-Communist. The Communist cells in universities were small; at Harvard in 1938, at the height of the popular front, there were fourteen faculty Communists in all. While the Communists were able to enlist a sizable number of well-known names for their fronts, the Committee for Cultural Freedom, in issuing a statement in 1939 bracketing the Soviet and Nazi states as equally immoral, displayed a more distinguished roster of intellectuals than any statement issued by a Communist front.

How explain these contrasting images of the Red Decade—the anti-Communists who regarded the Communists as dominating the cultural life and the Communists who complained that they had little influence? The evidence, I would say, lies on Hicks' side. The Communists did not dominate the cultural field, though they wielded an influence far out of proportion to their numbers. What is true, and here I feel Hicks missed the subtle edge of the problem, is that the official institutions of the cultural community—because of the Spanish Civil War, the shock of Fascism, and the aura of New Deal reform—did look at the Communist with some sympathy; they regarded him as ultimately, philosophically wrong, but still as a respectable member of the community. But the vocal anti-Communists (many of them Trotskyites at the time), with their quarrelsome
ways, their esoteric knowledge of Bolshevik history (most of the intellectuals were completely ignorant of the names of the Bolsheviks in the dock at the Moscow trials, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Piatakov, Sokolnikov, Rakovsky) seemed extreme and bizarre—and were regarded with suspicion. The anti-Stalinists, by raising “extraneous” issues of a “sectarian” nature, were “sabotaging” the fight against Fascism. Hence, in the thirties, one found the Communist possessing a place in the intellectual world, while the anti-Communists were isolated and thwarted.

Here, in a sense, is the source of the present-day resentment against “the liberals.” If one looks for formal or ideological definition “the liberal” is difficult to pin down. To a McCarthyite, “the liberals” dominate the intellectual and publishing community—and define the canons of respectability and acceptance. And once again the knot of ex-Communists, now, as in the thirties, finds itself outside the pale. At stake is an attitude toward the Communists. The Freeman intellectuals want the Communists shriven or driven out of all areas of public or community life. The “liberal” says the effort is not worth the price, since there are few Communists, and the drive against them only encourages reactionaries to exact a conformity of opinion. By refusing to sanction these measures, the liberals find themselves under attack as “soft.”

In these strange times, new polar terms have been introduced into political discourse, but surely none so strange as the division into “hard” and “soft.” Certainly in attitudes towards the rights of Communists, there are many gradations of opinion among genuine anti-Communists, as the debates in the Committee for Cultural Freedom have demonstrated. But for The Freeman intellectuals, there are only two attributes—hard or soft. Even the New York Post, whose editor, James A. Wechsler has fought Communists for years, and the Americans for Democratic Action, whose initiating spirit was Reinhold Niebuhr, and whose co-chairman, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was one of the early intellectual antagonists of the Communist, before McCarthy ever spoke up on the subject, have been denounced as “soft.”

What does the term mean? Presumably one is “soft” if one insists that the danger from domestic Communists is small. But the “hard” anti-Communists insist that no distinction can be made between international and domestic Communism. This may be true regarding intent and methods, but is it equally so regarding their power; is the strength of domestic Communists as great as that of international
Communism? It is said, that many liberals refused to recognize that Communists constituted a security problem or that planned infiltration existed. This is rather a blanket charge, but even if largely true, the "hard" anti-Communists refuse to recognize the dimension of time. The question is: what is the degree of the present-day Communist infiltration? Pressed at this point some "hard" anti-Communists admit that the number of actual Communists may be small, but that the real problem arises because the liberals, especially in the large Eastern universities, are predominantly "anti-anti Communists." But what is the content of this "anti-anti Communism?" That it won't admit that the Communists constitute a present danger. And so we are back where we started.

The polarization of images reflects itself in a strange set, too, of contrasting conceptions about power position. The liberals, particularly in the universities, have felt themselves subject to attack by powerful groups; the pro-McCarthy intellectuals see themselves as a persecuted group, discriminated against in the major opinion forming centers in the land. A personal incident is relevant here. A few years ago I encountered Robert Morris, the counsel then for the Jenner Committee on internal subversion. He complained of the "terrible press" his committee was receiving. What press, he was asked; after all, the great Hearst and Scripps-Howard and Gannett chains, as well as an overwhelming number of newspaper dailies, had enthusiastically supported and reported the work of the Committee. I wasn't thinking of them, he replied. I was thinking of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

The paradoxical fact is that on traditional economic issues, these "liberal" papers are conservative. All three supported Eisenhower. Yet, traditional conservative issues no longer count in dividing "liberals" from "anti-Communists." The only issue is whether one is "hard" or "soft." And so, an amorphous, ideological issue, rather than an interest-group issue, has become a major dividing line in the political community.

The "ideologizing" of politics gains reinforcement from a third, somewhat independent tendency in American life, the emergence of what may be called the "symbolic groups." These are the inchoate, often ill-coordinated entities, known generally, in capital letters, as "Labor," "Business," the "Farmers," et al. The assumption is made that these entities have a coherent philosophy and a defined purpose.
The Radical Right

and represent actual forces. But is this true in a society so multi-fractioned and interest-divided?

The utilitarians, the first to give politics a calculus, and thus begin an experimental social science, made a distinction between a social decision (the common purpose) and the sum total of individual self-interest decisions. Adam Smith assumed a natural harmony, if not identity, between the two. But Jeremy Bentham knew that such identity was artificial, although he felt that they could be reconciled by an intelligent legislator through "a well-regulated application of punishments." The distinction between the self-interest and social decisions might be reworked in modern idiom as one between "market" and "ideological" decisions. The first represents a series of choices based on the rational self-interest of the individual or organization, with the aim of maximizing profit or the survival or enhancement of the organization. The second represents decisions, based on some purpose clothed in moral terms, in which the goal is deemed so important as to override when necessary the individual self-interest.

In modern society, the clash between ideological and market decisions is often as intense within groups, as between groups. The "labor movement," for example, has strongly favored lower tariffs and broader international trade; yet the seamen’s union has urged that U.S. government aid be shipped in American, not foreign bottoms, while the textile unions have fought for quotas on foreign imports. Political-minded unionists, like Mike Quill in New York, have had to choose between a wage increase for their members against a rise in transit fares for the public at large. Interest rivalries are often more direct. The teamsters’ unions have lobbied against the railroad unions and the coal miners against the oil workers. In every broad group these interest conflicts have taken place, within industry, farm, and every other functional group in the society.

The tendency to convert interest groups into "symbolic groups" derives from varied sources. Much of it comes from "vulgar" Marxist thinking, with its image of a self-conscious, coordinated Business class (as in Jack London’s image of "the oligarchs" in his The Iron Heel, and the stereotypes of "Wall Street"). Some of this was taken over by the New Dealers with their image of "America’s Sixty Families." But the biggest impetus has come from the changing nature of political decision-making and the mode of opinion formation in modern society. The fact that decision-making has been central-
ized into the narrow cockpit of Washington, rather than the impersonal market, leads groups like the National Association of Manufacturers, the Farm Bureau, the A.F. of L., et al, to speak for "Business," for the "Farmers," for "Labor." At the same time, with the increased sensitivity to "public opinion," heightened by the introduction of the mass polling technique, the "citizen" (not the specific-interest individual) is asked what "Business" or "Labor" or the "Farmer" should do. In effect, these groups are often forced to assume an identity and greater coherence beyond their normal intra-mural interest conflicts. A result again is that political debate moves from specific interest clashes, in which issues can be identified and possibly compromised, to ideologically-tinged conflicts which polarize the groups and divide the society.

The essays in this book are primarily analytical. Yet they also point implicitly to a dangerous situation. The tendency to convert issues into ideologies, to invest them with moral color and high emotional charge, invites conflicts which can only damage a society. "A nation, divided irreconcilably on 'principle,' each party believing itself pure white and the other pitch black, cannot govern itself," wrote a younger Walter Lippmann.

The saving glory of the United States is that politics has always been a pragmatic give-and-take rather than a series of wars-to-the-death. One ultimately comes to admire the "practical politics" of a Theodore Roosevelt and his scorn for the intransigents, like Godkin and Villard, who, refusing to yield to expediency, could never put through their reforms. Politics, as Edmund Wilson has described T.R.'s attitude, "is a matter of adapting oneself to all sorts of people and situations, a game in which one may score but only by accepting the rules and recognizing one's opponents, rather than a moral crusade in which one's stainless standard must mow the enemy down."26

Democratic politics is bargaining and consensus because the historic contribution of liberalism was to separate law from morality. The thought that the two should be separate often comes as a shock. Yet, in the older Catholic societies, ruled by the doctrine of "two swords," the state was the secular arm of the Church, and enforced in civil life the moral decrees of the Church. This was possible, in political theory, if not in practice, because the society was homogeneous and everyone accepted the same religious values. But the
religious wars that followed the Reformation proved that a plural society could only survive if it respected the principles of toleration. No group, be it Catholic or Protestant, could use the state to impose its moral conceptions on all the people. As the party of the *Politiques* put it, the "civil society must not perish for conscience's sake."  

These theoretical foundations of modern liberal society were completed by Kant, who, separating legality and morality, defined the former as the "rules of the game" so to speak; law dealt with procedural, not substantive issues. The latter were private matters of conscience with which the state could not interfere.

This distinction has been at the root of the American democracy. For Madison, factions (or interests) were inevitable and the function of the republic was to protect the causes of faction, i.e., liberty and "the diversity in the faculties of men." As an interpreter of Madison writes, "free men, 'diverse' man, fallible, heterogeneous, heterodox, opinionated, quarrelsome man was the raw material of faction." Since faction was inevitable, one could only deal with its effects, and not smother its causes. One curbed these effects by a federal form of government, by separation of powers, *et al.* But for Madison two answers were central: first, an *extensive republic*, since a larger geographical area, and therefore a larger number of interests, would "lessen the insecurity of private rights," and second, the guarantee of representative government.

Representative government, as John Stuart Mill has so cogently pointed out, means representation of all interests, "since the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked." And being overlooked, as Calhoun pointed out, constitutes a threat to civil order. But representative government is important for the deeper reason that by including all representative interests one can keep up "the antagonism of influences which is the only real security for continued progress." It is the only way of providing the "concurrent majorities" which, as Calhoun knew so well, were the solid basis for providing a check on the tyrannical "popular" majority. Only through representative government can one achieve consensus and conciliation.

This is not to say that the Communist "interest" is a legitimate one, or that the Communist issue is irrelevant. As a conspiracy, rather than as a legitimate dissenting group, the Communist movement is a threat to any democratic society. And, within the definition of "clear and present danger," a democratic society may have
to act against that conspiracy. But these are questions to be handled by law. The tendency to use the Communist issue as a political club against other parties or groups (i.e. to provide an ideological guilt by association), or the tendency to convert questions of law into issues of morality (and thus shift the source of sanctions from courts and legitimate authority to private individuals), imposes a great strain on democratic society.

In almost 170 years since its founding American democracy has been rent only once by civil war. We have learned since then, not without strain, to include the "excluded interests," the populist farmers and the organized workers. These economic interest groups take a legitimate place in the society and the ideological conflicts that once threatened to disrupt the society, particularly in the New Deal period, have been mitigated. The new divisions created by the status anxieties of new middle-class groups pose a new threat. The rancor of McCarthyism was one of its ugly excesses. Yet, the United States, so huge and complex that no single political boss or any single political grouping has ever been able to dominate it, may in time diminish these divisions. This is an open society, and these status anxieties are part of the price we pay for that openness.

1 See also, S. M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (University of California Press), pp. 224 passim.
3 See Dixon Ryan Fox, The Decline of the Aristocracy in the Politics of New York.
6 A. T. Mason, ibid., page 5.
10 For an extended discussion of the role of interest groups in American politics, see David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, 1951).
12 The amorphousness of power in contemporary United States and its relationship to the break-up of "family capitalism," in the United States is developed by the writer in a paper on "The Ambiguities of the Mass Society and the Complexities of American Life," presented at a conference in Milan, Italy,

13 By 1952 they controlled unions with fewer than five percent of United States labor membership as against a peak control of unions with 20 percent of union membership in 1944.

14 The contradictory stand of the Truman administration compounded these confusions and increased the alarums. On the one hand, leading members of the administration, including Truman himself, sought to minimize the degree of past Communist infiltration, on the other hand, the administration let loose a buckshot security program which itself inflamed the problems. This included the turning of the Attorney-General's list of subversive organizations into a blank check-list to deny individuals passports and even non-government jobs; an unfair loyalty program in which individuals could not even face their accusers; and the prosecution of the Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act.

15 Before the Civil War and immigration, discrimination in America was almost solely on religious grounds. In the decades that followed, the rising social classes began to create status demarcations. For an excellent account of the turning-point in social discrimination in America, i.e., its emergence in an egalitarian society, see the essay by Oscar Handlin, "The Acquisition of Political and Social Rights by the Jews in the United States," in the *American Jewish Yearbook, 1955*.

In the expansion and prosperity of the 1870s and 1880s, Professor Handlin points out, "many a man having earned a fortune, even a modest one, thereafter found himself laboring under the burden of complex anxieties. He knew that success was by its nature evanescent. Fortunes were made only to be lost; what was earned in one generation would disappear in the next. Such a man, therefore, wished not only to retain that which he had gained; he was also eager for the social recognition that would permit him to enjoy his possessions; and he sought to extend these on in time through his family. . . . The last decades of the nineteenth century therefore witnessed a succession of attempts to set up areas of exclusiveness that would mark off the favored groups and protect them against excessive contact with outsiders. In imitation of the English model, there was an effort to create a 'high society' with its own protocol and conventions, with suitable residences in suitable districts, with distinctive clubs and media of entertainment, all of which would mark off and preserve the wealth of the fortunate families."


18 H. Richard Niebuhr, *Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York, 1929), page 141.


20 *Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays* (New York, 1950).

21 Granville Hicks, *Where We Came Out* (New York, 1954).
I have attempted to assemble some of that evidence in my essay on the history of American Marxist parties in the volume *Socialism and American Life*, edited by Egbert and Persons (Princeton, 1952).

The sense of being a hunted, isolated minority is reflected quite vividly in an editorial note in *The Freeman*—June, 1955: "Since the advent of the New Deal (An Americanized version of Fabian socialism) the mass circulation media in this country have virtually closed their columns to opposition articles. For this they can hardly be blamed; their business is to sell paper at so much a pound and advertising space at so much a line. They must give the masses what they believe the masses want, if they are to maintain their mass circulation business; and there is no doubt that the promises of socialism reiterated by the propaganda machine of the government, have made it popular and dulled the public mind to the verities of freedom."


The distinction, thus, is more than one between opinion and behavior. Quite often an ideological decision will have greater weight for a group than immediate self-interest (defined in rational market terms), and the group will act on the basis of ideology. The task of a realistic social psychology is to identify under what circumstances the ideological or market conditions will prevail.


The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt—1955

RICHARD HOFSTADTER

Twenty years ago the dynamic force in American political life came from the side of liberal dissent, from the impulse to reform the inequities of our economic and social system and to change our ways of doing things, to the end that the sufferings of the Great Depression would never be repeated. Today the dynamic force in our political life no longer comes from the liberals who made the New Deal possible. By 1952 the liberals had had at least the trappings of power for twenty years. They could look back to a brief, exciting period in the mid-thirties when they had held power itself and had been able to transform the economic and administrative life of the nation. After twenty years the New Deal liberals have quite unconsciously taken on the psychology of those who have entered into possession. Moreover, a large part of the New Deal public, the jobless, distracted and bewildered men of 1933, have in the course of the years found substantial places in society for themselves, have become home-owners, suburbanites and solid citizens. Many of them still keep the emotional commitments to the liberal dissent with which they grew up politically, but their social position is one of solid comfort. Among them the dominant tone has become one of satisfaction, even of a kind of conservatism. Insofar as Adlai Stevenson won their enthusiasm in 1952, it was not in spite of, but in part because of the air of poised and reliable conservatism that he brought to the Democratic convention. By comparison, Harry Truman’s impassioned rhetoric, with its occasional thrusts at “Wall Street,” seemed passé and rather embarrassing. The change did not escape Stevenson himself. “The strange alchemy of time,” he said in a speech at Columbus, “has somehow converted the Democrats into the truly conservative party of this country—the party
dedicated to conserving all that is best, and building solidly and safely on these foundations.” The most that the old liberals can now envisage is not to carry on with some ambitious new program, but simply to defend as much as possible of the old achievements and to try to keep traditional liberties of expression that are threatened.

There is, however, a dynamic of dissent in America today. Representing no more than a modest fraction of the electorate, it is not so powerful as the liberal dissent of the New Deal era, but it is powerful enough to set the tone of our political life and to establish throughout the country a kind of punitive reaction. The new dissent is certainly not radical—there are hardly any radicals of any sort left—nor is it precisely conservative. Unlike most of the liberal dissent of the past, the new dissent not only has no respect for non-conformism, but is based upon a relentless demand for conformity. It can most accurately be called pseudo-conservative—I borrow the term from the study of The Authoritarian Personality published five years ago by Theodore W. Adorno and his associates—because its exponents, although they believe themselves to be conservatives and usually employ the rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism in the classical sense of the word, and they are far from pleased with the dominant practical conservatism of the moment as it is represented by the Eisenhower administration. Their political reactions express rather a profound if largely unconscious hatred of our society and its ways—a hatred which one would hesitate to impute to them if one did not have suggestive clinical evidence.

From clinical interviews and thematic apperception tests, Adorno and his co-workers found that their pseudo-conservative subjects, although given to a form of political expression that combines a curious mixture of largely conservative with occasional radical notions, succeed in concealing from themselves impulsive tendencies that, if released in action, would be very far from conservative. The pseudo-conservative, Adorno writes, shows “conventionality and authoritarian submissiveness” in his conscious thinking and “violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destructiveness in the unconscious sphere. . . . The pseudo conservative is a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions and defending them
against more or less fictitious dangers, consciously or unconsciously aims at their abolition."¹

Who is the pseudo conservative, and what does he want? It is impossible to identify him by class, for the pseudo-conservative impulse can be found in practically all classes in society, although its power probably rests largely upon its appeal to the less educated members of the middle classes. The ideology of pseudo-conservatism can be characterized but not defined, because the pseudo-conservative tends to be more than ordinarily incoherent about politics. The lady who, when General Eisenhower's victory over Senator Taft had finally become official, stalked out of the Hilton Hotel declaiming, "This means eight more years of socialism" was probably a fairly good representative of the pseudo-conservative mentality. So also were the gentlemen who, at the Freedom Congress held at Omaha over a year ago by some "patriotic" organizations, objected to Earl Warren's appointment to the Supreme Court with the assertion: "Middle-of-the-road thinking can and will destroy us"; the general who spoke to the same group, demanding "an Air Force capable of wiping out the Russian Air Force and industry in one sweep," but also "a material reduction in military expenditures";² the people who a few years ago believed simultaneously that we had no business to be fighting communism in Korea, but that the war should immediately be extended to an Asia-wide crusade against communism; and the most ardent supporters of the Bricker Amendment. Many of the most zealous followers of Senator McCarthy are also pseudo-conservatives, although there are presumably a great many others who are not.

The restlessness, suspicion and fear manifested in various phases of the pseudo-conservative revolt give evidence of the real suffering which the pseudo-conservative experiences in his capacity as a citizen. He believes himself to be living in a world in which he is spied upon, plotted against, betrayed, and very likely destined for total ruin. He feels that his liberties have been arbitrarily and outrageously invaded. He is opposed to almost everything that has happened in American politics for the past twenty years. He hates the very thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He is disturbed deeply by American participation in the United Nations, which he can see only as a sinister organization. He sees his own country as being so weak that it is constantly about to fall victim to subversion; and yet he feels that it is so all-powerful that any failure it may experience
in getting its way in the world—for instance, in the Orient—cannot possibly be due to its limitations but must be attributed to its having been betrayed. He is the most bitter of all our citizens about our involvement in the wars of the past, but seems the least concerned about avoiding the next one. While he naturally does not like Soviet communism, what distinguishes him from the rest of us who also dislike it is that he shows little interest in, is often indeed bitterly hostile to such realistic measures as might actually strengthen the United States vis-à-vis Russia. He would much rather concern himself with the domestic scene, where communism is weak, than with those areas of the world where it is really strong and threatening. He wants to have nothing to do with the democratic nations of Western Europe, which seem to draw more of his ire than the Soviet Communists, and he is opposed to all “give-away programs” designed to aid and strengthen these nations. Indeed, he is likely to be antagonistic to most of the operations of our federal government except Congressional investigations, and to almost all of its expenditures. Not always, however, does he go so far as the speaker at the Freedom Congress who attributed the greater part of our national difficulties to “this nasty, stinking 16th [income tax] Amendment.”

A great deal of pseudo-conservative thinking takes the form of trying to devise means of absolute protection against that betrayal by our own officialdom which the pseudo-conservative feels is always imminent. The Bricker Amendment, indeed, might be taken as one of the primary symptoms of pseudo-conservatism. Every dissenting movement brings its demand for Constitutional changes; and the pseudo-conservative revolt, far from being an exception to this principle, seems to specialize in Constitutional revision, at least as a speculative enterprise. The widespread latent hostility toward American institutions takes the form, among other things, of a flood of proposals to write drastic changes into the body of our fundamental law. Last summer, in a characteristically astute piece, Richard Rovere pointed out that Constitution-amending had become almost a major diversion in the Eighty-third Congress. About a hundred amendments were introduced and referred to committee. Several of these called for the repeal of the income tax. Several embodied formulas of various kinds to limit non-military expenditures to some fixed portion of the national income. One proposed to bar all federal expenditures on “the general welfare”; another, to prohibit American troops from serving in any foreign country except
on the soil of the potential enemy; another, to redefine treason to embrace not only persons trying to overthrow the government but also those trying to "weaken" it, even by peaceful means. The last proposal might bring the pseudo-conservative rebels themselves under the ban of treason: for the sum total of these amendments might easily serve to bring the whole structure of American society crashing to the ground.

As Mr. Rovere points out, it is not unusual for a large number of Constitutional amendments to be lying about somewhere in the Congressional hoppers. What is unusual is the readiness the Senate has shown to give them respectful consideration, and the peculiar populistic arguments some of its leading members have used to justify referring them to the state legislatures. While the ordinary Congress hardly ever has occasion to consider more than one amendment, the Eighty-third Congress saw six Constitutional amendments brought to the floor of the Senate, all summoning simple majorities, and four winning the two-thirds majority necessary before they can be sent to the House and ultimately to the state legislatures. It must be added that, with the possible exception of the Bricker Amendment itself, none of the six amendments so honored can be classed with the most extreme proposals. But the pliability of the senators, the eagerness of some of them to pass the buck and defer to "the people of the country," suggests how strong they feel the pressure to be for some kind of change that will give expression to that vague desire to repudiate the past that underlies the pseudo-conservative revolt.

One of the most urgent questions we can ask about the United States in our time is the question of where all this sentiment arose. The readiest answer is that the new pseudo-conservatism is simply the old ultra-conservatism and the old isolationism heightened by the extraordinary pressures of the contemporary world. This answer, true though it may be, gives a deceptive sense of familiarity without much deepening our understanding, for the particular patterns of American isolationism and extreme right-wing thinking have themselves not been very satisfactorily explored. It will not do, to take but one example, to say that some people want the income tax amendment repealed because taxes have become very heavy in the past twenty years: for this will not explain why, of three people in the same tax bracket, one will grin and bear it and continue to support social welfare legislation as well as an adequate defense,
while another responds by supporting in a matter-of-fact way the practical conservative leadership of the moment, and the third finds his feelings satisfied only by the angry conspiratorial accusations and extreme demands of the pseudo-conservative.

No doubt the circumstances determining the political style of any individual are complex. Although I am concerned here to discuss some of the neglected socio-psychological elements in pseudo-conservatism, I do not wish to appear to deny the presence of important economic and political causes. I am aware, for instance, that wealthy reactionaries try to use pseudo-conservative organizers, spokesmen and groups to propagate their notions of public policy, and that some organizers of pseudo-conservative and "patriotic" groups often find in this work a means of making a living—thus turning a tendency toward paranoia into a vocational asset, probably one of the most perverse forms of occupational therapy known to man. A number of other circumstances—the drastic inflation and heavy taxes of our time, the dissolution of American urban life, considerations of partisan political expediency—also play a part. But none of these things seem to explain the broad appeal of pseudo-conservatism, its emotional intensity, its dense and massive irrationality, or some of the peculiar ideas it generates. Nor will they explain why those who profit by the organized movements find such a ready following among a large number of people, and why the rank-and-file janizaries of pseudo-conservatism are so eager to hurl accusations, write letters to congressmen and editors, and expend so much emotional energy and crusading idealism upon causes that plainly bring them no material reward.

Elmer Davis, seeking to account for such sentiment in his recent book, But We Were Born Free, ventures a psychological hypothesis. He concludes, if I understand him correctly, that the genuine difficulties of our situation in the face of the power of international communism have inspired a widespread feeling of fear and frustration, and that those who cannot face these problems in a more rational way "take it out on their less influential neighbors, in the mood of a man who, being afraid to stand up to his wife in a domestic argument, relieves his feelings by kicking the cat." This suggestion has the merit of both simplicity and plausibility, and it may begin to account for a portion of the pseudo-conservative public. But while we may dismiss our curiosity about the man who kicks the cat by remarking that some idiosyncrasy in his personal develop-
ment has brought him to this pass, we can hardly help but wonder whether there are not, in the backgrounds of the hundreds of thousands of persons who are moved by the pseudo-conservative impulse, some commonly shared circumstances that will help to account for their all kicking the cat in unison.

All of us have reason to fear the power of international communism, and all our lives are profoundly affected by it. Why do some Americans try to face this threat for what it is, a problem that exists in a world-wide theater of action, while others try to reduce it largely to a matter of domestic conformity? Why do some of us prefer to look for allies in the democratic world, while others seem to prefer authoritarian allies or none at all? Why do the pseudo-conservatives express such a persistent fear and suspicion of their own government, whether its leadership rests in the hands of Roosevelt, Truman or Eisenhower? Why is the pseudo-conservative impelled to go beyond the more or less routine partisan argument that we have been the victims of considerable misgovernment during the past twenty years to the disquieting accusation that we have actually been the victims of persistent conspiracy and betrayal—"twenty years of treason?" Is it not true, moreover, that political types very similar to the pseudo-conservative have had a long history in the United States, and that this history goes back to a time when the Soviet power did not loom nearly so large on our mental horizons? Was the Ku Klux Klan, for instance, which was responsibly estimated to have had a membership of from 4,000,000 to 4,500,000 persons at its peak in the 1920s, a phenomenon totally dissimilar to the pseudo-conservative revolt?

What I wish to suggest—and I do so in the spirit of one setting forth nothing more than a speculative hypothesis—is that pseudo-conservatism is in good part a product of the rootlessness and heterogeneity of American life, and above all, of its peculiar scramble for status and its peculiar search for secure identity. Normally there is a world of difference between one's sense of national identity or cultural belonging and one's social status. However, in American historical development, these two things, so easily distinguishable in analysis, have been jumbled together in reality, and it is precisely this that has given such a special poignancy and urgency to our status-strivings. In this country a person's status—that is, his relative place in the prestige hierarchy of his community—and his rudimentary sense of belonging to the community—that is, what we
call his "Americanism"—have been intimately joined. Because, as a people extremely democratic in our social institutions, we have had no clear, consistent and recognizable system of status, our personal status problems have an unusual intensity. Because we no longer have the relative ethnic homogeneity we had up to about eighty years ago, our sense of belonging has long had about it a high degree of uncertainty. We boast of "the melting pot," but we are not quite sure what it is that will remain when we have been melted down.

We have always been proud of the high degree of occupational mobility in our country—of the greater readiness, as compared with other countries, with which a person starting in a very humble place in our social structure could rise to a position of moderate wealth and status, and with which a person starting with a middling position could rise to great eminence. We have looked upon this as laudable in principle, for it is democratic, and as pragmatically desirable, for it has served many a man as a stimulus to effort and has, no doubt, a great deal to do with the energetic and effectual tone of our economic life. The American pattern of occupational mobility, while often much exaggerated, as in the Horatio Alger stories and a great deal of the rest of our mythology, may properly be credited with many of the virtues and beneficial effects that are usually attributed to it. But this occupational and social mobility, compounded by our extraordinary mobility from place to place, has also had its less frequently recognized drawbacks. Not the least of them is that this has become a country in which so many people do not know who they are or what they are or what they belong to or what belongs to them. It is a country of people whose status expectations are random and uncertain, and yet whose status aspirations have been whipped up to a high pitch by our democratic ethos and our rags-to-riches mythology.  

In a country where physical needs have been, by the scale of the world's living standards, on the whole well met, the luxury of questing after status has assumed an unusually prominent place in our civic consciousness. Political life is not simply an arena in which the conflicting interests of various social groups in concrete material gains are fought out; it is also an arena into which status aspirations and frustrations are, as the psychologists would say, projected. It is at this point that the issues of politics, or the pretended issues of politics, become interwoven with and dependent upon the personal
problems of individuals. We have, at all times, two kinds of processes going on in inextricable connection with each other: interest politics, the clash of material aims and needs among various groups and blocs; and status politics, the clash of various projective rationalizations arising from status aspirations and other personal motives. In times of depression and economic discontent—and by and large in times of acute national emergency—politics is more clearly a matter of interests, although of course status considerations are still present. In times of prosperity and general well-being on the material plane, status considerations among the masses can become much more influential in our politics. The two periods in our recent history in which status politics has been particularly prominent, the present era and the 1920s, have both been periods of prosperity.

During depressions, the dominant motif in dissent takes expression in proposals for reform or in panaceas. Dissent then tends to be highly programmatic—that is, it gets itself embodied in many kinds of concrete legislative proposals. It is also future-oriented and forward-looking, in the sense that it looks to a time when the adoption of this or that program will materially alleviate or eliminate certain discontents. In prosperity, however, when status politics becomes relatively more important, there is a tendency to embody discontent not so much in legislative proposals as in grousing. For the basic aspirations that underlie status discontent are only partially conscious; and, even so far as they are conscious, it is difficult to give them a programmatic expression. It is more difficult for the old lady who belongs to the D.A.R. and who sees her ancestral home swamped by new working-class dwellings to express her animus in concrete proposals of any degree of reality than it is, say, for the jobless worker during a slump to rally to a relief program. Therefore, it is the tendency of status politics to be expressed more in vindictiveness, in sour memories, in the search for scapegoats, than in realistic proposals for positive action.7

Paradoxically the intense status concerns of present-day politics are shared by two types of persons who arrive at them, in a sense, from opposite directions. The first are found among some types of old-family, Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and the second are found among many types of immigrant families, most notably among the Germans and Irish, who are very frequently Catholic.

The Anglo-Saxons are most disposed toward pseudo-conserva-
tism when they are losing caste, the immigrants when they are gaining.8

Consider first the old-family Americans. These people, whose stocks were once far more unequivocally dominant in America than they are today, feel that their ancestors made and settled and fought for this country. They have a certain inherited sense of proprietorship in it. Since America has always accorded a certain special deference to old families—so many of our families are new—these people have considerable claims to status by descent, which they celebrate by membership in such organizations as the D.A.R. and the S.A.R. But large numbers of them are actually losing their other claims to status. For there are among them a considerable number of the shabby genteel, of those who for one reason or another have lost their old objective positions in the life of business and politics and the professions, and who therefore cling with exceptional desperation to such remnants of their prestige as they can muster from their ancestors. These people, although very often quite well-to-do, feel that they have been pushed out of their rightful place in American life, even out of their neighborhoods. Most of them have been traditional Republicans by family inheritance, and they have felt themselves edged aside by the immigrants, the trade unions, and the urban machines in the past thirty years. When the immigrants were weak, these native elements used to indulge themselves in ethnic and religious snobberies at their expense.9 Now the immigrant groups have developed ample means, political and economic, of self-defense, and the second and third-generation have become considerably more capable of looking out for themselves. Some of the old-family Americans have turned to find new objects for their resentment among liberals, left-wingers, intellectuals and the like—for in true pseudo-conservative fashion they relish weak victims and shrink from asserting themselves against the strong.

New-family Americans have had their own peculiar status problem. From 1881 to 1900 over 8,800,000 immigrants came here, during the next twenty years another 14,500,000. These immigrants, together with their descendants, constitute such a large portion of the population that Margaret Mead, in a stimulating analysis of our national character, has persuasively urged that the characteristic American outlook is now a third-generation point of view.10 In their search for new lives and new nationality, these immigrants have suffered much, and they have been rebuffed and made to feel
inferior by the "native stock," commonly being excluded from the better occupations and even from what has bitterly been called "first-class citizenship." Insecurity over social status has thus been mixed with insecurity over one's very identity and sense of belonging. Achieving a better type of job or a better social status and becoming "more American" have become practically synonymous, and the passions that ordinarily attach to social position have been vastly heightened by being associated with the need to belong.

The problems raised by the tasks of keeping the family together, disciplining children for the American race for success, trying to conform to unfamiliar standards, protecting economic and social status won at the cost of much sacrifice, holding the respect of children who grow American more rapidly than their parents, have thrown heavy burdens on the internal relationships of many new American families. Both new and old American families have been troubled by the changes of the past thirty years—the new because of their striving for middle-class respectability and American identity, the old because of their efforts to maintain an inherited social position and to realize under increasingly unfavorable social conditions imperatives of character and personal conduct deriving from nineteenth-century, Yankee-Protestant-rural backgrounds. The relations between generations, being cast in no stable mold, have been disordered, and the status anxieties of parents have been inflicted upon children. Often parents entertain status aspirations that they are unable to gratify, or that they can gratify only at exceptional psychic cost. Their children are expected to relieve their frustrations and redeem their lives. They become objects to be manipulated to that end. An extraordinarily high level of achievement is expected of them, and along with it a tremendous effort to conform and be respectable. From the standpoint of the children these expectations often appear in the form of an exorbitantly demanding authority that one dare not question or defy. Resistance and hostility, finding no moderate outlet in give-and-take, have to be suppressed, and reappear in the form of an internal destructive rage. An enormous hostility to authority, which cannot be admitted to consciousness, calls forth a massive overcompensation which is manifest in the form of extravagant submissiveness to strong power. Among those found by Adorno and his colleagues to have strong ethnic prejudices and pseudo-conservative tendencies, there is a high proportion of persons who have been unable to develop the capacity to criticize
justly and in moderation the failings of parents and who are profoundly intolerant of the ambiguities of thought and feeling that one is so likely to find in real-life situations. For pseudo-conservatism is among other things a disorder in relation to authority, characterized by an inability to find other modes for human relationship than those of more or less complete domination or submission. The pseudo-conservative always imagines himself to be dominated and imposed upon because he feels that he is not dominant, and knows of no other way of interpreting his position. He imagines that his own government and his own leadership are engaged in a more or less continuous conspiracy against him because he has come to think of authority only as something that aims to manipulate and deprive him. It is for this reason, among others, that he enjoys seeing outstanding generals, distinguished secretaries of state, and prominent scholars browbeaten and humiliated.

Status problems take on a special importance in American life because a very large part of the population suffers from one of the most troublesome of all status questions: unable to enjoy the simple luxury of assuming their own nationality as a natural event, they are tormented by a nagging doubt as to whether they are really and truly and fully American. Since their forebears voluntarily left one country and embraced another, they cannot, as people do elsewhere, think of nationality as something that comes with birth; for them it is a matter of choice, and an object of striving. This is one reason why problems of "loyalty" arouse such an emotional response in many Americans and why it is so hard in the American climate of opinion to make any clear distinction between the problem of national security and the question of personal loyalty. Of course there is no real reason to doubt the loyalty to America of the immigrants and their descendants, or their willingness to serve the country as fully as if their ancestors had lived here for three centuries. None the less, they have been thrown on the defensive by those who have in the past cast doubts upon the fullness of their Americanism. Possibly they are also, consciously or unconsciously, troubled by the thought that since their forebears have already abandoned one country, one allegiance, their own national allegiance might be considered fickle. For this I believe there is some evidence in our national practices. What other country finds it so necessary to create institutional rituals for the sole purpose of guaranteeing to its people the genuineness of their nationality? Does the Frenchman or
the Englishman or the Italian find it necessary to speak of himself as "one hundred per cent" English, French or Italian? Do they find it necessary to have their equivalents of "I Am an American Day?" When they disagree with one another over national policies, do they find it necessary to call one another un-English, un-French or un-Italian? No doubt they too are troubled by subversive activities and espionage, but are their countermeasures taken under the name of committees on un-English, un-French or un-Italian activities?

The primary value of patriotic societies and anti-subversive ideologies to their exponents can be found here. They provide additional and continued reassurance both to those who are of old American ancestry and have other status grievances and to those who are of recent American ancestry and therefore feel in need of reassurance about their nationality. Veterans’ organizations offer the same satisfaction—what better evidence can there be of the genuineness of nationality and of earned citizenship than military service under the flag of one’s country? Of course such organizations, once they exist, are liable to exploitation by vested interests that can use them as pressure groups on behalf of particular measures and interests. (Veterans’ groups, since they lobby for the concrete interests of veterans, have a double role in this respect.) But the cement that holds them together is the status motivation and the desire for an identity.

Sociological studies have shown that there is a close relation between social mobility and ethnic prejudice. Persons moving downward, and even upward under many circumstances, in the social scale tend to show greater prejudice against such ethnic minorities as the Jews and Negroes than commonly prevails in the social strata they have left or are entering. While the existing studies in this field have been focused upon prejudice rather than the kind of hyper-patriotism and hyper-conformism that I am most concerned with, I believe that the typical prejudiced person and the typical pseudo-conservative dissenter are usually the same person, that the mechanisms at work in both complexes are quite the same, and that it is merely the expediencies and the strategy of the situation today that cause groups that once stressed racial discrimination to find other scapegoats. Both the displaced old-American type and the new ethnic elements that are so desperately eager for reassurance of their fundamental Americanism can conveniently converge upon liberals, critics, and nonconformists of various sorts, as well as Com-
munists and suspected Communists. To proclaim themselves vigilant in the pursuit of those who are even so much as accused of "disloyalty" to the United States is a way not only of reasserting but of advertising their own loyalty—and one of the chief characteristics of American super-patriotism is its constant inner urge toward self-advertisement. One notable quality in this new wave of conformism is that its advocates are much happier to have as their objects of hatred the Anglo-Saxon, Eastern, Ivy League intellectual gentlemen than they are with such bedraggled souls as, say, the Rosenbergs. The reason, I believe, is that in the minds of the status-driven it is no special virtue to be more American than the Rosenbergs, but it is really something to be more American than Dean Acheson or John Foster Dulles—or Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The status aspirations of some of the ethnic groups are actually higher than they were twenty years ago—which suggests one reason (there are others) why, in the ideology of the authoritarian right-wing, anti-Semitism and such blatant forms of prejudice have recently been soft-pedaled. Anti-Semitism, it has been said, is the poor man's snobbery. We Americans are always trying to raise the standard of living, and the same principle now seems to apply to standards of hating. So during the past fifteen years or so, the authoritarians have moved on from anti-Negroism and anti-Semitism to anti-Achesonianism, anti-intellectualism, anti-nonconformism, and other variants of the same idea, much in the same way as the average American, if he can manage it, will move on from a Ford to a Buick.

Such status-strivings may help us to understand some of the otherwise unintelligible figments of the pseudo-conservative ideology—the incredibly bitter feeling against the United Nations, for instance. Is it not understandable that such a feeling might be, paradoxically, shared at one and the same time by an old Yankee-Protestant American, who feels that his social position is not what it ought to be and that these foreigners are crowding in on his country and diluting its sovereignty just as "foreigners" have crowded into his neighborhood, and by a second- or third-generation immigrant who has been trying so hard to de-Europeanize himself, to get Europe out of his personal heritage, and who finds his own government mocking him by its complicity in these Old-World schemes?

Similarly, is it not status aspiration that in good part spurs the pseudo-conservative on toward his demand for conformity in a wide variety of spheres of life? Conformity is a way of guaranteeing
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and manifesting respectability among those who are not sure that they are respectable enough. The nonconformity of others appears to such persons as a frivolous challenge to the whole order of things they are trying so hard to become part of. Naturally it is resented, and the demand for conformity in public becomes at once an expression of such resentment and a means of displaying one's own soundness. This habit has a tendency to spread from politics into intellectual and social spheres, where it can be made to challenge almost anyone whose pattern of life is different and who is imagined to enjoy a superior social position—notably, as one agitator put it, the "parlors of the sophisticated, the intellectuals, the so-called academic minds."

Why has this tide of pseudo-conservative dissent risen to such heights in our time? To a considerable degree, we must remember, it is a response, however unrealistic, to realities. We do live in a disordered world, threatened by a great power and a powerful ideology. It is a world of enormous potential violence, that has already shown us the ugliest capacities of the human spirit. In our own country there has indeed been espionage, and laxity over security has in fact allowed some spies to reach high places. There is just enough reality at most points along the line to give a touch of credibility to the melodramatics of the pseudo-conservative imagination.

However, a number of developments in our recent history make this pseudo-conservative uprising more intelligible. For two hundred years and more, various conditions of American development—the process of continental settlement, the continuous establishment in new areas of new status patterns, the arrival of continuous waves of new immigrants, each pushing the preceding waves upward in the ethnic hierarchy—made it possible to satisfy a remarkably large part of the extravagant status aspirations that were aroused. There was a sort of automatic built-in status-elevator in the American social edifice. Today that elevator no longer operates automatically, or at least no longer operates in the same way.

Secondly, the growth of the mass media of communication and their use in politics have brought politics closer to the people than ever before and have made politics a form of entertainment in which the spectators feel themselves involved. Thus it has become, more than ever before, an arena into which private emotions and
personal problems can be readily projected. Mass communications have aroused the mass man.

Thirdly, the long tenure in power of the liberal elements to which the pseudo-conservatives are most opposed and the wide variety of changes that have been introduced into our social, economic and administrative life have intensified the sense of powerlessness and victimization among the opponents of these changes and have widened the area of social issues over which they feel discontent. There has been, among other things, the emergence of a wholly new struggle: the conflict between businessmen of certain types and the New Deal bureaucracy, which has spilled over into a resentment of intellectuals and experts.

Finally, unlike our previous postwar periods, ours has been a period of continued crisis, from which the future promises no relief. In no foreign war of our history did we fight so long or make such sacrifices as in World War II. When it was over, instead of being able to resume our peacetime preoccupations, we were very promptly confronted with another war. It is hard for a certain type of American, who does not think much about the world outside and does not want to have to do so, to understand why we must become involved in such an unremitting struggle. It will be the fate of those in power for a long time to come to have to conduct the delicate diplomacy of the cold peace without the sympathy or understanding of a large part of their own people. From bitter experience, Eisenhower and Dulles are learning today what Truman and Acheson learned yesterday.

These considerations suggest that the pseudo-conservative political style, while it may already have passed the peak of its influence, is one of the long waves of twentieth-century American history and not a momentary mood. I do not share the widespread foreboding among liberals that this form of dissent will grow until it overwhelms our liberties altogether and plunges us into a totalitarian nightmare. Indeed, the idea that it is purely and simply fascist or totalitarian, as we have known these things in recent European history, is to my mind a false conception, based upon the failure to read American developments in terms of our peculiar American constellation of political realities. (It reminds me of the people who, because they found several close parallels between the NRA and Mussolini's corporate state, were once deeply troubled at the thought that the NRA was the beginning of American fascism.) However, in
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a populistic culture like ours, which seems to lack a responsible elite with political and moral autonomy, and in which it is possible to exploit the wildest currents of public sentiment for private purposes, it is at least conceivable that a highly organized, vocal, active and well-financed minority could create a political climate in which the rational pursuit of our well-being and safety would become impossible.

1 Theodore W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950), pp. 675–76. While I have drawn heavily upon this enlightening study, I have some reservations about its methods and conclusions. For a critical review, see Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954), particularly the penetrating comments by Edward Shils.


6 Cf. in this respect the observation of Tocqueville: "It cannot be denied that democratic institutions strongly tend to promote the feeling of envy in the human heart; not so much because they afford to everyone the means of rising to the same level with others as because these means perpetually disappoint the persons who employ them. Democratic institutions awaken and foster a passion for equality which they can never entirely satisfy." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. by Phillips Bradley (New York, 1945), Vol. I, p. 201.

7 Cf. Samuel Lubell's characterization of isolationism as a vengeful memory, The Future of American Politics (New York, 1952), Chapter VII. See also the comments of Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman on the right-wing agitator: "The agitator seems to steer clear of the area of material needs on which liberal and democratic movements concentrate; his main concern is a sphere of frustration that is usually ignored in traditional politics. The programs that concentrate on material needs seem to overlook that area of moral uncertainties and emotional frustrations that are the immediate manifestations of malaise. It may therefore be conjectured that his followers find the agitator's statements attractive not because he occasionally promises to 'maintain the American standards of living' or to provide a job for everyone, but because he intimates that he will give them the emotional satisfactions that are denied them in the contemporary social and economic set-up. He offers attitudes, not bread." Prophets of Deceit (New York, 1949), pp. 91–92.

8 Every ethnic group has its own peculiar status history, and I am well aware that my remarks in the text slur over many important differences. The status history of the older immigrant groups like the Germans and the Irish is quite different from that of ethnic elements like the Italians, Poles and Czechs, who have more recently arrived at the point at which they are bidding for wide acceptance in the professional and white-collar classes, or
at least for the middle-class standards of housing and consumption enjoyed by these classes. The case of the Irish is of special interest, because the Irish, with their long-standing prominence in municipal politics, qualified as it has been by their relative non-acceptance in many other spheres, have an unusually ambiguous status. In many ways they have gained, while in others, particularly insofar as their municipal power has recently been challenged by other groups, especially the Italians, they have lost some status and power. The election of 1928, with its religious bigotry and social snobbery, inflicted upon them a status trauma from which they have never fully recovered, for it was a symbol of the Protestant majority’s rejection of their ablest leadership on grounds quite irrelevant to merit. This feeling was kept alive by the breach between Al Smith and F.D.R., followed by the rejection of Jim Farley from the New Deal succession. A study of the Germans would perhaps emphasize the effects of uneasiness over national loyalties arising from the Hitler era and World War II, but extending back even to World War I.

One of the noteworthy features of the current situation is that fundamentalist Protestants and fundamentalist Catholics have so commonly subordinated their old feuds (and for the first time in our history) to unite in opposition to what they usually describe as “godless” elements.

Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry* (New York, 1942), Chapter III.

See Else Frenkel-Brunswik’s “Parents and Childhood as seen through the Interviews,” *The Authoritarian Personality*, Chapter X. The author remarks (pp. 387–88) concerning subjects who were relatively free from ethnic prejudice that in their families “less obedience is expected of the children. Parents are less status-ridden and thus show less anxiety with respect to conformity and are less intolerant toward manifestations of socially unacceptable behavior. . . . Comparatively less pronounced status-concern often goes hand in hand with greater richness and liberation of emotional life. There is, on the whole, more affection, or more unconditional affection, in the families of unprejudiced subjects. There is less surrender to conventional rules. . . .”


The similarity is also posited by Adorno, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 ff., and by others (see the studies cited by him, p. 152).

I refer to such men to make the point that this animosity extends to those who are guilty of no wrongdoing. Of course a person like Alger Hiss, who has been guilty, suits much better. Hiss is the hostage the pseudo-conservatives hold from the New Deal generation. He is a heaven-sent gift. If he did not exist, the pseudo-conservatives would not have been able to invent him.
Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited:
A Postscript — 1962

RICHARD HOFSTADTER

At the time these essays appeared, many critics objected to an assumption that I believe underlies all of them—the assumption that the radical right is a response to certain underlying and continuing tensions in American society. It was held that the authors of these essays were being intellectually fancy and oversubtle. There was no need to go so far around the bend to find new explanations for these phenomena, critics complained, when the important explanations were obvious: the anxiety arising from the Korean stalemate, coming as it did right on the heels of the sacrifices of a major war; a series of startling revelations about Communist espionage; the long wartime and postwar inflation, the continuing high level of taxation, the frustration of the Republican Party shut out of the White House for twenty years. With all these things on tap to account for right-wing discontent, why invoke sociological forces whose relation to the issues seemed less direct?

Such criticism, I believe, was based upon a fundamental misconception of what these essays were trying to do. I can speak only for myself, but I doubt that any of the authors would deny that the Korean War was in the foreground of radical-right thinking, or that taxation had a good deal to do with its economic discontents. But the authors of these essays were curious about something in which their critics do not seem to have been interested—and that is the whole complex of forces that underlay the responses of the public to the frustrations of the 1950s. After all, not every wealthy American demanded the repeal of the income-tax amendment; not every Republican responded to the twenty-year period of Democratic as-
cendancy by branding the Democratic Party as treasonous; not every American who was wearied by the Korean stalemate called for all-out war at the risk of starting World War III—and, indeed, some Americans who expressed violent impatience over the conduct of the Korean War were those who were in fact benefiting from it economically. What puzzled us was how to account for the complex of forces in the structure of American society, in American traditions, that made it possible for men and women who were sharing the same experiences and the same disorders to call for drastically different types of remedies. After six or seven years of additional observation of the extreme right, it now seems more probable that our original approach was correct.

One aspect of my own essay that may be of enduring use and yet that now seems to require some modification is the concept of status politics. That there is a need for some such concept I have little doubt. My generation was raised in the conviction that the basic motive power in political behavior is the economic interest of groups. This is not the place to discuss at length the inadequacies of that view of the world, but it may be enough to say that we have learned to find it wanting as an account of much of the vital political behavior of our own time. However much importance we continue to attach to economic interests or imagined economic interests in political action, we are still confronted from time to time with a wide range of behavior for which the economic interpretation of politics seems to be inadequate or misleading or altogether irrelevant. It is to account for this range of behavior that we need a different conceptual framework, and I believe that the extreme right wing provides a pre-eminent example of such behavior.

However, it now seems doubtful that the term "status politics," which apparently was used for the first time in this essay, is an adequate term for what I had in mind. No doubt, social status is one of the things that is at stake in most political behavior, and here the right wing is no exception. But there are other matters involved, which I rather loosely assimilated to this term, that can easily be distinguished from status, strictly defined. The term "status" requires supplementation. If we were to speak of "cultural politics" we might supply part of what is missing. In our political life there have always been certain types of cultural issues, questions of faith and morals, tone and style, freedom and coercion, which become fighting issues. To choose but one example, prohibition was an issue of
this kind during the twenties and early thirties. In the struggle over prohibition, economic interests played only the most marginal role; the issue mobilized religious and moral convictions, ethnic habits and hostilities, attitudes toward health and sexuality, and other personal preoccupations. There are always such issues at work in any body politic, but perhaps they are particularly acute and important in the United States because of our ethnic and religious heterogeneity. As I indicated in my essay, they loom larger during periods of prosperity, when economic conflicts are somewhat muted, than they do during periods of depression and economic discontent. Hard times mobilize economic group antagonisms; prosperity liberates the public for the expression of its more luxurious hostilities.

But this brings us to another aspect of the matter: at times politics becomes an arena into which the wildest fancies are projected, the most paranoid suspicions, the most absurd superstitions, the most bizarre apocalyptic fantasies. From time to time, movements arise that are founded upon the political exploitation of such fancies and fears, and while these movements can hardly aspire to animate more than a small minority of the population, they do exercise, especially in a democratic and populistically oriented political culture like our own, a certain leverage upon practical politics. Thus, today, despite the presence of issues of the utmost gravity and urgency, the American press and public have been impelled to discuss in all seriousness a right-wing movement whose leaders believe that President Eisenhower was a member of the "Communist conspiracy. It seems hardly extravagant to say that the true believers in a movement of this sort project into the arena of politics utterly irrelevant fantasies and disorders of a purely personal kind. Followers of a movement like the John Birch Society are in our world but not exactly of it. They intersect with it, they even have effects on it that could become grave, but the language they speak is a private language; they can compel the rest of us to listen to this language because they are just numerous enough, and because, the structure of political influence is loose enough for them to apply a political leverage out of proportion to their numbers. They represent a kind of politics that is not exactly status politics or cultural politics, as I have defined them, but that might be called "projective politics." It involves the projection of interests and concerns, not only largely private but essentially pathological, into the public scene.

In action, of course, considerations of status and cultural role be-
The Radical Right
come intertwined with the content of projective politics, and what may be well worth making as an analytical distinction is not necessarily so clear in the actual world of political controversy. One of the reasons why the term "status" now seems to me to be inadequate to suggest the full complex of realities that I had in mind is that several considerations are woven together in an unusually complex social fabric. One thing that has been at stake is the problem of an American identity, which has an especial poignance because of the heavy immigrant composition of our population and its great mobility. Many Americans still have problems about their Americanness and are still trying, psychologically speaking, to naturalize themselves. Ethnicity is in itself partly a status problem because American life does contain a status hierarchy in which ethnic background is important. Finally, because of the great mixture of religious and moral strains in our population, there is a constant argument over the social legitimacy of certain roles and values.

One of the facets of my own essay which I am disposed to regret is its excessive emphasis on what might be called the clinical side of the problem. Whether or not the psychological imputations it makes prove to be correct or not, I think a good deal more might have been said on purely behavioral and historical grounds to establish the destructive and "radical" character of pseudo-conservatism. The political character of this movement can be helpfully delineated by comparing it with true conservatism. The United States has not provided a receptive home for formal conservative thought or classically conservative modes of behavior. Lacking a formidable aristocratic tradition, this country has produced at best patricians rather than aristocrats, and the literature of American political experience shows how unhappy the patricians (for example, Henry Adams) have been in their American environment. Restless, mobile both geographically and socially, overwhelmingly middle-class in their aspirations, the American people have not given their loyalty to a national church or developed a traditionally oriented bar or clergy, or other institutions that have the character of national establishments. But it is revealing to observe the attitude of the extreme right wing toward those institutions that come closest here to reproducing the institutional apparatus of the aristocratic classes in other countries. Such conservative institutions as the better preparatory schools, the Ivy League colleges and universities, the Supreme Court, and the State Department—exactly those institutions that have been
largely in the custodianship of the patrician or established elements in American society—have been the favorite objects of right-wing animosity.

And while the right-winger dislikes the social type that might be called conservative—a type represented by men like Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Adlai Stevenson, and Harry L. Stimson—it also dislikes what might be called the practical conservatism of our time, as represented by the Eisenhower administration and by the eastern Dewey-Willkie-Eisenhower wing of the Republican Party. The Chicago Tribune expressed the dominant right-wing view some years ago when it lumped together "the nationalist, the Demi-Reps, the Truman Republicans, and the New Dealers, who . . . played footie-footie with the Communist for years." When the Democrats were finally ousted in the election of 1952, nothing less than a complete bouleversement in government would have satisfied the extreme right. Most of them were already highly suspicious of Eisenhower, and they felt they were justified when his administration neither uprooted the welfare reforms of the previous twenty years nor reversed the general strategy of American foreign policy. As the Chicago Tribune said of Eisenhower's 1955 State of the Union message, "Welfare statism and a tender if meddlesome solicitude for every fancied want of a once self-reliant citizenry were pyramided and compounded in this message."

Perhaps what is more to the point—even though it is conjecture and not history—is that if Robert A. Taft had been nominated and elected in 1952, his administration might have been almost as disappointing to the hard core of the extreme right as Eisenhower's. The extreme right really suffers not from the policies of this or that administration, but from what America has become in the twentieth century. It suffers, moreover, from an implacable dislike and suspicion of all constituted authority. In part this is because, entertaining expectations that cannot be realized, it is bound to be dissatisfied with any regime. But still more decisive, in my opinion, is that the extreme right wing is constituted out of a public that simply cannot arrive at a psychological modus vivendi with authority, cannot reconcile itself to that combination of acceptance and criticism which the democratic process requires of the relationship between the leaders and the led. Being uncomfortable with the thought of any leadership that falls short of perfection, the extreme right is also incapable of analyzing the world with enough common sense to
establish any adequate and realistic criterion for leadership. The right wing tolerates no compromises, accepts no half measures, understands no defeats. In this respect, it stands psychologically outside the frame of normal democratic politics, which is largely an affair of compromise. One of the most fundamental qualities, then, in the right-wing mentality of our time is its implicit utopianism. I can think of no more economical way of expressing its fundamental difference from the spirit of genuine conservatism.

If this essay were to be rewritten today, there is one force in American life, hardly more than hinted at in my original formulation, that would now loom very large indeed, and that is fundamentalism. The little that we know from the press about the John Birch Society, the Christian Crusade of Dr. Fred Schwarz, and the activities of the Reverend Billy Hargis has served to remind us how much alive fundamentalism still is in the United States, and how firmly it has now fixed its attention on the fight against Communism, as it once concentrated on the fight against evolution. To understand the Manichaean style of thought, the apocalyptic tendencies, the love of mystification, the intolerance of compromise that are observable in the right-wing mind, we need to understand the history of fundamentalism as well as the contributions of depth psychology; and those who would understand it will do well to supplement their acquaintance with Rohrschach techniques or the construction of the F-scale with a rereading of the Book of Revelations. To the three sources of right-wing sentiment that are commonly enumerated— isolationism (or anti-Europeanism), ethnic prejudice, and old-fashioned "liberal" economics—one must add the fundamentalist revolt against modernity, and not by any means as a minor partner.
The Intellectuals

and the Discontented Classes

— 1955

DAVID RIESMAN

and NATHAN GLAZER

In the nineteen-thirties, Maury Maverick, who died in 1954, was a quite exceptional but far from untypical representative of the Texas political outlook: free-swinging, red-tape cutting, "a man's a man for a' that." Born to a famous Texas name which had entered the common speech, he enjoyed living up to it by defending the downtrodden: the Spanish-Americans of San Antonio; the small businessmen; and, most courageously, the Communists and their right to be heard in the municipal auditorium. In the Maverick era, Texas was reputed to be the most interventionist state in the Union, providing some of the firmest support to Roosevelt's foreign policy. Its influential Congressional delegation, which included Sam Rayburn as well as Senator Tom Connally and a less cautious Lyndon Johnson, were Roosevelt's stalwarts as often in domestic as in foreign policy. But not many years later Maverick had turned into a political untouchable, and Texas competed with the North Central isolationist belt in violent opposition to the old Roosevelt policies no less than to the policies of Truman, his successor and legitimate heir.

Texas demonstrates in extreme form the great shift in the character of American politics and political thinking since the Second World War. We can date the change more precisely than that. In the election of 1948, Harry Truman, more unequivocally and guilelessly committed to many New Deal policies and attitudes than F.D.R., won an election against a candidate far more liberal and capable, if
less appealingly homespun, than Eisenhower. Even as late as the beginning of 1950, the special political tone of the Roosevelt era continued to influence public life. We need only recall the mood of the Democratic Senators investigating McCarthy's charges of Communist infiltration into the State Department early that year. The transcript shows them at ease, laughing away McCarthy's charges, taking it for granted that the country was with them, and that McCarthy was another Martin Dies. Four years later, another group of Democratic Senators sat in judgment on McCarthy. They were tense and anxious, seeking the protective cover of J. Edgar Hoover, trying to seem just as good Communist-hunters—indeed, better Republicans—than any of their colleagues. In the last years of Truman's term, while many demagogic anti-Communist steps were taken by a reluctant administration—as well as many effective ones under Acheson's bedeviled auspices—the general climate of Washington still remained comparatively easygoing. Congress was a partially manageable menace and General Vaughan still could get along without knowing the difference between Harry Dexter White and Adolf Berle.

Many explanations have been offered for what appears to be a decisive shift in the American mentality. Fear of the Soviet Union is alleged by some to be the cause; others blame McCarthy, his allies, and his victims; others look for cynical explanations, while still others think that Americans have abandoned liberal traditions for good and all. In this essay we attempt to estimate the real extent of the shift, to delineate some factors, previously neglected, which may be relevant, and to offer some very tentative interpretations pointing toward the revival of a liberal political imagination.

I

Detectable and decisive shifts of political mood can occur, of course, without affecting the majority. And this seems to be what has happened in this country. The less educated part of the population takes a long time learning to form an opinion about any international matter and even more time to change it. It is not easily accessible to new information and is not trained to alter its opinions under exposure to the public interpretation of events. Thus, the World War II alliance with the Soviet Union did little to change the suspicion and distrust with which (apart from sheer apathy) the
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poor and less educated in this country have always regarded Russia—indeed, all foreign countries; these people were “protected” by their fatalism, generalized suspiciousness, and apathy from the war-time messages of the movies, the OWI, and like agencies. Consequently, the worsening of relations with the Soviet Union found the “backward” strata already holding the appropriate attitudes toward Russia—no change was demanded of them, and little change occurred.

The less educated of whom we speak are of course literate; they have radios and TV and buy newspapers; and to an Asiatic they must appear to move with fabulous speed. Certainly, in non-political matters (where the “voter” has at hand the ready mechanism of a retail store) fashions spread with ever faster waves, and the “backward” buy “modern” in furniture long before they will buy it in elections. Yet it is the educated, the readers of editorial pages, who have customarily been responsible for the major changes in American political position. For example, the shift of this group from neutrality to intervention in 1940 and 1941 allowed the Lend Lease Act to slip through. It also supplied the cadre under Averell Harriman which then energetically did the actual “lending.”

The odd situation today, however, is that such a change does not suffice to explain what happened between 1950 and 1952. Many of the intelligent (i.e., college-educated) and articulate minority still in the main are not unsympathetic to Roosevelt’s and Truman’s foreign policies. They believe that the alliances with Britain and France must be maintained; they do not regard Communist infiltration as a serious problem; they do regard the threat to civil liberties by Communist hunters as a serious problem. If they do not always say so, this is partly for protective coloration, partly because, as we shall see, they have been put on the defensive not only strategically but also within themselves. (There are of course others of the college-educated who have always hated Truman and Roosevelt, largely for domestic “that man” reasons; they are not averse to using foreign policy as a heaven-sent means of vindication.)

As we have seen, the shift has not been among the inarticulate—they have always held their present attitudes. The decisive factors, we suggest, have been twofold, and interconnected. On the one hand, the opinion leaders among the educated strata—the intellectuals and those who take cues from them—have been silenced, rather more by their own feelings of inadequacy and failure than by
direct intimidation. On the other hand, many who were once among
the inarticulate masses are no longer silent: an unacknowledged so-
cial revolution has transformed their situation. Rejecting the liberal
intellectuals as guides, they have echoed and reinforced the stri-
dency of right-wing demi-intellectuals—themselves often arising
from those we shall, until we can find a less clumsy name, call the
ex-masses.

II

During the New Deal days a group of intellectuals led and played
lawyer for classes of discontented people who had tasted prosperity
and lost it, and for a mass of underprivileged people who had been
promised prosperity and seen enough mobility around them to be-
lieve in it. Today, both sources of discontent have virtually
disappeared as a result of fifteen years of prosperity. This same
prosperity, and its attendant inflation, has hit many elderly and
retired people who cannot adjust financially, politically, or psycho-
logically to the altered value of a dollar—people, who, though they
have the money, cannot bring themselves to repair their homes be-
cause they have not been brought up to “do it yourself” nor to pay
three dollars an hour to someone else for doing it. Among the youth,
too, are many people who are at once the beneficiaries and the
victims of prosperity, people made ill-at-ease by an affluence not
preceded by imagining its reality, nor preceded by a change to a
character-structure more attuned to amenity than to hardship. The
raw-rich Texas millionaire appears often to be obsessed by fears
that “they” will take his money away—almost as if he were fasci-
nated by a fatality which would bring him, as it were, back to
earth.

These people, whether suddenly affluent or simply better off, form
a new middle class, called out of the city tenements and the marginal
small towns by the uneven hand of national prosperity; many have
moved to the fringes of urban centers, large and small. This has been
described in Fortune as a new middle-class market, which will play
a great role in keeping the economy prosperous. But in politics,
these former masses do not have so benign an influence—we shall
call them the discontented classes.

Their discontent is only partially rooted in relative economic de-
privation. Many of them, it is true, forgetting their condition of fifteen
years ago, see only that the salaries and income they would once have thought princely do not add up to much. Politically, such people, thinking in terms of a relatively fixed income (in this case, of course, not from capital, save occasional rentals, but from salaries and wages) against a standard of variable expenses, are generally conservative. And their conservatism is of a pinched and narrow sort, less interested in the preservation of ancient principles than in the current reduction of government expenditures and taxes. It is the conservatism we usually associate with provincial France rather than with the small-town venture capitalist of the older Yankee sort. This conservatism helps create the particular posture of the discontented classes vis-à-vis America's foreign role; they are mad at the rest of the world for bothering them, hate to waste money in spankings and cannot stand wasting money in rewards.

But more significant, and more difficult to understand and grapple with, is a discontent which arises from the mental discomforts that come with belonging to a class rather than a mass—discomforts founded less on economic than on intellectual uncertainty. If one belongs to the middle class one is supposed to have an opinion, to cope with the world as well as with one's job and immediate surroundings. But these new members have entered a realm where the interpretations of the world put forth by intellectuals in recent decades, and widely held among the educated, are unsatisfying, even threatening. Having precariously won respectability in paycheck and consumption style, they find this achievement menaced by a political and more broadly cultural outlook tending to lower barriers of any sort—between this nation and other nations, between groups in this nation (as in the constant appeals to inter-ethnic amity), between housing projects reserved for Negroes and suburbs reserved for whites; many families also cannot stand the pressure to lower barriers between men and women, or between parents and children.

When this barrier-destroying outlook of the intellectuals promised economic advance as well as racial equality, many of the impoverished could accept the former and ignore the latter. Now, having achieved a modicum of prosperity, the political philosophy of the intellectuals, which always requires government spending, taxes, and inflation, is a threat—and the racial equality, which could be viewed with indifference in the city tenement or homogeneous small town, is a formidable reality in the new suburbs. When the intellectuals were developing the ideology justifying cutting in the masses on the boun-
ties of American productivity, they were less apt to be called do-gooders and bleeding hearts—the grown-up version of that unendurable taunt of being a sissy—than now when the greater part of the masses needing help are outside the nation’s boundaries.  

Very often, moreover, the individuals making up the discontented classes have come, not to the large civilizing cities, but to the new or expanding industrial frontiers—to Wichita and Rock Island, to Jacksonville or the Gulf Coast, to Houston or San Diego, to Tacoma or Tonawanda. Even those who become very rich no longer head automatically for New York and Newport. Whereas the Baptist Rockefeller, coming from Cleveland where he was educated, allowed Easterners to help civilize him by giving away his money, as Carnegie and Frick also did, these new rich lack such centralized opportunities for gratuitous benevolence, being constrained by the income tax and the institutionalization of philanthropy. And their wives (whatever their secret and suppressed yearnings) no longer seem to want the approval of Eastern women of culture and fashion; they choose to remain within their provincial orbits, rather than to become immigrants to an alien cosmopolitan center. Indeed, the airplane has made it possible for the men—and *Vogue* and Neiman-Marcus for the women—to share in the advantages of New York without the miseries, expenses, and contaminations of living there. Howard Hughes, for example, can do business operating from a plane, yacht, or hotel room.

All this, however, puts some complex processes too simply. New big money in America has always tended to unsettle its possessors and the society at large. For one thing, the absence of an aristocracy means that there is no single, time-approved course of buying land, being deferential to the values of those already on the land, and earning a title by good behavior. Though Rockefeller tried philanthropy, he was still hated, still needed the services of Ivy Lee. Yet he lived at a time when the aristocratic model, in Europe if not here, provided certain guide-posts. Today, the enormously wealthy new men of Texas have not even the promise of an assured well-traveled road, at the end of which stand duchesses, Newport, and gatekeepers like Ward McAllister. Instead, such men may prefer to buy a television program for McCarthy, or to acquire the publishing firm of Henry Holt, or, on behalf of an anti-Wall Street business demagogue, the very railroad which once helped cement New York “Society.”

Moreover, the partial and uneven spread of cosmopolitan values to the lower strata and to the hinterland has as one consequence the
fact that rich men can no longer simply spend their way to salvation. Conspicuous underconsumption has replaced conspicuous consumption as the visible sign of status, with the result that men who have made enough money to indulge the gaudy dreams of their underprivileged youth learn all too fast that they must not be flamboyant. This is a trick that the older centers of culture have played on the newer centers of wealth. The latter can try to catch up; Baylor and Houston Universities, and the Dallas Symphony, have not done too badly. Or they can enter the still gaudy forum of politics to get back at those they suspect of ridiculing their efforts. Perhaps there was something of this in Hearst, as there is in some of the newer magnates of the media. Senator McCarthy, with his gruff charm and his Populist roots, seems made to order for such men; and he has attracted some of the political plungers among the new underprivileged rich, a task made easier by the fact that they have too few intellectuals and idea men to divide and distract them.

Furthermore, a great many Americans, newly risen from poverty or the catastrophe of the Depression, are much more fearful of losing their wealth than are scions of more established families already accustomed to paying taxes, to giving to charity, and to the practice of noblesse oblige. We know many men who made their money in war orders, or through buying government-financed plants, or through price supports, who hate the federal government with the ferocity of beneficiaries—and doubtless want to cut off aid from the ungrateful French or British! Such men cannot admit that they did not make “their” money by their own efforts; they would like to abolish the income tax, and with it the whole nexus of defense and international relations, if only to assert their own anachronistic individualism the more firmly. They are likely to be clients, not only of lawyers who specialize in the capital gains tax, but also of prophets and politicians specializing in the bogeys of adults.

The rapid and unanticipated acquisition of power seems to produce a sense of unreality—people are “up in the air.” We face the paradox that many Americans are more fearful today though more prosperous than ever before and though America is in some ways more powerful.

III

It is the professional business of politicians, as of other promoters and organizers, to find in the electorate or other constituency organ-
izable blocs who will shift their allegiance to them, who will respond with passion in the midst of indifference, and with identification in the midst of diffuse and plural ties. In the pre-World War I days of the great outcry against the Trusts, it was possible to find a few old and dislocated middle-class elements which resented the new dominance by big and baronial business—in some respects, these were precursors of the present discontented classes, though with more to hope for and less to fear. In the thirties, the way had already in large measure been prepared for an appeal to unemployed factory workers and Southern and Western farmers on the basis of Wilsonian and Populist rhetoric, made into a heady brew by more recent infusions of radicalism, native and imported. These discontented masses showed in their voting behavior (in NLRB and Agricultural Adjustment Act elections as well as at the polls) that the appeal, whatever it meant to those who made it, hit home in terms of the listeners' wants and situation.

How can the discontented classes of today be welded into a political bloc? This is the question that haunts and tempts politicians. The uncertainty of the Democrats faced with Stevenson and of the Republicans faced with McCarthy signifies not only disagreements of principle but also doubts as to whether a proper appeal has as yet been found on which a ruling or controlling coalition can be built. As geologists cover the earth prospecting for oil, so politicians cover the electorate prospecting for hidden hatreds and identities.

In local elections campaigns can be waged on the promise to hold down taxes and build no more schools. And many people in national affairs will respond to a promise to hold down inflation or to create more jobs. But when voters feel insecure in the midst of prosperity, it is not an economic appeal that will really arouse them. For it is not the jobs or goods they do not have that worry them; indeed, what worries them is often that they do not know what worries them, or why, having reached the promised land, they still suffer. Sharply felt needs have been replaced by vague discontents; and at such a time programs or clear-cut ideas of any kind are worse than useless, politically speaking. This is one reason why the appeal to the discontented classes is so often more a matter of tone than of substance—why a gesture of retroactive vindictiveness like the Bricker Amendment can arouse angry Minute Women and small-town lawyers, why on the whole the pseudo-conservative right has so small a program and so belligerent a stance. In this situation, ideology tends to become more important than economics. 5
And when one must resort to ideology in a prosperous America, one must fall back on the vaguely recalled, half-dreamlike allegiances and prejudices serving most people for ideology. Americanism, of course, will play a major role; but, paradoxically enough, so do those underground half-conscious ethnic allegiances and prejudices which, as Samuel Lubell has shown, still play a large part in American politics. In much that passes for anti-Communism these strands are combined, as for instance for many Irish or Polish Catholics whose avid anti-Communism enables them to feel more solidly American than some less fanatical Protestants who, as earlier arrivals, once looked down on them; similarly, a good deal of McCarthy's support represents the comeback of the German-Americans after two world wars. A haunting doubt about Americanism and disloyalty, however, affects not only those of recent enemy or socially devalued stocks but also those many businessmen forced to operate under government regulations of price and materials control, or under defense contracts. As Talcott Parsons has observed (see Chapter 9), these men are constantly being asked, on grounds of patriotism, to obey government norms which they are as constantly opposing and evading; for them it is convenient to discover that it is not they who are ambivalent toward defense, but those others, the Reds or the State Department or the Democrats. Many of these men, especially perhaps in small business, are victims of a prosperity which has made them rich but neither as enlightened as many big business managers nor as independent as their ideology expects them to be.

Not all members of the discontented classes come from similar backgrounds or arrive at similar destinations; nevertheless, mobility—a fast rise from humble origins, or a transplantation to the city, or a move from the factory class to the white-collar class—is a general characteristic. They or their parents are likely to have voted Democratic sometime between 1930 and 1948, and such a memory makes them more susceptible to ideological appeals, for in rising above their impoverished or ethnically "un-American" beginnings, they have found it "time for a change" in identification: they would like to rise "above" economic appeals ("don't let them take it away") to ideological ones—or, in more amiable terms, "above" self-interest to patriotism. Such people could not be brought in one move into the Republican Party, which would seem too much like a betrayal of origins, but they could be brought to take a stand "above party"—
and to vote for a non-partisan general whom the Democrats had also sought. According to a recent study reported by Professor Malcolm Moos, in two counties outside Boston the self-declared "independent" voters now outnumber the Republicans and Democrats combined—a reflection of this roving background of discontented classes which has become the most dynamic force in American political life.

Recently, a woman who had campaigned for Eisenhower (while her husband voted for Stevenson) told one of us how much she admired Ike's sincerity, adding, "Actually I don't know enough about politics to identify myself with either one [major party], and I am a—what do you call it—an independent." Of course, not all independents stand in this sort of proud ignorance above parties and above the politicians who may have helped their parents with jobs or visas or the warmth of recognition.

Just as many among the newly prosperous tend at present to reject the traditional party labels (while others seek, perhaps after a split ticket or two, the protective coloration of the GOP), so they also reject the traditional cultural and educational leadership of the enlightened upper and upper-middle classes. They have sent their children to college as one way of maintaining the family's social and occupational mobility. Some of these children have become eager strivers for cosmopolitanism and culture, rejecting the values now held by the discontented classes. But many of those who have swamped the colleges have acquired there, and helped their families learn, a half-educated resentment for the traditional intellectual values some of their teachers and schoolmates represented. While their humbler parents may have maintained in many cases a certain reverence for education, their children have gained enough familiarity to feel contempt. (Tragically, the high schools and colleges have often felt compelled at the same time to lower their standards to meet the still lower level of aspiration of these youngsters, no eager beavers for learning, but too well off to enter the labor force.) In many local school board fights, the old conservative and hence intellectually libertarian elites have been routed by lower-middle-class pressure groups who, often to their surprise, discovered the weakness of the schools and their defenders—in many of these fights, much as on the national scene, ethnic elements helped identify the combatants. Once having seen the political weakness, combined with social prestige, of the traditional cultural values, the discontented classes,
trained to despise weakness, became still less impressed by the intellectual cadres furnishing much of the leadership in the Thirties.

The high school and college training has had a further effect of strengthening the desire of the graduates to take some part in political life, at least by voting: we know that non-voting and non-participation generally is far more common among the uneducated. Even more, it has strengthened their need for an intellectual position to give a name, an identity, to their malaise. Whatever they think of intellectuals as such, they cannot do without them, and sustenance rejected in the form of the adult education work of the Ford Foundation is sought or accepted from mentors like Hunt's Facts Forum whose tone reflects their own uneasiness and yet gives it a factual, "scientific" cast. Thus they repay their "education for citizenship."

We have spoken earlier of the xenophobia and slowness in altering opinions characteristic of the lower classes. If in a survey people are asked, "Do you think it wise to trust others?" the less educated are always the more suspicious; they have in the course of life gained a peasant-like guile, the sort of sloganized cynicism so beautifully described by Richard Wright in Black Boy. In a hierarchical society, this distrust does not become a dynamic social and political factor; except insofar as it prevents the organization of the masses it remains a problem only for individuals in their relations with other individuals. But when the mistrustful, with prosperity, are suddenly pushed into positions of leverage, attitudes previously channeled within the family and neighborhood are projected upon the national and international scene.

Recent psychoanalytically-oriented work on ethnic prejudice provides possible clues as to why overt anti-Semitism has declined at the same time that attacks on Harvard and other symbols of Eastern seaboard culture seem to have increased. In their valuable book, The Dynamics of Prejudice, Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz make the point that in America Jews and Negroes divide between them the hostilities which spring from internal conflict: The super-ego is involved in anti-Semitism, since the Jew is felt to represent the valued but unachieved goals of ambition, money, and group loyalty ("clannishness"), whereas fear and hatred of the Negro spring from id tendencies which the individual cannot manage, his repressed desires for promiscuity, destruction of property, and general looseness of living. (In Europe, the Jews must do double duty, as the outlet for both id and super-ego dynamisms.) Today, on the one
hand, the increasing sexual emancipation of Americans has made the Negro a less fearsome image in terms of sexuality (though he remains a realistic threat to neighborhood real estate and communal values) and, on the other hand, prosperity has meant that the Jew is no longer a salient emblem of enviable financial success. Thus, while the KKK declines the former "racial" bigot finds a new threat: the older educated classes of the East, with their culture and refinement, with "softness" and other amenities he does not yet feel able to afford.  

Furthermore, the sexual emancipation which has made the Negro less of a feared and admired symbol of potency has presented men with a much more difficult problem: the fear of homosexuality. Indeed, homosexuality becomes a much more feared enemy than the Negro. (It may also be that homosexuality is itself spreading or news of it is spreading, so that people are presented with an issue which formerly was kept under cover—another consequence of enlightenment.) How powerful, then, is the political consequence of combining the image of the homosexual with the image of the intellectual—the State Department cooky-pusher Harvard-trained sissy thus becomes the focus of social hatred and the Jew becomes merely one variant of the intellectual sissy—actually less important than the Eastern-educated snob! Many people say of McCarthy that they approve of his ends but not of his methods. We think this statement should be reversed to read that they approve of his methods, which are so obviously not sissified, but care little about his ends, which are irrelevant provided that the targets are drawn with the foregoing constellation in mind.

As a result of all this, the left-wing and liberal intellectuals, who came forward during the New Deal and who played so effective a role in the fight against Nazism and in "prematurely" delineating the nature of the Communist as an enemy, today find themselves without an audience, their tone deprecated, their slogans ineffectual.

IV

Apart from this central social change, much has happened to reduce the intellectuals to a silence only temporarily broken by such a clamor as that over McCarthy.

For one thing, the success of the New Deal has silenced them. The New Deal as a triumphant movement at once of the "folk," liberal
government officials, and the intellectuals, came to an end in 1937. By this time the major reforms, such as the NLRB and Social Security, had already been institutionalized, and many of the remaining unspent energies of the movement were dissipated in the Court-packing fight—nominally waged to preserve the reforms. After this, the crusading spirit could only work on modifications and defenses of an extant structure (for instance, the last major New Deal bill, the Wages and Hours Act of 1938). This vacuum of goals was concealed by affairs in Europe; Fascism in Spain and Germany, and its repercussions in this country, absorbed many New Dealers, the intellectuals, and their allies among the cultivated, and provided them with an agenda. But it was assumed that, once the war was over, the New Dealers and their allies could return to the unending problem of controlling the business cycle and reforming the economy. The business cycle, however, refused to turn down, or did not turn down very far. The one postwar victory based on something like the old New Deal approach and coalition—that of 1948—owed more to the anger of well-to-do farmers at the sag in agricultural prices than it did to the self-interested voting of the city workers. Had the depression come, the alliance forged by Roosevelt might have emerged unimpaired from the wartime National Unity front. But it turned out to be "too easy" to control the business cycle: Keynesianism was no longer esoteric knowledge but the normal working doctrine of administrators, liberal or conservative, and even the Republicans, as was demonstrated in 1953–54, could keep a down-turn in the business cycle under control.

What was left on the home front? One could raise the floor under wages, but in a time of prosperity and inflation that could not excite many beyond those, like the Textile Workers Union, who spoke for the worst-paid workers. One could press for socialized medicine, but this had little of the force of the old New Deal campaigns. One could denounce Wall Street and the interests, but it looked old-fashioned, and more, it divided the liberal intellectuals from those who, on the issues that still counted, were natural allies. For Wall Street was closer to the liberal intellectuals on the two domestic issues that were still alive—civil rights and civil liberties—and on the whole range of issues related to foreign policy than were the former allies of the liberal intellectuals, the farmers and the lower classes of the city, both in their old form as factory workers and in their new form as white-collar workers.
Indeed, what has happened is that the old issues died, and on the new issues former friends or allies have become enemies, and former enemies have become friends. Thus: the liberal intellectuals have had to switch their attitudes toward Wall Street—as symbolizing both the great financiers and the giant corporations they organize—and toward “small business.” By 1940, one could no longer speak of Wall Street as “the enemy.” Demographic shifts and the Depression, along with the increasing ability of industry to finance expansion from reserves, had already weakened the hegemony of Eastern capital. The New Deal, by rhetoric and by such legislation as the SEC and the Holding Company Act, weakened it further, in comparison with the growing power of mid-continent businessmen (not to speak of tax-privileged oil and gas men). And the war had the same effect, for the small businessmen and tougher big businessmen of the Midwest paid less taxes and less attention to OPA and WPB. Wall Street lawyers Stimson and McCloy (perhaps Wendell Willkie might be added), Wall Street bankers Forrestal, Lovett, and Harriman, all have had a far greater cosmopolitanism and tolerance for intellectuals than do, for example, the big and little car dealers and other “small businessmen” of the Eisenhower administration. In general, Wall Streeters, like the British Tories, are a chastened lot—and an easy symbol of abuse for pastoral and Populist simplifications. But, while Harry Hopkins and Tommy Corcoran recruited such men for Roosevelt, many New Dealers and their journalist and intellectual supporters resented their entrance.

They also resented the military, who were frequently similarly chastened men, sensitive to the limits of “free enterprise.” The liberal political imagination in America, with its tendency to consider generals and admirals hopeless conservatives, and its tendency to consider war an outmoded barbarity that serious thinkers should not concern themselves with, was incapable of seeing that military men, like Wall Streeters, might be natural allies in the new epoch, and that military issues would become at least as important as the domestic economic issues of the New Deal era. What could be more crucial today than the outcome of the struggle between the Strategic Air Command and the Army Ground Forces? Yet who concerns himself with it? (The self-styled conservatives, being so often isolationists with overtones of manifest-destiny jingoism, have been on the whole even less well prepared to consider such issues.)

When the comments on policy of intellectuals and academic peo-
ple are dated by ignorance, the military man who might be guided by thoughtful civilians—and there are many such—feels the hopelessness of communication; he must, in spite of himself, resort to pressure and public relations to defend his service and with it his country. Aside from a few journalists like the Alsops, several able magazine editors, and a handful of academic people like Bernard Brodie and the late Edward Mead Earle, only atomic scientists (and their occasional sociological counselors such as Edward A. Shils) have made serious efforts to grapple with such factors.

Today, the Federal defense budget is so large as to leave little room for major socio-cultural argument; in Washington, at least, anything outside of it can be no more than a fringe benefit. As Eliot Janeway has pointed out, we are now in a defense cycle rather than a business cycle; and Daniel Bell, tracing this out in terms of the capital expansion consequences of military commitments, has emphasized how many of the conventional areas of business and social decision are foreclosed. If a depression permitting reshaping of political thinking is unlikely, so also is a huge surplus the spending of which could lead to a healthy controversy outside the warring military services and their highly placed civilian partisans. Everywhere we look, then, there is room for change only within a narrow margin, if we interpret change in terms traditional among intellectuals.

At home, indeed, only the cause of racial emancipation remains to arouse enthusiasm. And this cause differs politically from the old New Deal causes in that it represents for many liberals and intellectuals a withdrawal from the larger statist concerns—it is a cause which is carried into personal life and into the field of culture where it attracts many reflective young people who appear apathetic to civic and electoral politics. By its nature, the field of race is one in which everyone can have a hand: institutionalization has not proceeded nearly so far as it has with economic underprivilege. Thus, every state has some form of social security, but only a few have an FEPC; and, as many Americans become more sensitive to interpersonal considerations, they feel it imperative to work for the amelioration of racial slights that would not have troubled an earlier generation. But as we have indicated, the demand for tolerance of Negroes cannot replace, politically, the demand for "economic equality": it is a very great and aggravating demand to make on children of white immigrants who are paying off the mortgage on their first suburban house.
Thus, for liberal intellectuals in the postwar era the home front could not be the arena for major policies, mobilizing a majority coalition, that it was in the 1930s; the focus had shifted to foreign policy. But for this the New Dealers and the intellectuals were generally unprepared. In particular, they were not prepared to view the Communists and the Soviet Union as the enemy in the way they had earlier recognized Fascism as the enemy, and for this failure they were to suffer seriously. Not many New Dealers had actually been pro-Soviet: the liberal politicians, lawyers, and civil servants had little in common with Popular Front writers, who were contemptuous of reform and addicted to slogans about Marx, the proletariat, and the Revolution. Indeed, the New Dealers were almost too ready to dismiss both the Stalinists and their left-wing sectarian critics; preoccupied with domestic reforms and anti-fascism, they formed no clear-cut image of Communism. They did not sympathize with it, let alone accept it, but they did not see it as a major enemy.

Understandably, they could not be as ebullient in carrying on a policy in which Communism was the major enemy as they could be in attacking depression and the interests. True, they did what was necessary: Truman’s Point IV program and the Marshall Plan were the major postwar achievements of the American political imagination. However, these brilliant anti-Communist measures have not succeeded in saving the New Dealers from the taint of fellow-traveling. Moreover, these measures were not able to arouse among intellectuals, and sensitive young people, very much enthusiasm, even in the hearts of those active in administration of the aid program. For one thing, with the whole planet sending in distress signals, Point IV seems a drop of milk in a rusty Malthusian bucket—to be defended more for what it symbolizes at home than for its often ambiguous blessings (lowered death rates and uncontrollable population growth) abroad. For another thing, all these measures of international hope and help have been launched and caught up in the spirit of cold-war public relations. Thus, no one knows any longer whether he supports a program because it is worthwhile and an expression of humaneness, or because it is necessary to harry Soviet satellites or win over neutralists in Europe and Asia, or because it is necessary to appear tough-minded vis-à-vis congressmen and Philis-
times generally. A military "angle" has been discovered in, for instance, the work of anthropologists seeking to mediate the coming of industry to Indonesia. While such practical compromises and dual motives are always involved in reform, in this case they have often served to confuse the reformers, who deny, even to themselves, that they are motivated by anything visionary; hence the intellectual climate becomes less and less open to political imagination. 9

As the hope of solving our foreign problems by indiscriminately and rapidly raising the standard of living of the rest of the world has waned, the more informed critics of contemporary politics have had to fall back on an austerity program—a program promising less and requiring more: more money, more soldiers, more arms, more aid, hence more taxes. All this is required, of course, not for redistribution within America, though a good deal of this does ensue, but to provide a new carrier (it costs as much as a Valley Authority) or a radar early-warning defense (as costly as socialized medicine). This program divides the intellectuals among themselves—many still agitate for socialized medicine—but divides them still more grievously from the poor and uneducated—for the latter, whatever the bellicose consequences of their xenophobia and love of verbal violence, always oppose war and sacrifice.

It is perhaps in reaction to these dilemmas that one new issue—that of the protection of traditional civil liberties—has risen in recent years to monopolize almost completely the intellectuals' attention. But this, too, is an issue which demands sacrifice from the uneducated masses—not financial sacrifice but the practice of deference and restraint which is understood and appreciated only among the well-to-do and highly educated strata. 10 Thus, a focus on civil liberties and on foreign policy tends, as we have seen, to make intellectuals seek allies among the rich and well-born, rather than among the workingmen and farmers they had earlier courted and cared about; indeed, it tends to make them conservative, once it becomes clear that civil liberties are protected, not by majority vote (which is overwhelmingly unsympathetic), but by traditional institutions, class prerogatives, and judicial life-tenure.

At the same time, the protection of civil liberties has had to cope with the Communist issue, much as other liberal causes have. The Sacco-Vanzetti case united the liberals; the Rosenberg case divided them. The great civil liberties cases of the post-Enlightenment era were not fought to save the Czar's spies and police from detection
and punishment; they were fought for anarchists, for socialists and liberals, for professors teaching evolution or economics; and it takes either a case-hardened and sometimes disingenuous naïveté about Communists or a subtle strategic decision about where to draw the line to muster much enthusiasm for the defense of intellectuals who plead the Fifth Amendment. In this situation, the defense becomes at best a rear-guard action, but cannot hope to be a “positive” program—a demand on the basis of which political identities can be reshaped.

Where do the college-bred young stand in all this? In the late Thirties they were offered blood, sweat, and tears in the fight against Nazism. Some sought and accepted the agenda. But the fight against Nazism was made real by its domestic opponents: one saw almost all that was despicable—anti-Semites, fascists, Europe-haters, the bigoted and the crackpot—lined up on the pro-Nazi side. Today, the pathetic passel of domestic Communists cannot be compared with these fascists who organized street gangs or shook down businessmen; and many of the Communists’ allies are decent, if misguided, “liberals who haven’t learned.” In international politics, we must accept alliances with despots no more savory than our erstwhile domestic fascists. Thus, the young are asked to fight international Communism not on the basis of street experience but of what they are taught. Cool in spirit generally, they can hardly be expected to show enthusiasm. Indeed, a holding game against the Communists is a reality and a prospect to sober the most enthusiastic. The question of appeasement that most thoughtful people could reject offhand in the pre-atom-bomb era now becomes more insistent intellectually even while it becomes outlawed politically.

If we leave substance aside, and consider the tone of politics, we realize that the loss of initiative by intellectuals is coupled with a change of emotional accent. The conservative and ascetic program just sketched is not avant-garde; it is dull; there is no hope in it of saving the world; it assumes the world is well enough and only wishes the Communists thought so too.

Demands are the basis of politics: the demands of a group or class, formulated by its intellectual leaders—or, more accurately, the demands create and identify the group or class which then is led. When a group is either satisfied or exhausted, when for whatever reason it no longer makes demands, then it has lost the élan which can attract new forces. It can only hope that the institutions
and battalions that have been built up by the vanished elan of the past are large enough to withstand the onslaught of those who do make new demands.

VI

It is not only the dilemmas of policy that have been responsible for the decline of enthusiasm and vitality among the liberal intellectuals in the last decade or so. Another factor is hard to discuss without sounding like E. A. Ross, Henry Pratt Fairchild, and other pre-World War I opponents of immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe; yet it seems evident to us that the American crusading spirit has been sustained in considerable measure by the non-conformist conscience of New England and its offshoots in the Western Reserve and the Far West.11 As long as the new immigrants looked up to this model, they tended to imitate the benign as well as the sharp-shooting doctrines and practices of the Yankees, but in a cumulative process which is only now reaching its end, the New Englanders themselves have run out of confidence and prestige: their land is now Vacationland, rather than the source of Abolitionist and other gospel; in the home territory, surrounded by Irish, Italians, Poles, French Canadians, Portuguese whom they have influenced more than either party will admit, they feel defeated and out of control in the charter institutions.12

This is not the place to trace the complex relations between the New England conscience and pragmatic reform. The remaining possessors of that conscience are still a national asset, but there are fewer of them proportionately; their wealth is smaller proportionately; and, scattered throughout the country, they are more remote from the centers of ideas. New ideas have their headquarters in New York. They often originate with, or are mediated by, Jews who have more reasons for hesitation and are perhaps psychologically as well as sociologically more vulnerable to pressure than the New Englanders—just as the newer media (movies and broadcasting) in which they are influential are weaker in the face of censorship than the older media (book publishing and the press) in which they play less part than the Yankees do. To be sure, there are many affinities between Jews and Puritans—both are people of the Book—and a political and intellectual alliance of the sort that Holmes and
Brandeis once typified is still to be found, especially in smaller communities.

On the whole, as Americanization spreads, the old Puritan families have been slowly losing status. Some have responded by eccentricity, leadership, intellectuality, and liberalism; others have joined angry "pro-America" movements—where, ironically enough (save in the DAR), they meet the very Irish or Italian or other newer elements who have displaced or jostled them. Since they can no longer safely snub these ex-Wops, ex-Shanty Irish, and ex-Hunkies, they displace their animus onto the weak targets provided by intellectuals, "left-wingers," "one-worlders," and so on. And they can blame these latter people for the very social changes that have brought the descendants of lowly immigrants into the top councils of what was once, in some areas, the ethnically rather exclusive club of the Republican Party. Their blame, moreover, is not entirely misplaced, for the New Deal, along with the war, did help bring prosperity and mobility and reputability to Catholics and Jews.

After the war, the recognition of the Communist menace still further boosted the status of Catholics by making them almost automatically charter members of the anti-Communist crusade. By the same token, the intellectuals, their limited links with Communism continuously and extravagantly exposed, became more vulnerable. We believe that Granville Hicks in Where We Came Out presents a reasonably just picture of the actual extent of Communist influence in the Thirties—an influence much less than is now often supposed even among intellectuals; indeed, his picture does not take sufficient account of the infinitesimal extent of Party effectiveness outside the major seaboard cities. The New Dealers, as we have already said, were even less affected than the intellectuals, but they shared with the latter some personal and journalistic ties; this, plus some dramatic cases like those of Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss and the belated fellow-traveling of Henry Wallace, made it politically possible—though fantastic—to damn the New Deal as a Communist-front organization. This has created a situation obviously quite different from that of earlier decades, when though liberal intellectuals and New Dealers were also called Communists, they only became as a result firmer and angrier. Today such libel is not only a disaster for public relations but cause for an anxious inner scrutiny. For as it becomes clear that few of the causes liberals have espoused have been immune to exploitation by the Communists, the liberal
The intellectuals lose their former sure conviction about their causes and are put, inside as well as out, on the defensive. One evidence of this is the strategy of continuous balancing so many of us engage in: if one day we defend Negroes (one of the few causes which, though taken up by Communists, still gets relatively unambiguous attention from intellectuals), then the next day we set the record straight by calling for more aid to Indo-China—not, let us repeat, merely for protective coloration but to make clear to ourselves that we are not fools or dupes of fellow-traveler rhetoric.

The intellectuals themselves are further weakened—in their own minds, at least—by the fact that their ideas, even where relevant to contemporary discontent, are quickly taken over by the mass media and transmuted into the common stock of middlebrow conceptions. They can no longer control, even by intentional opacity, the pace of distribution. Thus, what they produce soon becomes dissociated from them and their immediate coteries; in the division of labor, the middlebrows take over the function of dissemination and translation, and this alienation from their “product” leaves the intellectuals, even when they may reach a wider audience with more dispatch than ever before in history, with a feeling of impotence and isolation.

And, finally, the self-confidence of the liberal intellectuals is weakened by their own egalitarian ideology, which has led them not only to attack ethnic and class barriers but to defer to the manners and mores of the lower classes generally. Whereas in the days of Eastern seaboard hegemony the masses sought to imitate the classes, if they sought to rise at all, today imitation is a two-way process, and intellectuals are no longer protected by class and elite arrogance (and the strategic ignorances arrogance protects) against the attitudes of their enemies.18 We find, for example, the cynicism of the lower strata reflected in the desire of the intellectuals to appear tough-minded and in their fear to be thought naïve. Such tough-mindedness in turn may then require acceptance of belligerent and vindictive attitudes in domestic and foreign affairs, and a further weakening of any visionary hopes and motives.

What the left has lost in tone and initiative, the right has gained. The right has believed, ever since “that man” entered the White House, in the utter devilry of the New Deal. But what was once a domestic misanthropy has now been writ large upon the globe: the right has hit on what it regards as an unquestioned truth, which needs only to be spread (the utter sinfulfulness, the total evil, of the idea of
Communism and the total perfection of the idea of Americanism); it maintains the zeal of missionaries in propagating this truth; it feels today it possesses a newer, better, altogether more avant-garde knowledge, even though about so limited a subject as the influence of Communists on American culture and politics (look at The Freeman and The American Mercury, or at McCarthy and His Enemies for illustration). Moreover, this new right possesses that convenient and perhaps essential feeling of martyrdom which its very presence gives to many liberal intellectuals: it sees itself as a minority suffering for its desire to enlighten the people (Peter Viereck has referred to the "bleeding hearts of the right").

But the parallel is far from complete. For the left and the liberals in their days of influence really wanted something: they had specific reforms in mind, and specific legislation. The new right, with its few intellectuals trying to create a program for it, wants at best an atmosphere: it really has no desire to change the face of the nation; it is much more interested in changing the past, in rewriting the history of the New Deal, of the Second World War and its aftermath, or in more ambitious efforts, of the whole modern movement. Here again the comparison of the new right with the Communists is instructive, for the latter, too, in this country have been preoccupied with a state of mind: they have aimed, if not to make Americans sympathetic to the Soviet Union, at least unsympathetic toward its enemies here and overseas. To this end, their greatest efforts have been in rewriting recent and current history, in presenting a certain picture of the world in which big business, on the one side, supported fascism and anti-Semitism, while the Soviet Union, on the other side, fostered Negroes, Jews, and other minorities, and defended the working class. American domestic politics have been useful to the Communists in providing object-lessons for this general theory and in recruiting stalwarts for its further propagation. In the same way, one can read or listen to the organs of the new right and find nothing that amounts to a legislative program: the bills they want passed are those which give expression to their feelings about the past, such as the Bricker Amendment, or withdrawing Hiss's pension and otherwise harassing Communists (often in ways that such veteran Communist-hunters as Governor Dewey think unjust and unwise)—the fight for these measures is an educative fight in re-interpreting the past. When it comes to coping with world Communism, this group has nothing to propose in the way of strengthening anti-Communists abroad—noth-
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ing but withdrawal or muted quasi-suicidal hints of preventive war. In fact, the hatred this group feels for the modern world, as manifested at home, in America, is so huge that there is little energy left over for the rest of the globe—rather, there is an aimless destructiveness in which legislative and local battles simply focus and dramatize resentment.

Nevertheless, this group now possesses the enthusiasm and momentum previously held by liberals. Its leaders cannot channel discontent; they can interpret it: they can explain why everything has gone wrong—for the while, that is enough. Thus, the picture today in American politics is of intelligence without force or enthusiasm facing force and enthusiasm without intelligence.

How much longer can this pattern last? International developments will probably be determinative—the belligerence coupled with isolationism of this rightist group may tempt or frighten the Soviet Union into further adventures and incidents, finally touching off a war of annihilation (we think this most unlikely, and assuredly not inevitable). But the present leadership of the discontented classes has to do more than symbolize their disorientation and lack of satisfying political loyalties if it is to solidify new allegiances. For this, no intellectual reserve of demands appears in the offing. Instead, the leadership is continually subject to the temptation to fall back on the more developed intellectual positions of laissez-faire or of various brands of fascism—but these, it knows, will lose them much of their potential following, which is neither conservative in the older free enterprise sense nor on the lookout for, though tempted by, civil commotion and foreign adventure. It is not surprising that Congress represents the peak of strength of this group, since Congress is a sounding-board for mood—and an extraordinarily democratic one—as much as it is a machine for pork-processing and bill-passing. A tone, however, soon becomes monotonous and, if not institutionalized when at its shrillest, fades away.

In sum, the earlier leadership by the intellectuals of the underprivileged came about through a program of economic changes; and this program demonstrated an ability in the leaders to interpret the situation of the unorganized workers, of minority groups, and of marginal farmers. Today, a different group of classes (including many of these former underprivileged groups, now risen to middle-income status) wants something, but their wants (partly for the very
reason that these people are now above subsistence or disfranchise-
ment) are much less easily formulated. These new groups want an
interpretation of the world; they want, or rather might be prepared
to want, a more satisfying life.

It is the unsatisfying quality of life as they find it in America that
mostly feeds the discontent of the discontented classes. Their wealth,
their partial access to education and fuller exposure to the mass
media—indeed, their possession of many of the insignia they have
been taught to associate with the good life—these leave them rest-
less, ill at ease in Zion. They must continually seek for reasons ex-
plaining their unrest—and the reasons developed by intellectuals for
the benefit of previous proletariats are of course quite irrelevant.

Is it conceivable that the intellectuals, rather than their enemies,
can have a share in providing new interpretations and in dissipating,
through creative leadership, some of the resentment of the discon-
tented classes? What kind of life, indeed, is appropriate to a society
whose lower classes are being devoured faster by prosperity than
Puerto Rican immigration can replenish? We have almost no idea
about the forms the answers might take, if there are answers. But we
do recognize that one obstacle to any rapprochement between the
discontented classes and the intellectuals is the fact that many of the
latter are themselves of lower-middle-class origin, and detest the
values they have left behind—the dislike is not just one way. They
espouse a snobbery of topic which makes the interests of the semi-
educated wholly alien to them—more alien than the interests of the
lower classes. Only in the great new melting pot of the Army would
there appear to be instances where intellectuals discover that individ-
uals in the discontented classes are “not so bad,” despite their
poisonous tastes in politics and culture—instances where the great
camaraderie of the male sex and the even greater one of the brass-
haters bridge the gap created by the uneven development of social
mobility and cultural status. Of course, to suppose that the intellec-
tuals can do very much to guide the discontented classes by winning
friends and influencing people among them is as ridiculous as sup-
posing that Jews can do much to combat political anti-Semitism by
amiability to non-Jews. Nevertheless, there is only one side from
which understanding is likely to come, and that is their own.

1 For data on the negligible influence of political campaigns, see Paul Lazars-
feld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (Harper's,
New York, 1948).
2 To be sure, there are enclaves where the underprivileged can still be found, as in the Southern Alleghenies or the rural Deep South. And, as we shall see, the fact that “everyone” has moved up means that mobility may not have kept pace with aspiration, one reason why the slogan “you never had it so good” is a poor campaign weapon.

3 The concept of “intolerance of ambiguity,” developed by Else Frenkel-Brunswik and co-workers, is relevant here: these newly properous ones want to see the world clearly bounded, in blacks and whites; they have been brought up conventionally, to make use of conventional categories, and fluidity of boundaries threatens their self-assurance and their very hold on reality.

4 It is at this point that the lack of connection between the small cadre of truly conservative intellectuals and any sizable anti-liberal audience becomes a major factor in the present political scene. For patronage politics and for the untutored businessman, writers like Allen Tate or Russell Kirk have nothing but contempt; their “conservatism” (as some critics have pointed out) is based on an irrelevant landed-gentry and professional-class model. With a few exceptions, the pseudo-conservatives who have a radical and nihilistic message for the untutored have to face little intellectual competition, save from occasional socially conscious clergymen and priests.

5 Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an “economic” appeal, nor is a well-paying job a “natural” need of mankind. Rather, the present insistence of the American workingman that he is entitled to such a job is the outgrowth of recent experience, clarified and interpreted for him by his leaders. These combine into a demonstration that depressions are not necessary (though perhaps wars are), and that therefore jobs and all that goes with them are necessary.

6 According to a study of the 1952 election by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, only two groupings in the population were resistant to these appeals and went more strongly Democratic than in 1948: these were the Negroes on the one extreme of the social spectrum and the college-educated, upper income, and professional and managerial strata at the other extreme—the latter also produced more Republican votes, as the result of a decline in the non-voters. See Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Row, Peterson and Co., Evanston, 1954), Table 5.1.

7 Professor Richard Hofstadter, to whose work we are indebted, reminds us of the status gain involved in being able to bait old-family Anglo-Saxons on the ground they are un-American—a greater gain than is to be won by demonstrating superiority simply to the Jews. (See Chapter 3.)

8 In the perspective employed here, “Engine Charlie” Wilson’s Detroit provides a smaller and less cosmopolitan environment than Secretary Humphrey’s Cleveland.

9 Commenting on an earlier draft of this paper—and we are indebted to such comments for many important revisions—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., reminds us of utopian thinkers still alive and kicking, such as Stringfellow Barr, Clarence Streit, and the United World Federalists. We feel that the spectrum here is not wide or the proposals terribly imaginative; moreover, many of the proposals are counsels of despair, to avoid world catastrophe, rather than of hope, to improve American or planetary life.

10 It was evident in the first opinion polls of the thirties that the conventional notion of the rich as conservative and the poor as radical was correct in the realm of government, labor, and distributive policy—thus, the poor have no
objection to government ownership—but false in the realm of civil liberties and foreign policy where the greater impact of mistrust and fear of the strange and the stranger among the poor came to light.

11 In addition, the Southern Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, such as Woodrow Wilson, have played a great role, especially in the Democratic and in splinter parties.

12 On the whole, the English settlements over the globe indicate that the non-conformist conscience needs to be surrounded by other such consciences if it is to remain effective. The English Methodist who goes to Kenya or Australia to make his fortune is likely to retain the values he went out with, and not be prodded towards wider social sympathies, so that eventually his descendants will be estranged from Colonial Office officials representing his cousins who have stayed, and moved intellectually and morally forward in the Old Country. Similarly, the New Englanders who have left New England, the Quakers who have left Pennsylvania, may not—despite relative ease of intranational movement—keep up with developments in the original centers of cultivated morality. Indeed, New Englanders marooned in the Midwest (the late Robert Taft came of such stock) have been the source of much soured high-principled reaction—the “colonial” conscience at its worst.

13 The Jews, so largely beneficiaries of inflation and gainers of middle-class and professional status, have overwhelmingly remained Roosevelt Democrats, though a kind of “leakage” has provided some of the leadership and newspaper support for the new right.

14 See Richard Hofstadter’s excellent essay, “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt” (Chapter 3).

15 We ourselves had an experience of this when we undertook to write a criticism of Norman Dodd’s report as Staff Director of the Reece Committee investigating foundations. We criticized not only the crackpot notions that socialists and the great foundations had plotted to take America over on behalf of education and the Federal government—a plot somehow connected with “empiricism” and the prestige-laden “name” universities—but we also ridiculed the illiteracy, the demi-educated vein in which the report was written. Then we had misgivings about pulling the rank of our own education and relative fluency, and withdrew our comments on the style of the report. It is no longer comfortable (or expedient) to bait the hillbilly, the hick, the Negro preacher, or the night-school lawyer—so, too, with the political arriviste. The ridicule that greeted Bryan in Tennessee did not greet Congressman Reece.

16 When not long ago we heard Frank Chodorov, a leading organizer and publicist of the right, speak to a businessmen’s luncheon, we felt that he bore much the same relation to his audience that, for instance, a speaker sent out by the American League for Peace and Democracy might have borne to a meeting of a Unitarian Sunday evening forum: he was more extreme, and therefore seemed more daring, but he shared enough of the values and verbal tags of the group to disguise somewhat the extent to which he was pushing their logics and rhetorics to fanatical limits. Indeed, Communist organizing tactics have often given lessons to rightists, and the little library in a New Hampshire town that might have received, from an anonymous donor, a copy of a novel by Howard Fast or a subscription to The National Guardian will now get the Buckley and Bozell book or The Freeman.

17 The Minute Women of America who buttonholed Senators on behalf of the Bricker Amendment are of course quite different in social position from the lower-class women who, in a few interviews a student supervised by one
of us conducted by telephone, praised Senator McCarthy as the only one in Washington who was cleaning out the crooks and the Commies: they saw him as a kind of Lone Ranger, bravely fighting an all-powerful “they.” Throughout this paper, we have had to collapse such distinctions to form general categories; we hope to stimulate further discussion of the coalitions—and the contradictions—that we lump as the discontented classes.
As TIME marches on, our own understanding of the past shifts, not only with new evidence and new interpretations, but also with the impact of our own experience of life. So it is with the foregoing essay: Nathan Glazer and I sought to explain McCarthyism, especially its attack on the intellectuals, not so much in terms of the Korean War and the problems of foreign policy as in terms of endemic strains in American life and the discovery that charges of domestic Communism gave political leaders a way to seem active, strong, and rough without actually having a program. What follows is a re-examination of the essay, to correct what now seems mistaken in it and to add a few comments concerning more recent developments.

The original essay was criticized by a number of readers for seeking the sources of American discontent primarily in America, and especially in socio-psychological and cultural developments, rather than viewing this discontent as a rational response to Communist aggressions. Similarly, Margaret Mead, in her essay "The New Isolationism," criticizing Richard Hofstadter's essay as well as ours, wrote:

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There might be no atom bomb, no hydrogen bomb, no explicit insistence on a polarized world, no Communist China to alter the attitudes of the American people, to pinch and prune their luxuriant sense of national assurance, to plunge the mobile young into an orgy of grabbing at opportunities which they are sure will be snatched from them by conscription, to tear people loose from the certainties of their old invincibilities.

Far from denying the relevance of our contentions in general, what troubled Margaret Mead was the emphasis of our essay, and our tendency to criticize the Americans for reacting anxiously and aggressively to a world situation only partly of our own making. Undoubtedly, without the cold war and the revolutionary ferment in the world that both feeds on it and inflames it, the radical right would have far less of a colorable focus for its resentments: one cannot build a national movement out of an attack on the income tax, on allegedly Keynesian professors, or even on desegregation. Nevertheless, I still think that Hofstadter, Glazer, and I were right to emphasize strains endemic to American life. For the more we read American history, the more we are struck by the persistence of a secularized crusading spirit, seldom managing to seize power but frequently distorting the political spectrum and creating a climate in which the range of discussion and the possibilities for peaceful change have been foreshortened. Even since we wrote the article, there have been internal developments, only marginally influenced by events abroad, that have shifted the locale of politically relevant discontent. I think especially of the increasing pace of change in the South, including the fight over desegregation, the decline of export-oriented farming, and the rise of tariff-oriented industry; I think also of the increasing gap between the generations produced by differential education and experience, and of the consequences of electing an activist Irish Catholic to the Presidency.

To take the last of these first, the election has seemed to open the possibility of an alliance, attempted but never consummated prior to the Korean War: that between Protestant and Catholic fundamentalism. A relatively small minority of Catholics found Kennedy too much of a Harvard man, too liberal, to be a true ethnic anti-Communist patriot. (A few of them have turned up in the ranks of the John Birch Society, named after a vehemently fundamentalist Protestant missionary.) As long as Eisenhower was President, Catholics
who had turned Republican and Protestants who had always been Republican could feel that they were not totally powerless and devoid of influence. Furthermore, as a conservative and an at least nominal Republican, a General and a man of old-fashioned budget-balancing morality, Eisenhower could for a time reassure various old guards in American life that they need not bother their heads about politics. Such people might crusade locally to prevent the fluoridation of water (which some regarded as a Communist-capitalist plot and an invasion of the "states' rights" inherent in every human body). And such people might make sure that there were various subjects, such as the recognition of Red China, that it was impolitic for schoolteachers, librarians, or Congressmen to raise. However, public-opinion pollers in the 1956 Presidential election campaign reported a widespread torpor, even an incipient "era of good feeling," and in the early Eisenhower era the call for national purpose trumpeted by a few intellectuals and publicists seemed as out of place as an evangelist at a country club.

As Samuel Lubell has pointed out on the basis of his surveys, this complacency was jarred first by sputnik, then by the dramatic rise of Khrushchev, and most recently by Castro. President Kennedy fought his campaign on the basis of an ascetic insistence on sacrifice, reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt's belief in strenuousness, in American destiny, and in the responsibility owed the nation by patriots and intellectuals. As has already been suggested, Kennedy's victory released the Republican radical right (never quite happy with Nixon in any case) and the fundamentalist Democrats North and South from many of the mild restraints that Eisenhower's presence had imposed. At the same time, the new administration brought into office a number of the most influential spokesmen for liberalism within the Democratic Party; and these men, though not exactly "muzzled," have not only been removed from the ranks of the liberal and radical opposition but have taken part in the President's effort to reach a bi-partisan consensus, especially in foreign policy, to secure passage of necessary measures in Congress, and to create the strong working majority not provided by the election itself. The presence of intellectuals and academicians in the new administration, and its cosmopolitan style and dash, have helped persuade many liberals that they have access to power, that the country is once again in purposeful, intelligent hands, and that the fight against the radical right doesn't need their energies.
I think there is some truth in this optimism, but also a considerable element of illusion. I define intellectuals as a group of men who, whatever their field, take part in and contribute to general ideas and speculative thought. This group must be distinguished analytically, if not in concrete cases, from the many intelligent professional and academic men who serve the government or devote themselves to questions of public policy. In the limited definition I have used, there are not many intellectuals in America (or in any country), and of these, not many have the political acumen, personal assertiveness, or relative insensitivity to criticism that would open political or administrative careers to them. There has, however, developed in this country a group of lucid, well-educated, widely traveled men, recruited from the universities or the mass media or occasionally from the law, who are committed to shaping a global mission for America, sometimes a stabilizing and sometimes an expanding or policing one. Their belief, reminiscent in some ways of the early Puritans, that the country, like an individual, needs a purpose; their insistent charges that America is too affluent and indolent; and that we are in a race with world Communism that can be won only by tireless and resourceful activity—all this is in many respects a new morality, quite out of keeping with Abilene or even the traditional service academies (even though, as I have indicated, one can find precursors of it in the first Roosevelt and also, if we put aside his more insistent moralism, in Woodrow Wilson). President Kennedy presents himself in this context as the principal hope of American liberals in fending off attacks from the troublesome minority of American Poujadists, and also as the hope of those who want this country to be more active on the world scene, employing its military, economic, and propaganda powers more effectively.

Thanks to the continuing prosperity that rests so dangerously on the Keynesian multiplier of a war economy, it would seem that the center of gravity of discontent has shifted upward in the status system. True, hidden beneath the growing middle of our middle-class society are millions of disinherited citizens, the aged and infirm and unskilled, the Negroes and Puerto Ricans and Southern poor whites—large numbers of all of whom are unemployed or underemployed. But save for the increasingly vigorous Negro protest movements (including the Negro version of the radical right, the Black Muslim movement), most of these millions are isolated and unorganized, as yet unavailable as constituencies for radical political leadership. In
Senator McCarthy's movement, there were elements of a soured obscurantist populism; in many parts of the country McCarthy—the fighter, the good Joe, the exposer of Establishment shams—had a working-class and lower-middle-class following that responded not to his program, for he had none, but to his methods, his tone and targets. Today's radical right wing, in contrast, appears to draw much of its membership as well as its financial and polemical backing from far more well-to-do strata. It would seem that the small businessmen who belong to the John Birch Society are on the whole, like the Texas oil-rich who backed McCarthy, small businessmen in the sense of having limited educations and little experience as corporate managers in a complex world—but they are not poor. One can own a small trucking or real-estate firm or candy company and still amass millions—and be encouraged to believe that one did it all by oneself. Even more menacing are the indications that a few large corporations have found that anti-Communism is no longer "controversial" but can bring in sales and good will, so that hitherto cautious corporate officials who undoubtedly supported Eisenhower and, after him, Nixon now may listen to the peddlers of propaganda films and educational materials like those General Walker thought his division in Germany required. Furthermore, while many of the scientists and other staff men who work for the big missile and electronics companies are apolitical and at times quite cynical about their work (and a very few actively favor arms limitation), others may be grateful for the ideological justification provided by that right-wing brain trust, swelled by former Communists who have seen the light, without which Senator McCarthy himself would not have known the First Amendment from the Fifth Amendment or a Trotskyite from a Social Fascist.

To be sure, it remains true that the growing minority of old people who feel rejected, disoriented, impoverished and resentful are ready to applaud an anti-political movement that promises to reorganize the world so that the old folks can understand it again. Many of them, less well educated than their children or even the entertainers who nightly abuse them on television, are grateful for the simplistic, evangelistic messages of anti-Communism, which affirm to their hearers that the latter are the really good Americans, whatever their ethnicity, whatever their failure to live up to the American dream of youthfulness, competence, love, and success. These devalued elders, moreover, may be willing to applaud a speaker who denounces
the income tax, though the vigor of denunciation matters even more to them than the topic. But it remains a question whether the rich reactionaries and the poor oldsters can form a united front around the anti-Communist issue when what they actually want from society is something so different.

In many communities, notably in the South and Southwest, extremely rapid urbanization and industrialization (often based on or growing out of defense activities) have disrupted the already fragile social structure so that there is no old elite sufficiently in charge of affairs to say "nobody's going to beat up Freedom Riders in this town and nobody, in the name of anti-Communism, is going to push librarians and schoolteachers around either." It is notable that perhaps the first public opposition to the John Birch Society came in Santa Barbara, from a very old man, a newspaper publisher who had grown up with the community and who assumed responsibility for civic decency when no one else would. (Papers that are owned by the staff or by a chain are often too faceless for this sort of free enterprise.) The fluid social structure in many expanding communities creates anxiety and bewilderment as well as opening opportunities for aggressive political activism among the newly awakened and the newly rich, who suddenly have discovered the uses of literacy. The situation allows new converts to the dangers of domestic Communism to practice their skills of intimidation locally: heckling at SANE meetings, expunging a textbook that mentions the United Nations, or setting students to spy on their professors at the teachers' college. Meanwhile, they watch the political horizon in search of a national leader comparable to McCarthy, appraising Senators Goldwater and Thurmond, hopeful about General Walker, but not yet solidified behind a single leader.3

But they have found a national—and nationalistic—cause in an anti-Communism, the belligerent frenzy and fanaticism of which is often vaguely reminiscent of the extravagances of Frenchmen in Algeria or of Japanese militarists before Pearl Harbor. Since this country has never been seriously hurt by war, except for the one it fought with itself (the memory of which we are now turning into a nostalgic celebration), and since most Americans have been in my opinion grossly miseducated about the world during the cold-war years, the radical right can always insist that the administration is following a policy that is insufficiently belligerent, insufficiently tough and dynamic. In fact, Kennedy during his campaign shared the
right-wing picture of an America pushed around by Khrushchev and Castro, and suffering defeat after defeat in the cold war, a tendentious picture that ignores the troubles of the Communists in the Congo and elsewhere and that proceeds from tacit premises either of omnipotence or of total rather than limited containment. The real chance of the right wing will come, it would seem, as this picture is highlighted through further changes in world alignments that can be interpreted as defeats for us and victories for a monolithic Communism. While it may generally be true that the ordinary citizen is averse to policies requiring war and sacrifice, it is possible that if the fear of Communism and nuclear war becomes sufficiently intense, many Americans will leap eagerly to short-cuts that promise to get things over with.

This jumpiness is enhanced by the fact that many Americans find it hard to realize, with full emotional awareness, that nuclear war is not simply a quantitative extrapolation of previously terrible near-total wars. The very term "war" puts it in a familiar category, as do the common terms "all-out war" or "shooting war" or "hot war." In the face of right-wing attacks, the administration denies that it is pursuing a "no win" policy; it argues instead that it is just as combative, only more clever or roundabout. It is true, as public opinion polls have shown, that perhaps the majority of Americans intellectually recognize the catastrophic nature of what strategists sometimes refer to as a nuclear "exchange," and will tell an interviewer that they do not expect to survive. But these same Americans see no legitimate way to deal with what they regard as the encircling, crescent dangers of world Communism, other than by applying misread lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor. And even now, against their better judgment, they find it hard to believe that this broad country, shielded by right and might, could be damaged beyond recognition: things have gone well with them as individuals (as the polls also show) and, outwardly, with the country.

A psychologically and politically expedient "solution" for these dilemmas is to find a scapegoat who can be ostracized and bullied because he stands for the bigger Soviet bully who is at once less available and more threatening. As already argued, the extreme right wing occupies itself very largely with domestic scapegoats of this sort, finding an inexhaustible supply among vulnerable liberals even when the supply of actual (non-FBI-agent) Communists and even fellow travelers does not meet the demand. Castro has become such a scape-
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goat. No German Jew, he may have welcomed this role. It binds more firmly to him the Communist powers, on whom he has become dependent. And the role may also be welcome to a Latin-American revolutionary who wants to break with the soberer reformism of men like Muñoz Marin, Betancourt, or Haya de la Torre, and whose provocativeness may have a touch of the cult of machismo, or maleness, that appeals to many students in Latin America, and to a few in this country. The chances seem all too good that we will continue to make Castro a scapegoat, and that the latter will be able, by frightening and aggravating us, to do precisely what we most resent and fear, namely, to allow our adversaries to limit our freedom of action by pushing us into violent counter-aggression. Indeed, Kennedy in his campaign was driven toward this very trap, not only by his specific denunciation of Communism "ninety miles from home," but also by his general assault on the do-nothing character of the administration.

In the last years of the Eisenhower presidency, Eisenhower's supporters themselves had tended to grow somewhat restless and disaffected. Though their Republican ideology favored decentralization and federal inaction, even men who would have enjoyed Eisenhower's company at golf or hunting or bridge in South Georgia had become uneasy at the growing signs that the United States could no longer play world policeman with impunity, and that we might someday be unable to roll back the tide of Communist advance while going about our business as before. Hence the propaganda about national purpose began to hit home among those who once would have thought a national purpose a violation of laissez-faire and perhaps a form of spurious religiosity as well—as if the new nationalism of the rising nations (including the Communist ones) were being echoed here at home just as other militant nationalistic tactics were becoming attractive in the name of freedom. Thus Eisenhower left to the country, and to his successor, a legacy of feeling that there ought to be someone in charge—and this feeling perhaps was heightened by the new awareness that there was obviously no one in charge of our sprawling metropolises, our wasting natural resources, and our increasingly complicated and ambiguous ties with the rest of the globe. There are still powerful currents of evangelical fervor in America. These currents may in fact be exacerbated by a prosperity that is associated with cities, complexity, "softness," irreligion, and skepticism toward traditional virtues. And while President Eisen-
bower's election owed something to that fervor, which is not confined to rural areas and small towns, many who had voted for him could not rest comfortably with what they felt was a somewhat shaky and uneven prosperity. Such people might still not be prepared to make real sacrifices, let alone the unimaginable sacrifices even of "tactical" nuclear war, but they might be prepared to listen to calls for sacrifice to reassert national control and supremacy against the apparently unequivocal Communist successes. Furthermore, as suggested in the earlier essay, an evangelical counterattack by proponents of American Puritan virtues could allow Catholics and other newer Americans thus to establish their superiority to older, better-educated, but "decadent" families. The counterattack itself, calling for "action" but securing it at present only in symbolic doses, provides a sense of momentum.

Activist lay leaders in fundamentalist churches sometimes have an opportunity to conduct their church work with a single-minded, businesslike efficiency and pep from which they are restrained in the conduct of business itself by having to cope with labor unions, customers, tax collectors and other government officials. So, too, when such men and their wives as well get into political work, their local community may offer a wide range of relatively easy victories, exciting rallies, and dramatic, seemingly dangerous vicissitudes reminiscent on a higher income and educational level of Ku Klux Klan attractions. Quite generally, it would seem, when such right-wingers attend a Unitarian or other liberal-church meeting to picket or heckle, and are asked who they are, they reply with some right-wing version of the Fifth Amendment; e.g., "I am a loyal American." They may hand out a mimeographed statement, but they will refuse to give their names, sometimes indicating that they fear Communist reprisal. The rich and the poor fundamentalists have this much in common: they fear the way the world is going, at home or abroad; they resent those more cosmopolitan people who appear to understand the world less badly and who seem less ill at ease with all the different kinds of people who mingle in our big cities or at the United Nations. Moreover, whatever sectarian or doctrinal differences divide the discontented from each other in theological terms, "all can agree on the gospel of Americanism. (Of course, it should be clear that I speak of right-wing fundamentalism, but I am not suggesting that all fundamentalists in religion are right-wingers in politics. Many reject politics as one of the things of this
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world that is alien to the devout and otherworldly; many others find in the Gospels the basis for often courageous Christian social action for peace or racial integration.)

Seven years ago, it appeared to Mr. Glazer and me that a holding game against the Communists would be frustrating but endurable. Since then, Soviet Communism has broken away from Stalin's paranoia, caution, and brutality and seems at once more flexible and more difficult to understand; it is also much better armed, militarily if not ideologically. At the same time, as I have sought to emphasize, President Kennedy has broken out of the limits imposed on American policy by the provincial, benign—but restrictive—morality of his predecessor. President Kennedy brings to this task exceptional gifts of virtuosity, drive, charm, and impatience, and he and his advisers have a grasp of the world far more differentiated and supple than the narrow moralism of John Foster Dulles. In addition, the new administration is deeply and energetically committed to civil rights as both a domestic- and a foreign-policy imperative, and it is naturally drawn toward support for civil liberties by its ties to academic and intellectual values and by its view of what is fitting for a civilized and sophisticated society. President Kennedy himself is anything but a demagogue, as his debates with Nixon showed, nor is he an indignant and fanatical ideologue. Nevertheless, his rhetoric of activism speaks to the mood of many in the discontented classes, and since he has in some measure freed himself from his predecessor's budgetary and other controls, the anti-Communism of the radical right can always appear to be an extension of the administration's doctrine to its logical conclusion—a conclusion from which, as the right would say, the administration itself draws back only from softness, inconsistency, treason, or incompetence. The effect of this pressure from the radical right, in the absence of anything like comparable pressures from the left, is to shift the whole climate of political contest and discussion toward the right (a process of which the men of intellect and intelligence in the administration may not be fully aware, protected as they are by their metropolitan locale and contacts).

At the present writing (winter, 1962), President Kennedy appears to have satisfied all but the wildly irrational right wing (plus the Republicans and the racketeers who hope to get money or office by playing on the fears and hopes of this group) that he is pursuing a vigorous yet cautious anti-Communism and that he can not only
“stand up to Khrushchev,” as at Berlin, but outpoint him in the ring. Grateful in spite of themselves for forcefulness and direction, many conservatives have come to realize that President Kennedy, outside of the field of civil rights and discounting rhetoric and personal sympathies, is himself quite conservative, and not a reborn New Dealer. Thus the President would seem to have absorbed some of the right-wing’s drive and to have rendered it relatively harmless on the national scene, whatever its power to punish dissenters locally. But in a fluid national and international setting, the problem cannot be left at this point. In moods of crisis, militancy, where it is not too ideological or complicated, is an attractive quality to Americans. Older, more tolerant, or more acquiescent men who are not themselves militant may be influenced more than they realize by militant subordinates or critics, especially if the latter combine an apparently hardheaded realism (e.g., a skepticism about the possibilities of peaceful coexistence) with the quiet sincerity and fervor of their dedication. This constellation may help press the administration toward policies (that are also attractive on other grounds) of responding to the nuclear stalemate by energetic non-nuclear military actions, whether in Cuba or in South Vietnam, or in the domestic para-military step of an expanded civil-defense program.

Such measures, whatever justification each standing in isolation may have, antagonize much of the rest of the world, especially the non-white formerly colonial world. And this antagonism seems to Americans both utterly bewildering and grossly ungrateful, detaching us still further from the rest of the world and thus feeding discontent simultaneously at home and abroad. Indeed, it may well be that this administration, far more cosmopolitan and world-minded than the country at large, may serve to isolate us from the world more than did an administration dominated by the fiscal conservatism and small-mindedness of men like George Humphrey and “Engine Charley” Wilson. This is all the more likely since Communism is no longer confined within the limited bounds of Stalin’s mistrustful isolationism. And can anyone foretell the reaction here at home, or the situation abroad, when the Chinese Communists gain nuclear weapons? While we and the Soviet Union are running an accelerated arms race, nationalistic and discontented groups within each adversary of the two superpowers or their allies help provoke their opposite numbers in each country, and thus lend justification to a program of increased militancy at home and abroad.
In this perspective, it appears that in the earlier essay Mr. Glazer and I may have underestimated somewhat the effect of foreign policy and of such issues as "who lost China" in the support of McCarthyism. But what I still would stress is that we deal here not with foreign affairs in the abstract but with specifically American reactions to solutions that must be imperfect, or indeed to any ambiguous and tragic situations.

As C. Vann Woodward pointed out a few years ago, only the South is "un-American" in having suffered defeat, in having lacked the dynamic of industrialism, and in having gained in these ways some skepticism about the doctrine of progress. Yet despite much talk of states' rights and individual freedom, the South does not today seem aware of the consolations of being a defeated power. It has certainly made no effort to control its own booming industrialization or its combination of sectional Irredentism and nationalist belligerence. And while before the Second World War the South was perhaps the most pro-British, pro-free-trade, interventionist part of the country, today it may be the most tariff-minded and the most anti-British (whenever Britain tries to moderate the cold war).

The Southern white college students, as a number of surveys have shown, seldom share either the prejudices or the passions of their vocal elders. And the Negro college students increasingly fail to adopt the passivities and covert compromises of their elders. Our earlier essay was written before the desegregation decision had made itself felt in the South, and shortly thereafter, in connection with the Fund for the Republic study of academic freedom, I visited, though only for a day, the Greensboro Agricultural and Technical College, where a few years later the first sit-ins began. From my visit and from what I was told by other observers, I would not have expected the sit-ins to start in an institution where most of the students appeared to be satisfied to enter the lower ranks of the "black bourgeoisie" and where their apparently docile patriotism comforted and confirmed the established leadership, Negro and white alike. That same year, I analyzed several hundred interviews of college seniors at twenty colleges and universities throughout America in which the students had described what they looked forward to in life fifteen years hence; I noted complacency, amiability, tolerance, and a lack of ideological and political concerns on the part of most of these respondents. From such material I certainly did not expect the sudden growth on many campuses of student protest movements, today
still small in number but not small in vigor and impact. When I came to Harvard in 1958, an effort to found a Committee to Study Disarmament was temporarily abandoned thanks to disruption by a group of Young Republicans (who intervened much as Communists used to take over liberal organizations); in February, 1962, as I write these lines, Harvard students are taking active leadership in planning a demonstration in Washington, and three hundred students at this notably skeptical, cool, and sophisticated college have volunteered to go.

Students in America are not a class, nor do they speak for a class (though in the Negro community they are able, perhaps, to speak for a race). At times their tendency to act outside of conventional parliamentary channels may represent a feeling that they are living in an occupied country—and indeed those students who have been abroad, whether in the Peace Corps or in such predecessors of it as the Experiment in International Living, are often well aware that the climate of debate in this country on cold-war issues has become extremely constricted.

It is generally thought that the debate is more open and uncensored now than it was at the height of McCarthyism. In some respects, this is so: there is, for instance, more give and take with the Communist countries, and more awareness of the fact that these countries are not all alike or unalterable, either ideologically or in terms of social organization. Yet in other respects, the bi-partisan consensus with respect to foreign policy has served to impose more complex and subtle restraints on free discussion of alternatives than McCarthyism did. For the very virulence, unpleasantness, and demagoguery of McCarthy led, if not to counterattack or even to solidarity, at least to a common feeling of disgust and distrust among liberal intellectuals and many conservatives.

McCarthy, however, was not interested in the cold war but only in dissatisfactions within America, including the exploitable grievances of rising ethnic minorities. Today, in contrast, the Kennedy administration focuses much, if not most, of its attention on the cold war, and the very attractiveness and élan of this administration tend to mute liberal and radical dissent. World Communism is a real and not a factitious adversary, and perhaps it is easier to unify the country against Communism abroad than against people who are extravagantly alleged to be Communists at home. In any case, many leading intellectuals have been hesitant to plumb the depths of their
misgivings about the Kennedy administration. In the nuclear age their anxiety about the future has a nightmarish quality, and as the cold-war consensus develops, they understandably fear the prospect of becoming alienated and powerless. When the President expresses their more utopian hopes, as he sometimes does, they are cheered; when he moves in the opposite direction, they blame his advisers or—not unreasonably—Congress or the mass media or an electorate responsive to slogans.

The young radical students, in contrast, have in many cases been more quickly alienated from the administration. Because so many of them believed that the Democrats in the North are the party of virtue, their expectations were perhaps too high, and the Cuban invasion began for a number of them a drastic disenchantment, ending with the view that Kennedy's administration is more clever but also more dangerous and militaristic than Eisenhower's.¹³ In the eyes of the young, the older generation of intellectuals has succeeded almost too well in dissecting and demolishing Communism and its fronts—and liberal hopefulness and trust also. I have sometimes found that young activists do not want to be warned about the duplicities of domestic Communists and fellow-travelers. They are impatient with our prudence and historical awareness, which they regard as pussyfooting at best and witch-hunting at worst. The enormous changes that have overtaken America in the last generation, particularly in the last few years, have separated many young people from their elders rather more than generations are usually divided, and each generation in the presence of the other feels insecure and perplexed.

At the same time the dominant academic liberalism of the major metropolitan centers, combined with the vitality and activity of the new protest groups, has helped bring into being new organizations of right-wing students for whom in an earlier day college would have been simply the dormitory and locale for fun and games. In the past, students who identified themselves as conservative did not feel threatened in the campus social climate that supported their prankish and ordinarily unreflective activities. Many such students can still be found; perhaps they are the majority in the country as a whole. In the past, the fraternities and sororities could protect such students from having to come to terms with the academic culture, while remaining on relatively good terms with the values of their parents and of the alumni, whose ranks they would soon join. Increasingly
today, however, these protections against the larger intellectual world do not suffice, any more than the Atlantic and Pacific suffice to protect America itself from the fear of destruction. On the larger campuses, at least a few students can usually be found who possess the forensic ability, the desire for individualism, and the eagerness to fight fire with fire that can propel them into organizing right-wing groups; articulate journals such as the National Review provide ammunition.

These right-wing students (and some of the more sober and ideologically committed conservatives as well) are armored with facts and are often able to cite Communist abuses and treacheries around the globe with a debater's skill. Such students, on graduation if not before, are capable of taking part in the many seminars, schools, and more or less intellectual apparatuses of today's anti-Communist movements. (To be sure, there are still plenty of less articulate right-wingers who are satisfied to shout “Better dead than Red” or “We want more bombs,” but these are seldom found among the educated—just as Southern segregationist mobs include few from the educated strata.)

I speak here on the basis of rough impressions and cannot adequately document the changes that I sense. Father Coughlin had his followers gather in small groups or cells to listen to his broadcasts and receive instructions, but his sermons made little attempt at intellectual analysis. Senator McCarthy's speeches and hearings made more of an effort to give the appearance of analysis, with the constant waving of documents and citing of supposed facts. Members of the John Birch Society and enrollees at various anti-Communist seminars sometimes appear to be people of the book, and a portion of the literature aimed at them blends exigent secularized fundamentalism with the witch-doctor academese (“each and every Harvard graduate”; “known Comsymp”) that helps make such pamphleteering attractive for some of the uneasy new rich whose achievements have outrun their anticipations. It is not clear to me where to draw the line between the radical right and extreme conservatives. Senator Goldwater's sometimes humorous and genial tone is very different from that of the more obviously sectarian and suspiciously secretive groups. But he is capable of simplifications, such as the demand for total victory in the battle with world Communism, which speak to the malaise of the more angrily discontented.
Nor is it clear to me what weight ideology possesses in these various fragmentary movements. The sit-in and disarmament groups often reject ideology and complexity in preference for a single issue simply seen—though some of the groups are scholarly and searching, particularly in the field of disarmament and foreign policy. On the radical right, as just suggested, there is a stronger attempt than before to support attitudes with ideology or at least with slogans and superficial information; there is more fanaticism and less fooling around. As people become aware of their national defenselessness in the nuclear age, the militant may feel they need ideas even while they fear them. The educational and intellectual upgrading of our population as a whole forces right-wing groups to pay more attention to ideas or to their semblance.

Efforts to explain even in social psychological terms a political or cultural movement risks making it appear too rational, too much a direct response to external events. I now think that in our earlier effort to understand the radical-right mentality we placed too much emphasis on the ties between New Dealers and a few Communists or alleged Communists such as Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White. For the discovery of a few actual spies and compromised bureaucrats had slight importance, perhaps, among the fanatical true believers of the radical right, convinced of their own powerlessness and cynical about politicians and big shots; among such an audience even so inveterate an anti-Communist as Dean Acheson could be made to appear traitorous. Beyond these circles, with their crusading wildness, however, such events as the Hiss case did have an important effect, giving McCarthy and his allies a gloss of rationalism and demoralizing many liberals, whether or not they had had any contact with front organizations. Looking inward at their own mistakes, moreover, as lack of power often leads the vulnerable and reflective to do, some articulate and self-conscious intellectuals who left the Communist Party or various splinter groups have remained perhaps unduly preoccupied with liberal guilt, innocence, or disingenuousness vis-à-vis Communism in the 1930s and 1940s. In my judgment, both Communists and anti-Communists have a stake in exaggerating the importance of the Communists in this period, and the ready gullibility of liberals to Communist-front organizations. But (as Hannah Arendt pointed out in The Origins of Totalitarianism) fronts look both ways, and it is arguable that labor unions and other movements for social betterment exploited the Communists' fanaticism.
while the Communists believed that they were the exploiters. It seems to me that many liberal intellectuals have become fixated on the past, yet without seeing it in perspective, and are distracted from imagining a better future by the gnawing desire to cope with vestiges of domestic Communist contamination and with the still potent dangers of McCarthyism. In practical politics—for instance, in the peace movement—the two issues create difficult questions for strategy, ethics, and clarity, but they offer diminishing returns to our understanding of the dangers and the opportunities of the future.

If we must wait until we understand ourselves, we are unlikely to get out of the nuclear age, indeed may not get out of it whatever we do. But clearly one requirement for getting out is a less oppressive domestic climate, and achieving this would seem to entail drastic re-education, and measures on many fronts abroad and at home, to give Americans a feeling of creativity in the discovery of a political equivalent that would also be a moral equivalent for war.

In the light of all these crescent dangers, the earlier article seems to me today too detached and somewhat complacent an essay. Since it was written, intelligence and discontent have both gained much more importance in American life. Emerging from the sordid and frightening distraction provided by Senator McCarthy—though not by any means from all the legacies of his procedures and his view of the world—the intellectuals regained some confidence. And in the last years of the Eisenhower presidency, despite Stevenson's two defeats, men began to run for Congress and the Senate and to take part in political life who were as much at home in the world of ideas as their colleagues and predecessors were in the courthouse crowd or the Masonic Lodge of small-town Republicanism. Indeed, the discussion of disarmament and foreign policy in the United States has become more open, more sophisticated, and more widespread in the last few years; preoccupations once confined to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and a few other specialized or sectarian groups can now be shared with a far wider audience, inside as well as outside the administration. The difficulty, as so often in history, is that events seem to be outpacing the rapid growth of understanding and the rather slower development of political concepts and forms that might bring about a more creative domestic and foreign policy. The spirit of McCarthyism reflects long-standing discontents and bellicosities in America, for our society is one
where men and groups are accustomed to mobility, to expansion, to progress and secular growth, and the cold war now provides a wider stage for the drama of winning and losing, of growth and senescence.16

The antibodies against McCarthyism are not hardy. But what makes the radical right so ominous now is less its impact on civil liberties and domestic affairs, which can be held in check with the resiliency of politics, than its potential power, in co-operation with mindless militancy in other countries, to jeopardize, at least in the northern latitudes, the human enterprise itself. Political plagues become devastating when a single plane or Polaris submarine can carry more death than all the bombs of World War II.

1 The American Scholar, Summer, 1955, pp. 378–82.
3 This is a perennial problem of the right wing and perhaps of all extremist groups. The authoritarianism, suspiciousness, and even mild paranoia that drive people into the right wing also drive them into suspicion of each other. Hitler’s accomplishment lay in part in bringing to his banner the gifted Goebbels and Goering and, later, Speer, whereas the American right wing has not yet been able to unite behind a team with such diversified abilities.
4 Another consequence of the election campaign was apparently to make more difficult the re-election of a number of liberal Congressmen, and a number of those who had belonged in Congress to the small, brave, but not willful band of “peace Congressmen”—such as Byron Johnson, Charles Porter, and William Meyer—were defeated. The jingoism of the campaign might have been a factor in their defeat; also reflected was the way in which Protestant fundamentalist bigotry against a Catholic in the White House was aroused against Democratic candidates generally, even in areas where it was all right for a Catholic to occupy the statehouse. Cf., however, Tris Coffin, “The Political Effects of the Liberal Project” (Newsletter of the Committee of Correspondence, May, 1962), pointing out that these defeated Congressmen ran ahead of President Kennedy and calling attention to local factors both in their earlier victories and their later defeats.

Since this postscript was written, the attack by Senator Barry Goldwater and by the Chairman of the Republican National Committee and other right-wing Congressmen on The Liberal Papers, a collection of essays on foreign policy, edited by Congressman James Roosevelt and prepared for the Liberal Project, has served to underline the ability of the right wing in marginal Congressional districts to intimidate its opposition and to narrow the discussion of alternatives. The Liberal Papers, to which I was one of the contributors, includes a number of reasonably scholarly essays exploring various foreign-policy issues, but the attack on the book has been so ferocious, accusing it of being a blueprint for an American Munich or the left-wing equivalent of the John Birch Society’s Blue Book, that a number of the Democratic Congressmen who had originally taken part in the Project have understandably disidentified themselves with it. The defeats of 1960 have not helped
The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes—1962

the morale of these men, all of whom come from close districts, and it is hard to criticize their lack of solidarity when it is realized that each Congress-
man seeking re-election is on his own, facing an irreducible minimum of right-wing opinion in his home district (often well financed and in control of the local media) and unable to explain to his constituents why he has taken it on himself to sharpen foreign-policy issues that are not his main concern—and that aren't their main concern either. Political analysts have observed that few Congressmen are in fact defeated because of stands they have taken on issues, but they can be defeated if they seem far out, or inattentive to local preoccupations.

I recall in this connection an extremely revealing and disturbing study done at a junior college on the West Coast, which indicated that education served to moderate the anti-minority ethnocentrism of students (many of whom were planning to become teachers) but, if anything, to increase their nationalism. In other words, a certain tolerance for minorities within this country has, as it were, been gained at the cost of a greater chauvinism.

While President Kennedy's rhetoric is less budget-minded than that of President Eisenhower, his administration would appear to be almost as orthodox in fiscal matters, limited not only by fear of offending the financial community but also by the balance-of-payments problem. Even so, the radical right is frightened by the liberal speeches of the Democrats, and I believe the latter are in fact less able than the Republicans to use the budget as a tacit form of arms control. There has been left very little budget surplus to use as a political weapon in domestic controversy—after armaments, and associated foreign-aid programs, nearly everything else becomes a fringe benefit.

There is some evidence that the Kennedy-Nixon TV debates, by compelling Nixon supporters to see the latter's opponent (rather than shut him out, as partisans so often do with the opposition), prepared them to realize that the enemy candidate was no monster and thereby to be won over after the inauguration.

I recognize that there are reasons, perhaps in one or another case sufficient ones, for each of these actions, quite apart from domestic politics. Thus we are pressured to act in South Vietnam by Communist-guerrilla tactics (and the hope of finding a way of repulsing these everywhere else) and by fear for all our Asian allies with whom we are linked in military pacts. And we are pressed to act in Cuba by shaky Central and South American states. Moreover, the administration would deny that civil defense, though shifted to the Pentagon, is a para-military measure (though it is clearly this in the minds of some counterforce strategists), being simply a rational effort at insurance. What I am emphasizing in this essay as in the preceding one are the domestic pressures that are one factor in the American response to the cold war and to the momentum and forms in which that war is carried on.

As W. J. Cash angrily reminds his readers in The Mind of the South, not even before the Civil War was the South the stable social order, governed by Tidewater gentry, that magnolia mythology describes.

The South (not counting Texas) was also anti-McCarthy, while today it offers support to various right-wing crusaders who, whatever their nominal political color, are opposed to the Democratic Party of President Kennedy. I recognize that the voting South is a minority, and that those who claim to speak for the South speak for a minority; the entire South has perhaps changed less rapidly than its articulate and organized cadres.

Cf. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., The Academic Mind:
The Radical Right


13 Since they fear being again disillusioned, there is sometimes a tendency wholly to disregard the efforts toward disarmament and the reduction of tensions that President Kennedy has in fact made, in alternation with his efforts to secure "positions of strength."

14 Goldwater was picketed at a recent meeting by members of a radical-right organization who carried signs saying, "We want war. . . . Red Russia must not survive." Such exhortations are alien to much of the literate prose of the National Review. At some Catholic colleges, Goldwater may be a drawing card for students who find the priests and other religious who teach at their college departing from the doctrine or liturgical practice of their diocesan priest and threatening the students with complexity, much as they are threatened on secular campuses.

15 Rejecting ideology, like rejecting abstraction or being sincere and natural, is more easily said than done. There is always a tacit ideology. Furthermore, there has been a flourishing of student liberal and radical journalism (the active leaders are often graduate students) which both reviews what is happening in the world and seeks to interpret it in a neo-Marxist, existentialist, or other contemporary perspective.

The Revolt Against the Elite—1955

PETER VIERECK

Defeat of western silver.
Defeat of the wheat.
Victory of letterfiles
And plutocrats in miles
With dollar signs upon their coats
And spats on their feet.
Victory of custodians,
Plymouth Rock,
And all that inbred landlord stock.
Victory of the neat.
Defeat of the Pacific and the long Mississippi.
And all these in their helpless days
By the dour East oppressed,
Crucifying half the West,
Till the whole Atlantic coast
Seemed a giant spiders' nest.
And all the way to frightened Maine the old East
heard them call.
Prairie avenger, mountain lion,
Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan,
Smashing Plymouth Rock with his boulders from the West.

—from Vachel Lindsay's "higher vaudeville" imitation of how a sixteen-year-old Bryanite Populist radical in 1896 would have viewed the revolt of western mass egalitarianism against Atlantic Coast traditionalism and aristocracy. Note the stress on revenge ("avenger, mountain lion") for having been humiliated and patronized intellectually or socially by "that inbred landlord stock" of Plymouth Rock; this emotion of revenge for
The Radical Right

humiliation is often shared by recent immigrants in Boston and the east as well as by the Populist older stock in Wisconsin and the west.

During the Jacobin Revolution of 1793, in those quaint days when the lower classes still thought of themselves as the lower classes, it was for upper-class sympathies and for *not* reading "subversive leftist literature" that aristocrats got in trouble.

Note the reversal in America. Here the lower classes seem to be the upper classes—they have automobiles, lace curtains and votes. Here, in consequence, it is for alleged lower-class sympathies—for "leftist" sympathies—that the aristocrats are purged by the lower class.

In reality those lower-class sympathies are microscopic in most of that social register (Lodge, Bohlen, Acheson, Stevenson, and Harvard presidents) which McCarthy is trying to purge; even so, leftist sympathies are the pretext given for the purge. Why is it necessary to allege those lower-class sympathies as pretext? Why the pretext in the first place? Because in America the suddenly enthroned lower classes cannot prove to themselves psychologically that they are now upper-class unless they can indict for pro-proletarian subversion those whom they know in their hearts to be America's real intellectual and social aristocracy.

Ostensibly our aristocrats are being metaphorically guillotined for having signed, twenty years ago, some pinko-front petition by that egghead Voltaire (a typical reversal of the 1793 pretext) and for having said, not "Let them eat cake," but "Let them read books" (violation of loyalty oath to TV). Behind these ostensible pretexts, the aristocratic pro-proletarian conspirators are actually being guillotined for having been too exclusive socially—and, even worse, intellectually—at those fancy parties at Versailles-sur-Hudson. McCarthyism is the revenge of the noses that for twenty years of fancy parties were pressed against the outside window pane.

In Populist-Progressive days and in New Deal days, those same noses were pressed with openly radical, openly lower-class resentment. During 1953 and 1954, the same noses snorted triumphantly with right-wing Republicanism. This demagogue's spree of symbolically decapitating America's intellectual and social upper class, but doing so while shouting a two hundred per cent upper-class ideology,
suggests that McCarthyism is actually a leftist instinct behind a self-deceptive rightist veneer. This combination bolsters the self-esteem of sons of Democratic urban day laborers whose status rose into stuffy Republican suburbia. Their status rose thanks to the Communism-preventing social reforms of Roosevelt. Here for once is a radicalism expressing not poverty but sudden prosperity, biting the New Deal hand that fed it.

What figure represents the transition, the missing link, between the often noble, idealistic Populist-Progressives (like that truly noble idealist, La Follette) and the degeneration of that movement into something so different, so bigoted as McCarthyism? According to my hypothesis, that transition, that missing link is Father Charles Coughlin. All liberals know that Coughlin ended by defending Hitler in World War II and preaching the vilest anti-Semitism. They sometimes forget that Coughlin began his career by preaching social reforms to the left of the New Deal; his link with Populism and western Progressivism emerges from the fact that Coughlin’s chief panacea was the old Populist panacea of “free silver,” as a weapon against Wall Street bankers, eastern seaboard intellectuals, and internationalists, three groups hated alike by democratic Populists and by semi-fascist Coughlinites. And Coughlin’s right-wing fascist anti-Semitism sounds word for word the same as the vile tirades against “Jewish international bankers” by the left-wing egalitarian Populist, Ignatius Donnelly.

On the surface, Senators like Wheeler and Nye (originally Progressives and campaigners for La Follette) seemed to reverse themselves completely when they shifted—in a shift partly similar to Coughlin’s—from “liberal” Progressives to “reactionary” America Firsters. But basically they never changed at all; throughout, they remained passionately Anglophobe, Germanophile, isolationist, and anti-eastern-seaboard, first under leftist and then under rightist pretexts. Another example is Senator McCarran, who died in 1954. McCarran ended as a McCarthyite Democrat, hating the New Deal more than did any Republican. This same McCarran had been an eager New Dealer in 1933, voting for the Wagner Act and even for the NRA. Yet throughout these changes, he remained consistently anti-internationalist, anti-British, anti-eastern-intellectual.

Broadening the generalization, we may tentatively conclude: the entire midwest Old Guard Republican wing of today, journalistically or vulgarly referred to as “conservative,” does not merit that word
at all. Theirs is not the traditional conservatism of a Winston Churchill or of a Burke or of our own Federalist papers. Theirs is not true American conservatism in the sense in which Irving Babbitt defines indirect democracy (in his great book Democracy and Leadership), as opposed to plebiscitarian, Tom Painean direct democracy. "Conservative" is no proper label for western Old Guard Republicans, nor for their incongruous allies among the status-craving, increasingly prosperous, but socially insecure immigrants in South Boston and the non-elite part of the east. What all these groups are at heart is the same old isolationist, Anglophobe, Germanophile revolt of radical Populist lunatic-fringers against the eastern, educated, Anglicized elite. Only this time it is a Populism gone sour; this time it lacks the generous, idealistic, social reformist instincts which partly justified the original Populists.

Many of our intellectual aristocrats have helped to make the McCarthyite attack on themselves a success by denouncing McCarthyism as a rightist movement, a conservative movement. At first they even denounced it as a Red-baiting, anti-Communist movement, which is exactly what it wanted to be denounced as. By now they have at least caught on to the fact that it is not anti-Communist, has not trapped a single Red spy—whether at Fort Monmouth, the Voice of America, or the State Department—and is a major cause of the increased neutralism in Europe, McCarthy being the "Typhoid Mary" of anti-Americanism.

But although American liberals have now realized that McCarthyism is not anti-Communist (which is more than many American businessmen and Republicans have realized), they have still not caught on to the full and deep-rooted extent of its radical anti-conservatism. That is because they are steeped in misleading analogies with the very different context of Europe and of the European kind of fascism. Partly they still overlook the special situation in America, where the masses are more bourgeois than the bourgeoisie. I am speaking in terms of psychology, not only of economics. A lot more is involved psychologically in the American ideal of the mass man than the old economic boast (a smug and shallow boast) that simply "everybody" is "so prosperous" in America. "Every man a king" is not true of America today. Rather, every man is a king except the kings.

The real kings (the cultural elite that would rank first in any traditional hierarchy of the Hellenic-Roman West) are now becom-
ing declassed scapegoats: the eggheads. The fact that they partly brought that fate on themselves by fumbling the Communist issue does not justify their fate, especially as the sacred civil liberties of everybody, the innocent as much as the guilty, must suffer for that retribution.

America is the country where the masses won't admit they are masses. Consequently America is the country where the thought-controllers can self-deceptively "make like" patriotic pillars of respectability instead of admitting what they are: revolutionaries of savage direct democracy (Napoleon plus Rousseau plus Tom Paine plus the Wild West frontier) against the traditional, aristocratic courts and Constitution and against the protection of minority intellectual elites by the anti-majoritarian Bill of Rights. The McCarthyites threaten liberty precisely because they are so egalitarian, ruling foreign policy by mass telegrams to the Executive Branch and by radio speeches and Gallup Poll. The spread of democratic equal rights facilitates, as Nietzsche prophesied, the equal violation of rights.

Is liberté incompatible with sudden égalité? It was, as people used to say in the Thirties, "no accident that" an American Legion meeting in New York in July, 1954, passed two resolutions side by side—the first condemning another Legion branch for racial discrimination (the "Forty and Eight" society) and the second endorsing McCarthyism. This juxtaposition is noted not in order to disparage the long overdue anti-bigotry of the first resolution. Rather, the juxtaposition is noted in order to caution the oversimplifying optimism of many liberal reformers who have been assuming that the fight for free speech and the fight for racial tolerance were synonymous.

Admittedly not all nationalist bigots have yet "caught on" to the more lucrative new trend of their own racket. Many will continue to persecute racial minorities as viciously as in the past, though surely decreasingly and with less profit. Because of the Southern atmosphere of Washington, the anti-segregation resolution could not be repeated when the Legion met there a month later.

Often untypical or tardy about new trends, the South is more opposed to the good cause of Negro rights and to the bad cause of McCarthyism than the rest of the nation. One Southerner (I am not implying that he represents the majority of the South) told me he regards as Communistic the defenders of the civil liberties of any of our several racial minorities; then he went on to reproach the
North for "not fighting for its civil liberties against that fascist McCarthy."

The same day I heard that statement, I read an account of a McCarthy mass meeting in the North at which racial discrimination was denounced as un-American and in which anyone defending civil liberties against McCarthy was called Communist. At the same meeting, a rabbi accused the opposition to Roy Cohn of anti-Semitic intolerance. Next, Cohn's was called "the American Dreyfus Case" by a representative of a student McCarthyite organization, Students for America. This young representative of both McCarthyism and racial brotherhood concluded amid loud applause: "Roy Cohn and Joe McCarthy will be redeemed when the people have taken back their government from the criminal alliance of Communists, Socialists, New Dealers, and the Eisenhower-Dewey Republicans."

This outburst of direct democracy\(^1\) comes straight from the leftist rhetoric of the old Populists and Progressives, a rhetoric forever urging the People to take back "their" government from the conspiring Powers That Be. What else remained but for Rabbi Schultz, at a second Cohn-McCarthy dinner, to appeal to "the plain people of America" to "march on Washington" in order to save, with direct democracy, their tribune McCarthy from the big bosses of the Senate censure committee?

Bigotry's New Look is perhaps best evidenced by McCarthy's abstention, so far, from anti-Semitic and anti-Negro propaganda and, more important, by countless similar items totally unconnected with the ephemeral McCarthy. A similar juxtaposition occurs in a typical New York Times headline of September 4, 1954, page one: PRESIDENT SIGNS BILL TO EXECUTE PEACETIME SPIES; ALSO BOLSTERS BAN ON BIAS. Moving beyond that relatively middle-of-the-road area to the extremist fringe, note the significant change in "For America." This nationalist group is a xenophobic and isolationist revival of the old America First Committee. But instead of appeasing the open Nazis who then still ruled Germany, as in the old-fashioned and blunter days of Father Coughlin, "For America" began greatly expanding its mass base in 1954 by "quietly canvassing Jewish and Negro prospects."

And so it goes. From these multiplying examples we may tentatively generalize: Manifestations of ethnic intolerance today tend to decrease in proportion as ideological intolerance increases. In sharp contrast, both bigotries previously used to increase together.
If sociologists require a new term for this change (as if there were not enough jargon already), then at least let it be a brief, unponderous term. I would suggest the word “transtolerance” for this curious interplay between the new tolerance and the new intolerance. Transtolerance is ready to give all minorities their glorious democratic freedom—provided they accept McCarthyism or some other mob conformism of Right or Left. I add “or Left” because liberals sometimes assume conformism is inevitably of the Right. Yet “Right” and “Left” are mere fluctuating pretexts, mere fluid surfaces for the deeper anti-individualism (anti-aristocracy) of the mass man, who ten years ago was trying to thought-control our premature anti-Communists as “warmongers” and who today damns them as “Reds” and who ten years from now, in a new appeasement of Russia, may again be damning them as “Wall Street warmongers” and “disloyal internationalist bankers.”

Transtolerance is the form that xenophobia takes when practiced by a “xeno.” Transtolerant McCarthyism is partly a movement of recent immigrants who present themselves (not so much to the world as to themselves) as a two hundred per cent hate-the-foreigner movement. And by extension: Hate “alien” ideas. Transtolerance is also a sublimated Jim Crow: against “wrong” thinkers, not “wrong” races. As such, it is a Jim Crow that can be participated in with a clear conscience by the new, non-segregated flag-waving Negro, who will be increasingly emerging from the increased egalitarian laws in housing and education. In the same way it is the Irishman’s version of Mick-baiting and a strictly kosher anti-Semitism. It very sincerely champions against anti-Semites “that American Dreyfus, Roy Cohn”; simultaneously it glows with the same mob emotions that in all previous or comparable movements have been anti-Semitic.

The final surrealist culmination of this new development would be for the Ku Klux Klan to hold non-segregated lynching bees.

At the same moment when America fortunately is nearer racial equality than ever before (an exciting gain, insufficiently noted by American-baiters in Europe and India), America is moving further from liberty of opinion. “Now remember, boys, tolerance and equality,” my very progressive schoolma’am in high school used to preach, “come from cooperation in some common task.” If Orwell’s 1984 should ever come to America, you can guess what “some common task” will turn out to be. Won’t it be a “team” (as they will obviously call it) of “buddies” from “all three religions” plus the significantly
increasing number of Negro McCarthyites, all "cooperating" in the "common task" of burning books on civil liberties or segregating all individualists of "all three" religions?

It required Robespierre to teach French intellectuals that égalité is not synonymous with liberté. Similarly, Joseph McCarthy is the educator of the educators; by his threat to our lawful liberties, he is educating America intellectuals out of a kind of liberalism and back to a kind of conservatism. The intellectual liberals who twenty years ago wanted to pack the Supreme Court as frustrating the will of the masses (which is exactly what it ought to frustrate) and who were quoting Charles Beard to show that the Constitution is a mere rationalization of economic loot—those same liberals today are hugging for dear life that same court and that same Constitution, including its Fifth Amendment. They are hugging those two most conservative of "outdated" institutions as their last life preservers against the McCarthyite version of what their Henry Wallaces used to call "the century of the common man."

Our right to civil liberties, our right to an unlimited non-violent dissent, is as ruggedly conservative and traditional as Senator Flanders and the mountains of Vermont. It is a right so aristocratic that it enables one lonely individual, sustained by nine non-elected nobles in black robes, to think differently from 99.9 per cent of the nation, even if a majority of "all races, creeds, and colors," in an honest democratic election, votes to suppress the thinking of that one individual.

But what will happen to that individual and his liberties if ever the 99.9 per cent unite in direct democracy to substitute, as final arbiter of law, the white sheets for the black robes?

II

Asians and Europeans ought never to confuse genuine American anti-Communism, a necessary shield for peace and freedom against aggression, with the pseudo-anti-Communism of the demagogues, which is not anti-Communism at all but a racket. American anti-Communism, in the proper sense of the term, usually turns out to be a surprisingly sober and reasonable movement, fair-minded and sincerely dedicated to civil liberties. Indeed, when you consider the disappointed hopes and the murderous provocations suffered by an unprepared public opinion in the five years between Yalta illusions
and Korean casualty lists, there emerges a reality more typical and impressive than the not-to-be-minimized existence of racketeers and thought-controllers; and that impressive reality is the sobriety, the reasonableness of America's genuine anti-Communists, whether Eisenhower, Stevenson or Norman Thomas.

Pro-Communist periodicals in Europe have been linking American anti-Communists and McCarthy, as if there were some necessary connection. The zany rumor that McCarthyism is anti-Communism may be spread by honest ignorance, but it may also be spread maliciously: to give anti-Communism a bad name abroad, to make anti-Communism as intellectually disreputable as it seemed during the Popular Front era. But the fact that pro-Communists find it strategic to link the McCarthy methods with American anti-Communism is no reason for our American anti-Communists to do so, or to allow even the hint of such a linkage to continue.

To move to a different but overlapping problem: There is likewise no reason for philosophical conservatives (disciples of Burke, Coleridge, Tocqueville, Irving Babbitt and the Federalists, rather than of President McKinley or Neville Chamberlain) to condone even the hint of any linkage between our philosophical conservatism and that rigor mortis of Manchester liberalism known as the Old Guard of the Republican Party.

I now propose to develop the above two generalizations. First, if McCarthyism does not represent anti-Communism, what does it represent? Second, if the present Republican Party does not merit the support of philosophical (Burkean or Federalist) conservatives, then who does merit that support in 1956?

To a certain extent, the new nationalist toughness ("McCarthyism") is the revenge of those who felt snubbed in 1928, when the man with the brown derby lost the election, and who felt snubbed a second time in 1932, when the nomination went to his victorious rival from Groton and Harvard.

But even more important than that old wound (the Irish Catholic role in McCarthyism being intolerantly overstressed by its liberal foes) is the McCarthy-Dirksen-Bricker coalition of nationalism, Asia Firstism and Europe-Last isolationism; and what is this coalition but a Midwest hick-Protestant revenge against that same "fancy" and condescending east? That revenge is sufficiently emotional to unite a radical wing with a reactionary wing. The revenge-emotion of McCarthyism has united the old Midwest Populist instincts on the down-
with-everybody Left (barn-burners from way back and distrusters of Anglicized highbrow city-slickers) with the rich Chicago *Tribune* nationalists on the authoritarian Right. Both these Midwest groups are Protestant, not Catholic. Both are against an east viewed as Europe First and Asia Last—shorthand for an east viewed as aristocratic, internationalist, overeducated, and metaphorically (if rarely literally) Grotonian.

By itself and without allies, the resentment of lower-middle-class Celtic South Boston against Harvard (simultaneous symbol of Reds and Wall Street plutocrats) was relatively powerless. (Note that no serious mass movement like McCarthy's was achieved by the earlier outburst of that resentment in Coughlinism.) It was only when the South Boston resentment coalesced with the resentment of flag-waving Chicago isolationists and newly-rich Protestant Texans (still denied *entrée* into the *chiqué* of Wall Street) that the American seaboard aristocracy was seriously threatened in its domination of both governmental and intellectual public opinion and in its domination of its special old-school-tie preserve, the Foreign Service. Against the latter, the old Populist and La Follette weapon against diplomats of "you internationalist Anglophile snob" was replaced by the deadlier weapon of "you egghead security-risk"—meaning, as the case might be, alleged unbeliever and subverter or alleged homosexual or alleged tippler and babbler. All of these allegations have been made for centuries by pseudo-wholesome, "pious" peasants against "effete" noblemen.

What is at stake in this revolt? Liberty or mere economic profit? Probably neither. Nobody in any mass movement on any side in any country is really willing to bear the burden of liberty (which is why liberty is preserved not by mass-will nor by counting noses but by tiny, heroic natural-aristocracies and by the majesty—beyond mob majorities—of moral law). As for economic profit, there is enough of *that* lying around in lavish America to keep both sides happily glutted, in defiance of both Marx and Adam Smith. Instead, the true goal of both sides—the McCarthyite rebels and the seaboard aristocracy—is the psychological satisfaction of determining the future value-pattern of American society.

As a pretext for its drive toward this true goal, the first side uses "anti-Communism." (Falsely so, because nothing would please the Communists more than a victory of the Bricker, McCarthy and Chi-
The latter is not solely a pretext but valid enough at the moment, now that this side is seeing its own ox being gored. But ultimately much of its oratory about civil liberties rings as false as that of self-appointed anti-Communism, if only you consider the silence of the second side about "civil liberties" when the gored ox was not their own pet Foreign Service aristocrats and professors but the violated civil liberties of thousands of interned Japanese-Americans during World War II or the Minneapolis Trotskyites jailed under the Smith Act (in both cases under Roosevelt), not to mention the hair-raising precedent of currently denying a passport to the anti-Stalinist Marxist, Max Schachtman. With some honorable exceptions, the internment of friendless Japanese-Americans, of un-"forward-looking" conscientious objectors and of presumably un-chic Trotskyites has evoked fewer decibels of "witch-hunt, witch-hunt!" from fashionable liberals, fewer sonorous quotations of what Jefferson wrote to Madison about free minds, than does the current harassing of a more respectively bourgeois and salonfähig ex-Stalinoid from the Institute of Pacific Relations. Thus does snobbism take precedence over ideology in the conformism known as "anti-conformism."

In every American community, picture some eagle scout of "anti-Communism" battling some village Hampden of "civil liberties." What a spectacle! Insincerity or self-deception on both sides.

Which of the two unattractive alternatives can be sufficiently improved and matured to become not merely a lesser evil but a positive good? Since the noble pretexts of both sides ring so hollow, why do I favor (while retaining an independent third position) a victory by the second of these two sides? Not for its beaux yeux—not, that is, for its comic snobbism, its mutually contradictory brands of "progressive" political chic, avant-garde cultural chic, and Eastern-college, country-club social chic. Even its trump card, namely, the ethical superiority to McCarthyism of its upper-class educated liberals, remains badly compromised by the 1930s—the silence, because of expediency, during the Moscow Trials and the business-baiting McCarthyism-of-the-Left of too many New Deal agitations and investigations. Still, despite everything, the heritage known as "New England" (a moral rather than sectional term and diffused through all sections) does inspiringly combine the two things that mean most.
to me in determining my choice: respect for the free mind and re-
spect for the moral law.

This combination of moral duty and liberty may by 1956 have a
new birth of nationwide appeal, owing to the providential emergence
of the leadership of Adlai Stevenson, a blender of New England and
Middle West, an intellectual uncompromised by Popular Frontist illu-
sions or by the era of Yalta appeasement.

No "great man" theories, no determinism: Let us take Stevenson
merely as symbolizing imperfectly a still potential goal, a new era
that may or may not be attained by his very diverse followers. For
intellectuals, he symbolizes the mature outgrowing and discarding of
what in part was their bad and silly era. A bad era insofar as they
sacrificed ethical means to a progress achieved by Machiavellian
social engineering. (Defined metaphysically, the ethical double
standard of many toward Russia was a logical consequence of the
initial false step of seeking a short-cut to material progress outside
the moral framework.) A silly era insofar as they alternated this ex-
pediency with the opposite extreme, that of idealistic a priori
blueprints and abstractions; these lack the concrete context of any
mature, organically evolved idealism. An oscillation between these
extremes was likewise characteristic of the eighteenth-century liberal
intellectuals, oscillating between impractical utopian yearnings and
an all-too-practical softness (double standard) toward Jacobin social
engineering.

Here is one extremely small but revealing example of the new,
maturer kind of intellectual leadership: Stevenson did not have his
name listed to endorse the Nation magazine (that Last Mohican
from the liberal illusions of the 1930s), even though such routine
endorsements in past years came automatically from the highest lib-
eral intellectuals and New Dealers. Today, most liberal intellectuals
have learned to distinguish between the "liberalism" of certain
double-standard Nation experts (even while rightly defending their
free speech against McCarthyism or thought control) and the valid
liberalism of, say, the New Republic, The Progressive, or the Re-
porter. Five years ago, when I began writing the chapter about the
Nation in Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals, that ethical distinc-
tion was still unclear to most liberal intellectuals. How much saner
America would be today if those businessmen who would like to be
"conservatives" had some Republican version of Mr. Stevenson to
teach them the comparable quality of distinguishing between en-
dorsing genuine anti-Communism and endorsing the "anti-Communism" of the McCarthys, Jenners and Dirksens!

What businessman today—whether in the New York-Detroit axis or even in Chicago Tribuneland—sees anything radical or even liberal about the SEC or insurance of bank deposits? These and other New Deal cushionings of capitalism have become so traditional, so built-in a part of our eastern business communities that their old feud with the New Deal becomes a fading anachronism, a feud dangerous only if it still hampers their support of Eisenhower's "New Deal Republicans" against the isolationist nationalist Republicans.

Though the partly unintentional effect of such New Deal reforms has been conservative, this does not mean we can go to the opposite extreme and call the New Deal as a whole conservative. In contrast with its Communism-preventing social reforms, its procedures of agitational direct democracy were occasionally as radical as the business world alleged them to be, by-passing the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and the rest of our indirect democracy. Further, the Popular Front attitude of expediency toward the sheer evil of Communism, though it mesmerized New Deal talkers in New York more than actual New Deal doers in Washington, was as radical an anti-ethics on the Left as is—on the Right—the similar anti-ethics of a Popular Front with McCarthyism.

It is the bad and silly aspects of the New Deal, the procedural and unethical aspects, which have been rightly outgrown in new leaders like Stevenson, who rightly retain the valuable humane and conservative aspects. This refreshing development, by which—unlike its nationalist Republican foes—a fallible movement outgrows its own errors, is the decisive argument for supporting Stevenson and the Democrats in the Presidential election of 1956. The same support was actually earned by them already in 1952, but less obviously then, owing to the then legitimate hope that Eisenhower could help the Republicans to similarly outgrow their errors.

Despite the magnificent personal intentions of our decent and kindly President, the present Republican Administration—when considered as a whole, Knowland, Nixon and all—has obviously failed to evoke a world-minded, responsible American conservatism. Instead, the Republican leadership has left to others (like the bipartisan Watkins Committee) its own plain duty of restraining its wild men of the Right, whose activity was defined by the ever perceptive Will Herberg (New Leader, January 18, 1954) as "government by
rabble-rousing, the very opposite of a new conservatism." Such rev-
olutionary agitators would never be tolerated in the more truly con-
servative party of Eden, Butler and Churchill.

A conservative kind of government would bring the following qualities: a return to established ways, relaxation of tension and calm confidence, reverence for the Constitution and every single one of its time-hallowed amendments and liberties, orderly gradualism, protection of the Executive Branch from outside mob pressure. The conservative kind of government would bring an increased respect—even to the point of pompous stuffiness—for time-honored authority and for venerable dignitaries. Specifically, that would mean an increased respect for such dignitaries as Justices of the Supreme Court, famous generals decorated for heroism or with a Nobel Prize for statesmanship, past Presidents (because of the impersonal dignity of that office and because of the traditionalist's need of historical con-
tinuity), and any present President and his top appointments, es-
pecially in such a snobbishly aristocratic preserve as the Foreign Service. The above qualities are the stodgier virtues. They are not invariably a good thing, nor is conservatism in every context a good thing. All I am saying is that these happen to be the qualities of con-
servative rule, and the Republican Administration has not brought us a single one of them.

The Democrats were voted out of office partly because the coun-
try was fed up (and rightly so) with certain of the more radical notions and agitations of the New Deal 1930s. Yet, it now appears, by contrast, that those now-nostalgic "twenty years of treason" gave America a bit more of old-fashioned conservative virtues than the present self-styled anti-soap-boxing of Republican soapboxers.

Unless one of two unexpected events occurs, the Republican Party has forfeited its claim to retain in 1956 those decisive votes of non-
partisan independents which gave it victory in 1952. The unexpected events are either a far firmer assertion of presidential leadership over the anti-Eisenhower barn-burners and wild men in the Senate, or else their secession into a radical third party. If either of these blessings occurs, there will again be good reason for independents to vote for Eisenhower: on moral grounds if he asserts his leader-
ship, on strategic grounds if there is a McCarthy third party. The latter would save the Republicans in the same unexpected way that the secession of pro-Communists into the Progressive Party saved Truman in 1948.
If neither of these unlikely blessings occurs for the Republicans, then the last remaining obstacle has been cleared away for all thoughtful conservatives and independents, as well as liberals and Democrats, to support Adlai Stevenson for President in 1956. Though neither giddy optimism nor personal hero-worship is in order, at least there is a good chance—in proportion to our own efforts to make it a good chance—that a Stevenson party, outgrowing the bad and the silly aspects of the 1930s will lead America beyond the two false alternatives of Babbitt Senior Republicans and Babbitt Junior liberals. Ahead potentially lies an American synthesis of Mill with Burke, of liberal free dissent with conservative roots in historical continuity.

Of two American alternatives with bad records, the slanderous wild nationalists and the sometimes double-standard civil-libertarians, only the second alternative is capable of outgrowing a bad and silly past. The 1956 elections can bring it a better and wiser future under the better and wiser intellectualism of Stevenson. Here ends a cycle once partly symbolized by Alger Hiss ("a generation on trial"). Here, symbolized by Adlai Stevenson, begins potentially a new cycle of the glory, not the shame, of the eggheads.

III

In view of America's present mood of prosperous moderation, the McCarthy revolution and all other extremes of right and left will almost certainly lose. All that might rescue them is the emotionalism that would accompany a lost or costly war in China. But, luckily, the stakes are neither that high nor that desperate. America is no Weimar Republic, and McCarthyism tends to be more a racket than a conspiracy, more a cruel publicity hoax (played on Fort Monmouth, the Voice of America, the State Department) than a serious "fascist" or war party. Despite demagogic speeches ("speak loudly and carry a small stick"), the nationalist wing of the Republicans cares no more about really blockading and fighting the Red Chinese despotism than Hamlet's vehement player cared about Hecuba. Our indispensable European allies need not fear that Americans, even our nationalist wild men, will become preventive-warriors or trigger-happy. The struggle to be the new American ruling (taste-determining) class is a domestic struggle, in which foreign policy and Our
Boys in China merely furnish heartless slogans to embarrass the older ruling class.

In this struggle, two points emerge about diction: First, "nationalism" is less often a synonym of "national interest" than an antonym; second, no alchemy has yet been invented by which a loud repetition of the word "anti-Communism" transforms a Yahoo into a Houyhnhnm.

That the McCarthy movement normally accuses only non-Communists of "Communism" is one of the main rules of the game. Why? Not because the Communist menace to America has decreased (it has increased since Malenkov), but because McCarthy is not after the scalps of Communists in the first place but after the scalps of all those traditionalists who, like Senators Watkins and Flanders, favor government by law. And the reason why emotional McCarthyism, more by instinct than design, simply must be against traditionalists, conservatives and government-by-law is explained by its unadmitted but basic revolutionary nature. It is a radical movement trying to overthrow an old ruling class and replace it from below by a new ruling class.

I use "ruling class" not in the rigid Marxist sense but to mean the determiners of culture patterns, taste patterns, value patterns. For in America classes are fluid, unhereditary, and more psychological than economic. As suggested earlier, our old ruling class includes eastern, educated, mellowed wealth—internationalist and at least superficially liberalized, like the Achesons of Wall Street or the Paul Hoffmans of the easternized fraction of Detroit industrialists. The new would-be rulers include unmellowed plebeian western wealth (Chicago, Texas, much of Detroit) and their enormous, gullible mass-base: the nationalist alliance between the sticks and the slums, between the hick-Protestant mentalities in the west (Populist-Progressive on the Left, Know-Nothing on the Right) and the South Boston mentalities in the east. The latter are, metaphorically, an unexplored underground catacomb, long smoldering against the airy, oblivious palaces of both portions (liberal and Wall Street) of the eastern upper world.

Nobody except McCarthy personally can bridge this incongruous alliance of sticks and slums, and likewise span both sides of their respective religions. Too many commentators assume that the censured McCarthy, being increasingly discredited, will now be replaced by a smoother operator, by a more reliably Republican type like
Nixon. To be sure, an Arrow collar ad like Nixon, eager-eyed, clean-shaven and grinning boyishly while he assesses the precise spot for the stiletto, is socially more acceptable in the station-wagons of all kinds of junior executives on the make. However, even though the Vice President’s tamer version of the McCarthy drama would flutter more lorgnettes in respectable suburbia, that gain would be counterbalanced by the loss of the still more numerous South Boston mentalities. The latter would thereupon revert to the Democratic party, from which only a “proletarian,” non-Protestant McCarthy, never a bourgeois Rotarian Nixon, can lure them.

A fact insufficiently stressed is that McCarthy himself was originally a member of the Wisconsin “Democrat Party.” The otherwise similar Senator Pat McCarran preferred to remain, at least nominally, a Democrat to the end. Here, clearly, is a function of voter-wooing—namely, wooing to Republicanism the slimmier part of the thought-control bloc—which only a McCarthy and not even the most “glamorous” Nixon or Dirksen can perform for the wealthy, suburban, Republican anti-civil-libertarians. I would, therefore, disagree with Adlai Stevenson when he equates Nixon’s appeal with McCarthy’s.

No one but McCarthy can combine these incompatibles of Catholic slums and Protestant sticks into one movement, not to mention scooping up en passant the scattered lunatic fringes that emerged from anti-anti-Fascist isolationism during World War II. Therefore, it is premature to write McCarthy off as finished. What will indeed destroy him in the long run is the fact that his organizing ability does not keep pace with his publicizing ability, and that the left (New Deal) and right (Wall Street) wings of the old aristocracy can today partly team up whenever they need to protect their common interests. The wealthy Wall Street lawyer Acheson symbolized this team-up under Truman and was hated for it; his aristocratic, old-school-tie, Anglicized mannerisms were a Red flag to the McCarthyite plebeian revolution.

The New Deal and Wall Street battled in the 1930s when their imagined interests seemed irreconcilable. (I say “imagined” and “seemed” because it was hardly a threat to Wall Street when the New Deal reforms immunized workers against that lure of Communism to which French workers succumbed.) But the common Anglophilism of the internationalist, educated eastern seaboard united them (fortunately for the cause of liberty) on the interven-
tionist, anti-Nazi side during World War II. And, by today, the New Deal reforms have become so deeply rooted and traditional a part of the status quo, so conservative in a relative (though not absolute) sense, that the new plebeian money from the Midwest can no longer count on a split between social chic (eastern money in New Canaan and Long Island) and progressive chic (clichés of "forward"-looking uplift). Whether under Eisenhower Republicans or Stevenson Democrats, there will be no such split. And, unless there is a lost war, this partial unity between the financial and the liberal wings of aristocracy will fortunately smash the McCarthyite plebeian insurrection of "direct democracy" (government by mass meetings and telegrams).

The partial rapprochement between Wall Street and a now middle-aged New Deal is evidenced by the many recent books by veteran New Dealers on the advantages of enlightened "bigness" in business—books, for example, by David Lilienthal, J. K. Galbraith and Adolf Berle. These three valuable writers I profoundly admire on most points, but I disagree on the following rhetorical question: While fully recognizing the harmful snob-motives of the medieval feudal mind, was there not, nevertheless, some sound moral core within its "reactionary" distrust of the cash-nexus bourgeois?

Are liberal intellectuals, in a mirror-image of their former Left Bank stance, now suddenly to become joiners, good sports, success-worshipers, members of The Team? Will it next be a triumph of their adaptability to suffer in silence, without the old "holy indignation," the spectacle of a Republican auto dealer patronizing a great scientist as if he were his clerk instead of approaching him cap in hand? In that case, who on earth, if not the intellectuals, will resist the periodic stampedes to entrust American culture to the manipulators of gadgets? This resistance to stampedes ought to express not the conformism of "non-conformism," flaunted to pose as a devil of a fellow, but the sensitivity of a deeper and finer grain, an ear conforming not to bandwagon-tunes but to the finer, older, deeper rhythms of American culture.

A few years ago, liberal intellectuals were reproaching me for refusing to bait Big Business—and today (in several cases) for refusing to equate it with Santa Claus. Why do either? Business-baiting was and is a cheap bohemian flourish, a wearing of one's soulfulness on one's sleeve, and no substitute for seriously analyzing the real problem: namely, the compulsion of modern technics (whether
under capitalist bigness or a socialist bigness) to put know-how before know-why.

When the alternative is the neo-Populist barn-burners from Wisconsin and Texas, naturally I ardently prefer Big Business, especially a noblesse-obligated and New Dealized Big Business. For its vanity (desire to seem sophisticated) makes a point of allowing a lot more elbowroom to the free mind. But what a choice! All America’s great creative spirits of the past, like Melville (who spoke of “the impieties of Progress”) and conservative Henry Adams, would turn in their graves, as indignantly as would liberal Abraham Lincoln, at even the hint that no noble third alternative remained for a nation boasting of itself as the freest on earth.

Insofar as they refute the old Stalinist lie about America’s imaginary mass poverty and the imaginary prosperity of the Soviet slave kennels, let us welcome the belated liberal conversions to anti-business-baiting. But what when they go to the other extreme of whitewashing almost everything, from the old robber barons to the new “bigness”? What when the paens to economic prosperity ignore the psychological starvation, the cultural starvation, the mechanized mediocrity of too-efficient bigness? At that point, the value-conserver must protest: Judge our American elephantiasis of know-how not solely in contrast with the unspeakably low values of Soviet Communism but also in contrast with our own high anti-commercial traditions of Hawthorne, Melville and Thoreau, all of whom knew well enough that the railroad rides upon us, not we on the railroad.

Where the Communist police state is the alternative, let us continue to emphasize that American Big Business is an incomparably lesser evil. But beyond that special situation no further concessions, least of all unnecessary ones. Let us frankly embrace as enjoyable conveniences the leisure and services resulting from IBM efficiency. But must the embrace be corybantic? Shall intellectuals positively wallow in abdicating before a bigness which admittedly gives Americans economic prosperity and, at present, a relative political freedom but which robotizes them into a tractable, pap-fed, Reader’s-Digested and manipulated mass-culture?

Too utilitarian for a sense of tragic reverence or a sense of humor, and prone (behind “daring” progressive clichés) to an almost infinite smugness, one kind of bourgeois liberal is forever making quite unnecessary sacrifices of principle to expediency—first to the fellow-traveling Popular Front line in the 1930s, now to the opposite line
in the 1950s. But there comes a time when lasting values are conserved not by matey back-slapping but by wayward walks in the drizzle, not by seemingly practical adjustments but by the ornery Unadjusted Man.

1 What do we mean by “direct democracy” as contrasted with “indirect democracy”? Let us re-apply to today the conservative thesis of Madison’s tenth Federalist paper and of Irving Babbitt’s Democracy and Leadership.

Direct democracy (our mob tradition of Tom Paine, Jacobinism, and the Midwestern Populist parties) is government by referendum and mass petition, such as the McCarthyite Committee of Ten Million.

Indirect democracy (our semi-aristocratic and Constitutionalist tradition of Madison and the Federalist) likewise fulfills the will of the people but by filtering it through parliamentary Constitutional channels and traditional ethical restraints.

Both are ultimately majority rule, and ought to be. But direct democracy, being immediate and hotheaded, facilitates revolution, demagogy, and Robespierrian thought control, while indirect democracy, being calmed and canalized, facilitates evolution, a statesmanship of noblesse oblige, and civil liberties.
The Philosophical
“New Conservatism” — 1962

PETER VIERECK

The author’s preceding chapter of 1955, in the symposium book *The New American Right*, treats this new right as mainly the right-wing radicals of McCarthyism and of Midwest neo-populist Republicanism. Hence, the 1955 chapter fails to deal with something far more serious intellectually—the non-McCarthyite, non-thought-controlling movement known as “the new conservatism.” The latter movement, being non-popular and being burdened with partly merited philosophical pretensions, is restricted mainly to the campuses and the magazine world, even though it sometimes lends ghost-writers and an egghead façade to the popular political arena outside.

The extreme McCarthy emphasis of the 1955 chapter was justified in the exceptional context of the early 1950s. It is perhaps no longer justified in the context of this 1962 edition. As for over-publicized groups like the John Birch Society, fortunately they have no chance of attaining anything like the mass base attained by McCarthy, Coughlin, or Huey Long. This is because they lack the demagogic populist or pseudo-socialist economic platform without which chauvinist thought-control movements have no chance of success. Note that Hitler called himself not merely a nationalist but a National Socialist. Note that Huey Long (“every man a king”), Coughlin (“free silver”), and McCarthy (“socialistic” farm subsidies) had a similar rightist-leftist amalgam rather than a purely rightist or nationalist platform.

Though the pseudo-conservatism of Long-Coughlin-McCarthy seems dead for the time being, and though that of the John Birchers
seems stillborn, the philosophical "new conservatism" is still—on its admittedly smaller scale—alive. Alive whether for better or worse, its merits and defects being approximately equal. Since the present author furnished the first postwar book of the new conservatism—Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Revolt (1949, reprinted by Collier Books, 1962)—he bears a certain responsibility: again, "whether for better or worse." Hence, since the new conservatism is still alive and since it was not included in the preceding chapter of 1955, the following supplementary chapter seems in order.

I

In the 1930s, when the present author, still a student, was writing an article for the Atlantic Monthly urging "a Burkean new conservatism in America," and to some extent even as late as his Conservatism Revisited of 1949, "conservatism" was an unpopular epithet. In retrospect it becomes almost attractively amusing (like contemplating a dated period piece) to recall how violently one was denounced in those days for suggesting that Burke, Calhoun, and Irving Babbitt were not "Fascist beasts" and that our relatively conservative Constitution was not really a plot-in-advance, by rich bogeymen like George Washington and the Federalist Party. For example, the author's Atlantic article, written in prewar student days, was denounced more because the word used ("conservative") was so heretical than because of any effort by the Popular Frontist denouncers to read what was actually said. It was the first-written and worst-written appeal ever published in America for what it called a "new" conservatism ("new" meaning non-Republican, non-commercialist, non-conformist). This new conservatism it viewed as synthesizing in some future day the ethical New Deal social reforms with the more pessimistic, anti-mass insights of America's Burkean founders. Such a synthesis, argued the article, would help make the valuable anti-Fascist movement among literary intellectuals simultaneously anti-Communist also, leaving behind the Popular Frontist illusions of the 1930s.

As the liberal Robert Bendiner then put it, "Out of some 140,000,000 people in the United States, at least 139,500,000 are liberals, to hear them tell it. . . . Rare is the citizen who can bring himself to say, 'Sure I'm a conservative.' . . . Any American would sooner drop dead than proclaim himself a reactionary." In July,
1950, a newspaper was listing the charges against a prisoner accused of creating a public disturbance. One witness charged, "He was using abusive and obscene language, calling people conservatives and all that."

When conservatism was still a dirty word, it seemed gallantly non-conformist to defend it against the big, smug liberal majority among one's fellow writers and professors. In those days, therefore, the author deemed it more helpful to stress the virtues of conservative thought than its faults, and this is what he did in the 1949 edition of *Conservatism Revisited*. But in the mood emerging from the 1950s, blunt speaking about conservatism's important defects no longer runs the danger of obscuring its still more important virtues.

The main defect of the new conservatism, threatening to make it a transient fad irrelevant to real needs, is its rootless nostalgia for roots. Conservatives of living roots were Washington and Coleridge in their particular America and England, Metternich in his special Austria, Donoso Cortés in his Spain, Calhoun in his antebellum South, Adenauer and Churchill in the 1950s. American conservative writings of living roots were the *Federalist* of Hamilton, Madison, Jay, 1787–88; the *Defense of the Constitutions* of John Adams, 1787–88; the *Letters of Publicola* of John Quincy Adams, 1791; Calhoun's *Disquisition* and *Discourse*, posthumously published in 1850; Irving Babbitt's *Democracy and Leadership*, 1924. In contrast, today's conservatism of yearning is based on roots either never existent or no longer existent. Such a conservatism of nostalgia can still be of high literary value. It is also valuable as an unusually detached perspective about current social foibles. But it does real harm when it leaves literature and enters short-run politics, conjuring up mirages to conceal sordid realities or to distract from them.

In America, southern agrarianism has long been the most gifted literary form of the conservatism of yearning. Its most important intellectual manifesto was the Southern symposium *I'll Take My Stand* (1930), contrasting the cultivated human values of a lost aristocratic agrarianism with Northern commercialism and liberal materialism. At their best, these and more recent examples of the conservatism of yearning are needed warnings against shallow practicality. The fact that such warnings often come from the losing side of our Civil War is in itself a merit; thereby they caution a nation of success-worshippers against the price of success. But at their worst such books of the 1930s, and again of today, lack the living roots of
genuine conservatism and have only lifeless ones. The lifeless ones are really a synthetic substitute for roots, contrived by romantic nostalgia. They are a test-tube conservatism, a lab job of powdered Burke or cake-mix Calhoun.

Such romanticizing conservatives refuse to face up to the old and solid historical roots of most or much American liberalism. What is really rootless and abstract is not the increasingly conservatized New Deal liberalism but their own utopian dream of an aristocratic agrarian restoration. Their unhistorical appeal to history, their traditionless worship of tradition, characterize the conservatism of writers like Russell Kirk.

In contrast, a genuinely rooted, history minded conservative conserves the roots that are really there, exactly as Burke did when he conserved not only the monarchist-conservative aspects of William III’s bloodless revolution of 1688 but also its constitutional-liberal aspects. The latter aspects, formulated by the British philosopher John Locke, have been summarized in England and America ever since by the word “Lockean.”

Via the Constitutional Convention of 1787, this liberal-conservative heritage of 1688 became rooted in America as a blend of Locke’s very moderate liberalism and Burke’s very moderate conservatism. From the rival Federalists and Jeffersonians through today, all our major rival parties have continued this blend, though with varied proportion and stress. American history is based on the resemblance between moderate liberalism and moderate conservatism; the history of Continental Europe is based on the difference between extreme liberalism and extreme conservatism.

But some American new conservatives import from Continental Europe a conservatism that totally rejects even our moderate native liberalism. In the name of free speech and intellectual gadflyism, they are justified in expounding the indiscriminate anti-liberalism of hothouse Bourbons and czarist serf-floggers. But they are not justified in calling themselves American traditionalists or in claiming any except exotic roots for their position in America. Let them present their case frankly as anti-traditional, rootless revolutionaries of Europe’s authoritarian right wing, attacking the deep-rooted American tradition of liberal-conservative synthesis. Conservative authority, yes; right-wing authoritarianism, no. Authority means a necessary reverence for tradition, law, legitimism; authoritarianism means statist coercion based only on force, not moral roots, and suppressing
individual liberties in the Continental fashion of czardom, Junkerdem, Maistrean ultra-royalism.

Our argument is not against importing European insights when applicable; that would be Know-Nothing chauvinism. The more foreign imports the better, when capable of being assimilated: for example, the techniques of French symbolism in studying American poetry or the status-resentment theory of Nietzsche in studying the new American right. But when the European view or institution is neither applicable to the American reality nor capable of being assimilated therein, as is the case with the sweeping Maistre-style anti-liberalism and tyrannic authoritarianism of many of the new conservatives, then objections do become valid, not on grounds of bigoted American chauvinism but on grounds of distinguishing between what can, what cannot, be transplanted viably and freedom-enhancingly.

The Burkean builds on the concrete existing historical base, not on a vacuum of abstract wishful thinking. When, as in America, that concrete base includes British liberalism of the 1680s and New Deal reforms of the 1930s, then the real American conserver assimilates into conservatism whatever he finds lasting and good in liberalism and in the New Deal. Thereby he is closer to the Tory Cardinal Newman than many of Newman's American reactionary admirers. The latter overlook Newman's realization of the need to "inherit and make the best of" liberalism in certain contexts:

If I might presume to contrast Lacordaire and myself, I should say that we had been both of us inconsistent;—he, a Catholic, in calling himself a Liberal; I, a Protestant, in being an Anti-liberal; and moreover, that the cause of this inconsistency had been in both cases one and the same. That is, we were both of us such good conservatives as to take up with what we happened to find established in our respective countries, at the time when we came into active life. Toryism was the creed of Oxford; he inherited, and made the best of, the French Revolution.¹

How can thoughtful new conservatives, avoiding the political pitfalls that so many have failed to avoid, apply fruitfully to American life today what we have called non-political "cultural conservatism"—the tradition of Melville, Hawthorne, Thoreau, Henry Adams, Irving Babbitt, William Faulkner? In order to conserve our classical humanistic values against what he called "the impieties of progress," Melville had issued the following four-line warning to both
kinds of American materialists: (1) the deracinating, technology-
brandishing industrialists; their so-called freedom and progress is
merely the economic “individualism” of Manchester-liberal pseudo-
conservatism; and (2) the leftist collectivists; their unity is not a
rooted organic growth of shared values\(^2\) but a mechanical artifact of
apriorist blueprint abstractions,\(^3\) imposed gashingly upon concrete
society by a procrastean statist bureaucracy. The last-named dis-
tinction—between a unity that is grown and a unity that is made—
differentiates the anti-cash-nexus and anti-rugged-individualism of
“Tory Socialists” (in the aristocratic Shaftesbury-Disraeli-F.D.R.-
Stevenson tradition) from the anti-capitalism of Marxist Socialists or
left-liberal materialists. Here, then, is Melville’s little-known warning
to both bourgeois and Marxist materialists:

Not magnitude, not lavishness,
But Form—the site;
Not innovating willfulness,
But reverence for the Archetype.

A scrutiny of the plain facts of the situation has forced our report
on the new conservatives to be mainly negative. But a positive con-
tribution is indeed being made by all those thinkers, novelists, and
poets in the spirit of this Melville quotation today (whether or not
they realize their own conservatism) who are making Americans
aware of the tragic antithesis between archetypes and stereotypes in
life and between art and technique in literature. Let us clarify this
closely related pair of antitheses and then briefly apply them to that
technological brilliance which is corrupting our life and literature to-
day. Only by this unpopular and needed task, closer in spirit to the
creative imagination of a Faulkner or an Emily Dickinson than to the
popular bandwagons of politics, can the new conservatism still
overcome its current degeneration into either (at best) Manchester-
liberal economic materialism or (at worst) right-wing nationalist
thought control. And only via this task can America itself humanize
and canalize its technological prowess creatively, instead of being
dehumanized and mechanized by it in the sense of Thoreau’s “We
do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us.”

Every outlook has its own characteristic issue of moral choice. For
thoughtful conservatives today, the meaningful moral choice is not
between conforming and nonconforming but between conforming to
the ephemeral, stereotyped values of the moment and conforming to the ancient, lasting archetypal values shared by all creative cultures.

Archetypes have grown out of the soil of history—slowly, painfully, organically. Stereotypes have been manufactured out of the mechanical processes of mass production—quickly, painlessly, artificially. They have been synthesized in the labs of the entertainment industries and in the blueprints of the social engineers. The philistine conformist and the ostentatious professional nonconformist are alike in being rooted in nothing deeper than the thin topsoil of stereotypes, the stereotypes of Babbitt Senior and Babbitt Junior respectively.

The sudden uprooting of archetypes was the most important consequence of the worldwide industrial revolution. This moral wound, this cultural shock was even more important than the economic consequences of the industrial revolution. Liberty depends on a sub-stratum of fixed archetypes, as opposed to the arbitrary shuffling about of laws and institutions. The distinction holds true whether the shuffling about be done by the apriorist abstract rationalism of the eighteenth century or by the even more inhuman and metallic mass production of the nineteenth century, producing new traumas and new uprootings every time some new mechanized stereotype replaces the preceding one. The contrast between institutions grown organically and those shuffled out of arbitrary rationalist liberalism was summed up by a British librarian on being asked for the French constitution: "Sorry, sir, but we don't keep periodicals."

Every stereotyped society swallows up the diversities of private bailiwicks, private eccentricities, private inner life, and the creativity inherent in concrete personal loyalties and in loving attachments to unique local roots and their rich historical accretions. Apropos the creative potential of local roots, let us recall not only Burke's words on the need for loyalty to one's own "little platoon" but also Synge's words, in the Ireland of 1907, on "the springtime of the local life," where the imagination of man is still "fiery and magnificent and tender." The creative imagination of the free artist and free scientist requires private elbowroom, free from the pressure of centralization and the pressure of adjustment to a mass average. This requirement holds true even when the centralization is benevolent and even when the mass average replaces sub-average diversities. Intolerable is the very concept of some busybody benevolence, whether economic, moral, or psychiatric, "curing" all diversity by making it average.

Admittedly certain kinds of diversity are perfectly dreadful; they
threaten everything superior and desirable. But at some point the cure to these threats will endanger the superior and the desirable even more than do the threats themselves. The most vicious maladjustments, economic, moral, or psychiatric, will at some point become less dangerous to the free mind than the overadjustment—the stereotyping—needed to cure them.

In the novel and in the poem, the most corrupting stereotype of all is the substitution of good technique for art. What once resulted from the inspired audacity of a heartbreakingly lonely craftsman is now mass-produced in painless, safe, and uninspired capsules. This process is taking over every category of education and literature. The stream of consciousness for which James Joyce wrestled in loneliness with language; the ironic perspective toward society that Proust attained not as entertainment but as tragedy; the quick, slashing insights for which a Virginia Woolf bled out her heart, all these intimate personal achievements of the unstandardized private life are today the standard props of a hundred hack imitators, mechanically vending what is called "the New Yorker-type story." Don't underestimate that type of story; though an imitation job, it is imitation with all the magnificent technical skill of America's best-edited weekly. And think of the advantages: no pain any more, no risk any more, no more nonsense of inspiration. Most modern readers are not even bothered by the difference between such an efficient but bloodless machine job and the living product of individual heart's anguish.

What, then, is the test for telling the coffee from the Nescafé—the true artistic inspiration from the jar of Instant Muse?

The test is pain. Not mere physical pain but the exultant, transcending pain of selfless sacrifice. The test is that holy pain, that brotherhood of sacrifice, that aristocracy of creative suffering of which Baudelaire wrote, "Je sais que la douleur est l'unique noblesse." In other words, in a free democracy the only justified aristocracy is that of the lonely creative bitterness, the artistically creative scars of the fight for the inner imagination against outer mechanization—the fight for the private life.

II

Nationalist demagogy, whether McCarthy style or John Birch style, would never have become such a nuisance if liberal intellectuals and New Dealers had earlier made themselves the controlling
spearhead of American anti-Communism with the same fervor they showed when spearheading anti-fascism. Only because they defaulted that duty of equal leadership against both kinds of tyranny, only because of the vacuum of leadership created by that default, were the bullies and charlatans enabled partly to fill the vacuum and partly to exploit the cause of anti-Communism. Such had been the thesis of my book *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals*—a thesis entirely valid for the postwar Yalta era of illusions about Communism among the Henry Wallace kind of liberal and New Dealer.

Today that era is long over. It is ironic that Johnny-come-lately anti-Communists like McCarthy and the Birchers did not attack New Dealers until after the latter had got over the pro-Communist illusions that some of them undoubtedly and disastrously had. Today it is no longer in the interest of our two political camps to go on forever with such recriminations of the past. What is to the co-operative interest of both parties is to make sure that both are not replaced (after an intervening Kennedy era) by the “rejoicing third”—some new movement of nationalist demogogy. Conservatives have no more excuse to refuse to co-operate with liberals and New Dealers against right-wing nationalist threats to our shared liberties than to refuse to co-operate against comparable left-wing threats.

Fortunately, many Burkean new conservatives—Raymond English, Chad Walsh, Thomas Cook, Clinton Rossiter, J. A. Lukacs, August Heckscher, Will Herberg, Reinhold Niebuhr, and other distinguished names—have always been active and effective foes of the thought-control nationalists. Every one of these names achieved a record of all-out, explicit anti-McCarthyism in the days when that demagogue still seemed a danger and when it still took courage, not opportunism, to attack him. The same cannot be said of other, often better-known “new conservatives.” They failed the acid test of the McCarthy temptation of the 1950s in the same way that the fellow-traveler kind of liberal failed the acid test of the Communist temptation of the 1930s. Both temptations were not only ethical tests of integrity but also psychological tests of balance and aesthetic tests of good taste.

Apropos such tests, Clinton Rossiter concludes, in his book *Conservatism in America*, “Unfortunately for the cause of conservatism, Kirk has now begun to sound like a man born one hundred and fifty years too late and in the wrong country.” But it is pleasanter to see
the positive, not only the negative, in a fellow-writer one esteems. Let us partly overlook Kirk's silence about the McCarthy thought-control menace in Chicago. Let us partly overlook his lack of silence in supporting as so-called "conservatives" the Goldwater Manchester liberals of old-guard Republicanism (as if historic Anglo-American conservatism, with its Disraeli-Churchill-Hughes-Roosevelt tradition of humane social reform, could ever be equated with the robber-baron kind of laissez-faire capitalism). Fortunately, Kirk's positive contribution sometimes almost balances such embarrassing ventures into practical national politics. His positive contribution consists of his sensitive, perceptive rediscovery of literary and philosophical figures like Irving Babbitt and George Santayana for a true humanistic conservatism today.

Even at its best, even when avoiding the traps of right-wing radicalism, the new conservatism is partly guilty of causing the emotional deep-freeze that today makes young people ashamed of generous social impulses. New conservatives point out correctly that in the 1930s many intellectuals wasted generous emotions on unworthy causes, on Communist totalitarianism masked as liberalism. True enough—indeed, a point many of us, as "premature" anti-Communists, were making already in those days. But it does not follow, from recognizing the wrong generosities of the past, that we should today have no generous emotions at all, not even for many obviously worthy causes all around us, such as desegregation. Not only liberals but conservatives like Burke (reread his speeches against the slave trade) and John Adams and John Quincy Adams (among America's first fighters for Negro rights) have fought racism as contradicting our traditional Christian view of man.

The cost of being a genuine Burke-Adams conservative today is that you will be misrepresented in two opposite ways—as being really liberals at heart, hypocritically pretending to be conservatives; as being authoritarian reactionaries at heart, hypocritically pretending to be devoted to civil liberties. So far as the first misrepresentation goes: devotion to civil liberties is not a monopoly of liberals. It is found in liberals and Burkean conservatives alike, as shown in the exchange of letters in their old age between the liberal Thomas Jefferson and his good friend, the conservative John Adams. So far as the second misrepresentation goes: the test of whether a new conservative is sincere about civil liberties or merely a rightist authori-
tarian is the same as the test of whether any given liberal of the 1930s was sincere about civil liberties or merely a leftist authoritarian. That test (which Senator Goldwater fails) is twofold, involving one question about practice, one question about theory. In practice, does the given conservative or liberal show his devotion to civil liberties in deeds as well as words? In theory, does he show awareness of a law we may here define as the law of compensatory balance? The law of compensatory balance makes the exposure of Communist fellow-traveling the particular duty of liberals, the exposure of right-wing thought-controllers the particular duty of conservatives.

Here are some further implications of the law of compensatory balance. A traditional monarchy is freest, as in Scandinavia, when anticipating social democracy in humane reforms; an untraditional, centralized mass democracy is freest when encouraging, even to the point of tolerating eccentricity and arrogance, the remnants it possesses of aristocracy, family and regional pride, and decentralized provincial divergencies, traditions, privileges. A conservative is most valuable when serving in the more liberal party, a liberal when serving in the more conservative party. Thus the conservative Burke belonged not to the Tory but the Whig Party. Similarly Madison, whose tenth Federalist paper helped found and formulate our conservative Constitutionalist tradition of distrusting direct democracy and majority dictatorship, joined the liberal Jeffersonian party, not the Federalist Party. Reinhold Niebuhr, conservative in his view of history and anti-modernist, anti-liberal in theology, is not a Republican but a New Dealer in political-party activities.

III

Our distinction between rooted conservatives and rootless, counterrevolutionary doctrinaires is the measure of the difference between two different groups in contemporary America: the humanistic value-conservers and the materialistic old-guard Republicans. The latter are what a wrong and temporary journalistic usage often calls "conservative." It is more accurate to call them nineteenth-century Manchester liberals with roots no deeper than the relatively recent post-Civil War "gilded age." Already on May 28, 1903, Winston Churchill denied them and their British counterparts the name of conservatives when he declared in Parliament:
The new fiscal policy [of high tariffs] means a change, not only in the historic English parties but in the conditions of our public life. The old Conservative Party with its religious convictions and constitutional principles will disappear and a new party will arise . . . like perhaps the Republican Party in the United States of America . . . rigid, materialist and secular, whose opinions will turn on tariffs and who will cause the lobbies to be crowded with the touts of protected industries.

The Churchill quotation applies well to Senator Goldwater today. This charming and personable orator is a \textit{laisser-faire} Manchester liberal when humane social reforms are at stake. But, as is Churchill in the above quotation, he is ready to make an exception against \textit{laisser-faire} when protection of privileged industry is involved. The Burkean conservative today cherishes New Deal reforms in economics and Lockean parliamentary liberalism in politics, as traditions that are here to stay. Indeed, it is not the least of the functions of the new conservatism to force a now middle-aged New Deal to realize that it has become conservative and rooted, and that therefore it had better stop parroting the anti-Constitutional, anti-traditional slogans of its youth. These slogans are now being practiced instead, and to a wilder extent than even the most extreme New Deal liberal ever envisaged, by the Republican radicals of the right, with their wild-eyed schemes for impeaching Justice Warren or abolishing taxes.

The best-rooted philosophical conservatives in America derive from the anti-material-progress tradition of Melville and Irving Babbitt; they are found mainly in the literary and educational world, the creative world at its best, the non-political world. Politics will not be ready for their ideas for another generation; they should shed their illusions on that score. The normal time lag of a generation likewise separated the literary and university origin of Coleridge's conservatism from its osmosis into the politics of Disraeli Toryism.

Sir Henry Maine (1822–1888), one of the world's leading authorities on constitutions, called America's Constitution the most successful conservative bulwark in history against majority tyranny and mass radicalism and on behalf of traditional liberties and continuity of framework. Later scholars like Louis Hartz prefer to derive our free heritage not from the Burkean and Federalist ideas of Adams and the Constitution but from eighteenth-century Lockean liberalism. Both sides are partly right and need not exclude each other. For
Locke's liberalism is a relatively moderate and tradition-respecting brand when compared with the Continental, anti-traditional liberalism of Rousseau, not to mention the Jacobins. So we come full circle in America's political paradox; our conservatism, in the absence of medieval feudal relics, must grudgingly admit it has little real tradition to conserve except that of liberalism—which then turns out to be a relatively conservative liberalism.

The need for new conservatives to maintain continuity also with well-rooted liberal traditions does not mean conservatism and liberalism are the same. Their contrast may be partly and briefly defined as the tragic cyclical view of man, based on a political secularization of original sin, versus the optimistic faith in the natural goodness of man and mass and the inevitability of linear progress. In Cole-ridgian terms, conservatism is the concrete organic growth of institutions, as if they were trees, while rationalist liberalism is an abstract, mechanical moving around of institutions as if they were separate pieces of furniture. Conservatism serves "growingness" and moves inarticulately and traditionally, like the seasons; liberalism serves "progress" and moves consciously and systematically, like geometry. The former is a circle, the latter an ever-advancing straight line. Both are equally needed half truths; both are equally inherent in the human condition, liberalism on a more rational level and conservatism on a perhaps deeper level. It may be generalized that the conservative mind does not like to generalize. Conservative theory is anti-theoretical. The liberal and rationalist mind consciously articulates abstract blueprints; the conservative mind unconsciously incarnates concrete traditions. Liberal formulas define freedom; conservative traditions embody it.

Even while philosophical conservatives support liberals in day-to-day measures of social humaneness or of Constitutional liberties against rightist or leftist radicals, the above basic contrast between the two temperaments will always remain. For these contrasts are symbolized by contrasting spokesmen in our history. George Washington, John Adams, and the Federalists are not the same as apriorist egalitarians like Paine, or believers in natural goodness like Jefferson. John Calhoun is not the same as Andrew Jackson. Barrett Wendell, Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More are not the same as the spokesmen of our liberal weeklies or of the New York Post. Charles Evans Hughes is not the same as La Follette or even Woodrow Wilson. No, the need for conservative continuity with America's institution-
alized liberal past does not mean identity with liberalism, least of all with optimism about human nature, or utilitarian overemphasis on material progress, or trust in the direct democracy of the masses. Instead, conservative continuity with our liberal past simply means that you cannot escape from history; history has provided America with a shared liberal-conservative base more liberal than European Continental conservatives, more conservative than European Continental liberals.

This shared liberal-conservative base is a rooted reality, not a rightist nostalgia for roots, and from it grows the core of the New Deal and of the Kennedy program, as opposed to the inorganic, mechanical abstractions of either a Karl Marx or an Adam Smith. So let new conservatives stop becoming what they accuse liberals of being—rootless doctrinaires.

IV

When asked by President Teddy Roosevelt what the justification was of Austria's supposedly outdated monarchy, the old Hapsburg emperor Francis Joseph replied, "To protect my peoples from their governments." Similarly Disraeli—like Lord Bolingbroke of the early eighteenth century—defended the Crown and the Established Church as bulwarks of the people's rights against ephemeral politicians. The throne, whether Hapsburg or British, serves to moderate excesses of nationalistic or economic pressure groups against individual rights. In non-monarchic America, this same indispensable protection of liberty against the mob tyranny of transient majorities is performed by the Supreme Court, that similarly hallowed and aloof inheritor of the monarchic aura.

So conservatism fights on two fronts. It fights the atomistic disunity of unregulated capitalism. It fights the merely bureaucratic, merely mechanical unity of modern Socialism. It fights both for the sake of organic unity—but thereby runs the risk of creating a third threat of its own. For within its organic unity lies the totalitarian threat whenever the free individual is sacrificed totally and without guarantees (instead of partly and with constitutional guarantees) to that unity. Such a total sacrifice of individual to society took place in German romanticism; organic unity there became an anti-individual cult of the folk-state (Volk). This cult took place already in the nineteenth century. It not only unbalanced German conserva-
tism toward extreme statism (via Hegel) but unwittingly prepared the German people psychologically for Hitler's gangster unity.

The proper conservative balance between individual diversity and organic social unity has been best formulated by Coleridge, in 1831:

The difference between an inorganic and an organic body lies in this: in the first—a sheaf of corn—the whole is nothing more than a collection of the individual parts or phenomena. In the second—a man—the whole is everything and the parts are nothing. A State is an idea intermediate between the two, the whole being a result from, and not a mere total of, the parts,—and yet not so merging the constituent parts in the result, but that the individual exists integrally within it.

Coleridgian conservatism, the height of the conservative philosophy, lies in the above intermediate "and yet," which saves the "individual integrally" while linking him organically. The folk romanticism of Germany and the "Third Rome" heritage of czarist Russia upset that balance in favor of "the whole is everything, the parts nothing," thereby paving the way for Nazism and Communism respectively. On the opposite extreme, America upset that Coleridgian balance in favor of "the whole is nothing" ("a sheaf of corn")—after the chaotic robber-baron individualists emerged as the real victors of the Civil War. So the proper rebalancing ("intermediate between the two") would promote an almost exaggerated individualism in Germany and Russia and an almost exaggerated "Socialistic" or New Deal unity in America, not for its own sake but to even the scales.

Therefore in America it is often the free trade unions who unconsciously are our ablest representatives of the word they hate and misunderstand—conservatism. The organic unity they restore to the atomized "proletariat" is the providential Coleridgian "intermediate" between doctrinaire capitalism and doctrinaire Socialism. In the words of Frank Tannenbaum in *A Philosophy of Labor*, 1952:

Trade unionism is the conservative movement of our time. It is the counter-revolution. Unwittingly, it has turned its back upon most of the political and economic ideas that have nourished western Europe and the United States during the last two centuries. In practice, though not in words, it denies the heritage that stems from the French Revolution and from English liberalism. It is also a complete repudiation of Marxism.

In contrast with [Communism, Fascism, and *laisser-faire* capitalism]
the trade union has involved a clustering of men about their work. This fusion [the new, medieval-style organic society] has been going on for a long time. It has been largely unplanned. . . . There is a great tradition of humanism and compassion in European and American politics, philosophy, and law, which counters, at first ineffectively, the driving forces operating for the atomization of society and the isolation of man. That tradition in England includes such names as Cobbett, Shaftesbury, Romilly, Dickens, Byron, Coleridge, Carlyle, Ruskin, Charles Kingsley. . . . The trade union is the real alternative to the authoritarian state. The trade union is our modern "society," the only true society that industrialism has fostered. As a true society it is concerned with the whole man, and embodies the possibilities of both the freedom and the security essential to human dignity.

This Tannenbaum passage is both conservative and new. Yet it would fill with horror the Kirk-Goldwater kind of mind that today claims to speak for "the new conservatism." Such horror is not an argument against Tannenbaum nor against a new conservatism. It is an argument against the misuse of language. And it is an argument against that old-guard wing of the Republican Party which has yet to learn the anti-rightist warning spoken in 1790 by the conservative Burke: "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation."

What about the argument (very sincerely believed by the National Review and old-guard Republicans) that denies the label "conservative" to those of us who support trade unionism and who selectively support many New Deal reforms? According to this argument, our support of such humane and revolution-preventing reforms in politics—by New Dealers and democratic Socialists—makes us indistinguishable in philosophy from New Dealers and democratic Socialists. Similarly our support of the liberal position on civil liberties in politics supposedly makes us indistinguishable from liberals in philosophy. Shall we then cease to call ourselves philosophical conservatives, despite our conservative view of history and human nature?

The answer is: Children, don't oversimplify, don't pigeonhole; allow for pluralistic overlappings that defy abstract blueprints and labels. Trade unionists (and some of the new humanistic, non-statist Socialists that are evolving in England and West Germany) may be what Frank Tannenbaum calls "the conservative counter-revolution" despite themselves (a neo-medieval organic society) and
against their own conscious intentions. Meanwhile, self-styled conservatives are often unconscious anarchic wreckers and uprooters (from the French O.A.S. to America’s second generation of campus neo-McCarthyites). Moreover, the same social reform in politics may be supported for very different philosophical reasons. To cite an old example newly relevant today, the support of the workingman’s right to vote and right to strike by both the Chartists and the Tory Disraeli merely means that some support a reform as a first step to mass revolution while others support the same reform to woo the masses away from revolution and to give them a sense of belongingness by changing them from masses to individuals.

Finally, there is the distinction between what is done and how it is done. This distinction differentiates the conservative from the democratic Socialist and from the New Deal bureaucrat even when they all vote the same ticket (as so many of us could not help but do, given the Republican alternative, in the case of Roosevelt, Stevenson, and Kennedy). This distinction, this clarification of the proper use of "conservative," is found in an important and much-discussed essay by August Heckscher, at that time the chief editorial writer of the New York Herald Tribune and in 1962 appointed President Kennedy’s Consultant for Cultural Affairs. Writing in the Harvard magazine Confluence in September, 1953, Mr. Heckscher said:

The failure to understand the true nature of conservatism has made political campaigns in the United States signally barren of intellectual content. In debate it is difficult at best to admit that you would do the same thing as the opposition, but in a different way. Yet the spirit in which things are done really does make a difference, and can distinguish a sound policy from an unsound one. Social reforms can be undertaken with the effect of draining away local energies, reducing the citizenry to an undifferentiated mass, and binding it to the shackles of the all-powerful state. Or they can be undertaken with the effect of strengthening the free citizen's stake in society. The ends are different. The means will be also, if men have the wit to distinguish between legislation which encourages voluntary participation and legislation which involves reckless spending and enlargement of the federal bureaucracy.

It is easy to say that such distinctions are not important. A conservative intellectual like Peter Viereck is constantly challenged, for example, because in a book like Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals he supports a political program not dissimilar in its outlines from that which was achieved during twenty years of social renovation under the Democrats.
But the way reforms are undertaken is actually crucial. Concern for the individual, reluctance to have the central government perform what can be done as well by the state or to have the public perform what can be done as well by private enterprise—these priorities involve values. And such values (upheld by writers like Mr. Viereck) are at the heart of modern conservatism. So conservatism at best remains deeper and more pervasive than any party; and a party that does claim it exclusively is likely to deform and exploit it for its own purposes.

In conclusion, let us broaden the discussion from America into certain worldwide considerations about the nature of despotism. They are considerations about which all men of good will can agree as a strategy of freedom, whether New Deal social democrats or Manchester-liberal Republicans or Burkean conservatives. If there is no such agreement, then the epitaph on the tombstone of freedom may appropriately be these lines of Yeats:

Things fall apart; the center cannot hold. . . .
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

According to the neo-Stalinist wing in Russia today, almost all intellectuals and reformers are secret agents of western capitalism. According to the right wing today in America, almost all intellectuals and reformers are secret agents of eastern Communism. Mirror images, of course. And wrong twice.

Each mirror image needs the other and reflects on the other. They need each other as bogeymen. They reflect on each other because each leftist extreme frightens waverers into the rightist camp; each rightist extreme frightens waverers into the leftist camp. McCarthyism used to frighten European liberals into being fellow-travelers with communism. Communism frightens American conservatives into being fellow-travelers with the pseudo-conservative nationalist thought controllers.

Neither mirror image is strong enough to destroy freedom by itself. Freedom is destroyed when both attack at the same time. Lenin was able to seize power in November, 1917, only because the new Duma government had been weakened by right-wing authoritarians, the John Birchers of Russia, who slandered it as "Red" and who had undermined it by the Kornilov Putsch in September. Hitler was able to seize power in 1933 only because the Weimar Republic had
been weakened by Communist authoritarians, who slandered it as "Social Fascist" and who had undermined it by postwar Putsches. In 1962 in France, the anti-de Gaulle Communists and the O.A.S. rightists are examples of the same process in our own time. So are the Gizenga leftists and Tshombe rightists in the Congo.

In both Congo and California, in France today as in Kerensky's Russia yesterday, the fellow-traveler left and the thought-control right are still needing each other and feeding each other, as against the center. Meanwhile in every country the Burke-style conservatives, who revere a rooted constitution, and the Mill-style liberals, who revere civil liberties, likewise need each other: to unite against what Metternich called "the white radicals" of the right as well as the red radicals. Hence this slogan to end all slogans: "LIBERTARIANS OF THE WORLD, UNITE! YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE BUT ABSTRACTIONS. YOU HAVE A WORLD TO CHAIN."

Liberties versus "liberty." Concrete liberties, preserved by the chains of ethics, versus abstract liberty-in-quotes, betrayed by messianic sloganizing, betrayed into the far grimmer chains of totalitarianism. "Man was born free" (said Rousseau, with his faith in the natural goodness of man) "but is everywhere in chains." "In chains, and so he ought to be," replies the thoughtful conservative, defending the good and wise and necessary chains of rooted tradition and historic continuity, upon which depend the civil liberties, the shared civil liberties of modern liberals and conservatives, and parliamentary monarchists, and democratic Socialists. Without the chaos-chaining, the id-chaining heritage of rooted values, what is to keep man from becoming Eichmann or Nechayev—what is to save freedom from "freedom?"

1 From the appendix of the second edition (London, 1865) of Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*.
2 Here to be defined as "archetypes."
3 Here to be defined as "stereotypes."
4 Longer, more complete definition, with all the needed specific examples in political and intellectual life, is attempted in the first three chapters of the present writer's Anvil paperback, *Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill* (Van Nostrand Company, Princeton, 1956).
To the relatively objective observer, whether American or foreign, it seems clear that the complex of phenomena that have come to be known as “McCarthyism” must be symptoms of a process in American society of some deep and general significance. Some interpret it simply as political reaction, even as a kind of neofascism. Some think of it as simply a manifestation of nationalism. The present paper proposes to bring to bear some theoretical perspectives of sociology in an attempt to work out an interpretation which goes beyond catchwords of this order.

McCarthyism can be understood as a relatively acute symptom of the strains which accompany a major change in the situation and structure of American society, a change which in this instance consists in the development of the attitudes and institutional machinery required to implement a greatly enhanced level of national political responsibility. The necessity for this development arises both from our own growth to an enormous potential of power, and from the changed relation to the rest of the world which this growth in itself, and other changes extraneous to American development, have entailed. The strains to which I refer derive primarily from conflicts between the demands imposed by the new situation and the inertia of those elements of our social structure which are most resistant to the necessary changes.

The situation I have in mind centers on the American position in international affairs. The main facts are familiar to all. It is not something that has come about suddenly, but the impact of its pressures has been cumulative.

The starting point is the relative geographical isolation of the United States in the “formative” period of its national history, down
to, let us say, about the opening of the present century. The Spanish-American War extended our involvements into the Spanish-speaking areas of the Caribbean and to the Philippines, and the Boxer episode in China and our mediation of the Russo-Japanese War indicated rapidly growing interests in the Orient. Then the First World War brought us in as one of the major belligerents, with a brief possibility of taking a role of world leadership. From this advanced degree of international involvement, however, we recoiled with a violent reaction, repudiating the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations.

In the ensuing period of "normalcy," until the shock of Pearl Harbor settled the question, it could still be held that the "quarrels" of foreign powers beyond the Americas were none of our concern, unless some "arbitrary" disturbance impinged too closely on our national interests. By the end of the Second World War, however, this attitude could not again be revived by any body of opinion which pretended to depend upon a realistic appraisal of our situation. Our own strength, in spite of our massive disarmament and demobilization, had grown too great; the defeat of France and the disorganization of Germany destroyed such continental European balance of power as had existed; Britain, though victorious, was greatly weakened in the face of world-wide commitments; and Soviet Russia emerged as a victorious and expanding power, leading with a revolutionary ideology a movement which could readily destroy such elements of stability favorable to our own national values and interests as still remained in the world. Along with all this have come developments in military technology that have drastically neutralized the protections formerly conferred by geographical distance, so that even the elementary military security of the United States cannot now be taken for granted apart from world-wide political order.

The vicissitudes of American foreign policy and its relations to domestic politics over this period show the disturbing effect of this developing situation on our society. We have twice intervened militarily on a grand scale. With a notable difference of degree, we have both times recoiled from the implications of our intervention. In the second case the recoil did not last long, since the beginnings of the Cold War about 1947 made it clear that only American action was able to prevent Soviet domination of the whole continent of Europe. It can, however, be argued that this early and grand-scale resumption of responsibility imposed serious internal strains because it did
not allow time for "digesting" the implications of our role in the war.

The outstanding characteristic of the society on which this greatly changed situation has impinged is that it had come to be the industrial society par excellence—partly because the settlement of the continental area coincided with the later industrial revolution, partly because of the immense area and natural resources of the country, but partly too because of certain important differences between American and European society. Since the United States did not have a class structure tightly integrated with a political organization that had developed its main forms before the industrial revolution, the economy has had a freedom to develop and to set the tone for the whole society in a way markedly different from any European country or Japan.

All highly industrialized societies exhibit many features in common which are independent of the particular historical paths by which their developments have taken place. These include the bureaucratic organization of the productive process itself, in the sense that the roles of individuals are of the occupational type and the organizations in which they are grouped are mainly "specific function" organizations. Under this arrangement the peasant type of agricultural holding, where farming is very closely bound up with a kinship unit, is minimized; so too of small family businesses; people tend to look to their productive function and to profit as a measure of success and hence of emancipation from conflicting ties and claims; the rights of property ownership are centered primarily in the organization which carries functional responsibility, and hence permits a high degree of segregation between private life and occupational roles for production purposes; contract plays a central part in the system of exchange, and para-economic elements tend to be reduced in importance.

Outside the sphere which touches the organization of the economy itself, industrialism means above all that the structures which would interfere with the free functioning of the economy, and of their adaptation to it, are minimized. The first of these is family and kinship. The American family system, chiefly characterized by the isolation of the nuclear or conjugal family, has gone farther than in any European society toward removing all interferences with the occupational roles of the breadwinning members, and with occupational mobility. A second field is religion. The American combination of federalism and the separation of church and
The state has resulted in a system of "denominational pluralism" which prevents organized religion from constituting a monolithic structure standing in the way of secular social developments. The third field concerns the matter of social stratification. The United States of course has a class structure; but it is one which has its primary roots in the system of occupational roles, and in contrast to the typical European situation it acts as no more than a brake on the processes of social mobility which are most important to an industrial type of occupational system. Under an effective family system there must be some continuity of class status from generation to generation, and there cannot be complete "equality of opportunity." In America, however, it is clearly the occupational system rather than kinship continuity that prevails.

Linked to this situation is our system of formal education. The United States was among the pioneers in developing publicly supported education; but this has taken place in a notably decentralized way. Not only is there no Department of Education in the Federal government, but even the various state departments are to a large extent service organizations for the locally controlled school systems. Higher education further has been considerably more independent of class standards which equate the "scholar" with the "gentleman" (in a class sense) than has been the case in Europe. Also a far larger proportion of each age-group attends institutions of higher education than in European countries.

Politically the most important fact about American industrialism is that it has developed overwhelmingly under the aegis of free enterprise. Historically the center of gravity of the integration of American society has not rested in the political field. There came to be established a kind of "burden of proof" expectation that responsibilities should not be undertaken by government unless, first, the necessity for their being undertaken at all was clearly established, and second, there was no other obviously adequate way to get the job done. It is therefore not surprising that the opening up of vast new fields of governmental responsibility should meet with considerable resistance and conflict.

The impact of this problem on our orientation to foreign relations has been complicated by an important set of internal circumstances. It is a commonplace that industrialism creates on a large scale two sets of problems which uniformly in all industrialized countries have required modifications of any doctrinaire "laissez-faire" policy: the
problems of controlling the processes of the economy itself, and of dealing with certain social repercussions of industrialization.

As the process of industrialization has developed in America there has been a steady increase in the amount of public control imposed on the economy, with the initiative mainly in the hands of the Federal government. This trend was accelerated in the latter years of the nineteenth century, and has continued, with interruptions, through the New Deal. The New Deal, however, was more concerned with the social repercussions of industrialization, rather than with more narrowly economic problems. The introduction of a national system of social security and legislation more favorable to labor are perhaps the most typical developments. This internal process of government intervention has not gone far enough to satisfy European socialists, but it certainly constitutes a great modification of the earlier situation. Moreover, in broad lines it can be regarded as firmly established. It is significant that the major political parties now tend to vie with each other in promoting the extension of social security benefits, that there is no likelihood of repeal of the Federal Reserve Act, and that there is no strong movement to place the unions under really severe legal restraints.

On the whole, business groups have accepted the new situation and cooperated to make it work with considerably more good faith than in Continental Europe. Nevertheless, these internal changes have been sufficiently recent and far-reaching to keep the strains attendant on them from being fully resolved. Moreover they have created an important part of the problems with which this examination is chiefly concerned, problems touching the composition of the higher strata of the society, where the primary burden of responsibility must fall.

By contrast with European countries, perhaps in some ways particularly Britain, the United States has been conspicuous for the absence or relative weakness of two types of elite elements. The first of these is a hereditary upper class with a status continuous from pre-industrial times, closely integrated with politics and public service. The second is an occupational elite whose roots are essentially independent of the business world—in the independent professions, the universities, the church, or government, including civil and military services.

In America the businessmen have tended to be the natural leaders of the general community. But, both for the reasons just reviewed
and for certain others, this leadership has not remained undisputed. On the whole the business community has, step by step, resisted the processes of internal change necessitated by industrialization rather than taken the leadership in introducing them. The leadership that has emerged has been miscellaneous in social origin, including professional politicians, especially those in touch with the urban political machines, leaders in the labor union movement and elements in close touch with them. An important part has been played by men and women who may be said to exhibit a more or less “aristocratic” tinge, particularly in the Eastern cities, President Roosevelt of course having been among them. An important part has been played by lawyers who have made themselves more independent of the business connection than the typical corporation lawyer of a generation ago. Under the pressure of emergency, there has been a tendency for high military officers to play important roles in public life.

Another important group has been composed of “intellectuals”—again a rather miscellaneous assembly including writers, newspapermen, and members of university faculties. In general the importance of the universities has been steadily enhanced by the increasingly technical character of the operations of the economy; businessmen themselves have had to be more highly educated than their predecessors, and have become increasingly dependent on still more highly trained technicians of various kinds.

The important point is that the “natural” tendency for a relatively unequivocal business leadership of the general community has been frustrated, and the business group has had to give way at many points. Nevertheless, a clearly defined non-business component of the elite has not yet crystallized. In my opinion, the striking feature of the American elite is not what Soviet propaganda contends that it is—the clear-cut dominance by “capitalists”—but rather its fluid and relatively unstructured character. In particular, there is no clear determination of where political leadership, in the sense including both “politics” and “administration,” is to center.

A further feature of the structure of American society is intimately related to the residual strains left by recent social changes. There is a continuing tendency for earlier economic developments to leave a “precipitate” of upper groups, the position of whose members is founded in the achievements of their ancestors, in this case relatively recent ones. By historical necessity these groups are strongest in the older parts of the country. Hence the cities of the Eastern seaboard
have tended to develop groups that are the closest approach we have—though still very different from their European equivalent—to an aristocracy. They have generally originated in business interests, but have taken on a form somewhat similar to the mercantile aristocracies of some earlier European societies, such as the Hanseatic cities. In the perspective of popular democratic sentiments, these groups have tended to symbolize at the same time capitalistic interests and social snobbery. In certain circumstances they may be identified with "bohemianism" and related phenomena which are sources of uneasiness to traditional morality.

As the American social and economic center has shifted westward, such groups in the great Middle Western area and beyond have been progressively less prominent. There the elites have consisted of new men. In the nature of the case the proportional contribution to the economy and the society in general from the older and the newer parts of the country has shifted, with the newer progressively increasing their share. But at the same time there is the sense among them of having had to fight for this share against the "dominance" of the East. A similar feeling permeates the lower levels of the class structure. A major theme of the populist type of agrarian and other radicalism had combined class and sectional elements, locating the source of people's troubles in the bankers and railway magnates of the East and in Wall Street. It must not be forgotten that the isolationism of the between-the-wars period was intimately connected with this sectional and class sentiment. The elder La Follette, who was one of the principal destroyers of the League of Nations, was not a "conservative" or in any usual sense a reactionary, but a principal leader of the popular revolt against "the interests."

It must also not be forgotten that a large proportion of the American population are descendants of relatively recent immigrants whose cultural origins are different from the dominant Protestant Anglo-Saxon elements. A generation and more ago the bulk of the new immigration constituted an urban proletariat largely dominated by the political machines of the great cities. By now a great change has taken place. The children of these immigrants have been very much Americanized, but to a considerable degree they are still sensitive about their full acceptance. This sensitivity is if anything heightened by the fact that on the whole most of these elements have risen rapidly in the economic and social scale. They are no longer the
inhabitants of the scandalous slums; many have climbed to lower-middle-class status and higher. They have a certain susceptibility to "democratic" appeals which are directed against the alleged snobbery of the older dominant elements.

Finally, the effect of the great depression of the 1930s on the leading business groups must not be forgotten. Such a collapse of the economy could not fail to be felt as a major failure of the expectation that business leaders should bear the major responsibility for the welfare of the economy as a whole and thus of the community. In general it was not the businessmen but the government, under leadership which was broadly antagonistic to business, which came to the rescue. Similarly, the other great class of American proprietors, the farmers, had to accept governmental help of a sort that entailed controls, which in turn inevitably entailed severe conflicts with the individualistic traditions of their history. The fact that the strains of the war and postwar periods have been piled so immediately on those of depression has much to do with the severity of the tensions with which this analysis is concerned.

My thesis, then, is that the strains of the international situation have impinged on a society undergoing important internal changes which have themselves been sources of strain, with the effect of superimposing one kind of strain on another. What responses to this compound strain are to be expected?

It is a generalization well established in social science that neither individuals nor societies can undergo major structural changes without the likelihood of producing a considerable element of "irrational" behavior. There will tend to be conspicuous distortions of the patterns of value and of the normal beliefs about the facts of situations. These distorted beliefs and promptings to irrational action will also tend to be heavily weighted with emotion, to be "overdetermined" as the psychologists say.

The psychology of such reactions is complex, but for present purposes it will suffice to distinguish two main components. On the negative side, there will tend to be high levels of anxiety and aggression, focused on what rightly or wrongly are felt to be the sources of strain and difficulty. On the positive side there will tend to be wishful patterns of belief with a strong "regressive" flavor, whose chief function is to wish away the disturbing situation and establish a situation in phantasy where "everything will be all right," preferably as it was before the disturbing situation came about.
Very generally then the psychological formula tends to prescribe a set of beliefs that certain specific, symbolic agencies are responsible for the present state of distress; they have "arbitrarily" upset a satisfactory state of affairs. If only they could be eliminated the trouble would disappear and a satisfactory state restored. The role of this type of mechanism in primitive magic is quite well known.

In a normal process of learning in the individual, or of developmental change in the social system, such irrational phenomena are temporary, and tend to subside as capacity to deal with the new situation grows. This may be more or less easily achieved of course, and resolution of the conflicts and strains may fail to be achieved for a long period or may even be permanently unsuccessful. But under favorable circumstances these reactions are superseded by an increasingly realistic facing of the situation by institutionalized means.

Our present problem therefore centers on the need to mobilize American society to cope with a dangerous and threatening situation which is also intrinsically difficult. It can clearly only be coped with at the governmental level; and hence the problem is in essence a matter of political action, involving both questions of leadership—of who, promoting what policies, shall take the primary responsibility—and of the commitment of the many heterogeneous elements of our population to the national interest.

Consequently there has come to be an enormous increase in pressure to subordinate private interests to the public interest, and this in a society where the presumptions have been more strongly in favor of the private interest than in most. Readiness to make commitments to a collective interest is the focus of what we ordinarily mean by "loyalty." It seems to me that the problem of loyalty at its core is a genuine and realistic one; but attitudes toward it shade all the way from a reasonable concern with getting the necessary degree of loyal cooperation by legitimate appeals, to a grossly irrational set of anxieties about the prevalence of disloyalty, and a readiness to vent the accompanying aggression on innocent scapegoats.

Underlying the concern for loyalty in general, and explaining a good deal of the reaction to it, is the ambivalence of our approach to the situation: The people in the most "exposed" positions are on the one hand pulled by patriotic motives toward fulfillment of the expectations inherent in the new situation; they want to "do their bit." But at the same time their established attitudes and orientations re-
sist fulfillment of the obligation. In the conflict of motives which ensues it is a natural consequence for the resistance to be displaced or projected on to other objects which function as scapegoats. In the present situation it is precisely those parts of our population where individualistic traditions are strongest that are placed under the greatest strain, and that produce the severest resistances to accepting the obligations of our situation. Such resistances, however, conflict with equally strong patriotic motives. In such a situation, when one's own resistance to loyal acceptance of unpalatable obligations, such as paying high taxes, are particularly strong, it is easy to impute disloyal intentions to others.

Our present emotional preoccupation with the problem of loyalty indicates above all that the crisis is not, as some tend to think, primarily concerned with fundamental values, but rather with their implementation. It is true that certain features of the pattern of reaction, such as tendencies to aggressive nationalism and to abdication of responsibilities, would, if carried through, lead to severe conflict with our values. But the main problem is not concerned with doubts about whether the stable political order of a free world is a goal worth sacrificing for, but rather with the question of how our population is rising or failing to rise to the challenge.

The primary symbol that connects the objective external problem and its dangers with the internal strain and its structure is "Communism." "World Communism" and its spread constitute the features of the world situation on which the difficulty of our international problem clearly centers. Internally it is felt that Communists and their "sympathizers" constitute the primary focus of actual or potential disloyalty.

With respect to the external situation, the focus of the difficulty in the current role of Soviet Russia is of course reasonable enough. Problems then arise mainly in connection with certain elements of "obsessiveness" in the way in which the situation is approached, manifested for instance in a tendency to subordinate all other approaches to the situation exclusively to the military, and in the extreme violence of reaction in some circles to the Chinese situation, in contrast to the relative tolerance with which Yugoslavia is regarded.

Internally, the realistic difficulty resides mainly in the fact that there has indeed been a considerable amount of Communist infiltration in the United States, particularly in the 1930s. It is true that
the Communist Party itself has never achieved great electoral success, but for a time Communist influence was paramount in a number of important labor unions, and a considerable number of the associations Americans so like to join were revealed to be Communist-front organizations, with effective Communist control behind the public participation of many non-Communists. Perhaps most important was the fact that considerable numbers of the intellectuals became fellow-travelers. In the days of the rise of Nazism and of the popular front, many of them felt that only Soviet Russia was sincere in its commitment to collective security; that there was a Franco-British "plot" to get Germany and Russia embroiled with each other, etc. The shock of the Nazi-Soviet pact woke up many fellow-travelers, but by no means all; and the cause was considerably retrieved by Hitler's attack on Russia.

Two other features of the Communist movement which make it an ideal negative symbol in the context of the present loyalty problem are the combination of conspiratorial methods and foreign control with the progressive component of its ideological system. On the one hand the party has drastically repudiated the procedures of constitutional democracy, and on this issue has broken with all the democratic socialist parties of Europe; it claims the protection of democratic procedures and civil liberties, but does not hesitate to abuse them when this seems to be advantageous. There has further never been any question of the American party determining its own policies by democratic procedures. Perhaps in fact the knowledge of the extent to which the "front" organizations have been manipulated from behind the scenes has been the most disillusioning aspect for liberal Americans of their experience with Communism at home.

At the same time the movement had a large content of professed idealism, which may be taken to account for the appeal of Communism before the Cold War era for such large elements of liberal opinion in the United States, as in other Western countries. Marx was, after all, himself a child of the Enlightenment, and the Communist movement has incorporated in its ideology many of the doctrines of human rights that have formed a part of our general inheritance. However grossly the symbols of democracy, of the rights of men, of peace and brotherhood, have been abused by the Communists, they are powerful symbols in our own tradition, and their appeal is understandable.

Hence the symbol "Communism" is one to which a special order
of ambivalence readily attaches. It has powerful sources of appeal to the liberal tradition, but those who are out of sympathy with the main tradition of American liberalism can find a powerful target for their objections in the totalitarian tactics of Communism and can readily stigmatize it as "un-American." Then, by extending their objections to the liberal component of Communist ideology, they can attack liberalism in general, on the grounds that association with Communist totalitarianism makes anything liberal suspect.

These considerations account for the anti-Communist's readiness to carry over a stereotype from those who have really been party members or advanced fellow-travelers to large elements of the intellectuals, the labor movement, etc., who have been essentially democratic liberals of various shades of opinion. Since by and large the Democratic Party has more of this liberalism than has the Republican, it is not surprising that a tendency to label it as "sympathizing" with or "soft toward" Communism has appeared. Such a label has also been extended, though not very seriously, to the Protestant clergy.

But there is one further extension of the association that is not accounted for in these terms, nor is the failure to include certain plausible targets so accountable. The extension I have in mind is that which leads to the inclusion as "pro-Communist" of certain men or institutions that have been associated with political responsibility in the international field. Two symbols stand out here. The first is Dean Acheson. Mr. Acheson has for years served the Democratic Party. But he has belonged to the conservative, not the New Deal wing of the party. Furthermore, the coupling of General Marshall with him, though only in connection with China, and only by extremists, clearly precludes political radicalism as the primary objection, since Marshall has never in any way been identified with New Deal views. The other case is that of Harvard University as an alleged "hot-bed" of Communism and fellow-traveling. The relevant point is that Mr. Acheson typifies the "aristocrat" in public service; he came of a wealthy family, he went to a select private school (Groton) and to Yale and Harvard Law School. He represents symbolically those Eastern vested interests, against whom antagonism has existed among the new men of the Middle West and the populist movement, including the descendants of recent immigrants. Similarly, among American universities Harvard has been particularly identified as educating a social elite, the members of which
are thought of as "just the type," in their striped trousers and morning coats, to sell out the country to the social snobs of European capitals. It is the combination of aristocratic associations—through the Boston Brahmins—and a kind of urban-bohemian sophistication along with its devotion to intellectual and cultural values, including precisely its high intellectual standards, which makes Harvard a vulnerable symbol in this context.

The symbol "Communism," then, from its area of legitimate application, tends to be generalized to include groups in the population who have been associated with political liberalism of many shades and with intellectual values in general and to include the Eastern upper-class groups who have tended to be relatively internationalist in their outlook.

A second underlying ambivalent attitude-structure is discernible in addition to that concerning the relation between the totalitarian and the progressive aspects of Communism. On the one hand, Communism very obviously symbolizes what is anathema to the individualistic tradition of a business economy—the feared attempt to destroy private enterprise and with it the great tradition of individual freedom. But on the other hand, in order to rise to the challenge of the current political situation, it is necessary for the older balance between a free economy and the power of government to be considerably shifted in favor of the latter. We must have a stronger government than we have traditionally been accustomed to, and we must come to trust it more fully. It has had in recent times to assume very substantial regulatory functions in relation to the economy, and now vastly enhanced responsibilities in relation to international affairs.

But, on the basis of a philosophy which, in a very different way from our individualistic tradition, gives primacy to "economic interests," namely the Marxist philosophy, the Communist movement asserts the unqualified, the totalitarian supremacy of government over the economy. It is precisely an actual change in our own system in what in one sense is clearly this direction that emerges as the primary focus of the frustrations to which the older American system has been subjected. The leaders of the economy, the businessmen, have been forced to accept far more "interference" from government with what they have considered "their affairs" than they have liked. And now they must, like everyone else, pay unprecedentedly high taxes to support an enormous military establish-
ment, and give the government in other respects unprecedentedly great powers over the population. The result of this situation is an ambivalence of attitude that on the one hand demands a stringent display of loyalty going to lengths far beyond our tradition of individual liberty, and on the other hand is ready to blame elements which by ordinary logic have little or nothing to do with Communism, for working in league with the Communist movement to create this horrible situation.

Generally speaking, the indefensible aspect of this tendency in a realistic assessment appears in a readiness to question the loyalty of all those who have assumed responsibility for leadership in meeting the exigencies of the new situation. These include many who have helped to solve the internal problems of the control of the economy, those who in the uneasy later 'thirties and the first phase of the war tried to get American policy and public opinion to face the dangers of the international situation, and those who since the war have tried to take responsibility in relation to the difficult post-provide some realistic basis for this tendency. In fact many elements who are also presumptively tainted with Communism. Here again, admittedly, certain features of our historical record and attitudes provide some realistic basis for this tendency. In fact many elements in both parties have failed lamentably to assess correctly the dangers of the situation, both internally and externally. New Dealers have stigmatized even the most responsible elements of the business world as economic royalists and the like, while many elements in business have clung long past a reasonable time to an outmoded belief in the possibility of a society with only a "night watchman" government. In foreign affairs, some members of the Democratic Party have been slow to learn how formidable a danger was presented by totalitarian Communism, but this is matched by the utopianism of many Republicans about the consequences of American withdrawal from international responsibilities, through high tariffs as well as political isolationism. The necessity to learn the hard realities of a complex world and the difficulty of the process is not a task to be imposed on only part of the body politic. No party or group can claim a monopoly either of patriotic motive or of competent understanding of affairs.

In a double sense, then, Communism symbolizes "the intruder." Externally the world Communist movement is the obvious source of the most serious difficulties we have to face. On the other hand,
although Communism has constituted to some degree a realistic internal danger, it has above all come to symbolize those factors that have disturbed the beneficent natural state of an American society which allegedly and in phantasy existed before the urgent problems of control of the economy and greatly enhanced responsibility in international affairs had to be tackled.

Against this background it can perhaps be made clear why the description of McCarthyism as simply a political reactionary movement is inadequate. In the first place, it is clearly not simply a cloak for the "vested interests" but rather a movement that profoundly splits the previously dominant groups. This is evident in the split, particularly conspicuous since about 1952, within the Republican Party. An important part of the business elite, especially in the Middle West and in Texas, the "newest" area of all, have tended in varying degrees to be attracted by the McCarthy appeal. But other important groups, notably in the East, have shied away from it and apparently have come to be more and more consolidated against it. Very broadly, these can be identified with the business element among the Eisenhower Republicans.

But at the same time the McCarthy following is by no means confined to the vested-interest groups. There has been an important popular following of very miscellaneous composition. It has comprised an important part of those who aspire to full status in the American system but have, realistically or not, felt discriminated against in various ways, especially the Mid-Western lower and lower middle classes and much of the population of recent immigrant origin. The elements of continuity between Western agrarian populism and McCarthyism are not by any means purely fortuitous. At the levels of both leadership and popular following, the division of American political opinion over this issue cuts clean across the traditional lines of distinction between "conservatives" and "progressives," especially where that tends to be defined, as it so often is, in terms of the capitalistic or moneyed interests as against those who seek to bring them under more stringent control. McCarthyism is both a movement supported by certain vested-interest elements and a popular revolt against the upper classes.

Another striking characteristic of McCarthyism is that it is highly selective in the liberal causes it attacks. Apart from the issue of Communism in the labor unions, now largely solved, there has been no concerted attack on the general position of the labor movement.
Further, the social program aimed toward the reduction of racial discrimination has continued to be pressed, to which fact the decision of the Supreme Court outlawing segregation in public education and its calm reception provide dramatic evidence. Nevertheless, so far as I am aware there has been no outcry from McCarthyite quarters to the effect that this decision is further evidence of Communist influence in high circles—in spite of the fact that eight out of nine members of the present court were appointed by Roosevelt and Truman.

Perhaps even more notable is the fact that, unlike the 1930s, when Father Coughlin and others were preaching a vicious anti-Semitism, anti-Semitism as a public issue has since the war been very nearly absent from the American scene. This is of course associated with full employment. But particularly in view of the rather large and conspicuous participation of Jewish intellectuals in the fellow-traveling of the 1930s, it is notable that Jewishness has not been singled out as a symbolic focus for the questioning of loyalty. A critical difference from German Nazism is evident here. To the Nazis the Jew was the primary negative symbol, the Communist the most prominent secondary one. But it must also be remembered that capitalism was symbolically involved. One of the functions of the Jew was to link Communism and capitalism together. This trio were the "intruders" to the Nazis. They symbolized different aspects of the disturbance created by the rapid development of industrialism to the older pre-industrial Gemeinschaft of German political romanticism. It was the obverse of the American case—a new economy destroying an old political system, not new political responsibilities interfering with the accustomed ways of economic life.

Negatively, then, the use of the symbol "Communism" as the focus of anxiety and aggression is associated with a high order of selectivity among possibly vulnerable targets. This selectivity is, I submit, consistent with the hypothesis that the focus of the strain expressed by McCarthyism lies in the area of political responsibility—not, as Marxists would hold, in the structure of the economy as such, nor in the class structure in any simple, Marxist-tinged sense.

The same interpretation is confirmed by the evidence on the positive side. The broadest formula for what the McCarthyites positively "want"—besides the elimination of all Communist influence, real or alleged—is perhaps "isolationism." The dominant note is, I
think, the regressive one. It is the wishful preservation of an old order, which allegedly need never have been disturbed but for the wilful interference of malevolent elements, Communists and their sympathizers. The nationalistic overtones center on a phantasy of a happy "American way" where everything used to be all right. Naturally it is tinged with the ideology of traditional laissez-faire, but not perhaps unduly so. Also it tends to spill over into a kind of irritated activism. On the one hand we want to keep out of trouble; but on the other hand, having identified an enemy, we want to smash him forthwith. The connection between the two can be seen, for example, in relation to China, where the phantasy seems to be that by drastic action it would be possible to "clean up" the Chinese situation quickly and then our troubles would be over.

The main contention of these pages has been that McCarthyism is best understood as a symptom of the strains attendant on a deep-seated process of change in our society, rather than as a "movement" presenting a policy or set of values for the American people to act on. Its content is overwhelmingly negative, not positive. It advocates "getting rid" of undesirable influences, and has amazingly little to say about what should be done.

This negativism is primarily the expression of fear, secondarily of anger, the aggression which is a product of frustration. The solution, which is both realistically feasible and within the great American tradition, is to regain our national self-confidence and to take active steps to cope with the situation with which we are faced.

On the popular level the crisis is primarily a crisis of confidence. We are baffled and anxious, and tend to seek relief in hunting scapegoats. We must improve our understanding and come to realize our strength and trust in it. But this cannot be done simply by wishing it to be done. I have consistently argued that the changed situation in which we are placed demands a far-reaching change in the structure of our society. It demands policies, and confidence, but it demands more than these. It demands above all three things. The first is a revision of our conception of citizenship to encourage the ordinary man to accept greater responsibility. The second is the development of the necessary implementing machinery. Third is national political leadership, not only in the sense of individual candidates for office or appointment, but in the sense of social strata where a traditional political responsibility is ingrained.
The most important of these requirements is the third. Under American conditions, a politically leading stratum must be made up of a combination of business and nonbusiness elements. The role of the economy in American society and of the business element in it is such that political leadership without prominent business participation is doomed to ineffectiveness and to the perpetuation of dangerous internal conflict. It is not possible to lead the American people against the leaders of the business world. But at the same time, so varied now are the national elements which make a legitimate claim to be represented, the business element cannot monopolize or dominate political leadership and responsibility. Broadly, I think, a political elite in the two main aspects of “politicians” whose specialties consist in the management of public opinion, and of “administrators” in both civil and military services, must be greatly strengthened. It is here that the practical consequences of McCarthyism run most directly counter to the realistic needs of the time. But along with such a specifically political elite there must also be close alliance with other, predominantly “cultural” elements, notably perhaps in the universities, but also in the churches.

In the final sense, then, the solution of the problem of McCarthyism lies in the successful accomplishment of the social changes to which we are called by our position in the world and by our own domestic requirements. We have already made notable progress toward this objective; the current flare-up of stress in the form of McCarthyism can be taken simply as evidence that the process is not complete.
I think that the diagnosis I put forward originally can stand. McCarthyism was essentially a crisis of national solidarity in the face of what, for us as a nation, were accumulating and unprecedented political demands and responsibilities. The precipitating factor was the Korean War, which, acting as a “last straw,” frustrated the expectations of relaxation that many Americans held after the end of the big war, a war that itself was entered into only after serious internal division and conflict. The focus of the strain was the problem of national loyalty. But the very insistence on national loyalty created a paradox that Edward Shils, in his The Torment of Secrecy, has highlighted more clearly than anyone else, in that the very demand for nearly absolute national loyalty undermined our national capacities for effective action.

One of the most striking features of the McCarthy movement was its intensity while it lasted, and the rapidity with which it subsided when the “bubble” finally burst. Though more deep-rooted and underlying strains may have been involved—and may still be—McCarthyism as a social threat was more clearly analogous to a financial panic, say, than to a long-drawn-out depression. Putting the situation in terms of that analogy may help to clarify the ways in which the strain operated. When there is a run on the bank by depositors the tendency is, in a cumulative regression, to more and more “elementary” monetary transactions. In the ordinary course of business “cash” is only a minor convenience, for most transactions are carried out essentially by exchange of deposits within a credit system. But if too many depositors want payment all at once, these
demands cannot be honored and the credit system maintained. “Logically” the end of the line of monetary deflation, of course, is a return to species payments, or the use of metal, the toting of which would make any commercial transaction quite weighty. Such a downward spin can only be checked by a restoration of “confidence,” which means willingness to accept payment other than “hard” cash—the return to credit. In short, there has to be a foundation of trust for the credit system to operate.

McCarthyism was such a “deflationary spiral.” The “credit” repudiated was the ordinary level of commitment of the citizen to the national interest, which in a pluralistic society is virtually never total. What the McCarthyites demanded of those who claimed to be “trustworthy” was not fulfillment of ordinary obligations, but an absolute guarantee that no other commitment could conceivably compete with what they called “loyalty” to the government.

Obviously this pressure generated a special kind of conflict in American society. We have a tradition that the claims of government on the individual are relatively minimal, and the presumptive morality is one of defense of individual rights against government. In the 1950s we were made acutely aware of the serious threats to national security and of the necessity of strengthening the government in ways that, in some sense, involved a sacrifice of private rights.

In such a situation there will necessarily be widespread ambivalence, and it was to be expected that the phenomenon of scapegoating would be prominent. It was my view, as stated in the original paper, that the most prominent scourgers would be those who had a strong—moral as well as “material”—vested interest in limiting the powers of government, and that the victims would be those who had on the whole taken the initiative in realistic attempts to meet the situation. From this point of view it was not unintelligible that the men who had entered government service were the ones most victimized. (This is perhaps analogous to the banker who, having taken the responsibility for lending “other people’s money” is then, by populistic demand, subjected to the most rigorous checking, so that even any minor loss through error of judgment comes to be attributed to his bad faith.)

The question may now be raised whether the most recent phase of development of the radical right is a repetition of McCarthyism or something different. There is, it seems to me, a common substratum,
but in many respects the current flare-up has markedly different features.

The common substratum seems to lie in the tendency to polarization that derives from the main pattern of developmental change in American society. In the broadest sense—which can be made to correspond only approximately to political-party divisions—the "right" is the protest against the fact that American society is changing, and against the direction of change. The United States is a society that has been evolving toward increasing complexities and scale of its organization and functions; a greater concentration of population and activities in complex communities; increasing responsibility in the world political system; and a higher order of technology, knowledge, sophistication, and the like. The conservatives are the rearguard resistance to this trend.

Common to all the multifarious aspects of the right wing is a certain type of "individualism." It has such facets as the individualism of the small unit as against the large—the independent entrepreneur versus the large corporation, and similarly the rural and small town versus the city and the metropolis. As regards international relations, this individualism romanticizes our earlier lack of involvement in the complex world of power relations, when America could be left to work out its own destiny. Most generally perhaps this individualism is the idealization of pristine simplicity as against organizational and other complexity.

In the general picture, the current right seems to be the more regressive of the two, and for that very reason possibly less threatening, since the radical wing of conservatism is likely to be excluded from power. In understanding its salience it should also be remembered that while McCarthyism started during the latter part of the Truman administration, it came to a head under a Republican administration. The so-called "resurgence" of the right in the past year is, in part, undoubtedly a simple function of the Republican Party's again going into opposition.

In spite of this common substratum, in an important sense the current rightist preoccupations, typified perhaps by the John Birch Society, are the obverse of the McCarthyites. The right of the 1960s shares, of course, the symbol of Communism as the source of all evil, but its meaning has been shifted in a way that brings to the fore the other side of an ambivalent motivational complex.

An important symptom of the difference between McCarthyism
and Birchism is the shift in the geographical center of gravity. This is a move from the Middle West to the Southwest. (Texas, to be sure, is the common sector in both movements, and to some extent the same is true of that perennial hothouse of the exotic, Southern California.) This is no accident; the Southwest is the nearest thing left to a frontier, or, more specifically, Texas and Southern California are the sections that, despite a rapidly burgeoning urban civilization, still cherish the illusion that the old frontier is alive.

The essential point about the frontier is that it was the situation—in legend at least—of the predominance of self-help. Here a man—who was allegedly really a man—was most obviously “on his own.” If “bad” men were about, he had to defend himself—and of course the good women—with his bare fists or his six-shooter. He made his living “honestly”—by wrestling with nature in the form of recalcitrant soils, drought, storm, and “ornery” beasts—so that no one could say when he won that it was because he was dependent on anyone.

It seems to me that it is this fierce and hence “defensive” independence which is the hallmark of the most recent right. The good life is to be completely untamed by the disciplines of complex society. From the point of view of this individualism, the income tax is a “tribute” exacted by a “foreign” unsurper; namely, the urban, and more or less European, America. The income tax—attacks on which were by no means absent from the ideology of the McCarthy era (cf. the views of the late Representative Carroll Reece)—has been upgraded to become almost the central symbol of evil; i.e., the first entering wedge of “Communism.” The reason why it is unexceptionably “Communist” is simply that it presumes to assert the authority of government. By taking away what “belongs to” the taxpayer, it symbolizes the arbitrariness in almost any regulation of the complete freedom of the individual to “do what he will with his own,” and defend himself against comers who challenge his rights.

This is the essential structure of the ambivalence. The McCarthy-ites demanded absolute subordination of all private rights to the government. McCarthy was in effect the most drastically radical “Socialist” imaginable. The Bircher demands nearly absolute immunity from any type of public control over his independence.

In this regard, the image of Communism is somewhat different in the two cases. In the original paper I argued that for the McCarthy-ites the aggression against the source that called for the development
of government was the key to its pattern. To meet the threat of real Communism, there was a strengthening of responsible government and more centralized authority. To fight "Communism," which stands for the total state, McCarthy demanded even more centralized government. This is a motivational mechanism operating analogously to the normal oedipal situation—the resentment against the "father" as the symbolic source of the pressure to grow up, but also an identification with him. The McCarthyites, by demanding absolute loyalty, were in fact promoting a kind of distorted identification with government. The identification was carried out in a destructive way so as to threaten the many altogether legitimate pluralistic loyalties and associations, to subordinate them altogether too drastically to the one national loyalty, and in the process to attack large numbers of completely innocent persons and in general spread an atmosphere of unwarranted distrust.

Except for the readiness in quick anger to deal summarily with sources of frustration, and hence to demand total victory over international Communism, the new right movements seem to lack this element of identification. Hence they are more regressive than McCarthy, in that they apparently seek, without qualification, to preserve the socially "infantile" state of everything "little." Their influence is even more drastically "deflationary" than the McCarthyite, in the constriction of commitments to the more highly organized sectors of society. This includes the extensive functions of government, but it also goes beyond them. Even the large corporation is in some sense felt to be vaguely "Socialistic," in that it interferes with the complete independence of the small man.

In this sense, the Birchers are the extreme wing of a much more ramified complex. The central focus of it seems to be the political rear-guard action (and its roots in the social structure) of the rural and small-town elements in the society, which have been able to "dig in," above all through legislative refusal to redistrict, first for the House of Representatives, but even more for the state legislature. In this connection, the question of "equal protection of the laws" through fair representation is slowly building up to becoming the most important internal political question of the society, a question that crosscuts many of the older bases of political differentiation and segmentation, most conspicuously, of course, underlying the coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats. 4

But one must see, too, that "individualism" is by no means con-
fined to a complex of what I have here called "regressive" attitudes. There is an opposite group whose orientation, though "ideological," presents a very different case from that of the reactionary individualists. These are the intellectuals whom Winston White has called the Moralizers. Regarding themselves as liberals, or left of center, they deplore many of the features of contemporary society, in particular what they hold to be the increasing pressures to "conformity," but they also stress the importance of the responsibility of the individual, not for "self-help," but for the welfare of the society, and hence for the collective interest of the nation as a whole. They stand in an obverse relation to the Birchers, but in a quite different direction from that of the McCarthyites. The element of acceptance of the developing social order, of "identification" with it, as described above, is stronger for them than for the McCarthyites. It does not, however, involve a coerced loyalty, but the opposite—a free acceptance of individual responsibility to the point of often being utopian about the necessity for formal organization and for authority that can implement important collective goals. Whereas the Birchers are drastically "deflationary" with respect to any sort of social responsibility, the Moralizers are "inflationary," in that they seem to hold that full commitment of the individual is enough—the practical organization and know-how are secondary.

But there is a third, and indeed a very different type of individualism that is focal to the whole American pattern of values and attitudes—the strong emphasis on freedom and responsibility of the individual within a framework of both normative order and collective organization. This is what on occasion I have called "institutionalized individualism," using Durkheim's famous analysis of the relation between contractual agreements and the "non-contractual" institutional elements of contract as a prototype. In this point of view, we can see society as providing for more complex, more technical, and more "professional" jobs; allowing for more variety of choices, in occupation and in culture, and providing greater diversity within the framework of organization. It is my strong conviction that the main trend of development in the society is individualistic in this sense.

The regressive individualism of which the Birchers are the extreme examples is very different from this. Regressive individualism resists the processes of institutional change by virtue of which a more complex and hence more effective division of labor or differentiation
has been developing, by which there has developed an increasingly ramified system of pluralistic collective solidarities and enterprises (including, of course, the enterprises of government but by no means confined to them\(^8\)), and, finally, by which there has been developing a more generalized and elaborated system of norms, especially at the level of law, through which the inevitably complex relations of such a society come to be regulated. Seen in this perspective, the Birchers are the generic type of the true "reactionary." The phrase that has already been rather widely applied to them and to groups like them—that they want to "repeal the twentieth century"—seems to sum them up very well indeed.

\(^1\) For emphasizing this point, as well as considerable contribution to the general pattern of analysis outlined here, I am indebted to Dr. Winston White.

\(^2\) A paradigmatic case of this frontier mentality is described in E. Z. Vogt, Jr., *Modern Homesteaders* (Harvard University Press), a study of "Texan" migrants into a semi-arid section of New Mexico.

\(^3\) Another interesting manifestation of this complex is the part it plays in the opposition to the fluoridation of water supplies.

\(^4\) The decision of the Supreme Court to restrict the legislatures' freedom to avoid redistricting may prove to be a highly important factor in this situation.

\(^5\) *Beyond Conformity* (Free Press, 1961).

\(^6\) Cf. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, Bk. I, Ch. 7.

\(^7\) Perhaps the fullest statement of the sense in which this is the case yet published is Parsons and White, "The Link Between Character and Society," in Lipset and Lowenthal, editors, *Culture and Social Character* (Free Press, 1961).

\(^8\) Durkheim was one of the few to see clearly that the "division of labor" in the private sector must proceed concomitantly with increasing elaboration of the functions of government. Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*
IN APRIL of 1961, the Gallup Poll asked a nationwide sample of Americans whether they had heard of the John Birch Society. The poll indicated that thirty-nine million persons—an extraordinary number, according to Gallup—had read or heard of the Birchers. Of these, 44 per cent had an unfavorable estimate of the Society, 9 per cent were favorable, and 47 per cent had not yet reached a judgment. In one sense, these figures suggest a five-to-one rejection of the Birchers. But the figures also indicate that at the moment when the Society was receiving highly damaging publicity—when the mass media were featuring the charge by Birch founder Robert Welch that President Eisenhower was “a dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy”—a projected three and a half million persons still perceived the Society as a commendable, patriotic anti-Communist organization. If the undecided 47 per cent were to be divided in the same proportion as those who had reached a judgment (and this might underweight pro-Birch sentiment), another three and a half million persons would be added to the ranks of the approving. By this estimate, as many as seven million Amer-

icans from among the most public-affairs-conscious forty million of our adult population seemed to be favorably impressed with the John Birch Society.

Between this poll and the beginning of 1962, virtually the entire religious, civic, and political Establishment of the nation rose to denounce the John Birch Society by name. Exposés filled the general and special media, while Robert Welch continued to contribute outlandish accusations to feed the exposés and dismay his conservative well-wishers. Yet when the Gallup Poll again asked a nationwide sample about the Birchers, in February, 1962, 8 per cent of the now fifty-six million who had heard of the Society were still favorably impressed. (43 per cent were unfavorable and 49 per cent had no opinion.) This represents a projected four and a half million approving citizens, with a potential among the undecided of another five million, making a "hard core" of nine and a half million Americans who are assumed to see the Birch Society as a useful organization in the anti-Communist cause.†

The explanation of this high degree of interest is that the Birch Society had become, for the while, the most appealing, activist, and efficient movement to appear on the extreme right since the fertile decade of the 1930s. Birch membership in 1962 was estimated by most observers at sixty thousand and was distributed widely throughout the nation, with particular strength in traditional centers of fundamentalism like Houston, Los Angeles, Nashville, Wichita, and Boston. This membership provided an annual-dues income of $1,300,000. Life membership at $1000, special donations by wealthy supporters, and sales of Society literature added perhaps $300,000 more, giving the group a working fund of $1,600,000 a year. As of early 1962, the Society, by its own count, had 41 staff workers in its home offices in Belmont, Massachusetts; 35 fully salaried and expenses-paid traveling "co-ordinators"; and 70 partially paid "volunteer" co-ordinators. The staff payroll alone was $12,000 a week, or $625,000 a year. During 1961 and 1962, the effect of this well-financed, well-staffed, and well-led apparatus had been felt in the civic and political life of dozens of local communities, and "Bircher" had become an instantly recognized term of political description. Such a phenomenon is worth close attention and analysis.

† For a more detailed breakdown of this survey, see pp. 344-48.
I

However much factors like urbanization, the cold war, and status insecurities may have provided a new setting for native fundamentalists, a large and irreducible corps of such people has always existed in the United States. Unlike American liberals and conservatives—who accept the political system, acknowledge the loyalty of their opponents, and employ the ordinary political techniques—the fundamentalists can be distinguished by five identifying characteristics:

1. They assume that there are always solutions capable of producing international victories and of resolving our social problems; when such solutions are not found, they attribute the failure to conspiracies led by evil men and their dupes.

2. They refuse to believe in the integrity and patriotism of those who lead the dominant social groups—the churches, the unions, the business community, and the like—and declare that the American Establishment has become part of the conspiracy.

3. They reject the political system; they lash out at "politicians," the major parties, and the give and take of political compromise as a betrayal of the fundamental Truth and as a circus to divert the people.

4. They reject those programs for dealing with social, economic, and international problems that liberals and conservatives agree upon as minimal foundations. In their place, the fundamentalists propose drastic panaceas requiring major social change.

5. To break the net of conspiracy, they advocate "direct action," sometimes in the form of a new political party, but more often through secret organizations, push-button pressure campaigns, and front groups. Occasionally "direct action" will develop into hate-propaganda and calculated violence.

Today, right-fundamentalism spans a broad spectrum. At one pole is the "hate" right, led by the Conde McGinleys, Gerald L. K. Smiths, Admiral Crommelins, Father Terminellos, John Kaspers, and George Rockwells, who offer various combinations of anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and anti-Negro sentiment. These groups are thoroughly discredited in contemporary America, and the major problem they present is a matter of defining the line that our law should draw between deviant expression and hate-mongering or
advocacy of violence. At the other pole is the semi-respectable right. Here we encounter a variety of different political and educational organizations including the Foundation for Economic Education, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Committee for Constitutional Government, and the White Citizens Councils of the South. Socially prominent figures belong to such groups, which are well financed, often have connections with local and national major-party factions, and exercise substantial lobbying influence. Their supporters and leaders may long to break with the two-party system and start a rightist party, but they are restrained by the knowledge that this would isolate them and thus diminish their present effectiveness.

The John Birch Society stands between the "hate" right and the semi-respectable right. In order to get a precise picture of its ideology and tactics, I examined the published works issued by the Society since its formation in 1958: the 1961 annotated edition of the Blue Book of the John Birch Society, its operating manual and theological fount; the monthly Bulletin, which is sent to members and contains the agenda of activities (the 1960 issues of the Bulletin are available in a bound edition entitled The White Book of the John Birch Society); those writings of Robert Welch that have been officially incorporated into and reprinted by the Society (e.g., The Life of John Birch, May God Forgive Us, A Letter to the South on Segregation); and every issue of American Opinion, the monthly publication edited by Robert Welch for the Society, published before 1958 under the title One Man's Opinion.

Measured by its official materials, the authenticated accounts of Welch's speeches, and public comments by members of the Society's Council, the Society emerges as a purebred specimen of American right-fundamentalism.

(1) *Its image of world events and American politics is wholly conspiratorial.* In the July, 1960, Bulletin, Welch explains that the "key" to the advance of world Communism "is treason right within our government and the place to find it is right in Washington." The danger, Welch says in the Blue Book, "is almost entirely internal." And it is "a certainty," he writes in May God Forgive Us, that there are "more Communists and Communist sympathizers in our government today than ever before." As recently as January, 1961, Welch was informing his supporters that "Communist influences are now in almost complete control of our Federal Government."
Each year since 1958, Welch and his "board of experts" have published a "score board" rating all the nations of the world according to the "present degree of Communist influence and control over the economic and political affairs" of the country. In 1958, the United States was rated as 20–40 per cent under Communist control; in 1959, the United States went up to 30–50 per cent; and in 1960, the figure climbed to 40–60 per cent. (At that pace, we will reach the 80–100-per-cent mark in 1964.) England's rating went from 20–40 per cent in 1958 to 50–70 per cent in 1960. Israel is presently rated as 40–60 per cent controlled; Egypt 80–100 per cent.

Everywhere, the Birchers advise, Communists are at the heart of events, even among some events that might seem to less skilled observers remote from Kremlin direction. In an open letter to Khrushchev in 1958, Welch said, "Your hands played the decisive unseen part" in the run on American banks and their closing in 1933. It was the Communist-contrived recognition of the Soviets in 1933 that "saved them from financial collapse." The "very idea of American foreign aid was dreamed up by Stalin, or by his agents for him." The "trouble in the South over integration is Communist-contrived"; the Communists have invented a "phoney 'civil rights' slogan to stir up bitterness and civil disorder, leading gradually to police-state rule by federal troops and armed resistance to that rule." The United States Supreme Court "is one of the most important agencies of Communism." The Federal Reserve system is a "realization" of "Point 5" of the Communist Manifesto, calling for centralization of credit in the hands of the state. The purpose of proposed legislation requiring registration of privately owned firearms is to aid the Communists in making "ultimate seizure of such by the government easier and more complete." Everywhere, Welch concludes, the Communists are winning—in "the press, the pulpit, the radio and television media, the labor unions, the schools, the courts, and the legislative halls of America."

All the above descriptions of conspiratorial trends have been cited from official Birch Society literature, what Welch calls the Society's "steps to the Truth." But the picture grows darker when one turns to the Black Book, or, as it is more commonly known, The Politician—the book-length "letter" that Welch circulated "privately" to hundreds of persons but that the Society has carefully rejected as an official document. The Politician is to the Society what Leninist dogma is to the Communist-front groups in Western
or neutralist nations—it is the ultimate truth held by the founder and his hard core, but it is too advanced and too powerful to present, as yet, to the "masses" being led. In *The Politician*, Welch names names. Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower; Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; C.I.A. Director Allen Dulles; Chief Justice Warren—all of these men are called knowing instruments of the Communist conspiracy.

It is worth noting that Eisenhower and his administration draw the strongest venom in *The Politician*. For Welch, the Eisenhower administration was a betrayal that could only have had Communists at its source. "For many reasons and after a lot of study," Welch writes, "I personally believe [John Foster] Dulles to be a Communist agent." "Allen Dulles is the most protected and untouchable supporter of Communism, next to Eisenhower himself, in Washington." Arthur F. Burns's job as head of the Council of economic Advisers "has been merely a cover-up for Burns's liaison work between Eisenhower and some of his Communist bosses." "The chances are very strong that Milton Eisenhower is actually Dwight Eisenhower's superior and boss within the Communist Party." As for Dwight Eisenhower himself, Welch states unequivocally: "There is only one possible word to describe [Eisenhower's] purpose and actions. That word is treason." "My firm belief that Dwight Eisenhower is a dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy," he continues, "is based on an accumulation of detailed evidence so extensive and so palpable that it seems to put this conviction beyond any reasonable doubt." Discussing what he terms Eisenhower's "mentality of fanaticism," Welch even refuses to accept the thought that Ike may just be an "opportunistic politician" aiding the Communists. "I personally think he has been sympathetic to ultimate Communist aims, realistically willing to use Communist means to help them achieve their goals, knowingly accepting and abiding by Communist orders, and consciously serving the Communist conspiracy for all of his adult life."

(2) *The Birchers impugn the integrity and patriotism of those at the head of the major social and economic groups of the nation*. In a supplement to the February, 1961, *Bulletin*, Welch announced that "Communist influences" are "very powerful in the top echelons of our educational system, our labor-union organizations, and of almost every important segment of our national life. Insidiously but rapidly the Communists are now reaching the tentacles
of their conspiracy downward throughout the whole social, economic, and political pyramid." Thus, the National Council of Churches of Christ is Communist-minded, and from three to five per cent of the Protestant clergy have been called actual Communists. "Treason," Welch further declares, "is widespread and rampant in our high army circles." The American Medical Association has been "took" and can no longer be depended upon for support in the fight against Socialism. So too with the United States Chamber of Commerce, which has been preaching dangerously liberal and internationalist doctrines in its courses on practical politics. (When Chamber leaders protested this slur, Welch replied that their outraged reaction was exactly like that of the State Department in the 1940s, when charges of Communist infiltration were first raised.) The leadership of our universities, corporations, foundations, communications media—all are riddled with Communists, or "Comsymps" (a word Welch coined to avoid having to say whether a given person was a real party member or only a sympathizer).

Naturally, Welch and his colleagues are certain that these "Comsymp" elites are out to destroy him and his movement. References to persecution and images of martyrdom abound in Birch literature, ranging from incessant mention of how the patron saint (Senator McCarthy) was driven to his death, to suggestions that Welch may be murdered one day by the Communists.

(3) The Birchers are convinced that the Communists have gone so far in penetrating American politics that there is little hope in the existing political system. In his letter to Khrushchev, Welch wrote that the Communists obviously intended to "maintain and increase [their] working control over both our major political parties." We cannot count on "politicians, political leadership or even political action." Though he advocates the nomination, on an American Party ticket, of Senator Barry Goldwater for President and J. Strom Thurmond for Vice-President in 1964, Welch has warned his followers that even Goldwater—the most "Americanist" figure around in politics at the moment—is "still a politician" and therefore not to be relied upon. Welch has also had some things to say about "Jumping Jack" Kennedy. According to Welch, the nation received "the exact Communist line . . . from Jack Kennedy's speeches, as quickly and faithfully as from the Worker or the National Guardian. . . ."

(4) Most of the Birch Society's positive program consists of
advocating the repeal of things or the removal of the nation from something or somewhere. A partial list of the things that the Society describes as wicked, Communist, and dangerous includes: U.S. membership in the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Trade Organization, UNICEF (the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund); membership in GATT (the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs); reciprocal trade agreements; the "useless and costly" NATO; "so-called defense spending"; all foreign aid; diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and all other Communist nations; the National Labor Relations Act; social security; the graduated income tax; the Rural Electrification Administration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the T.V.A.; government wage and price controls; "forced integration"; "deliberately fraudulent" U.S. government bonds; the Federal Reserve System; urban renewal; fluoridation; metro government; the corporate-dividend tax; the "mental-health racket"; federal aid to housing; and all programs "regimenting" farmers.

(5) Finally, the Birch Society advocates both "direct action" and "dirty tactics" to "break the grip of the Communist conspiracy." Unlike those right-fundamentalist groups that have energetic leaders but passive memberships, the Birchers are decidedly activist. "Get to work or learn to talk Russian" is a slogan Welch recommends to his followers, and they are certainly hard at work. From national headquarters in Belmont, Massachusetts, Welch formulates a set of complementary national and local action programs, then issues them to members through directives in the Bulletin and contacts with chapter leaders. A mixture of traditional and fundamentalist techniques is prescribed. The local programs include infiltration of community organizations such as the P.-T.A. ("to take them away from the Communists"); harassment of "pro-Communist" speakers at church meetings, political gatherings, and public forums; creation of local front groups (e.g., the Committee Against Summit Entanglements, College Graduates Against Educating Traitors at Government Expense, the Committee to Impeach Earl Warren, and the Committee to Investigate Communist Influences at Vassar College); campaigns to secure endorsement of Birch positions and signatures for Birch petitions in all groups that Birch members belong to (e.g., veterans and business organizations); letters and telephone calls to local public officials, leading citizens, and newspapers
who support what the Society opposes or oppose the Society directly; monthly telephone calls to the local public library to make sure it has copies of the five right-wing books recommended by Welch every month.

The national campaigns are carefully pinpointed efforts. They range from letter—and postcard—writing to national advertising campaigns. In the past two years, Birchers have been told to write the National Boy Scouts director and demand to know why the president of the National Council of Churches addressed their National Jamboree; insist personally and in writing each time a member flies American, United, or Eastern Airlines that they stock *Human Events* and the *National Review* on their planes; protest to the N.B.C. network and the Purex Corporation for sponsoring a TV drama favorable to Sacco and Vanzetti; circulate petitions and write letters to Congress to impeach Chief Justice Warren and thereby "give the Communists a setback."

Welch also sends out the copy for punchy postcards to be addressed to national political leaders. To cite instances in 1960 alone: to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., at the U.N., "Two questions, Mr. Lodge—Who Murdered Bang-Jensen? And Which Side Are You On?"; to Secretary of State Christian Herter, "Castro is a Communist. Trujillo is an anti-Communist. Whose Side Are You On?"; and to President Eisenhower, on the eve of the scheduled summit conference, "Dear President Eisenhower—if you go, don't come back."

The last postcard stirred some protests from Society members, who felt that Welch's savage little message to the President was a bit too strong. Welch set them straight in the *Bulletin*: "It is one of our many sorrows that, in fighting the evil forces which now threaten our civilization, for us to be *too civilized* is unquestionably to be defeated." The Communists, he continued, want us to be "too gentle, too respectable . . . [but] this is not a cream-puff war . . . and we do mean business every step of the way." Welch admitted that the technique of planted and loaded questions and the disruption of meetings was a "dirty trick," but he still defended it as another vital tactic.

To stimulate compliance by members with the local and national efforts prescribed each month in the *Bulletin*, Welch has devised the MMM system, or "Member's Monthly Memos." These forms are filled out by the member detailing what he or she has done
and including sundry observations on the "Americanist fight." They are then collected by the chapter leader and transmitted to Belmont. Welch and his staff, according to the Bulletin, spend much time going over the MMMs.

In its first years, the Birch Society was successful in attracting to it some highly substantial figures in local communities—physicians, stockbrokers, retired military officers, lawyers, businessmen (particularly small and middle-sized manufacturers in the Midwest and the South),\(^\text{1}\) and professionals, many of whom have become local chapter leaders and state co-ordinators. The Council of the Society is a veritable board of directors of right-fundamentalism: men like Colonel Lawrence Bunker, Cola G. Parker, T. Coleman Andrews, Clarence Manion, and Spruille Braden. Among the contributing editors and editorial advisory committee for American Opinion have been J. B. Matthews, William S. Schlamm, Kenneth Colegrove, J. Bracken Lee, Ludwig von Mises, Adolphe Menjou, J. Howard Pew, and Albert C. Wedemeyer. In several communities, observers of the Society have noted a significant number of thirty-to-forty-year-olds joining the organization. Welch has stated that half of the Society's membership is Catholic,\(^\text{2}\) that there are some Jewish members, and that there are Negroes also—two segregated locals in the South and integrated chapters in the North.

Press reports suggest that most of the Society's members already had strong affiliations with other right-wing groups before the Birch Society was formed. What Welch hoped to do was to build a one-million-member organization by welding together the masses of right-fundamentalist joiners into the fighting educational and pressure arm of the John Birch Society. In the Bulletin and American Opinion, Welch continually offers flattering salutes to various right-wing groups, publications, and personalities, stressing that "Americanists" can work in several forums at once for the cause. In May, 1961, for example, Welch listed two pages of "other anti-Communist groups" that he endorsed and urged Birchers to support. These included the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, the American Council of Christian Laymen, the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation, the Catholic Freedom Foundation, the Christian Crusade, the Freedom Club (of Los Angeles), Freedom in Action (Houston), the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, the Network of Patriotic Letter Writers (Pasadena), and We, The People! (Chicago). In turn, Welch's appearances are often sponsored by such groups: the
Freedom Club of Reverend James Fifield arranged his Los Angeles rally, and the Sons of the American Revolution sponsored his Houston appearance.

To a large extent, Welch's personal selflessness and his salesmanship made him a rallying point for the fundamentalist right, and no recent right-wing group comes to mind that has achieved so large and solid a dues-paying and working membership. In a world of Communist advances in Asia and Africa, pressures on Berlin, vast changes in the relation of white to colored populations throughout the world, the Birch Society has developed a thoroughly satisfying way for the thin-lipped little lady from Wichita or the self-made manufacturer of plumbing fixtures in North Carolina to work in manageable little daily doses against "the Communists." The cancer of the unquestioned international Communist menace and the surgery of local pressure on the P.-T.A. and the public library—here is a perfect appeal for right fundamentalism. This highlights the fact that the Society's most successful efforts to date have not been on the national scene but on the "soft underbelly" of American democracy—those places where a minimum of pressure can often produce maximum terror and restrictive responses. Welch has stressed that school boards, city colleges, local businesses, local clergy, and similar targets are the ones to concentrate on. Above all, Welch has brought co-ordination to the fundamentalist right—co-ordinated targets, co-ordinated meetings and rallies, and co-ordinated pressure tactics. "All of a sudden," the director of a Jewish Community Council in one city reflected, "the right-wingers began to function like a disciplined platoon. We have had to contend with precision and saturation ever since."

II

If this is what the Society advocates and how it functions, what are its prospects? The Society has already lost one of its most potent weapons—the element of secrecy. Those in local communities who felt the sting of Birch campaigns during 1959–61 report that it was the factor of surprise at these sudden fundamentalist pressures and the unawareness of their organizational source that threw them off balance. Now, however, the Society has been brought into public view. Its authoritarian character and extremist statements have been attacked in both liberal and conservative newspapers; by important Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders; and by political figures as
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diverse as Richard Nixon, President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Representative Sam Rayburn, Senator Thomas E. Dodd, and even Senator Barry Goldwater himself. The fact that a prominent leader of the Society who had been chosen as Washington lobbyist for the American Retail Federation was hastily discarded by the Federation because of his Birch affiliation indicates that publicity has damaged the Society’s claim to respectability. One Midwestern Congressman known for his open advocacy of right-wing movements felt it wise recently to seek out liberal leaders from his community and explain privately that he did not support the Birch movement. Increasingly, those “solid” figures who joined the group when it was operating privately have had to face public disapproval of the Society, and this probably has caused some falling away among borderline conservatives.

In the longer perspective, there are three specific factors that deserve mention in assessing the Society’s future. The first is the authoritarian character of the group and the centralized control exercised by Robert Welch (a situation that has led Senator Goldwater to criticize Welch directly). According to the charter of the Society, Welch is the absolute leader; there is no accounting of dues or contributions; there is no representative process or democratic system for selecting programs or defining positions; and Welch has the power (which he has used) to expel any member or chapter for reasons sufficient to him, without right of hearing or appeal on the expulsion. This has produced widespread criticism of Welch as a “little Hitler” and the Society as a group run on Fascist lines. However, Welch has stressed again and again that members can disagree with him; that he doesn’t expect any member to carry out a project which violates his conscience; and that the Society definitely opposes an “enforced conformity” within its ranks. The controls, Welch explains, are needed to prevent Communist infiltration of the Society (which he believes has already begun or will certainly begin as the Society becomes more effective) and infiltration by hate-mongers. This blend of leader-principle and group self-protection has great appeal to right fundamentalists and even to some right-wing conservatives. The authoritarian setup makes fine ammunition for liberal and mainstream-conservative fire, but this is not likely to harm Welch a bit in his recruiting among fundamentalists.

A second factor is Welch himself. The fantastic allegations he has made in The Politician—even though the book has not been
endorsed by the Council and is, indeed, repudiated by some members—have branded him as an unbalanced figure and convinced many staunch conservatives that Welch is a truly dangerous leader. The conservative Los Angeles Times did a thorough exposé of the Society and ran a stinging editorial that read Welch out of the conservative camp. Out of self-defense, Republicans in California joined in with the Times (especially in condemning Welch’s attacks on Eisenhower), for the Birchers were proving so effective in pulling the Republican Party to the far right that some counterattack was felt to be essential. Welch himself has been highly equivocal about The Politician. He insists that it was a “private” letter and never published, though he does not deny its authenticity. In the May, 1961, issue of the Bulletin, he alludes to “questions or criticism from some of our most loyal members” relating to The Politician. To these, he replies that “the considerations involved in connection with many such matters are varied, over-lapping, involved, and with too many ramifications to be explained in short compass. There are even times when, for reasons of strategy, we take an oblique approach to a specific objective, and fully to explain every step of our course would seriously handicap our effectiveness.” Having decided not to say anything at all, Welch assured members that if he “could give . . . the whole background of events,” then objections might turn into approval, and with this he dropped the subject of his magnum opus.

As Welch led his cadres on during 1962, he forced even those who applauded the Birch Society to speak out against Welch personally. The arch-conservative Manchester (N.H.) Union-Leader, published by William Loeb, called on Welch to resign in February of 1962, citing Welch’s praise for Batista and Trujillo as examples of his “nonsense.” Russell Kirk, Congressman Walter Judd, Senator Thomas Dodd, and even Fulton Lewis, Jr., joined in suggestions that Welch’s statements were wild, his presence a burden for “the cause,” and his retirement highly desirable. The fullest attack came from the National Review on February 13, 1962, in a documented complaint that Welch “persists in distorting reality and in refusing to make the crucial moral and political distinction . . . between 1) an active pro-Communist, and 2) an ineffectually anti-Communist Liberal.” After discussing The Politician, the National Review editorial added such examples of recent Welchery as these: “The Cuban invasion was a plot by Fidel Castro and his friends
in the U. S. Government. The invasion was planned by Castro and his friends in our government to make Castro stronger throughout Latin America [and to] reduce U.S. prestige”; the United States is now “50-70±%” under “Communist-control”; “the government of the United States is under operational control of the Communist Party.” The National Review also cited Welch’s claims that the Tito break with Stalin was “completely stage-managed and phoney”; that Nasser was as much a Kremlin agent “as. . . Mao Tse Tung”; that the Soviets “deliberately precipitated” the Polish and Hungarian revolts of 1956; that the C.I.A. “is on the [Communist] side”; NATO is a Communist “hoax”; Willy Brandt is a “hypocritical Com-symp”; and on, and on. The editorial concluded by noting that the John Birch Society could be a superb organization, and “might have had many millions” of members, but for Welch’s misleadership. Now, he should resign.

Not every Birch Society supporter joined this bandwagon of criticism, however. Congressman John Rousselot (Rep., Calif.), a Birch Society member and frank advocate, issued a statement on February 15, 1962, urging Welch’s retention. “Robert Welch is an intense foe of Communism and the fact that he is the anti-Communist most often attacked in Pravda as well as other Communist publications throughout the United States and the rest of the world, attests to the validity of his thesis.” Representative Rousselot added, “It seems unrealistic to me to ask any segment of our conservative, anti-Communist movement to be removed from the battle line at the time when we are beginning to win and just because we do not agree with every item.”

As of the spring of 1962, Welch had not resigned. He is subject to no election or governing board, and it is arguable whether he or his critics best express the ideas of the Society’s membership. In any event, his talents as organizer, salesman, and unifier of fundamentalist ranks made the Birch Society, and he has shown no intention of surrendering his apparatus.

A third factor relating to the Birch Society’s immediate prospects is the question of anti-Semitism. Repeated charges have been made that the Society is a genteel endorser of such anti-Semitic publications as Russell Maguire’s American Mercury and Merwin K. Hart’s Economic Council Newsletter. Hart—who often talks about a conspiracy of “Zionists and their confederates” controlling America and whose organization was described by a Congressional
committee investigating lobbying as one that relies on "an ill-concealed anti-Semitism"—is presently leader of the Birch Society's Manhattan Chapter No. 26. In addition, such openly anti-Semitic spokesmen as Conde McGinley have rushed to endorse the Birch Society. In the March 15, 1961, issue of Common Sense, McGinley wrote, "Inasmuch as we have received many inquiries from all over the United States regarding the John Birch Society, we want to go on record. We believe this to be an effective, patriotic group, in good hands."

On the other hand, Welch has always appealed to all religions, has urged Jews to join the Society, and has warned that it is a "Communist tactic to stir up distrust and hatred between Jews and Gentiles, Catholics and Protestants, Negroes and Whites." Much of the April, 1961, issue of his Bulletin is devoted to a discussion of the allegation that the Society is anti-Semitic, and what Welch has to say there is well worth close examination.

He opens by noting that "the most vicious" charges leveled against him have come from "such notorious anti-Semites as Lyrl Clark Van Hyning (Women's Voice) and Elizabeth Dilling (the Dilling Bulletin) on the grounds that my various committees and supporters are nothing but a 'bunch of Jews and Jew-kissers.' . . ." He then cites the names of Jewish members of the Society such as Willi Schlamm, Julius Epstein, Morrie Ryskind, the late Alfred Kohlberg, and Rabbi Max Merritt, and indicates that it has been endorsed by the American Jewish League Against Communism (a Jewish right-fundamentalist group). Next, Welch explains that he probably has "more good friends of the Jewish faith than any other Gentile in America." When he was in the candy-manufacturing business in Massachusetts, he recalls, he had many Jewish customers; he drank coffee in their kitchens at midnight, borrowed money from them and lent them money in return, and engaged in every kind of business and social activity with Jews.

Turning to some specific accusations, Welch admits that he used a pamphlet by Joseph Kamp as a source for his book May God Forgive Us, and also paid Kamp a hundred dollars to go through The Life of John Birch to find errors. This was in 1954. But later, he says, he became "aware of both the fact and the weapon of anti-Semitism in America, and I wanted no part of the whole argument." He had nothing further to do with Kamp after the 1954
contact, but he adds that he still simply doesn’t know enough to say whether Kamp is really anti-Semitic.

Welch goes on to relate that a person who had been trying to convert one local chapter into “a hotbed of anti-Semitism” was dropped from the Society, and he pledges that the Society will never become a haven for anti-Semitic feeling “so long as I am directing its policies.” After several additional paragraphs explaining why no member of the Jewish faith can also be a Communist (and pointing out that Karl Marx was “probably the most vicious anti-Semite of all times”), Welch concludes with the following warning:

There is only one real danger in the charge of anti-Semitism today, to the man who actually is not anti-Semitic. It is that the utter (and in some cases malicious) unfairness of the charge may cause him to react with anger against Jews in general, and then begin to let some of his feeling creep into his writings or his speeches. That brings on even more vitriolic attacks, with a few more straws to support them. And so the development continues until the man in question winds up actually becoming violently anti-Semitic. And he seldom realizes that this was the Communist game and purpose all along, of which the majority of Jews who innocently helped the Reds to implement it were as unaware and innocent as the ordinary Methodist who supports the National Council of Churches. And many an anti-Communist fighter of great promise in America has had his career ruined and his effectiveness destroyed by letting himself fall into that carefully prepared trap.

This will never happen to him, Welch declares; to his “thousands of Jewish friends” he pledges, “I shall remain your friend, no matter what happens. . . .” Furthermore, despite clear atmospheres of anti-Semitism at some of his public meetings and anti-Semitic questions from the floor, Welch has refused to give his estimate of how many American rabbis are Comsymps, though he has given definite figures for the Protestant and Catholic clergy.

All the evidence available at the moment suggests the presence of a certain ambivalence in the Birch Society on the matter of anti-Semitism. Welch himself seems to be personally without bias toward Jews, and he wants the Society to reflect this position. Yet there is no doubt that some local leaders and members are well-known anti-Semites. With one after another of the rabbinical associations and major Jewish civic groups speaking out in complete condemnation of Welch and his movement, there will be rising pressures to re-
spond to the "Jewish attacks." Probably, Welch will continue to allow some light flirtation with the more sophisticated anti-Semitic spokesmen. But it is a testimony to American maturity and the activities of Jewish defense agencies that open anti-Semitism is seen as a dead end today for any "middle-of-the-road right-wing organization."

One final aspect of the Society should be noted. Welch's writings have a remarkable combination of fantastic allegation and sweet reasonableness. Along with his proposals advocating drastic action against the Communist agents all over America will go reminders to be polite while making menacing telephone calls to local officials, to exercise self-restraint when attacked unfairly, and to take no action that violates "moral Principles." "It is a major purpose of the John Birch Society," he often explains, one "never to be overlooked by its members, to help in every way we can—by example as well as precept—to restore an abiding sense of moral values to greater use as a guide of conduct for individuals, for groups, and ultimately for nations." If there are some right-fundamentalists to whom this sort of passage sounds a bit like the National Council of Churches, the total blend of warmhearted, main-street vigilantism is still appealing to the majority of Welch's followers.

III

Whatever the specific prospects for the Birch Society, the 1960s will surely be years of expansion for the fundamentalist right in this country. Several things point toward this conclusion.

First, this will be a decade of immense frustration for American foreign policy. We will witness increased neutralism among the new nations; increased militancy among the non-white peoples over questions of color; constant military and scientific pressures from the Russians and, soon, the Chinese Communists; diminished American influence in the United Nations; greater conflict in Latin America; and continued outlays of foreign assistance that do not "buy loyalties" or "deliver votes" on critical issues. If the United States can simply prevent these situations from exploding, most informed students of diplomacy would think we had done well. But cutting losses inflicted by the stagnant 1950s and preparing hopeful future positions is not going to appeal to the right-fundamentalist masses (or to the frantic pacifist variety on the left, either). The right is un-
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shakable in its faith in unilateral solutions and its belief that each loss for America can be traced to a Communist agent or "Com-symp" in the C.I.A., on the New York Times, in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, or at the Yale Law School. And the in-escapable strategic retreats of the early 1960s (Laos is a good example) will lend fuel to the fires on the right.

Second, the domestic racial issue also poses a serious threat of a rise in right-fundamentalism. In the 1960s, the struggle for Negro equality will move increasingly into areas outside the South. Lower-middle-class and middle-class resentments against Negro neighbors and Negro competitors are bound to increase. The crescendo of Negro militancy and the spreading use of government power to enforce civil rights will peel away the already thinned layers of toleration in many sectors of the Northern and Western population. In this area of public policy, groups like the Birch Society—which are not explicitly anti-Negro but oppose compulsory integration—have a promising position, and the reservoirs of white hostility, unless carefully and wisely channeled by both white and Negro liberal leaders, could fill the well of the fundamentalist right to overflowing.

Third, there exists the distinct possibility of an unprecedented coalition of Catholic and Protestant right-fundamentalists in the 1960s. Only those who know little about the history of American Catholicism think this is a monolithic community. Yet many factors suggest that the 1960s may see an even deeper division of American Catholics into warring ideological factions than has obtained at any time in the past. Already some influential Catholics are complaining bitterly that President Kennedy has joined the "Liberalist Establishment," that he has been "selling out" Catholic Church interests, and that the administration of the first Catholic President may go down in history as the "softest on Communism." This is far from the dominant view among American Catholics. Indeed, it may represent the last thrashing of the old, super-loyalist element in the American Catholic community—a group that will be goaded to extremism by the sight of an a-clerical, literate, sophisticated Catholic liberal in the White House. Under these conditions, and with the magic memory of Joseph McCarthy to help bridge the chasm of the Reformation, the fundamentalist Protestants and the fundamentalist Catholics may enter into alliance (possibly inside the Birch Society).
DURING THE 1950s, a climate of political intolerance existed in the United States. While working on various surveys of this climate, I began to feel that our understanding of this phenomenon would be greatly enlarged by an examination of the English scene. Both countries are in that same broad temperate zone of the world where the balance of nature, forces of history, political geography, and law should have affected us equally. Yet England appeared to be a region that continued to be favored by a climate of political tolerance in sharp contrast to the unfavorable changes America had become exposed to. A comparative study to determine whether there was, in fact, a difference, and what the factors accounting for it might be, was planned, and the exploratory phases of it were conducted by field studies undertaken in 1961.

I

Some clarification of the concept involved in “a climate of political intolerance” is a necessary prelude. Our ultimate concern is with the widespread intolerance manifested in actions against political nonconformists. The overt intolerance may be regarded as a reflection of a climate of opinion—a pervasive pattern of beliefs and attitudes in a society—about political nonconformity. This, in turn, may be seen as embedded in a more fundamental system of belief.
and attitude involving generalized intolerance toward political groups, ethnic groups, and other groups within the country or outside its boundaries. To assume that these three phenomena are the same, or naturally flow and blend into one another, is to obscure the important questions of the processes by which they become linked. Thus, it is equally possible that generalized intolerance can become focused on or diverted from a particular object, and, once focused, can be translated or not into various forms of action against that object. Some of the differences in England might derive from fundamental differences in climates of opinion or might instead derive from factors that altered the focus of such opinions, or their translation into action.

A climate of political intolerance is a problem of deep concern, for it may generate in society an atmosphere of fear and distrust. Dissenters of all varieties—not only Communists—may become afraid to engage in innocent forms of behavior, expressions of attitude, or perhaps even to hold "dangerous" opinions. Such feelings may also be subsumed under the concept of a climate of opinion, but here again a correspondence between a climate of political intolerance and an atmosphere of fear should not be assumed. Whether such fears become pervasive or remain restricted to particular groups and the way they manifest themselves may depend on many factors, some that sustain possible victims of intolerance, and others that contain the intolerance itself. The measurement of the English atmosphere and the exploration of such factors formed the second purpose of the comparative study.

II

A brief review of some studies of America in the 1950s is necessary for comparison. The American conclusions can pose questions to be checked against the English experience. And by seeing what questions the American studies left unanswered, the crucial role of comparative studies in regions of tolerance and intolerance can be conveyed.

The many scholarly analyses of the American security programs have pointed out inadequacies in the criteria and legal procedures employed, and have documented the cases of injury and injustice to individuals in government and teaching. To demonstrate the
climate of opinion in the general public and the extent of fear, one must turn, however, to various surveys.

In a national survey in 1954, Samuel Stouffer demonstrated that the level of public intolerance, not only toward Communists but toward milder kinds of political nonconformists, was strikingly high. But the widespread intolerance was not matched by any widespread fear among the people about expressing views in their everyday life. One must recall that the public merely reported their intolerant opinions and did not always act them out, and this implies that a climate of intolerance requires stimulation and mobilization in order to work its social effects.

On this score, Stouffer's parallel inquiry among local community leaders, mainly those in legitimate positions of authority, had revealed that these persons, when asked to venture opinions in their roles as private individuals, were more tolerant than the public, although not as tolerant as one might hope. Thus, legitimate local leadership, which might mobilize popular sentiments, was not as rampant as the public, and acted as a partial check on possibly unbridled actions. Other psychological findings of Stouffer's study help resolve the paradox. The normal apathy of the public provided some restraint on violent action against possible victims and also made the public less responsive to appeals to intolerance from national figures. The Army-McCarthy hearings, via one mass medium or another, had reached an estimated audience of some eighty-five million adults. Yet Stouffer found that thirty per cent of the national sample could not name any of the senators who had been investigating Communism, not even McCarthy. Such is one of the blessed social functions of ignorance!

Stouffer's prime finding, the high degree of widespread intolerance, leads one to develop certain models of the way intolerance must be distributed within a population for it to generate maximum fear. The many who are intolerant do not fear the climate of opinion they themselves create; they are the agents of intolerance, not the victims. The more their numbers increase, the fewer are left over who hold the kind of opinions that would be a cause for fear—although as the minority weighs the odds, the fears might become more intense. Various models to represent such social processes might be elaborated along ecological lines, since the assumption that the national population is the meaningful social entity may be unwarranted. However, if one refines the model, it tends to become
clear that preponderant intolerance in a society does not create the widest repercussions of fear.

But while the general public did not exhibit what Stouffer termed a "national anxiety neurosis," studies of specialized population groups did document an atmosphere of fear in response to the felt climate of intolerance. Marjorie Fiske's study of librarians in California showed that the librarians engaged in many self-imposed restrictive practices so as to avoid sanctions. Lazarsfeld and Thielens in 1955 surveyed a large sample of social scientists in colleges throughout the country and documented the incidents of social pressure against political nonconformity that in turn had led to considerable apprehension and cautionary activity on the part of teachers. In 1954 Marie Jahoda studied a small sample of personnel then currently employed in the broadcasting industry and showed that the climate of intolerance, as channeled through the institution of the blacklist, had created a preponderant pattern of fear among such individuals, so that they had restricted their opinions, activities, and associations. A similar pattern of findings was evident in an earlier study by Jahoda and Cook, conducted in 1951, among a small sample of Washington civil servants; they demonstrated that the loyalty-and-security issue had become of such pervasive concern to these individuals that in response to the total climate of formal government procedures and informal pressures, these individuals showed much fear and cautionary activity. These and other specialized studies provide substantial evidence that, while the masses were not made afraid by the climate of intolerance, particular strategic groups who had been objects of attack were definitely prone to fear.

All of these studies exploited their resources to the full, but were limited empirically to certain forms of analysis. By comparing groups within the sample, the analysts indicated the factors accounting for differences in intolerance and sensitivity to fear on the part of an individual or psychological nature. They were also able to account for the differences in the situations—the milieu or community setting, and still larger factors of a sub-societal or sub-cultural nature—which shaped the responses. But these many diverse analyses, based as they were on an inquiry at a particular time or place within the one society, did not provide any empirical test of macroscopic factors, such as the cultural and historical, economic, polit-
A comparative national study can provide some test of such factors. And the comparison with England commends itself as an almost model experiment. The external threat of the Soviet Union and the cold war had affected both countries. The dangers of internal subversion existed in both countries and led to official programs of security promulgated at about the same time in 1948–49. If anything, England labored under handicaps that should have aggravated the security problem. England was weaker militarily and economically, and in terms of proximity was in even greater danger from the Soviet Union. Various English trade unions were threatened by Communist domination, including some strategic unions of civil servants. England had had its own notorious cases of espionage to stimulate official and public concern with problems of security and loyalty. Yet this very same complex of objective events led in the United States to McCarthyism, but in England, despite even more compelling conditions, it did not. Obviously, there is much more to it than these objective circumstances.

III

It may hardly appear to be a discovery that there are more subtle factors involved. Obviously, an objective threat to a society can be perceived in many different ways and need not always lead to the same demands that political dissent within the society be restricted. The findings from comparable surveys conducted in 1953 among samples of teachers in seven western European countries showed that the relation between “threat orientation” and tolerance of internal dissent varied among the countries, and that each of these variables was itself complex and could have a different psychological structure from country to country. Yet the value of a simple conclusion about objective threat should not be discounted. It has the practical virtue of showing that a tradition of civil liberties can survive such obstacles. From the point of view of social research, there would be no way of establishing the exact contribution of threatening events without recourse to some type of comparative design, and their importance has been strongly argued in past analyses of the American climate. For example, it has been suggested that Alger Hiss was “a heaven-sent gift. If he did not exist, the
pseudo-conservatives would have not been able to invent him."\textsuperscript{10}

How plausible it sounds to claim that such a case aggravated public irrationality and intolerance. But if America had an Alger Hiss, the English had their Fuchs, their Pontecorvo, their Burgess and McLean, and still others, and still the consequences in intolerance did not ensue. These cases are not sufficient causes, although they may be necessary ones.

If we must turn to other factors besides the objective threat to account for the difference in the extent of intolerance, the comparative study of the two countries narrows down our search considerably, for many other factors are also equated in what seems a fortunate natural experimental design. A history of legal guarantees of civil liberties is common to both countries; if anything, some of the protections that are most relevant are stronger in America. The American Civil Service, a focus for McCarthyism, has greater legal rights to employment. The English civil servant has no statutory protection and his employment is not within the jurisdiction of the courts. He serves by the prerogative of the Crown or the government. In the parliamentary discussions of the English security program in 1948, many issues were reviewed and debated, but on the point of the government's right to terminate the employment of a civil servant there was no argument.\textsuperscript{11} Law aside, the traditional norms and values that are taught as guides to conduct are much the same in both countries—justice, liberty, fair play, freedom of expression and belief—and if norms, not law, governed the phenomenon, the outcomes should have been the same.

It may be argued that what is written on the books counts less than what gets written on the mind. Perhaps the Americans do not really hold to the values. The values that are internalized are certainly relevant to the problem, and afford one illustration of a host of socio-psychological formulations that have been advanced to account for the American climate of intolerance. Whether they are, in fact, valid descriptions of American character is one issue, and this can be established from the comprehensive surveys that have been conducted in America. But the more important issue is the explanatory power of such formulations. Equivalent comparative data on the values of Englishmen would tell us whether such national value systems are crucial to the climates that emerged, for it might be the case that the values are widely honored, in the breach or
the observance, in both places, and are not enough to account for
the different outcomes.

Whatever direction these socio-psychological formulations take,
they should be tested twice, once for their validity as descriptions
of American character, and again for their validity as explanations
of the climate of political intolerance. The comparative study serves
the second test.

Many American surveys have shown that the public espoused
general democratic values in the abstract, but did not apply them to
particular concrete cases where they might be expected to apply.
Values have to be engaged, have to be seen as relevant to particular
situations, before a public uses them as guides to conduct. Perhaps,
the English and American publics differ in the degree to which their
common value system has been seen as relevant to the treatment
of political nonconformity. Comparative description of values must
be accompanied by research into the cognitive processes of value-
engagement.

England provides an ideal testing ground for other socio-psycho-
logical constructs that have figured in discussions of the American
climate of intolerance. For example, consider Alan Barth's recent
characterization of the 1960-style McCarthyites as the "rampageous
right": they see things simplistically; they do not make distinctions;
the tensions and frustrations under which we live make them angry
and less prone to reason. There is nothing wrong with the descrip-
tion. But how adequate is it to explain the prominence of these
groups in America? The English live in a similar world of tensions.
They too are likely to draw oversimple cognitive maps to guide
them toward a better world. Yet the English conservative does
not go on a rampage against political nonconformists.

What remains problematical is why the oversimplifications of
thought have taken on a particular content in America. Why do
the political nonconformist and the Communist in our midst figure
so prominently in the American cognitive map? Why is the boundary
line between the two so fuzzy on the American map? Doctrinal
distinctions are not simple, but the wild assortment of criteria for
identifying a Communist that Stouffer compiled from the responses
of his sample seem hardly to represent the limits of ordinary Ameri-
can intelligence. Comparative study might reveal some of the factors
that have encouraged oversimplification in thought and have shaped
its content.
Or consider the influential body of theory organized around the concepts of “status politics” and “status anxiety”—which were central to the original edition of this volume—in which McCarthyism was seen as the accompaniment of social mobility, of the displacement of some groups by others rising in the social order. The upward mobile in their status-anxiety become conservative and conforming, and become intolerant because they must display their conformity by demanding it from others. By other psychodynamic routes, the downward mobile, the status-deprived, also arrive at intolerance. Certainly, the social location of McCarthy’s support in America, and similar kinds of structural analyses of survey data, might give inferential support to such theories. But there are some stubborn facts about England that are hard to reconcile with the theory. The English postwar social order was mangled as much if not more than ours. They have their nouveaux riches, their “Texas millionaires,” who should have felt a need to validate themselves by excessive loyalty and zeal about others’ loyalty. Contrary to usual belief, social mobility in Britain, both upward and downward, has been substantial and not very different in magnitude from mobility in the United States.

IV

The contemplation of the comparative study provides a corrective for theories that employ some form of psychological analysis of the American past. The investigator finds the forerunners of the new intolerance of political nonconformists in such passages in our history as the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Know-Nothing Movement, the raids on Reds after World War I, the Ku Klux Klan, the rough and tough of the frontier, or some other gory item out of the American past from which one postulates a persistent streak of intolerance in American character. Comparison with England reveals the incompleteness of the argument. The scene there is one of lawfulness and restraint punctuated, only on occasion, by some brutal racial intolerance. But the English past was full of excess, punitive laws, lawlessness, and the victimization of types of nonconformists. We had our past oaths for teachers, but they had their acts of uniformity against teachers. At Oxford, religious tests were not completely abolished until 1871. We had our anti-Semitism, but the legal disabilities placed on Jews in England persisted well into
the latter half of the nineteenth century, and were not completely removed until about 1890. Paralleling our Alien and Sedition Acts—at about the same time and in similar response to the French Revolution, they had their Sedition trials.\textsuperscript{18} They had their violence. A widely traveled anthropologist and student of the English character, Geoffrey Gorer, puts the matter vividly. "No society in the world I know of had such persistently cruel and violent amusements and diversions as the people of Elizabethan England; the bull-baiting, the bear-baiting, the cock-fighting, the public executions and floggings, the teasing of the insane in Bedlam." By 1800, the scene is still lurid: "six women were publicly flogged for hedge-pulling till the blood ran down their backs, and the public flogging of women was only made illegal in 1817."\textsuperscript{19} The English parallel suggests that there is something questionable in the logic of explanations that appeal to a historical streak of general intolerance to account for the recent climate of political intolerance. History is obviously a record of discontinuities and changes in social character as well as a record of continuities. Somebody or something can break or extend the historical thread.

The blemishes on the English record, which we normally forget, suggest too that there may be something arbitrary in the sampling procedure used to support such theories about American intolerance. American History may be read as a record of periodic intolerance, violence, encroachment on civil liberties, but it is equally appropriate to draw opposite conclusions by judicious selection. In between the bad episodes, there were plenty of other things happening—native radicalism that was tolerated, utopian communities that survived unharmed, communistic communities founded by foreigners, reformers who were read and listened to, tracts on Socialism and even anarchism that were not burned or censored.\textsuperscript{20} There are many strands to the American past. Perhaps one must look in England and America at the forces that bring out any particular inchoate aspect of national character.

Another psychological construct that often figured in the discussion of McCarthyism was the theme of conformity in the American character. Political intolerance certainly exacts as its price a conformity from its victims, but the argument appeals to a notion that there is a more fundamental and generalized conformity that shapes the political demands for conformity and makes the victims compliant. Certainly, there is plenty of evidence of individual differences in
compliance with social pressures, and recently there has appeared some evidence of national differences in compliance under experimentally created social pressures.\textsuperscript{21} That Americans as a people demand more conformity from others than English people do, and that these demands must of necessity focus on the political sphere still remains unexamined and unproven. The seven-country study of teachers showed that the English subjects were among the highest in their disapproval of dissent on military matters, which was hardly suggestive of mildness when it came to conformity demands on matters of high importance,\textsuperscript{22} while some American data from the Detroit area studies had suggested that the politically intolerant were inclined to gentle forms of persuasion of nonconformists, rather than to harsh measures.\textsuperscript{23}

What we take as typifying the lack of English pressures for conformity, as some of my informants have suggested, is their tolerance of eccentricity, of the amateur engaged in odd hobbies; perhaps playing with politics is regarded as an innocent kind of nonconformity. The question whether a particular realm of behavior is defined as innocent or dangerous nonconformity is central to an understanding of the climate of intolerance in a society, and perhaps directs us to the definition of "dangerous" that is urged upon the ordinary man.\textsuperscript{24}

In these many ways, the planning of a comparative study led me to reappraise the large body of speculations about McCarthyism. The hypotheses that withstood this reappraisal became the guide to my travels and observations. The research design ideally would have followed a particular sequence of stages. The general climate of opinion—the pervasive pattern of values, beliefs and attitudes that characterized the British public—should be described first on the basis of adequate survey data. If the British public differed in their dispositions toward intolerance, the psychological hypotheses that had been advanced to account for the American climate of political intolerance would have greater plausibility. If, however, the British public were equally disposed toward intolerance, then one should explore the political and structural factors that had held the intolerance in check. Was the British elite even more tolerant than Stouffer had found the stratum of American leadership to be? Had particular political institutions prevented the mobilization of intolerant sentiments? What influence did events and situations have in shaping the forms of intolerance? And if the British public were disposed toward intolerance, had an atmosphere of fear been generated,
particularly among the kinds of groups that had been found to be vulnerable in the American studies?

Some of these hypotheses about climates of political intolerance could have been tested by another type of research design. Long-term trend surveys conducted within one society, the United States, would also have provided a comparison of political intolerance under conditions of changing events and national situations.²⁵

From trend questions on public intolerance asked by the National Opinion Research Center periodically over a decade, plus other survey data, Paul Sheatsley and I reported in 1953 considerable public intolerance long before the rise of McCarthy, but we also showed that this was correlative with events. With the cold war, public intolerance had grown and the relative tolerance of the more educated strata had been undermined.²⁶ McCarthyism declined, but the cold war did not abate. Some questions, therefore, were in order. How long does it take for the fears of the nonconformists to be dissipated? Have the social scientists, the civil servants, broadcasters, and librarians remained as apprehensive as they were? Has the public remained as intolerant in the years between McCarthy and Robert Welch, and, if so, what forms has such intolerance taken?

With these thoughts in mind, Sheatsley and I extended the trend line on two of the N.O.R.C. tolerance questions in surveys conducted in December, 1956, and April, 1957. At the height of McCarthyism, the earlier trend point had established in January, 1954, when 81 per cent of the national sample declared they would not allow Communist Party members to speak on the radio, a steady rise from a figure of 40 per cent in 1943. Three years later, in December, 1956, the figure was 73 per cent, and in April, 1957, it was 75 per cent. Similarly, we had reported in 1954 that 45 per cent would not allow Socialists to publish newspapers in peacetime, a rise from a figure of 25 per cent in 1943. In December, 1956, 38 per cent still endorsed this policy and in April, 1957, the figure was 39 per cent.²⁷ Such fragmentary data suggested that the sentiments of the American public continued to be intolerant, but simply had become latent in the absence of forces to activate, focus, or mobilize opinions.

If fragmentary findings over a short span can be suggestive, it would be much more illuminating to have longer trends to juxtapose against radical changes in events and political institutions. Under different leadership conditions, would the same pattern of sentiments have become mobilized into action? The fifties seem to have been a
period when the actions of elected officials such as Senator McCarthy and some administrative officers in government, and the lack of action of other officials against intolerance, gave a new legitimacy to such behavior. In the sixties, by contrast, the legitimacy of such social movements and climates of opinion has been questioned by the strong actions of the President.28 One wonders what difference this has made in the incidence, virulence, and forms of public intolerance and in the fears of nonconformists.29 Alas, the interest of sponsors and of researchers has diminished, as the problem of intolerance appeared less problematical, and no one thus far has seen fit to repeat the studies of Stouffer or Lazarsfeld or Fiske. Applied social research seems oriented to the immediate issue rather than being problem-oriented. The latent aspects of an issue are neglected and trend designs for surveys have lost prestige.

V

The first stage of my research strategy, as already indicated, was to find systematic survey data on the British climate of opinion. Occasional bits of such data that I had seen over the years had led me to doubt the image of a tolerant English public. If this were really so, I could then eliminate that variable as an explanation of the different climates of political tolerance, and concentrate on the other hypotheses. In England, huge volumes of data had been collected on all sorts of matters, but only a few questions had been asked on civil liberties and political nonconformity. To the question why, the survey people replied that they had no problem of McCarthyism, so why bother to study it?30

There was, however, enough survey data from a number of countries, varying in the effective climates of political tolerance, to show that the sentiments of the common man everywhere are often intolerant, thus suggesting that other factors explain the different outcome. For example, in Norway, a relatively tolerant country, a probability sample of the City of Oslo was studied in 1951–52. Thirty-two per cent felt Communists should not have the right to publish their own newspaper, even if it were carefully controlled by the authorities, and proportions ranging between 40–50 per cent felt Communists should be denied such positions as teachers, non-leading positions in states and municipalities, and trade-union offices.31 Surveys done by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in 1950 showed that
the magnitude of public intolerance of Communists was about the same as Stouffer demonstrated for the American public in 1954.32 The Australian Institute of Public Opinion had found in 1951 that about two-thirds of the public approved a ban on the Communist Party. Yet the ironical fact was that a national referendum had been held in September, 1951, on the issue of a ban and the ban had lost. One might have cast doubt on the validity of the surveys or argued for a last-minute shift in opinion. But in a survey conducted after the referendum, in December, 1951, the same finding was demonstrated. The finding was so startling that the survey was replicated once more and the exact same result obtained.33 While one can explore other technical reasons for the difference between the vote and the popular opinion, what is suggested is that the relation between opinion and action is complicated by other variables, and an effective climate of opinion does not necessarily mirror popular sentiment.

Lacking exact survey data on the English public, I had to turn in other directions: to inquiry of informants, analysis of documents, and to an examination of concrete events. I attempted to find out what had actually happened to freedom of opinion, to political nonconformists, to Communists and so-called Communists in the schools, universities, civil service, and community. And it became abundantly clear to me as these bits of evidence accumulated that there had been many fewer overt actions against nonconformists. While this might be seen as a reflection of a climate of tolerant political opinion, the reverse may be argued. The lack of such actions may well alter the climate, and it might still be asserted that the general English public initially held as intolerant sentiments as are found in other countries. And the lack of actions may easily account for the reduction in an atmosphere of fear.

Consider the scope of official investigative activities in the United States in the mid-fifties. At that time, approximately six million American adults were covered by the civilian personnel-security programs of the federal government. These included about 2,300,000 employees of the federal government, some three million employees in private industries engaged in defense work, plus other personnel who came under special federal legislation concerned with security problems in the Atomic Energy Commission, the United Nations, and in maritime trades. The military personnel-security program covered an additional three million, for a total of nine million adults.
subject to investigation in 1955. But even these figures seriously
understate the extent to which official governmental scrutiny of
security and loyalty touched the American people, for given the
normal turnover of employment, subsequent occupants of the same
positions would also be subject to investigation. Thus, depending on
the span of years involved, the number of American adults might
total considerably higher than nine million.

Investigations by committees of the Senate and the House of
Representatives sometimes covered government agencies and the
military, but other inquiries into the teaching professions and the
communications industries brought under official scrutiny some con-
siderable number of additional persons in non-federal employment.
In addition, the loyalty of other individuals employed in the private
sector came under official scrutiny through the requirement of a
loyalty oath attached to various research grants made by the federal
government, although such individuals were not actually subject to
investigative procedures. To these millions, add the additional
number whose political views came under scrutiny as a result of
the security and loyalty programs of the various state governments.
The two most populous states, New York and California, focused
extensive investigative programs on teachers, and no less than a
dozen other states had legislation covering various classes of em-
ployees. Municipalities added their weight to the numbers by
their own investigative activities.

The total number of individuals whose loyalty or security had been
subject to official scrutiny by some organ of American government
clearly extended into the many millions. The number of American
families who had been affected by inquiry about one of their family
members, and the additional number of families who had encountered
such an inquiry through a field investigation of one of their acquaint-
ances, friends, or relatives must have been so large as to make quite
a dent in the consciousness of the American people.

In contrast, investigations in England were focused on a much
smaller group, those employed in sensitive posts in government or
industry, and the aim was not to bar the individual from all employ-
ment, but merely to decide whether he should be transferred to a
less sensitive position. The recent case of Henry Houghton, found
guilty in 1960 of selling secret information to agents of the Soviet
Union, dramatically illustrates the difference in the British security
program. Houghton had been a clerk in the office of the naval
attaché in Warsaw in 1951, and was returned from this post to London on account of his drinking habits. Despite the potential security risk, he was appointed a year later to a post in the Underwater Detection Establishment of the British Navy, from which agency he stole the secret papers leading to his ultimate conviction. While the report of the Romer Committee, which was appointed to review security procedures following the revelation of these spy cases, strongly criticized the security practices employed by the Admiralty, it notes that "given the security criteria of the time, no legitimate criticism can be made of Houghton's subsequent appointment in 1952 to a post in the Underwater Detection Establishment at Portland which did not in itself involve access to secret material." 36

Comprehensive evidence on the exact scope of the official British security program is not easy to obtain. Official documents and statistical summaries of cases suggest that the program has been limited to a narrow sphere of employment and to a limited number of individuals. One can say that a much larger sphere and population could in fact be affected since investigations may be conducted secretly; witnesses similarly protected by secrecy; the real grounds for dismissal, transfer, or lack of promotion of employees not revealed; and decisions on job applicants not disclosed. To estimate the magnitude of this covert sphere is, in the nature of the case, impossible. If one turns to sources other than the official ones, evidence is impressionistic, much of it qualitative material involving selected cases, and all of it difficult to evaluate. Organizations representing various classes of employees, teachers' and professors' associations, and unions of civil servants were vigilant about their interests and well informed on grievances. This increased the estimates but might still understate the extent of the problem, since some victims of improper security practices might be unsuspecting and occasional others might prefer, on grounds of self-interest, to hush up the matter. Interest groups concerned with problems of civil liberties, and varying in their ideology and militancy, contributed additional evidence on the extent of the security program.

From these sources, plus interviews with informants, I arrived at an approximate picture of the total scope, probably missing only those ramifications of official-security programs so secret that no member of the public was aware of them. Secrecy, so secret, cannot alter the climate or create an atmosphere of fear, although it certainly frees investigators from constraint and violates canons of law. 37
The English security program, when first instituted in 1948, was expressly limited to only a part of the civil service—to those "employed in connection with work the nature of which is vital to the security of the state." Additional security procedures introduced in 1952 for government employees involved in "exceptionally secret work, especially work involving access to secret information about atomic energy," applied only to some 14,000 employees. After the Burgess and MacLean case, a conference of Privy Councillors on Security suggested a strengthening of the security program and urged especially stringent precautions in the Foreign Service, and the defense and atomic-energy fields; these recommendations were accepted by the government. One informed estimate put the number of employees brought within the scope of these recommendations at about 120,000. Between 1948-61, a total of 163 professional civil servants were involved in official cases arising out of all these procedures. Of these the largest group, 83, were transferred to non-secret positions, and 32 were reinstated.

The changes in the procedures introduced in 1956, however, may be more sweeping than they appear. The reports of the Campaign for the Limitation of Secret Police Powers, representing a committee of distinguished individuals, including a considerable number of M.P.s, have criticized the newer procedures, especially the secrecy involved and the fact that the normal safeguards against arbitrary action by Ministers provided by the principle of parliamentary responsibility cannot apply under a veil of secrecy. This committee refers to cases in their files involving personnel in the Merchant Navy, the Central Office of Information, the Post Office, private industry involved in defense contracts, and military personnel seeking commissions. The number of these cases is difficult to estimate from their report. The annual reports of the National Council for Civil Liberties make reference to only a very small number of such incidents, and all such reports taken together hardly convey the impression of magnitude that one obtains from equivalent accounts of American cases summarized by scholars or by American organizations concerned with civil liberties. By way of illustration, one summary by the American Civil Liberties Union abstracts and lists some seventy-five cases arising merely out of investigations by the House Un-American Activities Committee. In contrast, the annual report of the British National Council for 1956-57 remarks on "one or two disquieting reports of political discrimination creeping into employment where
no security issue could by any stretch of the imagination be said to exist.” The difference conveyed seems hardly accountable in terms merely of stylistic or expressive differences in annual report writing. On balance, it would appear that official English investigations of personnel in government and war-related industry have been limited in extent.42

Turning from the civil service and war-related industry to other occupational spheres, the contrast persists. In comparison with the extent of American investigation of the loyalty of teachers, the personnel of English elementary and secondary schools appears to be almost free from official governmental scrutiny. One major case clearly constitutes an exception, but in its very character is most informative for our purposes.43 Beginning in 1950, the Middlesex County Education Authority imposed a political test on all applicants for the position of head Teacher or for a staff position in teacher-training colleges, with the intent to debar past or present Communists or Fascists. It should be noted that this imposition occurred in only one of a hundred and forty-six Local Education Authorities in England and Wales, was restricted to a limited number of posts, and applied only to applicants, rather than incumbents. Moreover, it represented an action of a county authority that was expressly criticized by both the former and the then current National Ministers of Education, the current Minister even attempting by conference to persuade the local authority to reconsider its policy. In the years from 1950 to 1955, this test remained in force, but was finally withdrawn when a new local government was voted into power. This one major exception in the record of English schools was a passing thing, and the circumstances surrounding the reversal of policy are also informative for our inquiry.

It has been argued that the relative freedom of English teachers and scholars from investigations into security and loyalty reflects the militancy of their opposition to political tests. Yet, in this particular case, the national executive of the Teachers Union expressed itself strongly, attempted to exert persuasion through higher political authorities, and made attempts to persuade candidates running for office in the course of two local elections during the period 1950–55, and all to no avail. From one other episode it is clear that the sentiments of the rank-and-file members of the union, the teachers themselves, were neither militant nor important in the final outcome. After other procedures had failed, the union leadership contemplated
the extreme action of a teachers' strike, which before being called required a referendum from the membership. The vote on the referendum was three to one against a strike.

With respect to British universities, comprehensive and detailed facts on the degree to which political considerations have affected the actual appointment or promotion of teachers are, in the nature of the case, difficult to determine. Such criteria could operate through informal and subtle means. But clearly it is the case that government has not attempted to intervene and apply official pressures to those remaining in university positions, despite the fact that all British universities in the recent period have been dependent on the state for the largest part of their support.

There does appear to have been a certain amount of interference exercised indirectly by the English authorities over the international travel of liberal students and scholars, and their appointments to posts in other countries. These individuals, including one world-famous scholar, have found that the host country denies them entry or employment on grounds of information that presumably must have been transmitted by English police authorities. Thus, there is evidence that such dossiers are compiled for teachers, in some unknown number. How frequent the practice has been and whether it represents conventional police co-operation with requests initiated by other national governments or was initiated by the English authorities is not easy to evaluate.\textsuperscript{44}

One rather exceptional case occurred in the fifties, in which the government intervened and indirectly terminated the employment of a lecturer at Birmingham University. The peculiar circumstances are especially revealing for a comparison of British and American practices. In the case of Dr. J. H. Cort, an American citizen having a permit to reside in Great Britain, the Home Secretary terminated the permit upon pressures from the United States government.\textsuperscript{45} While the issues of the case are complex, it is interesting to note that the original source of the action was not British but stemmed from our side of the Atlantic.

The British university teacher, like his American counterpart, has been subject to interrogation by government investigators who seek to assess the reliability of students who might enter government employment. The British Association of University Teachers took an official stand against questions concerning the political beliefs and associations of students; their spokesman, Lord Chorley, made a
protest in Parliament, and the association provided their members with a special printed label to be attached as a reply to such inquiry whereby the teacher can register his disapproval of the investigation. The action of the organization hardly suggests a response of fear or compliance.

There does appear to be one area of official investigation and activity that violates traditional civil liberties and creates pressures against the free expression of opinion. The police, by invoking various regulations, have created difficulties for various public demonstrations and meetings. There are periodic reports of police surveillance of those in attendance at political meetings and police investigation of the organization of such meetings, plus reports of rough treatment by police of public demonstrators. Such police activity, in contrast with security procedures applied to specialized sectors such as the civil service or defense industries, would impinge on members of the general public and might diffuse an atmosphere of fear. Without denying the significance of such occurrences, it is likely that their impact is limited to a small circle within the public that is activist and that has nonconformist opinions. Evidence on this is provided by a national survey conducted in connection with the inquiry of the Royal Commission on the Police in late 1960. The sample includes but underrepresents young people aged 18–21, a group that may be more prominent among those involved in recent political demonstrations. The time of interviewing coincided with some demonstrations of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, an organization that had figured earlier in the cases reported above of police intervention. Only five per cent of the total sample thought that the police often exercised too much force in handling people. Only four per cent knew personally of such instances, but about half of them had occurred in the distant past, and most of the instances did not involve demonstrators or participants in public meetings.

In summary, it appeared that official-security procedures in England had been applied to a much smaller number of individuals within a relatively narrow sector of the society. The law of parsimony would suggest that the differences in the climate of political intolerance and the corollary atmosphere of fear in the fifties in the United States and England were a simple function of the magnitude of official investigation rather than a product of complex social, historical, and psychological variables. Those who know they are free of the
danger of investigation have no reason to be afraid. When millions of individuals, located everywhere, are brought under official scrutiny as possible security risks, it validates the belief that everyone ought to be regarded with suspicion, and it legitimates the idea of investigation itself, whether performed by professional officials or by amateurs. It thus encourages in the public at large a climate of intolerance toward those who may exhibit nonconformist opinions.

The suggestion seems congruent with the fact that pressures originating from outside of government, whether by the general public or specialized groups, and directed at nonconformists seem to have been minimal in England. There seem to have been few if any public pressures against teachers. The Middlesex County issue provided an obvious focus for public sentiment, was brought to public awareness by the press, and yet produced no resonance on the part of the public. One case occurred in 1950 in which a lecturer was dismissed from the University of London, and it was alleged that political grounds were involved. Apart from this instance, informants report little or no pressure on the part of the general or special publics against university teachers and students for their politics. In 1949, the John Lewis department stores announced a policy of excluding Communists from employment, one instance of privately organized action against individuals in non-sensitive employment on the ground of their politics. The reaction in Parliament was to introduce motions condemning the policy, which served to undermine the legitimacy of such private pressures. Apart from many instances within the British trade-union movement of pressures exerted on Communist Party members, there seems to be little evidence that private individuals or groups have harassed others for nonconformist opinions. Indirect evidence in support of this evaluation is provided by data from a survey conducted in June, 1959. While two-thirds of the sample reported that there were some people with whom they would not discuss politics, of these fewer than four per cent (some two per cent of the total sample) gave the reason that it might jeopardize their job, and only about .2 per cent gave the reason that it could lead to trouble with authorities.

VI

The parsimonious explanation for the rarity of intolerant actions on the part of the British public, and the absence of an atmosphere of fear, is based on the character of the official-security programs.
But I was unable to establish empirically whether the British public really held intolerant sentiments that remained latent because of political restraints. Systematic survey data, as noted, were not available to me, and a rigorous judgment would be that a diagnosis of British popular sentiment in this area is not possible. But certainly suggestive evidence is on the side of the second hypothesis. Even if such sentiments exist, very little has been done to agitate them, and a great deal has been done to keep them latent.

Political exploitation of the Communist issue, which could contribute to a climate of intolerance, has been negligible. Within the Parliament, debate, if anything, has focused on questions or excesses in the security program. In the election campaigns over the last decade, political exploitation of the issue to smear one's opposition seems also to have been almost nonexistent. The General Election of 1959 provides a dramatic illustration of such restraint in that the manifestoes of the Labour Party and Communist Party coincided on a number of policy issues, a similarity the Conservatives could readily have exploited but did not.52

Contrast the American handling of the issue in recent campaigns. In 1948, the cases of Alger Hiss and others had just come to light and became a hot campaign issue, leading the Chairman of the Republican National Committee to announce, “Once the Dewey-Warren Administration takes over, we will see the greatest house-cleaning in Washington since St. Patrick cleaned the snakes out of Ireland.” The Lieutenant Governor of New York predicted with pride that if Dewey were elected, “no one will be exempted from scrutiny as to their loyalty to the country. No one will be so high that they cannot be brought down and no one so hidden that they cannot be uncovered. We will have Americanism in the highest meaning of the word when Mr. Dewey becomes President.”53 The 1950 elections saw Senator McCarthy exploiting the Communist issue, and the 1952 elections may well have been a high point in the extravagant use of this issue for campaign purposes.

Now, it may be argued that the difference between Britain and the United States in the extent of political exploitation of the Communist issue is only part of the solution to our problem, and that the other part of the answer involves the psychology of the public. Perhaps the English public would not have been susceptible to such appeals if they had been made, and the American public has the latent intolerance that makes them especially responsive to such
political oratory. The formulation would again require empirical evidence on British sentiments of intolerance, which, as previously noted, are not available, and thus seem imponderable. But its plausibility can be questioned, for it is clear from extensive American survey data that the bulk of Americans showed no special responsiveness in the 1952 election to the issue of domestic Communism, despite the lavishness of the campaign appeals.

Following their study of that election, the Survey Research Center demonstrated that the issue was not salient to the voters, "only 3 per cent of the population mentioned the argument that the Democratic Administration has been 'soft to Communism.'" The 1956 survey data indicate that the "issue had virtually disappeared." Thus, any great significance that might be imputed to an American character structure as an explanatory principle seems unwarranted. For all one knows, the English might have been more susceptible to such appeals if they had been exploited! This is not to deny the significance of such campaign tactics for the emergence of a climate of intolerance and the corresponding atmosphere of fear, for while the issue never became highly salient to the general American public, it may have cut deep into the minds of a smaller attentive public, and it may well have struck fear into the hearts of those who were sensitive and vulnerable to possible attack.

Three of the celebrated British loyalty cases within the last decade represented potential focuses of political debate and, in turn, for public repercussions that might have altered the climate of tolerance. Here again one notes particular political structures and institutions which served as mechanisms to cool the atmosphere and reduce the consequences on the climate of tolerance. The Burgess and MacLean case certainly shook Parliament and aroused much discussion. In answer to the many questions asked, the government showed a good deal of reticence, and with respect to criticisms of laxity, the government countered that Burgess and MacLean had legal rights. It reacted by establishing in November, 1955, the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security, which did not present its findings until March, 1956. As noted, the report urged more stringent security procedures, but it reaffirmed the principle that no extra powers to detain suspects or withdraw passports should be sought. It may be urged that such reticence and delay mask incompetence and endanger internal security—or, alternatively, that such secrecy masks an insidious and
extensive security program. Nevertheless these procedures also served
to maintain the tolerant climate.

Again in 1961, two spy cases followed the same course. The
Houghton-Gee-Lonsdale case, in March, 1961, led to the appoint-
ment of the Romer Committee, which rendered a report in June,
1961. Only a summary of this report was made public; the Prime
Minister remarked that it would not serve the public interest to dis-
close the full report. The Blake case, resulting in a conviction in May,
1961, led to the appointment of the Radcliffe Committee. A report
of their findings was not made public until April, 1962, and the full
findings were again withheld on the ground that it would not serve
the public interest.\textsuperscript{58}

A feature of the British security program provides another
mechanism to reduce public sentiments below a fever point, and to
minimize the fears of those who might be injured or stigmatized
by the program. The decisions are not publicized. Individuals may
be transferred quietly, or removed from a sensitive job. This is
certainly a cause for suffering, but it is at least partially mitigated by
the likelihood that the persons involved can remain in the community
or obtain other work, since the reasons are not made public. Con-
trast this with the pattern of American legislative investigations of
suspects, where publicity is a common accompaniment of any ac-
cusation.\textsuperscript{59} Correspondingly, the publicity can aggravate the intolerance
of the American public.\textsuperscript{60}

It appears to me, then, that such political procedures and institu-
tions as I have described explain the differences in the English climate
of political tolerance. In the absence of systematic evidence on the
underlying opinions of the British public, one must still acknowledge
the possibility that there are prior restraints internalized within the
English character. However, it is also clear that the political mecha-
nisms would act as \textit{external} restraints on any latent public intoler-
ance.

One may well ask: Why \textit{these} particular political mechanisms?
Those in power could have behaved so as to encourage latent
intolerance. And there were and are in England other individuals
clamoring for political power, some of them fanatical on the problem
of Communism and security, and some who press their argument
from a privileged position within the British elite.\textsuperscript{61} One must
analyze the political structures that guide and discipline the behavior
of their members and into which the more fanatical individuals
cannot insinuate themselves.\textsuperscript{62} One must also examine the prevailing beliefs and values, the inner directives, that guide the conduct of the political elite—but on these unfortunately, systematic survey data were not available.

If, as I have conjectured, there is widespread intolerance in the British public, what insulates the elites and political structures from popular pressures? What frees them to follow their own inner directives? In contrast with the American public, the English public may well accord more privacy and more deference to the elite.\textsuperscript{63} Here is the focus for a most useful inquiry into the values of the English public. At the popular level, it may be in the area of deference, not tolerance, that we will find one key to the puzzle of the climate of political tolerance that emerged in England in the fifties.

\textsuperscript{1}See, for example, various works cited below. One finds no equivalent to this extensive literature for the British security programs. While this may represent the bent of English scholarship or the complacency of English scholars, it also suggests that there was very little provocative enough to call for the attention of analysts. Two of the very few treatments of the British program are, interestingly enough, by American scholars. See E. Bontecou, "The English Policy as to Communists and Fascists in the Civil Service," \textit{Columbia Law Review}, 51, 1951, pp. 564–86; H. H. Wilson, and H. Glickman, \textit{The Problem of Internal Security in Great Britain}, 1948–1953, Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science, 1954.


\textsuperscript{7}In the Stouffer study, respondents who had reported that people did not feel as free to express opinions as formerly were asked which kinds of people felt less free. The leadership sample included individuals in local government and on the school and library boards, thus giving them an obvious vantage point for making observations of these sectors of personnel. The major differences in the responses to this sub-question for the leadership as against the general population was in the tendency of leadership to mention people in public life, educators, and intellectuals. (\textit{Op. cit.}, p. 79.) An illustration of the climate of fear among civil servants during that period was reported by Chief Justice Warren: "A few days ago I read in the newspaper that a group of state employees . . . charged with responsibility for determining what announcements could be posted on the employees' bulletin board refused to permit the Bill of Rights to be posted on the ground that it was a controversial document. It was reported that the altercation became
intense, and that only after the Governor, in writing, vouched for its non-controversial character was the Bill of Rights permitted to occupy a place along with routine items of interest to state employees. And this happened in the United States of America on the 15th day of December, 1954, the 163rd anniversary of our Bill of Rights, declared by proclamation of President Eisenhower to be Bill of Rights Day." Quoted in John Lord O’Brien, National Security and Individual Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 68.

It is obviously very difficult to find a simple and appropriate index of the strength of the Communist Party and the dangers it presented for the internal security of England or the United States, and to obtain the statistical evidence to compute the index. Some sense of the comparative situation is afforded by various facts. Within the United States, estimates of membership at various times have not run higher than 100,000, and a reasonable estimate for the period in question, the early fifties, would place it at under 50,000. The vote, which might provide a better index of popular support, at least in the pre-war years when the Communist Party was on the ballot, generally ran under 50,000 and in the peak year was about 103,000, a fractional value of one per cent of the total vote. In the postwar years, the total third-party vote ran less than .1%, not counting the 1948 vote for Henry Wallace. In the postwar period in England, the Communist Party vote was also a fractional value of one per cent of the total vote cast, but was higher in magnitude than the corresponding American vote. The voting statistics for the United States are taken from conventional sources. For England, see Whittaker’s Almanac, 1962 (London: Whittaker’s, 1962), p. 316.

V. Aubert, B. Fisher, S. Rokkan, “A Comparative Study of Teachers’ Attitudes to International Problems and Policies: Preliminary Review of Relationships in Interview Data from Seven Western European Countries,” Journal of Social Issues, 10, No. 4, 1954, pp. 25–39. Comparable national surveys in England, the United States, and other countries yield estimates of perception of external threat from such indicators as expectation of war, belief that Russia is gaining over the United States, belief that the U.N. can maintain peace, or the belief that Russia is trying for world domination. Such beliefs fluctuate over time; in some instances the Americans are more prone to perceive external threat, but at other times the total English population has been more threat-oriented, and their upper classes have been much more threat-oriented than their American counterparts. See Where Stands Freedom: A Report on the Findings of an International Survey of Public Opinion (New York: Time Magazine, April, 1948); for a summary of other results, see Otto Klineberg, Tensions Affecting International Understanding (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1950), Bull. 62, pp. 131–32, 174–75.


R. H. Pear, an English political scientist, makes the point eloquently in a discussion of security problems when he remarks that it is “brutally obvious in England that government employees have no rights to their governmental employment.” See “People, Government and Security,” Northwestern University Law Review, 51, 1956, p. 107.

For one of many illustrations of the lack of engagement of a value, see the Cornell studies, which establish that students who endorse democratic values do not apply them consistently to a series of concrete instances where they might logically be regarded as applicable. R. K. Goldsen, M. Rosen-

13 Barth, *op. cit.*


15 For many elaborations of this theory, see the original essays in this volume. The statement of the theory above does not do full justice to all the subsidiary propositions in the theory, but seems a not unreasonable statement of the heart of the argument.

16 Such comparisons involve many technical complexities, but the evidence is substantial and the conclusions in general agreement. See, for example, D. V. Glass, ed., *Social Mobility in Britain* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 260–266; S. M. Lipset and H. Zetterberg, “A Theory of Social Mobility,” *Trans. Third World Cong. Sociol.*, 1956, III, pp. 155–77; B. Barber, *Social Stratification* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1957), 469–77; S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 17–28. Admittedly, these theories demand more subtle types of measurement. For the upward mobile, the conservatism, conformity, and intolerance might be construed as a kind of anticipatory socialization, and so would call for some evidence on subjective class affiliation. But even here the English data show that forty per cent of manual workers identify themselves as middle class, and over half of these vote conservative. Mark Abrams, “Social Class and British Politics,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25, 1961, pp. 342–50. For comparative data for an earlier postwar period, in which the size of the subjectively defined middle class is fairly close for the two countries and the amount of false consciousness not markedly different, see W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), pp. 13–17. Ironically, these findings indicate a smaller “subjective” middle class in England and the United States than was found in eight other countries surveyed in the same inquiry. Other relevant data are based on a comparative study of former Communist Party members in the two countries. Downward social mobility, when subjectively appraised as deprivational, has figured in theories on the psychodynamics of Communist affiliations as well as in theories of intolerance. Comparing his small samples of former Communists on a variety of subtle indicators of status deprivation, Almond shows that his English subjects have deteriorated more from the status of their parents than his American subjects, exhibit somewhat less career dissatisfaction than the Americans, and exactly equal “personal damage” due to events and misfortunes. See G. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 194–98.


18 How up-to-date, perhaps even American, the English prosecutor of 1793 sounds in his address to the jury. “... he used constantly to be reading seditious publications in the back shop;—it was there, in that cathedral of sedition, he sat like a spider, weaving his filthy web to ensnare the unwary. ... Even the poor organist could not pass the house of this demon of mischief but he must be stopped and desired to play ça ira—a tune which is made use of in that unhappy country, France, as a signal for blood and carnage.” A. E. Sutherland, “British Trials for Disloyal Association During the French Revolution,” *Cornell Law Quarterly*, 34, 1948–49, pp. 313–14.
Trends al.


Aubert, et al., p. 33.


Analyses of the American climate of intolerance in terms of susceptibility to compliance with social pressures also attract attention from two important features of the recent period. Most American adults did not have to comply in their attitudes—they weren't nonconformists to begin with—and the sustained pressures on the few who were nonconformists to start with were so severe that strength of character would have been little help. One may argue that in the formation of their original attitudes, a conformity process had already worked on the majority, but it seems valuable to distinguish such developmental phases of early socialization from later conformity processes, in which a change in opinion or action is coerced.

Ideally, comparative-trend surveys in both countries could be conducted, thus demonstrating changes in national climates of opinion as the respective contexts changed, and the differential response of national groups to situational factors. Earlier comparative national surveys provide one base-line point. In February, 1948, prior to the announcement of the British security program, surveys were conducted by Elmo Roper in nine European countries and the United States. One question asked was whether people did not have "today to a satisfactory degree" five specific freedoms. The British sample, in contrast to the Americans, very frequently mentioned the lack of the right to work at a job of one's choice or to private ownership of business, suggesting that the responses were discriminating. However, on the two freedoms relevant to our discussion—"the right to say or write what one believes without fear of punishment" and "protection from unreasonable interference by police"—the aggregate results are almost identical in the two countries, with only a small minority asserting that such freedoms were infringed. Comparisons between the American and the British educated strata, containing those individuals who would be more likely to be sensitive to and knowledgeable about such problems, reveal almost identical distributions, with only a small minority questioning the existence of such freedoms. Where Stands Freedom, op. cit.


The earlier trend data are reported in Hyman and Sheatsley, op. cit. The 1954 trend point was reported in Stouffer, op. cit., p. 56. The 1956–57 data are as yet unpublished.

I have in mind not only President Kennedy's California speech of November, 1961, but also other episodes such as the recent rebuke accorded a reporter who questioned the loyalty of two State Department employees. A chain of events was thus set in motion in which the broadcast networks made an official inquiry to determine whether a lawsuit would follow if the
story were carried, and the Under-Secretary of State left the parties in suspense. N.B.C. deleted the item from its transcription of the President's news conference, and the reporter declined to make any further public comment. The New York Times, Jan. 25, 1962, p. 12.

29 Some evidence is provided by a comparison of Gallup Poll findings on public opinion toward the John Birch Society with findings the Poll obtained on public approval of McCarthy in the early fifties.

30 This is a rather interesting example of a self-fulfilling prophecy among research workers. You can't find out that you do have a problem you think you don't have, if you don't study it. More generally, as I have suggested elsewhere, we will never be able to work toward a "theory of public opinion" until we have data showing how a new opinion emerges from an earlier state in which there were no opinions of that particular type held. Survey research here again shows how it has identified what is problematic for study almost exclusively with what is an issue, a hot problem, and this has been to its disadvantage.

31 C. Bay, I. Gullvag, H. Ofstad, and H. Tonnessen, Nationalism (Oslo, Institute of Social Research, 1953), III, pages not numbered. While this was a period of military build-up, following Norway's joining NATO and the Korean War, and a period in which legislation for "preparedness" was being debated, it should also be noted that there was much criticism of such legislation, and a good deal of it was abandoned. Also, the effective climate of opinion allowed for much dissent and the expression of nonconformist opinion.

32 See the releases of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion.

33 See various releases of the Australian Institute of Public Opinion.

34 These summary figures are taken from the Report of the Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (New York: Dodd Mead, 1956), passim.


37 Of greater concern as a possible source of bias in my findings was the extent of investigation known or believed to be practiced but whose detailed nature remained unknown to my informants. This latter type of investigation, because of its "semi-secret" character, could have profound psychological effects and would be the perfect device to create an atmosphere of anxiety. While anxiety stemming from such a psychological source is readily reported and is relevant to the study, its basis in objective reality cannot be determined because the facts are not known.


40 Campaign for the Limitation of Secret Police Powers, A Year with the Secret Police.
42 Discussions in print and conversations with informants often mention the very same case, that of Mr. J. H. A. Lang, the Assistant Solicitor of Imperial Chemical Industries, who was forced to resign as a result of threats to refuse the company government contracts, the official reason being that his wife had once been a Communist. By contrast, the same research procedure applied in the United States would no doubt have turned up a much more varied list of cases. Perhaps this reflects the notoriety of the Lang case, but it also suggests that informants and critics have a much more limited population of cases to draw upon for evidence of miscarriages of the British security program.
43 It is exceedingly difficult to determine the full extent of discrimination on political grounds exercised by local authorities in the appointment, continuation, or promotion of teachers. Officials of the National Union of Teachers, whose membership includes about seventy-five per cent of all teachers, report that the number of such grievances brought to their attention are very few, and probably reflect the true number of occurrences. Only one such case is cited in the reports of the National Council for Civil Liberties in the period studied. See Annual Report, 1956–57, p. 6. The publication “A Year with the Secret Police,” issued by the Campaign for the Limitation of Secret Police Powers, alludes to cases in the teaching profession, but cites no instances in detail.
44 See the cases cited by the Campaign for the Limitation of Secret Police Powers.
45 For a brief account of the complex legal and political aspects of the case, see Lord Chorley, “Dr. Cort and the Association of University Teachers,” University Review, 27, 1954, pp. 3–7.
46 See, for example, National Council for Civil Liberties, Annual Reports for 1957–58, 1958–59. See also this organization’s Submission to the Royal Commission on Police, November, 1960.
48 The Association of University Teachers in its review of the case claimed that no evidence of political discrimination was demonstrable. University Review, 23, 1950, No. 1, p. 5.
49 Consider a recent item in the British press in which the chairman of the Ruskin College Communist Club at Oxford remarks of future club plans, “We expect to draw considerable support. We’ve been making tentative inquiries with the University Authorities and anticipate no opposition from them.” In the same article, it is reported that the Oxford University Communist Club will resume its activities, lapsed since 1956, having found a new senior faculty sponsor in the person of a Roman Catholic, not himself a Communist, who was Professor of Religion. The Manchester Guardian, June 10, 1961.
50 Quoted in Bontecou, op. cit., pp. 256–57.
51 These data were made available to me by Gabriel Almond from his Comparative Survey of Citizenship, and are gratefully acknowledged.
52 A series of definitive volumes on the general elections of the last decade
are available, and reading of these bears out the general conclusion above. There are occasional instances where the issue of domestic Communists arose, but the nature of the assertions, ironically enough, would serve usually not to smear the opposition at all, but perhaps to lose whatever advantage was implicit in the issue. See H. G. Nicholas, *The British General Election of 1950* (London: Macmillan, 1951); D. E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1951* (London: Macmillan, 1952); D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London: Macmillan, 1960). An episode reported in a study of the Greenwich constituency during the 1950 General Election will illustrate the restraints. The Conservative candidate and his agent drafted a leaflet exploiting the fact that the Labour candidate, a Mr. Reeves, had made certain speeches in the Commons that were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The leaflet carried the slogan “Reeves and Crypto-Communism.” The Conservative Party chairman had been against the publication and, following its appearance, he closed the committee room, removed the posters from the windows, and did not reopen until “some very strong words had passed between candidate and chairman.” See, M. Benney, A. P. Gray, and R. H. Pear, *How People Vote* (London: Routledge, 1956), pp. 95–96.


54 A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 52. Louis Harris gives more weight to the issue of domestic Communism in the 1952 election, but he also indicates that it was far from salient, in that it was not volunteered by more than eleven per cent as a major national issue. See L. Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?* (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 32. Cf. also the findings cited earlier from Gallup Polls on the far from universal appeal of Senator McCarthy.


56 Mark Abrams, a distinguished English survey-research expert and political analyst, conducted a special survey in 1960 “to establish those attitudes and social values which have led the electorate to turn away steadily from the Labour Party over the past ten years.” In the course of this survey, a list of sixteen political goals was presented to the sample, and they were asked to choose the four that were most important in a good political party. Obviously, the sixteen were designed to cover the spectrum of political values that might possibly be important to Englishmen and that might have been inadequately supported by the Labour Party’s past actions. As Abrams remarks, “The sixteen formed a reasonably comprehensive coverage of current political values.” The issue of domestic Communism was not included, suggesting that it is of no special significance to the British working-class universe. But here again it is unfortunate, from our theoretical point of view, that no empirical evidence was obtained. See Abrams, *op. cit.*


58 *Security Procedures in the Public Service* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, April, 1962), CMD No. 1681. It is very difficult to summarize the findings of this rather lengthy report of about forty pages. The American
newspaper accounts stressed those aspects of the report that refer to the
dangers from Communists in the Civil Service and among the officials in
the Civil Service trade unions. Yet the recommendations did not suggest the
extension of security procedures to all government departments, "many of
which by the nature of their work have little or no need for special security
measures" and the committee urged that "security arrangements . . . will be
the more effective the more limited is the field to be protected."

59 See, for example, accounts by the American Civil Liberties Union of the
activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee. There is even the
suggestion that findings of security investigations by federal administrative
agencies have on occasion been communicated to potential private employers.
See Bontecou, op. cit., pp. 64–66.

60 It might be suggested that the English people hold strongly the value of
privacy, and thus accept and do not invade the domain of secret investiga-
tions of security. For an interesting discussion of the concepts publicity and
secrecy, and the third concept, privacy, as they affect the problems of cli-
mates of opinion, see Edward Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1956).

61 For a case study of one such attack by a member of the elite, see the
account of Lord Vansittart's 1950 speech in the House of Lords against
Communism in the B.B.C. (Wilson and Glickman, op. cit., *passim.*) In part,
the behavior of the legitimate political elite and of fringe leaders is re-
strained to some extent by the severe English libel laws. Thus, for example,
Atlee brought a libel suit against the National Workers Party in 1936, which
was settled in his favor. Similarly, Lord Camrose brought suit against
Mosley's British Union of Fascists in 1937 and received heavy damages. See
David Riesman, "Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment

62 I have in mind not only the formal analysis of political structures but the
obvious consequences of the fact that one of the major parties is the
Labour Party.

63 I am indebted to Gabriel Almond for various suggestions about features
of English political culture that could be relevant to the problem. His forth-
coming comparative study, based on surveys of the publics of England and
four other nations, will contribute much-needed evidence.
13

The Sources of the
"Radical Right"—1955

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

In the last five years we have seen the emergence of an important American political phenomenon, the radical right. This group is characterized as radical because it desires to make far-reaching changes in American institutions, and because it seeks to eliminate from American political life those persons and institutions which threaten either its values, or its economic interests. Needless to say, this movement is opposed to the social and economic reforms of the last twenty years, and to the internationalist foreign policy pursued by the successive Administrations in that period.

The activities of the radical right would be of less interest if it sought its ends through the traditional democratic procedures of pressure-group tactics, lobbying, and the ballot box. But, while most individuals and organizations which we shall consider as part of the radical right do use these means, many use undemocratic methods as well. The singular fact is that radical right agitation has facilitated the growth of practices which threaten to undermine the social fabric of democratic politics. The threats to democratic procedure which are, in part, an outgrowth of radical right agitation involve attempts to destroy the right of assembly, the right of petition, the freedom of association, the freedom to travel, and the freedom to teach or conduct scholarly research without conforming to political tests. This movement, therefore, must be seriously considered by all those who would preserve democratic constitutional procedures in this country.

In evaluating the activities of the radical right, this chapter is divided into three sections: Part 1 deals with continuing sources of
The Radical Right

extremist politics in America as they have their sources in American history; Part 2 analyzes the social groups which are more prone than others to support the radical right today; and Part 3 deals with the specific character of McCarthyism as the principal expression of radical right ideology on the current scene.

I

Status and Class Politics

Any analysis of the role of political extremism in the United States must recognize two fundamental political forces operating under the varying historical conditions of American society. These forces may be distinguished by the terms status politics and class politics. Class politics refers to political division based on the discord between the traditional left and the right, i.e., between those who favor redistribution of income, and those favoring the preservation of the status quo. Status politics, as used here, refers to political movements whose appeal is to the not uncommon resentments of individuals or groups who desire to maintain or improve their social status.  

In the United States, political movements or parties which stress the need for economic reform have usually gained strength during times of unemployment and depression. On the other hand, status politics becomes ascendant in periods of prosperity, especially when full employment is accompanied by inflation, and when many individuals are able to improve their economic position. The groups which are receptive to status-oriented appeals are not only those which have risen in the economic structure and who may be frustrated in their desire to be accepted socially by those who already hold status, but also those groups already possessing status who feel that the rapid social change threatens their own claims to high social position, or enables previously lower status groups to claim equal status with their own.

The political consequences of status frustrations are very different from those resulting from economic deprivation, for while in economic conflict the goals are clear—a redistribution of income—in status conflict there are no clear-cut solutions. Where there are status anxieties, there is little or nothing which a government can do. It is not surprising, therefore, that the political movements which have successfully appealed to status resentments have been irrational in character, and have sought scapegoats which conveniently serve to
symbolize the status threat. Historically, the most common scapegoats in the United States have been the minority ethnic or religious groups. Such groups have repeatedly been the victims of political aggression in periods of prosperity, for it is precisely in these times that status anxieties are most pressing. 4

American political history from this perspective emerges in a fairly consistent pattern. Before the Civil War, there was considerable anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant activity. Such agitation often took the form of organized political parties, the most important of which was the Know-Nothing or American Party. And it was during a prosperous decade that these parties and movements were at their height. The Know-Nothings who polled one fourth of the total popular vote for President in 1856 reached their greatest power in a period of widespread prosperity and inflation and practically vanished in the depression year 1857. 5 The American Protective Association (A.P.A.), which emerged in the late 1880s, was the next major organized anti-Catholic movement and it too arose in a period of renewed prosperity. A contemporary analyst of this movement has pointed to the status concerns which motivated many of the members of the A.P.A.

Latter day Know-Nothingism (A.P.A.ism) in the west, was perhaps due as well to envy of the growing social and industrial strength of Catholic Americans.

In the second generation American Catholics began to attain higher industrial positions and better occupations. All through the west, they were taking their place in the professional and business world. They were among the doctors and the lawyers, the editors and the teachers of the community. Sometimes they were the leading merchants as well as the leading politicians of their locality. 6

Interestingly enough, the publisher of many anti-Catholic A.P.A. works was also the publisher of the Social Register, which was first copyrighted in 1887, the year in which the A.P.A. was organized, 7 a fact which suggests a possible link between this mass organization and the desire of high-status, old family Americans to resist the upward mobility of the second generation Catholics. A large number of individuals listed in the Social Register were among the important financial supporters of the A.P.A., as well as of other anti-immigration organizations.
The Progressive movement, which flourished from 1900 to 1912, is yet another protest movement which attracted the interest and participation of large numbers of Americans during a period of high prosperity. This movement, while differing considerably from the others, since it was concerned with liberal social reforms, may, nevertheless, be a reflection of status politics. Richard Hofstadter has suggested that it was based in large measure on the reaction of the Protestant middle class against threats to its values and status. The Progressive movement had two scapegoats—the “plutocrat” millionaires, and the immigrants. The rise of the “robber barons,” the great millionaires and plutocrats of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, served to challenge the status of many old, upper-middle-class American families which had previously considered themselves the most important group in society; these new millionaires were able to outdo them in philanthropy and in setting new styles of life. The Progressive movement, like previous expressions of status politics, was also opposed to immigration. It viewed the immigrant and the urban city machines based on immigrant support as a basic threat to American middle-class Protestant values.

And finally the Ku Klux Klan, which vigorously attacked the rights of minority groups, also emerged in prosperous times, the 1920s. It is important to note, however, that while the Klan was against Jews, Catholics and Negroes, it also represented the antagonism of the small town and provincial city Protestant lower-middle class and working class against the “cosmopolitanism” of the upper classes. The upper-class, largely metropolitan-centered, Protestant churches were a frequent target of Klan attack. The English minister of a high Protestant church, divorced women who were accused of “playing around,” physicians who had allegedly engaged in sexual irregularities with patients, were among those subjected to Klan violence.

At its height, the Klan had the support of millions of individuals, and dominated political life in Indiana, Maine, Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas, Oregon, Arkansas, Ohio, and California. It would be rash to give any simplified interpretation of the factors underlying such an important social movement. If, however, one asks what had occurred on the American scene to encourage such a mass expression of provincial resentment, one important factor is the growing predominance of the large metropolitan centers, which were centers of Catholics, Jews, and high-status Protestants. In the changing world
of post-World War I America, the fundamentalist provincial was faced with the fact that he and his communities had lost much of their independence and status. The war boom, and later, the prosperity of the twenties, made it possible for many individuals to rise economically, including members of previously lower-class minority groups such as the Jews and Catholics. The Catholics were also beginning to get national political power. These changes were paralleled by a seeming decline in basic morality, and a growth in religious cynicism. The Klan, with its attack on metropolitan "cosmopolitanism" and the more traditional minority ethnic scapegoats, seems to have provided an outlet to the frustrated residents of provincial America, who felt their values, power, and status slipping away.

The hypothesis that the Klan represented the reaction of a large section of provincial America to the frustrations of boom-time social change may, of course, be questioned in view of the fact that it declined considerably as an organization after 1926, before prosperity ended. This decline, however, seems in large measure to be related to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Klan leaders were publicly exposed as obvious charlatans, who were using the organization to feather their own nest, and to the social pressure directed against the Klan by the upper class and every section of the press. The loss of respectability led to a rapid withdrawal from the organization by its middle-class adherents, and the jailing for fraud of some of its leaders soon disillusioned the large section of working-class supporters.

The 1928 Presidential election campaign, however, witnessed a new outburst of bigotry directed against the Catholic Democratic candidate, Al Smith (which showed that the sentiments which gave rise to the Klan had not vanished). In this election, the Democratic Party increased its vote in the large metropolitan centers, while reaching its lowest point in decades in the smaller communities.

These four movements, Know-Nothings, A.P.A., Progressives, and Ku Klux Klan, all illustrate the way in which American society has thrown up major protest movements in periods of prosperity, thus confounding the general assumption that protest politics are primarily products of depressions. The prosperity movements differ from those groups who are products of economic crises in that they find "scapegoats" who threaten their value system, while other protest groups have direct economic targets. The Progressives, a group one
does not normally see this way, were concerned with the manner in which the *nouveaux riches* and the immigrants were corrupting American institutions, while the Klan, a status-resentment group par-excellence, attacked the "cosmopolitanism" of Catholics, Jews, and the metropolitan elite, which undermined the middle-class Protestant virtues. Perhaps the most significant single fact concerning the strength of the Klan and the role of organized bigotry in America is that every effort to build a mass social movement based on bigotry during the great depression of the 1930s had little success. It is the common concern with the protection of "traditional" American values that characterizes "status politics" as contrasted with the regard for jobs, cheap credit, or high farm prices, which have been the main emphases of depression-born "class politics."

If we assume that this is a pattern in American politics, it is not surprising that the continuing prosperity of the late nineteen forties and early fifties should also have developed a political movement resembling the four discussed above. McCarthyism, like its predecessors, is characterized by an attack on a convenient scapegoat, which is defined as a threat to American institutions, and also involves an attempt to link "cosmopolitan" changes in the society to a foreign plot.11

*The State of Tolerance in America*

A second important factor to consider in evaluating present trends in American politics is the traditional attitude toward tolerance in American society. The historical evidence, some of which has been cited above, indicates that, as compared to the citizens of a number of other countries, especially Great Britain and Scandinavia, Americans are not a tolerant people. In addition to discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, each war and most prewar situations have been characterized by the denial of civil liberties to minorities, often even of minorities which were not opposed to the war. Abolitionists, for example, faced great difficulties in many areas, North as well as South, before the Civil War. Many were fired from schools and universities. During World War I, German-Americans and Socialists often experienced personal physical attacks, as well as economic discrimination. In the last war, the entire Japanese-American population on the West Coast was denied the most elementary form of personal freedom.12

Political intolerance has not been monopolized by political extrem-
ists or wartime vigilantes. The Populists, for example, discharged many university professors in state universities in states where they came into power in the 1890s. Their Republican opponents were not loath to dismiss teachers who believed in Populist economics. Public opinion polls, ever since they first began measuring mass attitudes in the early thirties, have repeatedly shown that sizable numbers, often a majority, of Americans oppose the rights of unpopular political minorities. In both 1938 and 1942, a majority of the American public opposed the right of "radicals" to hold meetings.

The state of current attitudes toward civil liberties has been reported on in detail in a study by Samuel Stouffer, based on interviews with a random sample of Americans in the spring of 1954. Large sections of the American population opposed the rights of atheists, Socialists, and Communists to free speech and free publication. One important factor affecting this lack of tolerance in American life is the basic strain of Protestant puritanical morality which has always existed in this country. Americans believe that there is a fundamental difference between right and wrong, that right must be supported, and that wrong must be suppressed, that error and evil have no rights against the truth. This propensity to see life in terms of all black and all white is most evident, perhaps most disastrous, in the area of foreign policy, where allies and enemies cannot be gray, but must be black or white.

The differences in fundamental economic philosophy and way of life between the Democrats and Republicans in this country are far less than those which exist between Conservatives and Socialist in Great Britain. Yet political rhetoric in this country is comparable in Europe only for those campaigns between totalitarians and their opponents. While McCarthy has indeed sunk American political rhetoric to new depths, one should not forget that his type of invective has been used quite frequently in American politics. For example, Roosevelt called some of his isolationist opponents, "Copperheads," a term equivalent to traitor. If various impressionistic accounts are to be believed, many Republicans, especially Republican businessmen, have a far deeper sense of hatred against Roosevelt and the New Deal, than their British or Scandinavian counterparts have against their socialist opponents.

Although Puritanism is probably one of the main sources of American intolerance, there are certainly many other elements which have contributed to its continuance in American life. The lack of
an aristocratic tradition in American politics helped to prevent the emergence of a moderate rhetoric in political life. Almost from the start of democratic politics in America with the early adoption of universal male suffrage, the political machines were led by professional politicians, many of whom were of lower-middle-class or even poorer origins, who had to appeal to a relatively uneducated electorate. This led to the development of a campaign style in which any tactic that would win votes was viewed as legitimate. Thus, Jefferson was charged with "treason," and with being a French agent before 1800, while Republicans waved the "bloody shirt" against the Democrats for decades following the Civil War. In order to involve the masses in politics, politicians have sought to make every election appear as if it involved life or death for the country or for their party.

Another factor which has operated to diminish tolerance in this country has been mass immigration. The prevalence of different cultural and religious ways of life has always constituted a threat to American stability and cultural unity. In order to build a nation, it was perhaps necessary that men should be intolerant of the practices of newcomers, and should force them to assimilate. All through world history, the intermingling of people from different cultural backgrounds has resulted in strife. Such conflict is obviously not conducive to the emergence of a tradition of civic discipline, in which everyone has the right to live out his life as he sees fit, and in which minorities are protected.

The minority immigrant groups themselves have contributed to the support for conformity. One of the principal reactions of members of such groups to discrimination—to being defined as socially inferior by the majority culture—is to attempt to assimilate completely American values, to reject their past, and to overidentify with Americanism. They tend to interpret indiscrimination against their ethnic group as a consequence of the fact that they are foreign and they behave differently, that in short they are insufficiently American. Many of those who adopt the assimilationist solution attempt to enforce conformity within their own group, and are intolerant of those who would perpetuate foreign ways and thus earn the enmity of those of Anglo-Saxon origin.19

At least one other element may be suggested as having operated against the development of tolerance: those situations which have encouraged or required men to take the law into their own hands in order to enforce the moral values of the dominant groups in society.
Such events occurred in the South after the Civil War, and in the West continuously with the expansion of the frontier. In the South, as Myrdal has pointed out, the conservative groups have resisted legal procedures in order to maintain white supremacy. On the western frontier, many men considered it necessary to engage in vigilante activities to eliminate lawlessness. Both of these traditions, especially the continuing Southern one, have helped to destroy civic discipline.

Americanism as an Ideology: Un-Americanism

A third element in American life related to present political events is the extent to which the concept of Americanism has become a compulsive ideology rather than simply a nationalist term. Americanism is a creed in a way that "Britishism" is not.

The notion of Americanism as a creed to which men are converted rather than born stems from two factors: first, our revolutionary tradition which has led us to continually reiterate the superiority of the American creed of equalitarianism, of democracy, against the old reactionary, monarchical and more rigidly status-bound systems of European society; and second, the immigrant character of American society, the fact that people may become Americans—that they are not simply born to the status.

But if foreigners may become Americans, Americans may become "un-American." This concept of "un-American activities," as far as I know, does not have its counterpart in other countries. American patriotism is allegiance to values, to a creed, not solely to a nation. An American political leader could not say, as Winston Churchill did in 1940, that the English Communist Party was composed of Englishmen, and he did not fear an Englishman.\(^{20}\)

Unless one recognizes that Americanism is a political creed, much like Socialism, Communism or Fascism, much of what is currently happening in this country must remain unintelligible.\(^{21}\) Our national rituals are largely identified with reiterating the accepted values of a political value system, not solely or even primarily of national patriotism. For example, Washington's Birthday, Lincoln's Birthday, and the Fourth of July are ideological celebrations comparable to May Day or Lenin's Birthday in the Communist world. Only Memorial Day and Veteran's Day may be placed in the category of purely patriotic, as distinct from ideological, celebrations. Consequently, more than any other democratic country, the United States makes
ideological conformity one of the conditions for good citizenship. And it is this emphasis on ideological conformity to presumably common political values that legitimatizes the hunt for "un-Americans" in our midst.

**The Multiple Elites**

While factors persistent in the culture have exerted great pressure towards conformity to the creed of Americanism, yet the rapid growth, and size, of the United States has prevented American society from developing an integrated cultural or power structure similar to those in smaller and older tradition-oriented European nations. One cannot, for example, speak of an American elite, be it economic, political or cultural. The elites that exist are fractioned regionally, ethnically, and culturally, so that friction and competition constantly arise among these segmented groups: West against East, North against South, new rich versus old rich, Anglo-Saxons against minority ethnics, the graduates of Ivy League schools against others, etc.

This segmentation has facilitated the emergence of new social movements, religions, and cultural fads. But it also has prevented any one of them from engulfing the country. Each new movement is opposed by some segment of a rival elite, as well as that part of the general population which follows it. Thus Populism, the Ku Klux Klan, the abortive labor and socialist parties, the Progressive movement, and the Know-Nothings, have all had important successes within specific regions, communities, or ethnic groups; but each died away without coming to national power. In the United States, seemingly, with the exception of prohibition, it has been impossible to build a durable national movement on a single issue, or on an appeal to a single interest group.

While the heterogeneity and sheer size of the United States apparently bar any extremist ideological group from coming to national power, it also promotes the emergence of such groups on a more parochial base since any can almost always find enough supporters, leaders, and financial backers to make an impression on the body politic. Any appeal, be it anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, Huey Long's "Share the Wealth movement," Townsend's Old Age pension crusade, monetary reform, Technocracy, or others such as those mentioned earlier, will have some appeal. It is almost an axiom of American politics that any movement can find some millionaire backing, and it does not take many millionaires to set up an impressive look-
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ing propaganda apparatus. Each of the various radical groups, the Socialist Labor Party, the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party, has had its millionaires. In recent decades, the Communists were more successful than others on the left in this regard.

The fact that it is relatively easy to build a new political or economic reform movement in America has often been overlooked by many observers because of the failure of every effort to construct a third major political party—a difference, obviously, between the ease of a movement and the difficulty of a party. The failure of third-party efforts has been a consequence, however, of the American electoral system with its requirement that only one party can control the executive branch of the government at one time. Actually, the two major American parties are coalitions, and the underlying base of American politics is much closer to the French multi-party system than it is to the British two-party political structure. American parties are coalitions of distinct and often conflicting factions, and no one interest group is able to dominate the government. As in France, however, it is relatively simple for a new ideological or interest group to gain representation, but it is almost impossible for it to secure majority control of the government. 22 For example, in the 1920s many Klan-backed individuals were elected to Congress, state legislatures, and some governor's office. At about the same time, the quasi-socialist Non-Partisan League won control of the Republican Party and the state government in North Dakota, and had considerable influence in a number of other midwest states, while an offshoot of it captured the Democratic Party and the governor's chair in Oklahoma. In the 1930s the Democratic Party of California, Oregon and Washington, was captured temporarily by Socialist factions—i.e., Upton Sinclair's EPIC movement in California, and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in the other two coast states. At the same time, three Northern midwestern states were actually governed by left-wing offshoots of the Republican Party—the Non-Partisan League in North Dakota, the Progressive Party in Wisconsin, and the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota. Townsend, Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Communists were also able to send some men to Congress through the mechanism of winning primary contests in one of the major parties. Today, as in the past, various ideological or interest factions strive to increase their representation in government through rather than against the traditional parties.
The fact that the leaders of American political parties have much less influence over the men whom they elect than do the heads of parties in the British Commonwealth also facilitates the emergence of dissident political tendencies. A Labor or Tory member of the British parliament could never engage in a one-man crusade with a power comparable to control of a Senate committee such as Senators Langer, La Follette, and McCarthy have done at different times.

The tendency of American society to throw up new movements or organizations is, of course, not limited to the political field. Tocqueville, more than a century ago, called attention to the American propensity, as compared with the greater lassitude of Europeans, to form organizations for various purposes. The reason for this distinctive pattern lay in the fact that America did not have a distinct aristocratic elite which could fulfill the functions of organization and leadership performed by the elite in Europe. And, Tocqueville argued, the very multitude of existing voluntary associations facilitated the emergence of new ones, since the older associations, because they train men in the skills of organization, provide a resource when some new need or new social objective is perceived. What little comparative data exist, suggest that this empirical generalization is still valid.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Americans who regard Communism as a great evil should form associations to combat it. These groups are but one more manifestation of American political and moral activity, much like the popular attempts to ban liquor, gambling, or immorality in comic strips. One may point to similar developments in the sphere of religion. Perhaps no other country, including Israel, has thrown up so many new religious sects. Spiritualism, the Mormon Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, Christian Science, and the Churches of God, are but some of the sects with over 100,000 church members which were born in the United States.

The various dissident social and religious movements have reflected the openness of the American social order. Conventional morality is not supported by a cohesive system of social control since there are, in effect, a variety of moralities. This generalization does not contradict the previous discussion of intolerance in American life, for intolerance to be effective on a national scale must represent the will of a majority or all-powerful group. Fortunately, with the exception of groups which are defined as agents of a foreign actual
or potential military enemy, it has been impossible for any group to convince the country to actively support restrictions against others who do not conform to the beliefs of one or another segment of American society. A Canadian sociologist, S. D. Clark, has commented on this aspect of American society. He suggests that the much tighter political and social control structure of Canada frustrates efforts at dissident movements before they can develop, while the United States permits them to emerge, but frustrates their dreams of power:

Critics outside the country [the United States] might well pause to consider not the intolerance which finds expression in McCarthyism but the tolerance which makes it possible for McCarthyism to develop. In Canada it would be hard to conceive of a state of political freedom great enough to permit the kind of attacks upon responsible political leaders of the government which have been carried out in the United States. More careful examination of the American community in general, and perhaps of the academic community in particular, would probably reveal that, in spite of the witch hunts in that country, the people of the United States enjoy in fact a much greater degree of freedom than do the people of Canada.25

The Shift to the Right

Four aspects of American society have been suggested as contributing to an understanding of extremist political developments in the United States: the role of the status-driven during periods of prosperity, their fear of other groups which threaten their status; the absence of a firm tradition of civic discipline or tolerance; the definition of Americanism in ideological terms; and the lack of an integrated cultural and political social control structure.

In order to understand the recent manifestations of political intolerance, however, it is necessary to discuss a fifth factor, the consequences of a liberal or conservative climate of opinion on the power of extremist groups. The period from 1930 to 1945 saw the predominance of liberal sentiment in American politics. This was largely the result of two factors, the depression and the threat of Fascism. The depression emphasized the need for socio-economic reforms and helped to undermine the legitimacy of conservative and business institutions. It was followed immediately by a war which was defined as a struggle against Fascism. Since Fascism was a right-
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1st movement, this fact tended to reinforce the political predominance of leftist liberal sentiments.

During this period the political dynamic in most democratic countries was in the hands of the left, and it used this strength to undermine the prestige of conservatism. In the United States, for example, several Congressional Committees conducted exposés of "undemocratic" activities of big business. In the thirties, the Nye Committee "exposed" the way in which Wall Street bankers had helped plunge the United States into World War I in order to maintain their investments, while the La Follette Committee revealed that large corporations employed labor spies and gangsters to prevent their employees from forming trade unions. The famous Truman Committee often exposed big business profiteering during World War II. All three committees helped to foster an anti-business and anti-conservative climate of opinion. It is quite true that the House Un-American Activities Committee operated at the same time as the liberal committees, but though it secured considerable publicity, it was relatively unimportant compared with the role of anti-subversive committees in the post-war years.

The period of liberal supremacy was also marked by a great growth in the influence of the Communist Party. In the United States, the Communists were concerned with penetrating and manipulating liberal and moderate left groups, rather than with building an electoral party. The Communists, by concealing their real objectives, by acting positively for liberal causes, by being the best organizers of the left, were able to penetrate deeply into various liberal organizations and into the labor movement. An index of their success may be seen in the fact that close to a dozen Congressmen, one state governor, many members of the staffs of liberal Congressmen and Congressional Committees, and a number of high-ranking civil servants, showed by their subsequent political behavior that they were close followers of the Communist Party.

The post-war period, on the other hand, has seen a resurgence of conservative and rightist forces. This has resulted from two factors, a prolonged period of prosperity and full employment, and second, the change in foreign policy. Where once we warred against Fascism, which is identified with the "right," we now war against Communism, which identifies with the "left." And while Fascism and Communism are much closer to each other in moral consequences and actual practice than either is to the democratic right or left, by the general
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populace, the one is considered right and the other left. And just as the Communists were able to secure considerable influence during the period of liberal ascendency, right-wing extremists have been able to make considerable headway during the conservative revival. Thus, the period from 1947-48 to 1954 presents a very different picture from the previous decade and a half. The conservatives and the extreme right are now on the offensive. The "free enterprise" system which provides full employment is once more legitimate. Liberal groups feel in a weak position politically, and now wage a defensive battle, seeking to preserve their conquests of the thirties, rather than to extend them.

It is striking to observe the similarities in the rhetoric of the liberals and conservatives when on the offensive. In the thirties, conservatives, isolationists, business leaders, Republican Senators and Congressmen were criticized by some liberals as being semi-Fascist, or with being outright Fascists. Similarly in the last half-decade, many conservatives have waged an attack on liberals, Democrats and opponents of a vigorous anti-Russian foreign policy for being pro-Communist, or "creeping Socialists." The sources of the violent attack on conservatism in the earlier period came in large measure from the Communists and their fellow-travelers, although it was voiced by many liberals who had no connection with the Communist Party and were unaware of the extent to which they had absorbed a Communist ideological position. More recently, the extreme right wing, the radical right of the American political spectrum, has been successful in setting the ideological tone of conservatism.

It is important to note the parallelism in the rhetoric employed by liberals when criticizing the State Department's policy toward the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39, and that used by many extreme rightists toward the policy of the same department a few years later in the Chinese Civil War. The liberal left magazines portrayed an American foreign office staffed by men who were sympathetic to extreme conservatism if not outright Fascism, and who tricked Roosevelt and Hull into pursuing policies which helped Franco. Various individuals, some of whom are still in the State Department, such as Robert Murphy, were labeled as pro-Franco. The recent right-wing accusations that our Chinese policies were a result of Communist influence in government sound like a rewritten version of the Fascist conspiracy of the thirties. The same allegations about
the social background of State Department members, that many of them come from Groton, Harvard, and the Brahmin upper class, were used by the Communists in the thirties to prove that the State Department was ultra-rightist in its sympathies, and are used today by McCarthy and other radical rightists to account for presumed sympathies with Communism. The State Department’s refusal to aid Loyalist Spain was presented as convincing proof of the presence of Fascist sympathizers within it. In the same way, the radical right now refuses to acknowledge that men may have made honest errors of judgment in their dealing with the Russians or the Chinese Communists.

So similar are the political approaches of the radical right and the Communists that one may fittingly describe the radical right doctrine as embodying a theory of “Social Communism” in the same sense as the Communists used the term “Social Fascism” in the early thirties. The Communists, before 1934, argued that all non-Communist parties including the Socialists were “Social Fascists,” that is, they objectively were paving the way for Fascism. The principal organ of the radical right today, The Freeman, contends that all welfare state and planning measures are “objectively” steps toward the development of a totalitarian Communist state. The New Deal, Americans for Democratic Action, the C.I.O. Political Action Committee, all are charged with “objective” totalitarianism. Both the Communists and writers for The Freeman have argued that the “social” variety of Fascism or Communism is more dangerous than the real thing, for the public is more easily deceived by a sugar-coated totalitarian program. The Communists in pre-Hitler Germany concentrated their fire not on the Nazis, but on the “Social Fascists,” the socialists and liberals, and The Freeman and other sections of the radical right let loose their worst venom on the American liberals.

An example of the violent character of this ideology may be seen in a 1950 Freeman article which contended that, “This new political machine, which . . . rules the old Democratic Party is an outgrowth of the C.I.O.’s Political Action Committee (PAC).” It further claimed that “every single element in the Browder [Communist Party] program was incorporated in the PAC program. It has been the policy of the Administration ever since.” The labor movement organized around Truman because of the Taft-Hartley Act. Why, asked this Freeman writer, did labor unite against this act, which though it “injured the Communists . . . certainly did not injure the
workers." . . . Because the Communists executed another strategic retreat. They let go of their prominent offices in the C.I.O. but they still had control of the press, and the policy-making and opinion-forming organs. Then they got their ideas into the opinion-forming agencies of the AFL, especially its League for Political Education.

"How could the AFL be captured by the Communist policy-makers? It had a great tradition, but in face of C.I.O. 'gains,' its leaders thought they had to 'do something.' And the Communists were ready and waiting to tell them what to do—policies nicely hidden behind the cloak of higher wages, more benefits, but still fitting perfectly the symbols laid down to guide policy-makers by Earl Browder in 1944."

The article went on to ask, "What proof have we that the Politburo in Moscow wanted the election of Wallace? Wallace certainly did not poll the total Communist vote. For eight years they had worked on getting control of a major party. Why give up the Truman party? . . .

"Practically every word of Truman's campaign came, again, from Browder's pattern of 1944, which is the policy of the PAC. Practically every word of his attack on the 80th Congress can be found earlier in the pages of the Daily Worker and the People's Daily World.

"What then was the role of Wallace and the third party? It was the old Communist dialectic. By setting up Wallace as the 'left,' the Communists could make Truman's platforms and speeches look like the 'center.'"²⁸

Here is a picture of the real world that should be placed side by side with that of the Communists. As they see a country controlled by a self-conscious plot of Wall Street magnates, of two "capitalist" parties competing just to fool the people, this radical rightist sees a nightmarish world in which the Communists also have two political parties in order to fool the people, in which Wallace's million votes only represented a presumably small part of total Communist strength.

In both periods, the thirties and the fifties, the extremists have been able to capitalize on sympathetic predispositions. These ideological predispositions have not reflected sympathy with extremism by the average liberal or conservative, but rather led men to view with sympathy any attack directed against their principal political opponents. The lack of any normative restrictions against violent
political rhetoric in American politics, to which attention was called earlier, facilitated the adoption by basically unideological politicians of terminology which in large part resembles that used by rival totalitarians in Europe. In effect, the extreme left and right have been able to influence the ideological setting of American politics since the early thirties. The radical right today, like the Communists before them, have been able to win influence far outweighing their numerical support in the general population, because they have seemingly been the most effective fighters against those policies and groups which are repugnant to all conservatives.

II

The Two Conservatives

The conservative elements in American society can be divided into two groups, the moderate conservatives and the radical right. These two may be differentiated by their attitude toward the New Deal era. The moderates are generally willing to accept the past within limits, that is, they do not want "to turn the clock back." They accept various Roosevelt reforms; they tolerate the labor movement; they tend to be internationalist in ideology and to accept the policies of Roosevelt in the last war. Moderate conservatives also believe in constitutional processes, civil liberties, and due process.

The radical right, on the other hand, refuses to accept the recent past, or is radical in the quixotic sense that it rejects the status quo. Most, though not all of the radical right are opposed to: (1) the welfare state; (2) the labor movement; (3) the income tax; (4) World War II—the radical right sees the war as an avoidable mistake, and prefers in retrospect a policy of Russia and Germany fighting it out alone.\textsuperscript{29}

In a larger sense, the radical right views our entire foreign policy from the recognition of Russia to Potsdam as appeasement, treason and treachery. It is opposed to membership in the United Nations, and to entangling foreign commitments. It is Asia-oriented, rather than Europe-oriented. It is suspicious of Great Britain as a Machiavellian power which has manipulated us into two wars, and now refuses to back us in our time of need.

Since the radical right believes that both our domestic and foreign policies over the last twenty years have represented tremendous setbacks for the country, it seeks an explanation of these calamitous
errors, and finds it in the penetration of the government and the agencies of opinion formation by the Communist movement. The radical right is far from having a unified ideology. Some groups are more concerned with our past and present foreign policy, others with domestic affairs. But the common denominator which unites the radical right is the identification of the policies which it opposes, either in the economic or foreign sphere, with the "softness" of Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party to the Soviet Union and the American Communist Party.

To some extent the two principal sources of bitter opposition to Roosevelt and the Democrats, the extreme economic conservatives and the isolationists, have tended to come together and adopt each other's ideologies. For example, right-wing Texans were ardent advocates of American entry into World War II. The Texas legislature by an almost unanimous vote passed a resolution telling Charles Lindbergh that he was not welcome in Texas during his leadership of America First. Today, however, many of the same Texans regard our participation in World War II as a blunder. On the other hand, a number of isolationists, such as Burton K. Wheeler, William Henry Chamberlain, and others, who were liberal or radical in economic matters, have become domestic conservatives. John T. Flynn is perhaps the outstanding example. He wrote regularly for the *New Republic* during the thirties and criticized Roosevelt's domestic and international policies from a left-wing point of view. With the onset of World War II, Flynn joined the America First movement. This action subjected him to vicious smears from liberal interventionists, who charged that he cooperated with Fascists. He found increasingly that his audiences and the magazines that would accept his articles were right-wing conservatives, and gradually in joining with the right in foreign policy, he accepted their position on economic issues as well.

It is difficult to demonstrate that similar changes in political ideology have occurred among sections of the general population. A cursory inspection of election results in Wisconsin and other mid-west states, however, indicates that many voters who once supported liberal isolationists are now backing right-wing nationalists. It would be interesting to know, for example, what proportion of those who supported the isolationist but progressive Bob La Follette in Wisconsin now backs McCarthy. Conversely, some of the economic radical rightists such as the new millionaires of Texas, or men who
were involved in the Liberty League in the thirties, have accepted the isolationist interpretation of the past, even though they were not isolationists before World War II.

Increasingly, a coherent radical right ideology has emerged which attacks past Democratic foreign policy as pro-Soviet, and criticizes New Deal economic policy as Socialist or Communist inspired. What are the sources of the support of the radical right in this country? It is difficult to answer this question since the groups who back the efforts to suppress the civil rights of men with whom they disagree, do not themselves agree on all or even most issues. The common denominator on which all the supporters of extremist action in the political arena agree is vigorous anti-Communism. This issue, today, has replaced anti-Catholicism or anti-immigrant sentiment as the unifying core for mass right-wing extremist action. One can identify some of the groups which play important roles in the anti-Communist crusade. These include groups reacting to the need for status policies, both the upward mobile ethnic population, and some of the downward mobile old American groups; groups responding to economic as well as status appeals; the *nouveaux riches*, and the insecure small businessmen; the traditionalist and authoritarian elements within the working-class groups whose values or ties to groups in other countries make them especially vulnerable to anti-Communist appeals (such as the Catholics or people coming from countries occupied by the Communists); and the traditional isolationists, especially those of German ancestry.

*Status Politics and the Radical Right*

One traditional source of extreme conservatism in the United States is the derivation of status from a claim to the American past—the people who belong to such filio-pietistic organizations as the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Colonial Dames, veterans’ organizations, historical commemoration societies, patriotic groups, etc. The point one must always recognize in considering such organizations is that few of them are actually what their name implies. That is, most of these organizations which supposedly contain all those who have a right to membership in the groups by virtue of their own actions or those of their ancestors only are supported by a minority of those who are eligible. The Daughters of the American Revolution, for example, do not contain all the female descendants of Revolutionary soldiers, but only a small segment, those who
choose to identify themselves in that fashion. The same point may be made about the membership of groups commemorating the War of 1812, the Civil War, the Confederacy, and other comparable groups. Further, in practice, the members who are active in these groups, who set policy, constitute an infinitesimal minority of the total membership.

What is the minority deriving status and other gratifications from such membership? Various sociological insights may be of some help here although unfortunately there is little or no research on their membership. It has been suggested that individuals who participate in such societies tend disproportionately to be people who have little other claim to status. They may be members of families which once were important, but whose present position is such that on the basis of personal achievement alone they would have little right to social prestige. Many such individuals tend to magnify this one claim to status, a claim to history, a claim to lineage, an identification with a heroic American past, which other people cannot have. It is their defense against the newcomers, against the rising minority ethnic groups. And consequently, such individuals and their organizations make a fetish out of tradition and past styles of life, and tend to be arch-conservative. Thus the groups which have the greatest sense of status insecurity will oppose both economic reform and internationalism, both of which are viewed as challenges to tradition.

While on one hand, the status-threatened old-family American tends to over-emphasize his identification with American conservative traditions, and thus be potentially or actually a supporter of the radical right, the new American, the minority ethnic, also is in strong need of asserting his status claims. For while the old American desires to maintain his status, the new American wishes to obtain it, to become accepted. This is particularly true for those members of the minority groups who have risen to middle or upper class position in the economic structure. These groups, having entered at the bottom, tend to view the status hierarchy as paralleling the economic ladder; they believe that one need only move up the economic scale to obtain the good things of the society. But, as they move up economically, they encounter social resistance. There is discrimination by the old-family Americans, by the Anglo-Saxon against the minority ethnics. The Boston Brahmins, for example,
do not accept the wealthy Irish. As Joseph Kennedy, father of the present Senator and former Ambassador to Great Britain, once put it in reaction to the fact that the Boston press continually made reference to him as Irish: "I was born here, my children were born here. What the hell do I have to do to be an American?" All through the country, one can find ethnic groups, often composed of third and fourth generation Americans, who have developed their own middle and upper classes, but who are still refused admittance into the social circles of Anglo-Saxon Protestants. One of the major reactions to such discrimination, as indicated earlier, is to become overconformist to an assumed American tradition. Since many members of these ethnic groups do not want to be defined as European, they also tend to become isolationist, ultra-patriotic, and even anti-European. For them, as for the old American traditionalist, the positive orientation towards Europe of liberals, of moderate conservative internationalists, creates a challenge to their basic values and to their rejection of Europe. Thus the status-insecure old-family American middle class, and the status-striving minority ethnics, both arrive at similar political positions.

But to return at this point to the theme developed in the earlier discussion of status politics, status insecurities and status aspirations are most likely to appear as sources of frustration, independent of economic problems, in periods of prolonged prosperity. For such times make it possible for individuals and groups who have moved up to constitute a visible threat to the established status groups; while at the same time the successfully mobile begin to search for means of improving their status. It is obvious that there are always many who do not prosper in periods of prosperity. And it is precisely members of the older prestigeful groups who are disproportionately to be found among the rentier class economically, with many living on fixed incomes, old businesses and the like—sources of income which are prone to decline in their relative position.

Thus, clearly, prosperity magnifies the status problem by challenging the economic base of the older groups, and accentuating the claim to status of the emerging ones. As a general hypothesis I would suggest that the supporters of the radical right in the 1950s come disproportionately from both the rising ethnic groups, and those old-family Americans who are oriented toward a strong identification with the past.
The Economic Extremists

A second source of support for extreme right-wing activities, here as in other countries, is the important group of newly wealthy individuals thrown up by great prosperity. New wealth most often tends to have extremist ideologies, to believe in extreme conservative doctrines in economic matters. The man who makes money himself feels more insecure about keeping it than do people who possess inherited wealth. He feels more aggrieved about social reform measures which involve redistribution of the wealth, as compared with individuals, still wealthy, who have grown up in an old traditionalist background, which inculcates the values of tolerance traditionally associated with upper-class aristocratic conservatism. It is not without reason that the new millionaires, such as those in Texas, have given extensive financial support to radical right movements, politicians, and to such propaganda organizations as Facts Forum.

While the most important significance of the newly wealthy lies in the power which their money can bring, rather than in their numbers, there is a mass counterpart for them in the general population, the small independent businessmen. Statistical data on social mobility in the United States indicates a great turnover in the ranks of these groups. A large proportion, if not a majority of them, come from other social strata: the small storekeepers and businessmen often are of working-class origin; the small manufacturer often comes out of the ranks of executives, white collar or government workers.

These small businessmen, perhaps more than any other group, have felt constrained by progressive social legislation and the rise of labor unions. They are squeezed harder than large business, since their competitive position does not allow them to pay increases in wages as readily as can big firms. Governmental measures such as social security, business taxes, or various regulations which require filling out forms, all tend to complicate the operation of small business. In general, these people are oriented upwards, wish to become larger businessmen, and take on the values of those who are more successful, or perhaps more accurately, they tend to take over their image of the values of more powerful groups, values which are often those of the radical right. Thus, as an hypothesis, it may be suggested that in terms of economic interest motivation, the
principal financial support of the radical right comes from those who have newly acquired wealth, and from small business.³⁷

Extreme conservatism on economic matters is, of course, not new. During the thirties it was represented by the Liberty League, and by various measures of organized business groups to block the development of trade unions. In general, one could probably safely say that most big business was willing to use undemocratic restrictive measures, such as labor spies and thugs, to prevent the emergence of trade unions in the twenties and thirties. The basic difference between the radical right and the moderate right, at present, however, is that the moderate right, which seemingly includes the majority of big business, has come to accept the changes which have occurred in the last twenty years, including trade unions and various social reforms, whereas the radical right still looks upon these as basic threats to its position. In practice economic rightists' efforts to turn the clock back have been successful in many states which are characterized by the lack of metropolitan areas, by rural and small-town predominance in the legislatures. In such states, laws have been passed outlawing the closed union shop, the amendment to repeal the income tax amendment to the Constitution has been endorsed by the legislature, and other legislation designed to destroy the reforms of the thirties and forties has been enacted. The fact remains, however, that the bulk of the reforms and institutions the liberal left created in the thirties and forties remain intact, and the business conservatives and the radical right cannot feel secure or victorious.

The "Tory" Worker

The previous sections have dealt with factors differentiating middle- and upper-class supporters of right-wing extremism from those who back more moderate policies. The stress on the radical right backers in these strata does not mean that the principal support of this type of politics lies here. In fact, survey as well as impressionistic data suggest that the large majority of these classes adhere to moderate politics, principally those of the moderate conservative, and that the overwhelming majority of the middle and upper groups have been consistently opposed to McCarthy and the whole radical right movement. The various studies of attitudes toward civil liberties and McCarthy suggest that the lower a person is in socioeconomic status or educational attainment, the more likely he is to
support McCarthy, favor restrictions on civil liberties, and back a "get tough" policy with the Communist states.\(^{38}\)

The lack of tolerance exhibited by large sections of the lower classes as compared with the middle classes is, of course, quite understandable. Support of civil liberties or tolerance for persons with whom one strongly disagrees requires, one would guess, both a high degree of material and psychic security, and considerable sophistication. As compared with the bulk of the middle and upper classes, the working class lacks these attributes. The consequences of these differences are manifest not only in the political arena, but in religion as well, for chiliastic evangelical religions have tended to draw their support from the lower classes, while liberal "tolerant" denominations have almost invariably been middle- and upper-class groups.

When one attempts, however, to go beyond the variables of economic status and education, in distinguishing between support or opposition to McCarthy or greater or less tolerance in civil liberties among the lower classes, the principal differentiating factors seem to be party allegiance, and religious beliefs. In the United States and Great Britain, the conservative workers, those who back the Tory or Republican parties, tend to have the most intolerant attitudes. Comparative impressionistic data suggests that these differences are not inherent in varying social strata, but rather are a consequence of partisan identifications and values. That is, the Democratic and Labour parties are more concerned with propagating a civil libertarian value system than are the conservative parties. Within the Democratic and Labour parties, however, the working class is more intolerant than the middle class.\(^{39}\)

The support which a large section of the American working class gives to right-wing extremism today may also be related to the greater sense of status deprivation felt by "failures" in periods of prosperity discussed earlier. Workers who fail to get ahead while some friends, classmates, and fellow war veterans do, are also likely to feel embittered. This prosperity-born bitterness should result in more varied forms of protest in America than in Europe, since American workers, unlike European ones, do not have a Socialist ideology which places the blame for individual failure on the operation of the social system.\(^{40}\) While the lower strata constitute the largest section of the mass base of the radical right, especially of McCarthy, who, as we shall see later, makes a particular appeal to them, in
power terms they are the least significant. Up to now, there are no organized working-class groups, other than some of the fundamentalist churches, which support radical right activities. And unlike the middle- and upper-class supporters of rightist opinions in the area of civil liberties, and foreign policy, who are also economic conservatives, many of the lower-class followers of radical-right leaders are in favor of liberal economic policies. Those workers who tend to back extreme right policies in economic as well as civil liberties and foreign policy areas tend to be the most traditionalistic and apolitical in their outlook. The principal significance of lower-class attitudes, therefore, lies in the votes and responses to public polls which they contribute to the radical right rather than in their potential utilization as part of a mass base for an organized movement.

*The Isolationists*

A fourth basis of strength of the radical right has developed out of the old isolationist-interventionist controversy. The traditional isolationists have become, in large measure, a base of the radical right. If one looks over the background of isolationism in this country, it seems largely rooted in ethnic prejudices or reactions, ties to the homeland, and populist xenophobia. Samuel Lubell, for example, suggests, "The hard core of isolationism in the United States has been ethnic and emotional, not geographic. By far the strongest common characteristic of the isolationist-voting counties is the residence there of ethnic groups with a pro-German or anti-British bias. Far from being indifferent to Europe's wars, the evidence argues that the isolationists are oversensitive to them." During two wars, the pro-German ethnic groups have been isolationists. In addition to the Germans, and some midwestern Scandinavian groups tied to them by religious and ecological ties, many Irish also have opposed support of Britain in two wars. Because German influence was concentrated in the Midwest, and in part because isolationist ideologies were part of the value system of agrarian radicalism, isolationism has been centered in the Midwest, especially among once-radical agrarians. The agrarian radicals of the Midwest tended to be xenophobic, suspicious of eastern and international finance capitalism. The various agrarian movements regarded efforts to involve the United States in European conflicts as motivated by the desire of eastern bankers to make money. The radical agrarian
character of isolationism, however, gradually began to change for at least two reasons: (1) numerically its mass Midwest base became less and less rural as the farm population declined, and more and more small-town middle class in character; and (2) interventionism was identified with the New Deal and social reform. Thus the small-town midwestern middle class was anti-New Deal, conservative and isolationist; this all added up to a fervent opposition to Roosevelt and his domestic and foreign policy.

This former isolationist group, especially its German base, was under a need to justify its past, and to a certain extent, to gain revenge. The Germans, in particular, were considered disloyal by the Yankees and other native American stock in two wars. Consequently, campaigns which seem to demonstrate that they were right and not disloyal would obviously win their support. The way in which one can understand the resentment against the UN and other international agencies is that these organizations are symbolic of American foreign policy and especially of the foreign policy of World War II, of collective security, of internationalism, of interventionism; and thus the attack on UNESCO, the attack on the UN is an attack on the past, an attack on Roosevelt, an attack on our whole foreign policy from '33 on.

The common tie which binds the former isolationist with the economic radical conservative is on the one hand the common enemy, Roosevelt and the New Deal, and secondly, the common scapegoat with which they can justify their past position. Both can now suggest that they were right, right in opposing the foreign policy or correct in opposing certain economic policies because these past policies were motivated or sustained by Communism or the Communist Party. Thus, both have an interest in magnifying the Communist plot, in identifying liberal and internationalist forces in American society with Communism.

The Catholics

A fifth source of mass support for the radical right in the recent period are many Catholics. As a rapidly rising group which was largely low status until recently, Catholics might be expected to be vulnerable to status-linked political appeals. In addition and probably more significant, however, Catholics as a religious group are more prone to support anti-Communist movements than any other sect with the possible exception of the fundamentalist Protestant
churches. This predisposition derives from the long history of Catholic opposition to Socialism and Communism, an organized opposition which has been perhaps more formalized in theological church terms than in almost any other group. This opposition has, in recent years, been magnified by the fact that a number of countries taken over by the Communists in eastern Europe are Catholic, and it is notable that in Europe those countries which are most in danger of Communist penetration are, in fact, Catholic.

In the past, however, Catholics in the United States and other English-speaking countries, have been traditionally allied with more left-wing parties. For example, in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, the Catholics tend to support the Labor Party. In the United States, they have backed the Democratic Party, while in Canada they support the Liberal Party.

The identification of Catholicism with the left in the English-speaking countries, as compared with its identification with the right in Western Europe, is related to the fact that the Catholic Church is a minority church in the English-speaking countries, and has been the church of the minority ethnic immigrants who have been largely lower class. As a lower-status group, Catholics have been successfully appealed to by the out-party, by the party of the lower class.

The rise of the Communist threat, however, and the identification of Communism with the left has created a conflict for many Catholics. Historically, this ideological conflict has developed just as the Catholic population in most of these countries has produced a sizable upper and middle class of its own, which in economic terms is under pressure to abandon its traditional identification with the lower-class party. The Republican Party in the United States and the (conservative) Liberal Party in Australia as well, it is interesting to note, are now given an opportunity to break the Catholics from their traditional political mores. The conservatives face the problem in the era of the welfare state, that welfare politics obviously appeal to lower-class people. Consequently, for the conservatives to gain a majority (and here I speak not only of the radical right but of the moderate conservatives as well), they must have some issues which cut across class lines, and which can appeal to the lower classes against the party of that class. Traditionally, nationalism and foreign policy issues have been among the most successful means for the conservatives to break through class lines. In this specific case, if the conservatives can identify the left with Communism they may
gain the support of many Catholics, both lower and middle class. This combination of the party desire to win elections plus the general desire of conservatives to dominate the society has led them to adopt tactics which normally they would abhor.

It may be appropriate to recall that the use of bigotry as a tactic by the conservatives to gain a political majority is not unknown in American history. The Whig Party before the Civil War, faced with the fact that increased immigration, largely Catholic, was constantly adding to the votes of the Democratic Party, realized that they might never obtain a majority. (They were in much the same position as the Republican Party from 1932 to 1952.) The Whigs, led largely by the so-called aristocratic elements in American society, upper-class Protestants both north and south, supported mass movements which were anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant, because of the belief that this would be the only way to win elections against the party of the "Demagogues," as they described the Democratic Party.

The upper-class Whigs hoped to break lower-class white Protestants from their support of the Democratic Party by identifying that party with the immigrants and with the Catholics. Today, of course, the position is reversed. The attempt is not so much to break Protestants from the Democrats, but to win the Catholics from the Democrats. The Republicans wish to break the Democratic allegiance of the Catholics, rather than use them as a scapegoat to secure lower-class Protestant voters.\(^48\)

It is also interesting to note that, since liberal groups draw so much support from the Catholics, it is an exceedingly delicate matter for them to defend themselves against the charge that they once made common cause with the Communists. American liberals are under pressure to deny their past, rather than defend it. To admit that liberals ever had sympathy for the Soviet Union, or that they ever in any way collaborated with Communists would be akin to confession, at least so far as their Catholic supporters are concerned, of collaboration with the Devil. In order to defend itself and to retain its Catholic base, the liberal left must either outdo the right in Communist charges, or at least tacitly agree with it. It fears that a large part of its mass base agrees with the radical right on the Communist question.\(^49\)

The introduction of a bill to outlaw the Communist Party by the most liberal members of the United States Senate is an example of this phenomenon. Many of them are vulnerable to the charge of
Communist collaboration. Paul Douglas, as a Socialist, visited the Soviet Union, and was addressed as Comrade by Stalin. This interview was published by the Communist Party. Wayne Morse was strongly backed by Harry Bridges in his election to the United States Senate. Hubert Humphrey was elected to the Senate by the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, shortly after the Communists captured the old Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party, and merged it with the Democratic Party of the state. None of these men ever supported the Communist Party, or even has any record of fellow-traveling for a brief period. Nevertheless, facts such as these would be difficult to explain without these men giving repeated evidence of their being strongly anti-Communist.

The situation in the Catholic community, today, is similar to conditions in the Jewish community during the thirties. The Jews, concerned with the growth of Nazism, felt the need to do something about it. Nazism became an important political issue for them. This situation played into the hands of the Communists who used the fight against Nazism as their principal appeal. And it is a fact that the Communists had considerable success among the Jews in this period. Perhaps even more important was the fact that this influence often affected the political ideology and tactics of Jewish organizations which were in no way Communist.

Today the Catholics face the Communist issue as the Jews did Nazism. Even unscrupulous anti-Communism, the sort which is linked to motives and policies unrelated to the problem of fighting Communists, can win support within the Catholic community. And just as the Communists were able to press forward various other aspects of their ideology among the Jews in the 1930s, so the radical right, stressing the anti-Communist issue, is able to advance other parts of its program. The radical right uses the anti-Communist issue to create or sustain hostility among the Catholics against the New Deal, against social reform, at the same time identifying liberalism with Communism.

It is, therefore, impossible to analyze the impact of the radical right on American life without considering the vulnerability of the Catholics to the Communist issue, and the effect of this Catholic sensitivity on the political strategy of both Republican and Democratic politicians in their reactions to the radical right. For political reasons many existing analyses of the radical right have found it convenient to ignore the Catholics, and attempts have been made to
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interpret the problem in terms of other variables or concepts, some of which, like the minority ethnic's reaction to status deprivation, have been suggested in this chapter as well. While such processes are important, it should not be forgotten that the majority of Catholics is still proletarian, and not yet in a position to make claim to high status. The role of the Catholic vulnerability to the radical right today, like the similar reaction of the Jews to the Communists a decade ago, must be considered independently of the fact that both groups have also reacted to the situation of being an ethnic minority.51

The Catalytic Elements

No analysis of the social strata and political tendencies which make up the radical right can be complete without a discussion of the catalytic elements, members of near Fascist and so-called borderline organizations, or individuals who though never members of such groups have maintained right-wing authoritarian sentiments. These groups and individuals have advocated extremist right-wing ideologies for a long time. Although their number may vary and their strength may fluctuate, they remain as a chronic source of potential extremist sentiments and organization. During the thirties, there were many avowedly authoritarian Fascist and racist organizations. Racism, at least in the form of anti-Semitism, lost much of its appeal during and following World War II. But while racism became even less useful politically than it ever had been, exposés of Communist plots, a traditional activity of most right-wing authoritarians, fitted in with the popular mood. It is probable that the neo-Fascist groups and individual authoritarians today use the Communist issue instead of anti-Semitism.52 For many of them hunting Communists with the seeming approval of society is much more palatable than attacking Jews. Engaging in attacks on alleged Communists or subversives may now serve to enhance their status, while attacks on minority groups meant accepting the role of a political and social deviant.

Here again, the analogy may be made with the role of the Communists in the late thirties and early forties. Being pro-New Deal and anti-Fascist, political values which were held by a large part of the population, made it psychologically much easier for Communists to operate than when they were primarily engaged in an avowed struggle for Communism. A number of former Communists have reported that many of the party members and leaders seemed
much happier in this role in the late thirties and early forties than in their earlier phase as avowed revolutionaries. In this latter period, the Communist movement was much more effective in initiating campaigns which appealed to large sections of the population.

While there is no right-wing conspiracy equivalent to that of the Communist Party (the various organizations and groups are disunited and often conflict with each other), nevertheless, there is an amorphous radical right extremist movement which receives the support of many who are not open members of extremist organizations. These may be termed the fellow-travelers of the radical right. In sociological terms, these groups should come disproportionately from the categories discussed earlier, that is, from the status-threatened or the status-aspiring, from the *nouveaux riches*, from the small businessman, from the ardent Catholics. However, it may be suggested that some of the research findings of studies such as the *Authoritarian Personality* are relevant in this context. The *Authoritarian Personality* and similar studies suggest that for a certain undefined minority of the population various personality frustrations and repressions result in the adoption of scapegoat sentiments. Such individuals are probably to be found disproportionately among the members of various patriotic and anti-Communist societies, in the crackpot extremist groups, and significantly in the committees of various Communist-hunt groups, for example, in the un-American activities committees of local Legion posts, and other groups. No one can object to people fighting Communists. If a minority in an organization denounced individual X or Y as a Communist, one may expect a general tendency for other members of the group to accept the charge in terms of their identification with the organization. Thus, with the climate of opinion shifted to the right, and with the Communist issue important to many people, that minority of individuals who for one reason or another feel the need to hunt out local subversive conspirators will be supported by many individuals and groups, who left alone would rarely engage in such activities.

One other group is important in the development of the radical right since World War II: the ex-Communists. Some of them, along with some other former non-Communist radicals, have given a coherent tone and ideology to the radical right. Basically, the radical right is unintellectual. Its leaders know very little about Communism or international affairs, and as a matter of fact, have little interest in international affairs. The former radicals and Communists can
pinpoint for the ideologists and spokesmen of the radical right those areas in American life where Communists have been important, those aspects of American foreign policy which are most vulnerable to attack. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is to be found in *The Freeman*. Many of the writers for this magazine have been former leftists, such as James Burnham, William Schlamm, John Chamberlain, Ralph De Toledano, J. B. Matthews, Freda Utley, Eugene Lyons, John T. Flynn, George Schuyler, and Charlotte Haldane.

Before concluding this review of general tendencies, one interesting and important contradiction between radical right ideology in the United States and the consequences of its promulgation should be stressed. Most of the intellectual and political spokesmen of the radical right proclaim a belief in complete liberty for all. *The Freeman* reads like a philosophical anarchist magazine. Its present editor, Frank Chodorov, has proclaimed the libertarian gospel in two recent books, *One Is a Crowd*, and *The Income Tax: Root of All Evil*. The New Deal is often denounced for having endangered civil liberties and individual freedom by increasing the power of the state and trade unions. Many of the speakers at the November 29, 1954 Madison Square Garden rally to protest the Senate censure of Senator McCarthy demanded the preservation of a "government of limited powers." Writers for *The Freeman* often criticized the tariff. Basically, the ideology of extreme conservatism in this country is *laissez-faire*. McCarthy's young intellectual spokesman, William Buckley, strongly supported the doctrines of Adam Smith in the same book in which he demanded a purge of American university faculties of left-wingers. In a real sense, the radical right is led by the Frondists of American society, those who want to turn the clock back to a golden age of little government.

III

*McCarthyism: The Unifying Ideology*

Extreme conservatism cannot ever hope to create a successful mass movement on the basis of its socio-economic program alone. Except during significant economic crisis, the majority of the traditional middle- and upper-class conservative elements are not likely to support extremist movements and ideologies, even when presented in the guise of conservatism, and the lower classes do not support
movements in defense of privilege. The problem of the radical right is to develop a political philosophy which will have appeal to its traditional rightist support, but will also enable it to win a mass base. Nazism was able to do this in Germany by combining a strong nationalist appeal to the status-threatened German middle and upper class, together with an “attack on Jewish international capitalism” designed to win over those most concerned with economic reform. As a number of European political commentators have suggested, anti-Semitism has often been the extreme rightist equivalent for the Socialist attack on capitalism. The Jewish banker replaces the exploiting capitalist as the scapegoat.

In the United States, the radical right had to find some comparable method of appealing to the groups which have a sense of being underprivileged, and McCarthy's principal contribution to the crystallization of the radical right in the 1950s has been to locate the key symbols with which to unite all its potential supporters. McCarthy's crusade is not just against the liberal elements of the country, cast in the guise of “creeping Socialist”; he is also campaigning against the same groups midwest Populism always opposed, the Eastern conservative financial aristocracy. In his famous Wheeling, West Virginia speech of February 9, 1950, McCarthy began his crusade against internal Communism by presenting for the first time an image of the internal enemy:

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this nation. It is not the less fortunate, or members of minority groups who have been selling this nation out, but rather those who have had all the benefits the wealthiest nation on earth has had to offer—the finest homes, the finest college educations, and the finest jobs in the government that we can give. This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouth are the ones who have been worse.

This defense of the minority groups and the underprivileged, and the attack on the upper class has characterized the speeches and writings of McCarthy and his followers. McCarthy differs considerably from earlier extreme right-wing anti-Communists. He is rarely interested in investigating or publicizing the activities of men who belong to minority ethnic groups. The image of the Communist which recurs
time and again in his speeches is one of an easterner, usually of Anglo-Saxon Episcopalian origins, who has been educated in schools such as Groton and Harvard.

The attack on the elite recurs frequently in the current writings of the radical right. *The Freeman* magazine writes that "Asian coolies and Harvard professors are the people . . . most susceptible to Red propaganda."^59* Facts Forum describes intellectuals as the group most vulnerable to Communism, and defines intellectuals as, "lawyers, doctors, bankers, teachers, professors, preachers, writers, publishers."^60* In discussing the Hiss case, Facts Forum argued that the forces defending Hiss which were most significant were not the Communists, themselves, but "the American respectables, the socially pedigreed, the culturally acceptable, the certified gentlemen and scholars of the day, dripping with college degrees. . . . In general, it was the 'best people' who were for Alger Hiss."^61* In discussing McCarthy's enemies, *The Freeman* stated: "He possesses, it seems a sort of animal, negative-pole magnetism which repels alumni of Harvard, Princeton, and Yale. And we think we know what it is: *This young man is constitutionally incapable of deference to social status.*"^62*

Over and over again runs the theme, the common men in America have been victimized by members of the upper classes, by the prosperous, by the wealthy, by the well educated. When specific names are given, these are almost invariably individuals whose names and backgrounds permit them to be identified with symbols of high status. As McCarthy could attack other individuals and groups, this concentration on the Anglo-Saxon elite is no accident. What are the purposes it serves?

Since McCarthy comes from Wisconsin, where for forty years isolationism and attacks on eastern business and Wall Street were staple political fare, he may have been searching for an equivalent to the La Follette appeal. Much of the electorate of Wisconsin, and other sections of the Midwest, the German-Americans and those who were sympathetic to their isolationist viewpoint, have been smarting under the charge of disloyalty. McCarthy has argued that it was not the isolationists, but rather those who favored our entry into war with Germany who were the real traitors, since by backing Great Britain they had played into the hands of the Soviet Union. The linkage between the attacks on Anglo-Saxon Americans and Great Britain may be seen in McCarthy's infrequent speeches on foreign
policy; these invariably wind up with an attack on Great Britain, sometimes with a demand for action (such as economic sanctions, or pressure to prevent her from trading with Red China). Thus McCarthy is in fact attacking the same groups in the United States and on the world scene, as his liberal predecessors.

On the national scene, McCarthy's attacks are probably much more important in terms of their appeal to status frustrations than to resentful isolationism. In the identification of traditional symbols of status with pro-Communism the McCarthy followers, of non-Anglo-Saxon extraction, can gain a feeling of superiority over the traditionally privileged groups. Here is a prosperity-born equivalent for the economic radicalism of depressions. For the resentment created by prosperity is basically not against the economic power of Wall Street bankers, or Yankees, but against their status power. An attack on their loyalty, on their Americanism, is clearly also an attack on their status. And this group not only rejects the status claims of the minority ethnics, but also snubs the *nouveaux riches* millionaires.

The celebrated Army-McCarthy hearings vividly presented to a national television audience the differences between the McCarthyites and their moderate Republican opponents. Every member of McCarthy's staff who appeared on television, with but one exception, was either Catholic, Jewish or Greek Orthodox in religion, and Italian, Greek, Irish, or Jewish in national origin. The non-military spokesmen of the Eisenhower administration on the other hand were largely wealthy Anglo-Saxon Protestants. In a real sense, this televised battle was between successfully mobile minority ethnics and, in the main, upper-class Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

It is also interesting to note that McCarthy is probably the first extreme rightist politician in America to rely heavily on a number of Jewish advisors. These include George Sokolsky, the Hearst columnist, Alfred Kohlberg, a Far-Eastern exporter, and of course, his former counsel, Roy Cohn. (These Jewish McCarthyites are, however, unrepresentative of the Jewish population generally, even of its upper strata, since all survey data as well as impressionistic evidence indicate that the large majority of American Jews are liberal on both economic and civil liberties issues.)

An attack on the status system could conceivably antagonize groups within the radical right: such as the patriotic societies, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and members of old upper-
status families like Archibald Roosevelt, who chaired a testimonial
dinner for Roy Cohn. Yet, attacks on the Anglo-Saxon Yankee
scapegoat do not have this effect because they are directed against
majority elements in the society. Criticism of Jews or the Irish, or
Italians or Negroes, would have resulted in an immediate response
from members of the attacked group. Anglo-Saxon white Protestants,
as a majority group, however, are not sensitive to criticism, they
are not vulnerable to being attacked, nor do they expect attack.
McCarthy, on the one hand, can throw out symbols and images
which appeal to the minority ethnics, to the Germans, to the Irish,
and the Italians, without at the same time securing the hostility
of radical rightists who also are members of the D.A.R., the Sons of
the American Revolution, the Patriotic Dames or any other compa-
rable group. And in spite of his populist-type symbols, he can
retain the support of these groups and the cooperation of some big
businessmen. This is his peculiar power. To the status-deprived he is
a critic of the upper class; to the privileged, he is a foe of social
change and Communism.

Anti-Communism: The Weakness of a Single Issue

In spite of its early successes in intimidating opponents, and gaining
widespread support behind some of its leaders, the radical right has
not succeeded in building even one organization of any political
significance. And without organizing its backing, it cannot hope to
secure any lasting power. This failure is not accidental, or a result
of inept leadership, but stems from the fact rather that the only
political issue which unites the various supporters of radical right
politicians is anti-Communism. It is only at the leadership level
that agreement exists on a program for domestic and foreign policy.
The mass base, however, is far from united on various issues. For
example, as McCarthy well knows, the dairy farmers of Wisconsin
want the government to guarantee 100 per cent parity prices. But
this policy is an example of government regimentation to some of the
extremist elements on his side.

The Catholic working class remains committed to the economic
objectives of the New Deal, and still belongs to trade unions. While
McCarthy and other radical rightists may gain Catholic support for
measures which are presented under the guise of fighting Communism,
they will lose it on economic issues. And should economic issues
become important again as during a recession, much of the popular
support for McCarthyism will fall away. As a result any attempt to build a radical right movement which has a complete political program is risky, and probably will not occur.

The radical right also faces the problem that it unites bigots of different varieties. In the South and other parts of the country, fundamentalist Protestant groups which are anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic back the radical right in spite of the fact that McCarthy is a Catholic.

One illustration of the way in which these contradictions among his supporters can cause difficulty is a statement which appeared in the New York Journal-American: "I think Joe owes the Army an apology but I doubt if our soldiers will get it. The Senator has sure lost his touch since he took up with those oil-rich, anti-Catholic Texas millionaires. They are the very same gang which threw the shiv at Al Smith back in 1928."66

Perhaps the greatest threat to the political fortunes of the radical right has been the victory of Eisenhower in 1952. As long as the Republican Party was in opposition the radical right could depend upon covert support, or at worst, neutrality from most of the moderate conservative sections of the Republican Party. Even when they viewed the methods of the radical right with distaste, the party leadership saw the group as potential vote gainers. The frustration of twenty years in opposition reduced the scruples of many Republicans, especially those who were involved in party politics.

The differences between the radical right and the moderate right are evident indeed and open factionalism existed in the party long before the election of Eisenhower. Nevertheless, the evidence is quite clear that a large proportion, if not the majority of the moderate Republicans, did not view McCarthy or the radical right as a menace to the party, until he began his attack upon them. Walter Lippmann once persuasively argued that when the Republicans were in office they would be able to control the radical right, or that the radical right would conform for the sake of party welfare. Most Republicans probably at the time agreed. However, the program of Eisenhower Republicanism has not been one of turning the clock back, nor has it fed the psychic needs of the radical right in domestic or foreign policy. Eisenhower's policies in the White House have certainly not reduced the needs of radical right groups for political action, for scapegoatism. They have not reduced McCarthy's desires to capitalize upon popular issues to maintain power and prestige in the general
body politic. As a result, the radical right is now forced to struggle openly with the moderate conservatives, essentially the Eisenhower Republicans, who in large measure represent established big business. This is a fight it cannot hope to win, but the danger exists that the moderates in their efforts to resist charges of softness to Communism, or simply to defeat the Democrats, will take over some of the issues of the radical right, in order to hold its followers, while destroying the political influence of its leaders.

The development of open warfare between the moderate Republican, high status, and big business groups on one hand, and McCarthy and the radical rightists on the other, has probably represented the turning point in the power of the latter. Thirty years earlier, the Ku Klux Klan was severely crippled by the emerging antagonism of the traditional power groups. As was pointed out earlier, many of its middle-class members dropped out of the organization when they discovered that such membership would adversely affect their status and economic interest. Today as in 1923–24, the moderate conservative upper-class community has finally been aroused to the threat to its position and values represented by the radical right.

It is extremely doubtful that the radical right will grow beyond the peak of 1953–54. It has reached its optimum strength in a period of prosperity, and a recession will probably cripple its political power. It cannot build an organized movement. Its principal current significance, and perhaps permanent impact on the American scene, lies in its success in overstimulating popular reaction to the problem of internal subversion, in supplying the impetus for changes which may have lasting effects on American life, e.g., the heightened security program, political controls on passports, political tests for schoolteachers, and increasing lack of respect for an understanding of the Constitutional guarantees of civil and juridical rights for unpopular minorities and scoundrels.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the causal influence of the radical right on the development of restrictions on civil liberties in American life. More significant than the activities of any group of active extremists are the factors in the total political situation which made Americans fearful of Communism. Perhaps most important of all these is the fact that for the first time since the War of 1812, the United States has been faced with a major foreign enemy before whom it has had to retreat. The loss of eastern Europe, of China, the
The impasse in Korea, Indo-China and Formosa, the seeming fiasco of our post-war foreign policy, have required an explanation. The theory that these events occurred because we were "stabbed in the back" by a "hidden force" is much more palatable than admitting the possibility that the Communists have stronger political assets than we do. The fear and impotence forced on us by the impossibility of a nuclear war requires some outlet. And a hunt for the internal conspirators may appear as one positive action. Political extremists are capitalizing on our doubts and fears, but it is the situation which creates these doubts and fears, rather than the extremists, that is mainly responsible for the lack of resistance by the political moderate.

Every major war in American history has brought with it important restrictions on civil liberties. Recognition of this fact has often led Americans who were primarily concerned with the preservation of civil liberties to oppose our entry into war. Before World War II, such ardent anti-Fascists as Robert Hutchins and Norman Thomas opposed an interventionist policy, on the grounds that entry into a prolonged major war might result in the destruction of American democracy. History fortunately records the fact that they were mistaken. The current situation, however, is obviously more threatening than any previous one, for one can see no immediate way for the United States to win the fight against Communism. And we now face the serious danger that a prolonged cold war may result in the institutionalization of many of the current restrictions on personal freedom which have either been written into law, or have become normal government administration procedure. Those who regard extremist anti-civil libertarian phases of American history as temporary and unimportant in long-range terms should be cautioned that one of the consequences of the Ku Klux Klan and the post-World War I wave of anti-radical and anti-foreigner hysteria was the restrictive immigration laws based on racist assumptions. The Klan died and the anti-radical hysteria subsided, but the quota restrictions based on the assumption of Nordic supremacy remained. Clearly the recent defeat of Senator McCarthy and the seeming decline of radical right support have not resulted in an end or even modification of many of the measures and administrative procedures which were initiated in response to radical right activity. Consequently if the cold war continues, the radical right, although organizationally weak, may play an important role in changing the character of American democracy.
The intellectual sources of this paper are far more numerous than the footnote references acknowledge. In particular, I am indebted to Richard Hofstadter, whose “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt” forms Chapter 3 of this volume, and Immanuel Wallerstein’s “McCarthyism and the Conservative” (M.A. thesis in the Department of Sociology, Columbia University, 1954). This paper is Publication No. A169 of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, one of a series prepared for the Fund for the Republic.

I do not assert that every or even most individuals or groups I classify in the radical right are involved in, or sympathetic to efforts to reduce personal freedom. In fact, as is made clear later in this paper, the ideology of the radical right is a belief in as much laissez-faire as possible. Most supporters of radical right politics believe that they are helping to increase democratic rights for everyone. The point is, however, that the nature of their attacks on political opponents, the definition they make of liberal or left politics as illegitimate, un-American, creeping socialism, fellow-traveling or worse, does have the consequence of encouraging the denial of civil liberties to their political opponents.

For a discussion of class and status politics in another context see, S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, “Social Status and Social Structure,” British Journal of Sociology, II (1951), especially pp. 230–33. Similar concepts are used by Richard Hofstadter in Chapter 3.

It is important to note that scapegoat and ethnic prejudice politics have not been exclusively the tactic of prosperity-based movements. Anti-Semitic movements, in particular, have also emerged during depressions. The Populist movement and Father Coughlin’s National Union for Social Justice are perhaps two of the most significant ones. It should be noted, however, that both of these movements focused primarily on proposed solutions to economic problems rather than racism. Initially, these groups were concerned with solving economic problems by taking away control of the credit system from the private bankers. Anti-Semitism emerged in both as a means of symbolizing their attack on eastern or international financiers. It is interesting to note that many movements which center their explanation of the cause for depressions on the credit system often wind up attacking the Jews. The Social Credit movement is the most recent example of this pattern. Apparently the underlying cultural identification of the international financier with the international Jew is too strong for these groups to resist. In each case, however, Populism, Coughlinism, and Social Credit, the economic program preceded anti-Semitism.

Historians have traditionally explained the decline of the Know-Nothing as a result of their inability to take a firm position on the slavery issue. Recent research, however, suggests that the depression may have been even more important than the slavery agitation. Detailed study of pre-Civil War electoral behavior indicates that the slavery issue played a minor role in determining shifts from one party to another. Evidence for these statements will be found in a forthcoming monograph by Lee Benson of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.


While the A.P.A. arose and won strength in a prosperous era, it continued to grow during the depression of 1893. Gustavus Myers, however, suggests that one of the major reasons for its rapid decline in the following two or three years was the fact that many of its leaders and members became actively
involved in the class politics which grew out of this depression. That is, many A.P.A.ers either joined the Bryan movement or actively supported McKinley, depending on their socio-economic position. Thus, the decline of the A.P.A., also, may be laid in large part to the fact that a depression accentuates economic issues and makes status concerns less important.


Quantitative evidence which fits in with this interpretation of the Progressive movement may be found in an unpublished paper, "The Genteel Revolt Against Politics—A study of the New York State Progressive Party in 1912," by Richard Ravitch. He summed up his statistical analysis as follows:

"It would be wrong to assume that the Progressives were anti-Catholic, but it was unusual for a political party in New York to have only one Catholic in its midst. Several Bull Mooses [Progressives] had belonged to the Guardians of Liberty, an organization which attacked the Church; but they withdrew to avoid the political repercussions. Certainly it can be said that the overwhelming religious affiliation was that of the Conservative [high status] Protestant sects.

"They were men conspicuous for their lack of association with the two groups which were slowly becoming the dominant forces in American life— the industrialist and the union leader. They were part of an older group which was losing the high status and prestige once held in American society. The Progressives represented the middle-class of the nineteenth century with all its emphasis on individualism and a set of values that was basically provincial. Resenting the encroachment on 'his' America by the corporations and urban masses, the formation of the Progressive Party may be considered his way of protesting what was now his defensive position in the bewildering 'drift' which characterized 20th-century society."

Evidence that anti-Catholic sentiment was strong during the pre-World War I prosperity may also be adduced from the fact that a leading anti-Catholic paper, The Menace, had a circulation of 1,400,000 in 1914.


11 It is interesting to note in this connection that much of the earlier extremist agitation also dealt with supposed plots of foreign agents. For example, the agitation leading to the Alien and Sedition Acts before 1800, the anti-Catholic movements, all involved claims that agents of a foreign power or of the Pope sought to subvert American life and institutions. The leaders of these movements all argued that men with loyalties to foreign institutions had no claim to civil liberties in America. "Can a Romanist be a good citizen of America ...? Romanism is a political system—as a political power it must be met. ... No ballot for the man who takes his politics from the Vatican." Reverend James B. Dunn, leader of the A.P.A. quoted in Myers, op. cit., p. 227. (Emphasis in Myers.)

The present situation, of course, differs from these past ones in that there
is a foreign directed conspiracy, the Communist Party. But today, as in the
past, the new right seeks to link native, non-Communist expression of dissent
to foreign powers as well.
12 Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, Politics and the Japanese Evacua-
13 See Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsley, "Trends in Public Opinion on
14 Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 32–33; see the summary and discussion
of his findings in Chapter 6.
16 Ibid., pp. 39–46.
17 David Riesman has suggested that the factors sustaining extreme moralism
in American life are declining as more and more Americans are becoming
"other-oriented," more concerned with being liked than being right. While
Riesman's distinction between inner-oriented and other-oriented people is use-
ful for analytical purposes, I still believe that viewed cross-culturally, Ameri-
cans are more likely to view politics in moralistic terms than most Europeans.
No American politician would say of an ally, as did Churchill of Russia,
that I will ally with the "devil, himself," for the sake of victory. The Ameri-
can alliance with Russia had to be an alliance with a "democrat" even if the
ally did not know he was democratic. Both the liberal reaction to the possi-
bility of alliance with Chiang Kai-shek and Franco, and the conservative
reaction to recognition of Communist China are but the latest examples of
the difficulty which morality creates for our international diplomacy. See
David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950), for a discussion of the decline of such morality; and George Kennan,
Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1950), Ch. III, "American Character and
Foreign Policy"; Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (London:
Derek Verschoyle, 1954), pp. 103–4, for analysis of the way in which
morality in politics hampers our foreign policy.
18 See Will Herberg, "Government by Rabble-Rousing," The New Leader,
January 18, 1954.
19 It is true, of course, that there has been an alternative nationalist reaction,
such as Zionism among the Jews, the Garvey movement among the Negroes,
and identification with national societies among other groups. In large mea-
sure, however, these patterns have been the reaction of lower-status, usually
foreign-born members of immigrant groups. Once assimilated, and accepted,
imigrant groups often adopt the so-called "third generation" pattern in
which they attempt to re-identify with their past national traditions. While
this pattern would seem to conflict with assumption that conformity is the
norm, I would suggest that it fits into the needs of individuals in a mass
urban culture to find symbols of belongingness which are smaller than the
total society.
20 Churchill made this statement in the House, in defending his refusal to
declare the Communist Party, then opposed to the war, illegal.
21 See Leon Samson, Toward a United Front (New York: Farrar and Rine-
hart, 1933).
22 For further comments on this theme see S. M. Lipset, "Democracy in
Alberta," The Canadian Forum, November and December 1954, pp. 175–
77, 196–98.
The Radical Right

26 That this is somewhat legitimate may be seen by analyzing the social bases of support of these totalitarian movements. In general, Communists, where strong, receive support from the same social strata which vote for democratic socialist or liberal groups in countries with weak Communist movements. Conversely, Fascist and right authoritarians, such as De Gaulle, have received their backing from previous supporters of conservative parties. There is little evidence of an authoritarian appeal per se. Rather, it would seem that under certain conditions part of the conservative group will become Fascists, while under others, part of the support of the democratic left will support the Communists. See S. M. Lipset, et al., "Psychology of Voting," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison Wesley, 1954), pp. 1135-36.
27 For a discussion of the way in which the radical right systematically attacks the Brahmin upper class in the State Department, see pp. 210-11 of this essay. Even as late as 1952, the left-wing journalist I. F. Stone attempted to bolster his attack on American policy in Korea by calling attention to the fact "that Acheson on making his Washington debut at the Treasury before the war, had been denounced by New Dealers as a 'Morgan man,' a Wall Street Trojan Horse, a borer-from-within on behalf of the big bankers." I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), p. 204.

It should be noted that, insofar as education at Harvard, Yale or Princeton is an indicator of upper-class background, the extremist critics of the State Department are correct in their claim that persons with a high-status background are disproportionately represented in the State Department. A study of 820 Foreign Office Officers indicated that 27 per cent of them graduated from these institutions, while only 14 per cent of high-ranking civil servants in other departments had similar collegiate backgrounds. (R. Bendix, Higher Civil Servants in American Society [Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1949] pp. 92-93.)

Some evidence that elite background is even of greater significance in the higher echelons of the State Department may be found in a recent article published in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin:

"The new United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (James B. Conant, Harvard '14, and former president of the University) will find, if he looks about him, fellow alumni in comparable positions. Across the border to the south and west, the Belgian ambassador is Frederick M. Alger, Jr. '30, and the French ambassador is C. Douglas Dillon, '31. Down the Iberian Peninsula the ambassadors to Spain and Portugal are John D. Lodge '25, and James C. H. Bonbright '25. A bit to the north, Ambassador Conant will find Ambassador Robert D. Coe '23 in Denmark and John M. Cabot '23 in Sweden. In the forbidden land to the east of him is Charles E. Bohlen '27, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Near at hand, across the Channel, is the senior member of Harvard's ambassadorial galaxy, Winthrop W. Aldrich '07, LL.D. '53, Ambassador to Great Britain. . . . There seem
to be enough Harvard ambassadors for a baseball team in Europe. . . .
29 A good example of extreme right ideology is contained in the newspaper report of a speech delivered at a meeting of Alliance, Inc., a right-wing group sponsored by Archibald Roosevelt:
“Gov. J. Bracken Lee of Utah declared last night that ‘We have in Wash-
ington what to my mind amounts to a dictatorship.’
“Asserting that high spending was heading the country toward poverty, he . . . [said] that the end result of all dictatorships was the same. ‘They end up with a ruling class and all the rest of us are peons.’ . . .
“There was no difference, he continued, between the Government in Russia and an all powerful central government in Washington. . . .
“. . . all the trouble in Washington began when a constitutional amend-
ment authorized the income tax. He assailed the United Nations, foreign aid and Federal grants to the states.
“He appealed to those who felt the way he did ‘to speak up now.’ When a voice in the audience asked, ‘How,’ he replied: ‘If you feel that McCarthy’s on our side say so.’ This reference to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wis-
consin evoked applause, cheers and whistles.”
For a description of the ideology of the radical right, or as he calls them, the ultra-conservatives, see Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 183–86.
30 One hypothesis which may explain the subsequent bitterness of some of the former liberals and leftists who broke with Roosevelt over his foreign policies is contained in a defense of the Moscow trials of the 1930s written by John T. Flynn in his more leftist days.
“Americans found it difficult to believe that the old Bolsheviks recently executed in Russia, after all their years of warfare against capitalism, could have been really guilty of intriguing with Italy and Germany to destroy Stalin. That seemed unbelievable. This incredulity struck me as possible only by ignoring the strange distance which the human mind and heart can lead a man of strong feeling when they begin to generate hatreds. Now we have a weird case of it in our own far more composed country. Would anyone have believed, four years ago for instance, that in 1937 we would behold John Frey, of the A.F.L.—as fine a person as one would care to meet—actually consorting with a company union in steel to defeat and destroy a singularly successful industrial union movement led by John L. Lewis? Yet this fantastic thing has occurred. It is no stranger than a Russian editor full of hatred of Stalin seeking to circumvent that gentleman’s plans by teaming up for the moment with Hitler.” New Republic, March 24, 1937, pp. 209–10 (my emphasis).
31 It is worth noting that existing evidence suggests that there is a substantial difference in the reactions of men and women to the radical right. Women are much more likely to support repressive measures against Communists and other deviant groups than are men as measured by poll responses, and many of the organizations which are active in local struggles to intimidate school and library boards are women’s groups. In part this difference may be related to the fact that women are more explicitly concerned with family status in the community than are men in the American culture, and hence,
may react more than the men do to status anxieties or frustrations. The organizations of old family Americans which are concerned with claiming status from the past are predominantly female. Hence, if the thesis that status concerns are related to rightist extremism and bigotry is valid, one would expect to find more women than men affected by it.

Secondly, however, evidence from election and opinion studies in a number of countries indicates that women are more prone to be concerned with morality in politics. They are much more likely to support prohibition of liquor or gambling, or to vote against corrupt politicians than men. This concern with morality seems to be related to the greater participation in religious activities by the female sex. Since Communism has come to be identified as a moral crusade against evil by every section of American public opinion, one should expect that women will be more likely to favor suppression of evil, much as they favor suppression of liquor and gambling. The propensity to support efforts to repress "corrupt ideas" is probably intensified by the fact that much of the concern with the activities of Communists is related to their potential effect on the young. See H. Tingsten, Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics (London: P. S. King, 1937), pp. 36–75 for a report of comparative data on women's attitudes and political behavior. In the 1952 Presidential election in the United States, more women voted Republican than Democratic for the first time in many years. It has been suggested that this was a product of the raising of strong moral issues by the Republicans. See L. Harris, Is There a Republican Majority? (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), Chapter VI.

The recent Stouffer study of attitudes toward civil liberties further tends to validate these inferences. The data indicate clearly that in 1954 women were much more intolerant of Communists, critics of religion, and advocates of nationalized industry than men. Similarly, presidents of women's clubs were less tolerant than any other group of community leaders interviewed with the exception of officers of the D.A.R. and the American Legion. (See S. A. Stouffer, op. cit., pp. 131–55, 52.) Part of the difference in attitudes between men and women reported in this study is accounted for by the fact that women are more religious than men, and religious people are more likely to be intolerant than the non-religious. However, even when religious participation is held constant, women are more likely to be intolerant than are men. I would suggest that part of this difference is related to the fact that women are more likely than men to reflect the political concerns derived from status. Unfortunately, the Stouffer study does not attempt to measure the effect of status concerns on political beliefs. For an excellent study which does attempt to do this in the context of analyzing the electoral support of British political parties see Mark Benney and Phyllis Geiss, "Social Class and Politics in Greenwich," British Journal of Sociology, 1950, Vol. I, pp. 310–24. The authors of this study found that women were more likely to report themselves in a higher social class than men at the same occupational level, and those who reported themselves to be higher status were more conservative.


33 In an article written shortly before his death, Franz Neumann suggested that one of the social sources of political anxiety which led to individuals and groups accepting a conspiracy theory of politics is social mobility:

"In every society that is composed of antagonistic groups there is an
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ascent and descent of groups. It is my contention that persecutory anxiety—but one that has a real basis—is produced when a group is threatened in its prestige, income, or its existence. . . .

"The fear of social degradation thus creates for itself 'a target for the discharge of the resentments arising from damaged self-esteem.' . . .

"Hatred, resentment, dread, created by great upheavals, are concentrated on certain persons, who are denounced as devilish conspirators. Nothing would be more incorrect than to characterize the enemies as scapegoats, for they appear as genuine enemies whom one must extirpate and not as substitutes whom one only needs to send into the wilderness. The danger consists in the fact that this view of history is never completely false, but always contains a kernel of truth and, indeed, must contain it, if it is to have a convincing effect."


84 One study of McCarthy's appeal indicates that, among Protestants, he gets much more support from persons of non-Anglo-Saxon ancestry than from those whose forefathers came from Britain. The polls are not refined enough to locate old Americans who support patriotic organizations, but the activities of groups which belong to the Coalition of Patriotic Societies are what would be expected in terms of the logic of this analysis. See Wallerstein, op. cit.

85 These observations about the nouveaux riches are, of course, not new or limited to current American politics. William Cobbett commented in 1827:

"... this hatred to the cause of public liberty is, I am sorry to say it, but too common amongst merchants, great manufacturers, and great farmers; especially those who have risen suddenly from the dunghill to chariot."


87 Again, poll data fit this hypothesis. Material from a 1952 Roper poll shows that the most pro-McCarthy occupational group in the country is small businessmen. See Wallerstein, op. cit. For an excellent discussion of the reactionary politics of upward mobile small business, see R. Michels, "Psychologie der anti-Kapitalistischen Massenbewegungen," Grundriss der Sozialekonomik, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 249. A recent study of post-war elections in Great Britain also suggests that small businessmen react more negatively to welfare state politics than any other occupational group. John Bonham reports that a larger proportion of small businessmen shifted away from the Labor Party between 1945 and 1950 than any other stratum. See the Middle Class Vote (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), p. 129.

88 There is a considerable body of evidence which indicates that economic liberalism (support of the labor movement, government planning, and so forth) is correlated inversely with socio-economic status, while non-economic "liberalism" (support of civil liberties, and internationalism), is associated positively with socio-economic status. That is, the poor are for redistribution of wealth, while the more well-to-do are liberal in non-economic matters. See G. H. Smith, "Liberalism and Level of Information," Journal of Educa-
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ditional Psychology, February 1948, pp. 65-81; Hyman and Sheatsley, op. cit., pp. 6-17; reports of the American Institute of Public Opinion, passim.

These findings are paralleled by various reports which suggest that lower status and education are associated with high scores on scales designed to measure degree of authoritarianism. See H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley, "The Authoritarian Personality—A Methodological Critique," in M. Jahoda and R. Christie, Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), p. 94; R. Christie, "Authoritarianism Re-examined," in ibid., pp. 169-75.

Janowitz and Marwick have reported the interesting finding based on a national sample that the two most "authoritarian" groups are the poorly educated lower class, and the poorly educated lower middle class. See M. Janowitz and D. Marwick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1953, pp. 185-201.

The Stouffer study reports results similar to these earlier ones. In addition it indicates that leaders of community organizations, most of whom are drawn from the upper part of the class structure and are college educated, are much more favorable to civil liberties than the general population. See S. A. Stouffer, op. cit., pp. 28-57, and passim.

89 Zetterberg in an unpublished study of attitudes toward civil liberties in a New Jersey community found that working-class respondents were much more intolerant on civil-liberties questions than middle-class respondents, and that working-class Republicans were somewhat more anti-civil libertarian than working-class Democrats. Similar conclusions may be deduced from various reports of the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) and the Stouffer study. The first indicates that lower-class respondents are more favorably disposed to McCarthy than middle and upper class, but that Democrats are more likely to be anti-McCarthy than are Republicans. Stouffer reports similar findings with regard to attitudes toward civil liberties. Unfortunately, neither the Gallup Poll nor Stouffer have presented their results by strata for the supporters of each party separately. See S. A. Stouffer, op. cit., pp. 210-15. A survey study of the 1952 elections indicates that at every educational level, persons who scored high on an "authoritarian personality" scale were more likely to be Eisenhower voters than were those who gave "egalitarian" responses. Robert E. Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," American Political Science Review, March 1955, p. 180.

In Britain, Eysenck reports that "middle-class Conservatives are more tender-minded [less authoritarian] than working-class Conservatives; middle-class Liberals are more tender-minded than working-class Liberals; middle-class Socialists more tender-minded than working-class Socialists, and even middle-class Communists are more tender-minded than working-class Communists." H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 137. Similar findings are indicated also in a Japanese study which reports that the lower classes and the less educated are more authoritarian than the middle and upper strata and the better educated, but the supporters of the socialist parties are less authoritarian than those who vote for the two "bourgeois" parties. See Kotaro Kido and M. Sugi, "A Report on Research on Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Tokyo (III). The Structure of Social Consciousness," Japanese Sociological Review, January 1954, pp. 74-100. See also National Public Opinion Research Institute (of Japan) Report No. 26, A Survey of Public Attitudes Toward Civil Liberty.

An as yet unpublished secondary analysis of German data collected by the UNESCO Institute at Cologne yields similar results for Germany. The work-
ing classes are less favorable to a democratic party system than are the middle and upper classes. However, within every occupational stratum men who support the Social-Democrats are more likely to favor democratic practices than those who back the more conservative parties. The most anti-democratic group of all are workers who vote for non-Socialist groups. (This analysis was done by the author.)

It is also true that the working class forms the mass base of authoritarian parties in Argentina, Italy, and France. Ignazio Silone is one of the few important Socialists who have recognized that recent historical events challenge the belief that the working class is inherently a progressive and democratic force.

"... the myth of the liberating power of the proletariat has dissolved along with that other myth of the inevitability of progress. The recent examples of the Nazi labor unions, those of Salazar and Peron... have at last convinced of this even those who were reluctant to admit it on the sole grounds of the totalitarian degeneration of Communism.... The worker, as we have seen and as we continue to see, can work for the most conflicting causes; he can be Blackshirt or partisan." Ignazio Silone, "The Choice of Comrades," Dissent, Winter 1955, p. 14.

It may in fact be argued that the lower classes are most attracted to chiliastic political movements, which are necessarily intolerant and authoritarian. Far from workers in poorer countries being Communists because they do not realize that the Communists are authoritarian, as many democratic Socialists have argued and hoped, they may be Communists because the evangelical "only truth" aspect of Communism is more attractive to them than the moderate and democratic gradualism of the social democracy.

40 See R. K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), Chapter IV.

41 The large Catholic working class, although predominantly Democratic, also contributes heavily to the support of extremist tendencies on the right in questions dealing with civil liberties or foreign policy. This pattern stems in large measure from their situation as Catholics, and is discussed in a later section.

42 It is interesting to note in this connection that the large group of persons who are inactive politically in American society tend to be the most conservative and authoritarian in their attitudes. These groups, largely concentrated in the lower classes, do, however, contribute to the results of public opinion polls since they are interviewed. Consequently such polls may exaggerate greatly the effective strength of right-wing extremism. Stouffer reports that those less interested in politics are less tolerant of the civil liberties of Communists and other deviants than are those who are interested. See S. A. Stouffer, op. cit., pp. 83–86. Sanford, who found a negative relationship between socio-economic status and authoritarian attitudes, states: "We have data showing that authoritarians are not highly participant in political affairs, do not join many community groups, do not become officers in the groups they become members of." F. H. Sanford, Authoritarianism and Leadership (Philadelphia: Stephenson Brothers, 1950), p. 168; see also G. M. Connelly and H. H. Field, "The non-voter—Who he is, what he thinks," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 8, 1944, pp. 175–87. Data derived from a national survey in 1952 indicate that when holding education constant, individuals who score high on an "authoritarianism" scale are more likely to belong to voluntary associations than those who score low. The high "authoritarians," however, are less likely to engage in political activity or have a sense that...
they personally can affect the political process. Robert E. Lane, op. cit., pp. 178–79. On the other hand Bendix suggests that the apathetic tradition-alist group was mobilized by the Nazis in the final Weimar elections; see R. Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, 1952, pp. 357–75. 

43 Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), p. 132. Lubell's thesis has been challenged by R. H. Schmuckler, "The Region of Isolationism," American Political Science Review, June 1953, pp. 388–401. Schmuckler denies that the statistical evidence proves that any one factor is basically correlated with voting behavior of isolationist members of Congress. Lubell, however, uses other indicators of the effect of ethnic attitudes on voting on foreign policy issues, the changes in the election of 1940. Regardless of who is correct, the basic hypothesis that feelings about past American policy which are linked to the position of different ethnic groups, affect the current political behavior of these groups may still be valid. 

44 Among once liberal Midwest isolationist politicians who were first liberals and became extreme rightists were Senators Nye, Wheeler and Shipstead.

45 "The memory of opposition to the last war seems the real mainspring behind present-day isolationism. What really binds the former isolationists is not a common view on foreign policy for the future, but a shared remembrance of American intervention in the last war. The strength of the Republican appeal for former isolationist voters is essentially one of political revenge." Lubell, op. cit., p. 152.

46 Various national surveys have indicated that Catholics are more likely to be favorable to Senator McCarthy than adherents of other denominations. (See the reports of the American Institute of Public Opinion.) The recent survey of attitudes toward civil liberties reports that outside of the South, church-going Catholics are more intolerant than church-going Protestants. See S. A. Stouffer, op. cit., pp. 144–45.


48 A similar effort is being made at the current time by the Australian conservatives who are attacking the Labor Party for alleged softness towards Communism, and for allowing itself to be penetrated by the Communists. The presence of a large Catholic population in these countries, traditionally linked to the more liberal party, is probably one of the most important factors affecting the reluctance of the moderate conservative politicians to oppose the tactics of the extremists on their own side.

49 In Canada, also, the Catholics have provided the main dynamic for threats to civil liberties, which are presented as necessary parts of the struggle against Communism. The government of the Catholic province of Quebec passed legislation in the thirties which gave the government the right to invade private homes in search of Communist activities and to padlock any premises which have been used by the Communists. Civil liberties groups in Canada have charged that these laws have been used against non-Communist opponents of the government especially in the labor movement.

50 There is, of course, no reliable quantitative way of measuring this influence, although all students of the Communist movement agree that its success was greatest among Jews. In Canada, where under a parliamentary system, the Communist Party was able to conduct election campaigns in districts where they had hopes of large support, they elected members to the Federal House and provincial legislatures from Jewish districts only. Similarly, in Great Britain, one of the two Communists elected in 1945 came from a London Jewish district.
It is possible to suggest another hypothesis for Catholic support of political intolerance in this country which ties back to the earlier discussion of the working class. All existing survey data indicate that the two religious groups which are most anti-civil libertarian are the Catholics and the fundamentalist Protestant sects. Both groups are predominantly low status in membership. In addition, both fall under the general heading of extreme moralizing or Puritanical religions. In the past, and to a considerable extent in the present also, the fundamentalists played a major role in stimulating religious bigotry, especially against Catholics. It is important, however, to note also that a large part of the American Catholic church is dominated by priests of Irish birth or ancestry. French Catholic intellectuals have frequently referred to the American Catholic church as the Hibernian American church. Irish Catholics, like French Canadians, are quite different from those in the European Latin countries. They have been affected by Protestant values, or perhaps more accurately by the need to preserve the church in a hostile Protestant environment. One consequence of this need has been an extreme emphasis on morality, especially in sexual matters. Studies of the Irish have indicated that they must rank high among the sexually repressed people of the earth. The church in Ireland has tended to be extremely intolerant of deviant views and behavior. The pattern of intolerance among the American Irish Catholics is in large measure a continuation in somewhat modified form of the social system of Ireland. Thus the current anti-Communist crusade has united the two most morally and sexually inhibited groups in America, the fundamentalist Protestants and the Irish Catholics. I am sure that much could be done on a psychoanalytical level to analyze the implications of the moral and political tone of these two groups. For a good report on morality and sex repression among the Irish in Ireland and America, see John A. O'Brien, ed., *The Vanishing Irish* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953); see also C. Arensberg and S. Kimball, *Family and Community in Ireland* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948).

Many, however, still make Aesopian references to the Jews. For a good current report on the anti-Semitic fringe within the radical right see James Rorty, "The Native Anti-Semite’s ‘New Look,’" *Commentary*, November 1954, pp. 413–21.

In reporting on the Madison Square Garden rally called by the Ten Million Americans Mobilizing for Justice, a group formed to fight the move to censure McCarthy, James Rorty suggests that many of the participants were individuals who had taken part in Fascist rallies in the thirties.

"Edward S. Fleckenstein, an American agitator and associate of neo-Nazis whom Chancellor Adenauer had the State Department oust from Germany, had worked overtime to mobilize his Voters Alliance of German Ancestry. So successful were his efforts that Weehawken, Secaucus, and other northern New Jersey communities had sent delegations so large that, according to organizer George Racey Jordan, it had been necessary to limit their allotment of seats, to avoid giving an ‘unrepresentative’ character to the meeting.” James Rorty, "What Price McCarthy Now?", *Commentary*, January 1955, p. 31.

I was present at this rally, and from my limited vantage point, would agree with Rorty. Men who sat near me spoke of having attended “similar” rallies ten and fifteen years ago. Perhaps the best indicator of the temper of this audience was the fact that Roy Cohn, McCarthy's counsel, felt called upon to make a speech for brotherhood, and reiterated the fact that he was
a Jew. One had the feeling that Cohn felt that many in his audience were anti-Semitic.


54 Stouffer reports that individuals who support "authoritarian . . . childrearing practices" and respond positively to the statement: "People can be divided into two classes—the weak and the strong," are prone to also advocate strong measures against Communists, supporters of nationalized industry, and critics of religion. These questions are similar to the ones used on various psychological scales to locate "authoritarian personalities." S. A. Stouffer, op. cit., pp. 94–99.


56 Much of the data in this section are drawn from Wallerstein, op. cit.

57 I am not suggesting that McCarthy or the radical right are Fascists or even precursors of Fascism. For reasons which are discussed below, I do not believe they could build a successful social movement even if they wanted to. Rather, however, I do suggest that the extreme right in all countries, whether Fascist or not, must find a program or issue which can appeal to a section of the lower middle class, if not the working class, if it is to succeed.

58 Congressional Record, February 20, 1950, p. 1954. (My emphasis.)


60 Facts Forum Radio Program, No. 57.

61 Ibid. (My emphasis.)

62 The Freeman, November 5, 1951, p. 72. (My emphasis.)

63 "Where have we loyal allies? In Britain? I would not stake a shilling on the reliability of a government which, while enjoying billions in American munificence, rushed to the recognition of the Chinese Red regime, traded exorbitantly with the enemy through Hong Kong and has sought to frustrate American interests in the Far East at every turn." Joseph R. McCarthy, The Story of General George Marshall, America's Retreat from Victory (No. publ., 1952), p. 166.

"As of today some money was taken out of your paycheck and sent to Britain. As of today Britain used that money from your paycheck to pay for the shipment of the sinews of war to Red China . . .

"Now what can we do about it. We can handle this by saying this to our allies: If you continue to ship to Red China, while they are imprisoning and torturing American men, you will not get one cent of American money." Joseph R. McCarthy, quoted in the New York Times, November 25, 1953, p. 5: 1–8.

64 It is, of course, possible that Anglo-Saxon Protestant supporters of McCarthy react similarly to the members of minority ethnic groups to the mention of Groton, Harvard, striped-pants diplomats, and certified gentlemen, that is, that they too, take gratification in charges which reduce the prestige of those above them, even if they are also members of the same ethnic group. In large measure, I would guess that it is the middle-class, rather than the upper-class members of nationalistic and historical societies who are to be found disproportionately among the supporters of the radical right. Consequently, they too, may be in the position of wanting the high and mighty demoted.

65 In addition much if not most of the support for radical right policies reported by the polls comes from groups which normally show the lowest
levels of voting or other forms of political participation, women, members of fundamentalist sects, and conservative workers. These groups are the most difficult to organize politically.

It is unfortunate that most American politicians as well as the general intellectual public do not recognize that the public opinion poll reports on civil liberties, foreign policy, and other issues are usually based on samples of the total adult population, not of the electorate. Consequently, they probably greatly exaggerate the electoral strength of McCarthyism. For a related discussion see David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Meaning of Opinion," in D. Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 492-507.


67 The cleavage in the Republican Party revealed by the vote in the United States Senate to censure McCarthy largely paralleled the lines suggested in this paper. The party divided almost evenly in the vote, with almost all the Republican Senators from eastern states plus Michigan voting against McCarthy, while most of the Republicans from the Midwest and far western states voted for him. The cleavage, in part, reflects the isolationist and China-oriented section of the party on one side, and the internationalist eastern wing on the other. From another perspective, it locates the Senators with the closest ties to big business against McCarthy, and those coming from areas dominated by less powerful business groups on the other. There are, of course, a number of deviations from the pattern.

An indication of the temper of the right wing of the Republican Party may be seen from the speeches and reaction at a right-wing rally held in Chicago on Lincoln's Birthday. Governor J. Bracken Lee of Utah stated, "We have gone farther to the left in the last two years [under Eisenhower] than in any other period in our history. I have the feeling that the leadership in Washington is not loyal to the Republican Party." Brigadier General William Hale Wilbur, U. S. Army, retired, charged that the "great political victory of 1952 is being subverted. . . . American foreign policy is no longer American." McCarthy drew loud cheers while denouncing the evacuation of the Tachens. Senator George W. Malone of Nevada stated that Washington is "the most dangerous town in the United States." New York Times, February 13, 1955, p. 54.

68 Perhaps the most interesting event in the extremist versus moderate conservative battle occurred in the 1954 senatorial elections in New Jersey. There, a liberal anti-McCarthyite, Clifford Case, former head of the Fund for the Republic, ran on the Republican ticket on a platform of anti-McCarthyism. A small group of right-wingers urged "real Republicans" to repudiate Case and write in the name of Fred Hartley, coauthor of the Taft-Hartley Act on the ballot. This campaign began with considerable publicity, but soon weakened. One reason for its rapid decline was that a number of the largest corporations in America put direct economic pressure on small businessmen, lawyers, and other middle-class people active in Hartley's behalf. These people were told that unless they dropped out of the campaign, they would lose contracts or business privileges with these corporations. It is significant to note that one of the few remaining groups vulnerable to direct old-fashioned pressure from big business is the middle-class backers of right-wing extremism.

69 The stress in this paper on the radical right should not lead to ignoring the contribution of the Communist Party to current coercive measures. The presence of a foreign controlled conspiracy which has always operated par-
tially underground, and which engages in espionage has helped undermine the basis of civil liberties. Democratic procedure assumes that all groups will play the game, and any actor who consistently breaks the rules endangers the continuation of the system. In a real sense, extremists of the right and left aid each other, for each helps to destroy the underlying base of a democratic social order.
Three Decades of the Radical Right: Coughlinites, McCarthyites, and Bircher

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

The three most prominent "radical-right" movements of the past three decades have been Coughlinism, which figured prominently in the political life of the 1930s; McCarthyism, which flared up in the early 1950s; and the John Birch Society, which has occasioned much controversy in the beginning of the 1960s. The following is a report of research into the social bases of these three movements. The three have been extremely nationalistic in different ways, opposing the philosophy of liberal internationalism as applied to the politics of their time. The political focus of their attack has been primarily though not exclusively the Democratic Party.²

The political ideologies shared by these three movements are not, however, what makes them a matter of special concern. Right-wing conservatism and nationalism are political doctrines that have a legitimate place within any democratic polity. What distinguishes these groups in particular is that they are extremist tendencies, and as such have rejected the basic rules of democratic society. Edward Shils has described these attributes well:

An extremist group is an alienated group. . . . It cannot share that sense of affinity to persons or attachment to the institutions which confine political conflicts to peaceful solutions. . . . The romantic reaction-

* Copyright © 1962, 1963 by Seymour Martin Lipset.
aries, aristocratic and populistic . . . allege that they wish to conserve tradition. In practice they regard tradition as dead or corrupt or pernicious and they think that they must wipe out all that exists in order to recreate the right kind of tradition. Neither . . . the Christian Front [of Father Coughlin] nor the most zealous populist followers of Senator McCarthy at his height found the living traditions of the society in which they lived worthy of conservation. They were convinced that they had fallen into the hands of corrupt politicians and had themselves become corrupt. . . .

The ideological extremists [of the left and right]—all extremists are inevitably ideological—because of their isolation from the world, feel menaced by unknown dangers. The paranoiac tendencies which are closely associated with their apocalyptic and aggressive outlook make them think that the ordinary world, from which their devotion to the ideal cuts them off, is not normal at all; they think it is a realm of secret machinations. What goes on in the world of pluralistic politics, in civil society, is a secret to them. It is a secret which they must unmask by vigorous publicity. Their image of the "world" as the realm of evil, against which they must defend themselves and which they must ultimately conquer, forces them to think of their enemy's knowledge as secret knowledge.³

But if these three rightist groups have many similarities, they differ greatly too. A large part of the differences may be attributed to the varying circumstances under which they arose. Coughlinism clearly was a response to the unsettled economic conditions of the 1930s, and to the international tensions of the period—the rise of Fascism, the Spanish Civil War, and, eventually, World War II. McCarthyism, as the original essays in this book make abundantly clear, developed in a period characterized domestically by prosperity and twenty years of Democratic Party rule, and internationally by the growing world power of Communism.⁴ The John Birch Society was formed in the late 1950s, and came to general public attention as a political force in the 1960s. This period resembles the heyday of McCarthyism. There has been a relatively high level of economic prosperity combined with frustration in the international struggle with Communism.

To a considerable degree, the ideological differences among the three rightist movements reflect these variations in time of origin. Father Charles Coughlin began his political career as a radical monetary reformer, and came to national attention with his attacks on
the bankers and the financial system for creating the Great Depression of the 1930s. He supported Franklin Roosevelt during his first years in office, but then turned on him in 1935 and launched a third party, the Union Party, in the Presidential elections of 1936. This party secured only 900,000 votes nationally, and Coughlin withdrew temporarily from politics. He returned to the air in 1937. Franco and the Spanish Civil War had become major issues, and Coughlin backed Franco against the "Communist" Loyalists. Accompanying the latter issue was a general commitment to isolationism and opposition to an anti-Nazi foreign policy. All these attacks were linked to extreme denunciations of President Roosevelt, the C.I.O., and liberal Democrats as having done little to reduce the economic misfortunes caused by the depression. And in the middle of 1938, he began to war openly and continuously against Jewish influence in politics and business. In a real sense, he attempted to build an anti-elitist, anti-liberal, nationalist movement, similar in many ways to the movements of Perón and Vargas in Argentina and Brazil.

If Coughlin sought to win the support of those whose social and economic position had been worsened by a prolonged depression, McCarthy, as the essays in this book indicate, appealed to the resentments of prosperity. Although he was a Republican Senator, he devoted little of his public discourse to domestic social and economic problems. Rarely after 1950 did he discuss welfare legislation, trade unions, pensions, or other major domestic issues. His attacks were concentrated on domestic Communism. Unlike Coughlin he never criticized Jews or other minority ethnic groups. Rather, McCarthy's ideal-typical Communist enemy was an upper-class Eastern Episcopalian graduate of Harvard employed by the State Department. The threat to our way of life was embodied in upper-class, well-educated Easterners and New Deal liberals, the dominant forces controlling American political life in both parties.

Although McCarthy was in no sense a Fascist, his appeal was nevertheless similar to those of European Fascist movements, which attacked the upper class, big business, and the Socialists. Fascist movements, however, explicitly appealed to the economic and status interests of the lower middle class; McCarthy never attempted an economic-interest appeal. Rather, wittingly or not, he directed his appeal to the status resentment occasioned by prosperity. However,
The Radical Right
dealt largely with the internal Communist conspiracy that had caused the loss of China, had involved us in the then ongoing Korean War, was preventing us from winning it, and had earlier been responsible for the seemingly pro-Russian foreign policy of World War II. Essentially, McCarthy functioned as a critic of New Deal Democratic Party policies and personnel. His fulminations against members of the Eisenhower administration of 1953 and 1954 were directed against their naiveté in not recognizing the need to clean out New Deal-appointed Communists from government, and their insistence on retaining the rules of due process when dealing with alleged subversion.

Some four years after McCarthy was censured by the Senate, the John Birch Society arose, seemingly in response to the failure of the Republican administration to eliminate the "Socialist" policies of its New Deal predecessors, and to its failure to cope adequately with the continued strength of international Communism. For the Birch Society, the liberal Republicans have been as much a danger to American institutions as the New Deal Democrats. Avowed Communists are not the main problem. Rather, the liberals in both parties have been sapping the moral strength of America by continuing the welfare state at home and refusing to fight Communism and Socialism abroad.

In a real sense, therefore, the three "radical-rightist" movements have differed in their domestic ideological approach. Coughlin appealed to the economically outcast against a major symbol of big economic power, the banks. Although opposed to Roosevelt, he did call for greater government aid to the underprivileged, particularly through manipulation of the credit system, restrictions on foreclosures, and the like. McCarthy, though a Republican, concentrated his attack on symbols of upper-class status as well as on the Democratic Party as such. He rarely criticized trade unions, and ignored or praised minority ethnic groups. Of the three leaders, Robert Welch of the Birch Society has been the most explicit in rejecting certain aspects of the democratic process, including universal suffrage, and in openly acknowledging his desire to imitate Communist political tactics, while at the same time proposing an uninhibited and pure version of economic conservatism. Hence, one might be justified in suggesting that the appeal of the first movement was to the underprivileged strata normally associated with leftism; that the second attracted the
middle classes, who have preferred center politics in the European sense (that is, against both the organized left and the upper classes and big business); and that the third, the Birch Society, which espouses economic conservatism, should have its greatest success with the more privileged strata. On other issues, of course, the three have shared similar orientations: isolationism, extreme nationalism, strong emphasis on the internal as well as the external Communist threat, and a lack of respect for due process in dealing with problems of domestic Communism.

Generalizations such as these concerning presumed support can be made from an examination of the speeches and programs of the diverse radical-right groups. To what extent they conform to reality has been a moot question. Although public-opinion-survey organizations have been gathering information concerning the attitudes of the general population since 1935, few scholars have attempted to find out who has supported groups such as these. This lack of knowledge is particularly true with regard to Coughlinism and other movements of the 1930s. Some limited use has been made of the rather large number of surveys conducted by polling organizations regarding attitudes toward McCarthy. Until the essays in this volume, nothing much has been published with regard to public support of the John Birch Society. An effort is now under way at the Survey Research Center of the University of California to analyze the nature of political extremism in the United States, a study that will be based in part on an analysis of public-opinion-survey data dealing with such politics. The study is as yet in a very early stage, but I feel that some preliminary findings that bear on the hypotheses discussed in the first edition of this book ought to be submitted to readers of the second.

I

The Coughlinites

The analysis of the supporters of Father Coughlin is based on two surveys conducted by the Gallup organization in April and December, 1938. Although conducted seven months apart, they show no significant differences with respect to the social characteristics of those indicating approval of Coughlin. Approximately 25 per cent of each sample stated that they supported Father Coughlin.
TABLE 1

OPINION OF FATHER COUGHLIN
(GALLUP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Total in Sample</th>
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<tr>
<td>April 1938</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>(2864)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1938</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>(2068)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that so many stated that they were in favor of Father Coughlin does not mean that such large proportions of the population had Coughlinite attitudes on any specific issues. For example, only 8 per cent of those who approved of him reported having voted for the Union Party's presidential candidate, William Lemke, in 1936. Many who favored Coughlin were also pro-Roosevelt and, in some cases, were sympathetic to Loyalist Spain. Although Coughlin turned openly anti-Semitic in July of 1938, and was sharply attacked by his liberal critics as early as 1935 for being pro-Fascist and sympathetic to racism, some of the Jews in the sample and one-half of the Negroes approved of him in the December survey. It would seem that Coughlin was never perceived by the bulk of the American people as a Fascist and anti-Semite, and that much of his support came from people who disapproved of much of what he advocated.11

The single most important correlate of support for Father Coughlin in 1938 was religion. Although many Catholic priests and bishops openly opposed him and attacked many of his views as being in conflict with Catholic doctrine, there can be little question that Catholics were much more in favor of him than were Protestants.12

As the data in Table 2 suggest, over two-fifths of the Catholics supported him and one-quarter opposed him in December, 1938.13 Among Protestants, less than one-fifth favored Coughlin, while almost one-third expressed disapproval. Coughlin was better known among Catholics than among Protestants; 33 per cent of the former had no opinion of him, as contrasted with over 50 per cent of the latter. Clearly, as we shall see later in the analysis of McCarthy, it is difficult to separate out any judgment concerning a prominent Catholic figure from attitudes toward him as a prominent member of that group.
TABLE 2
RELATION OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION TO ATTITUDES TOWARD COUGHLIN—DECEMBER, 1938
(GALLUP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes Toward Coughlin</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Catholics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(380)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As might be expected, Protestants varied according to denomination in their opinions on Coughlin (see Table 3). Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and Baptists showed the highest excess of disapproval over approval; Methodists and Presbyterians occupied a middle position, somewhat more opposed than favorable; Lutherans were the one Protestant group in which supporters outnumbered opponents. The opposition to Coughlin of Episcopalians and Congregationalists may reflect their position as the churches of high-status, old-stock Americans. The Coughlin support among Lutherans may be due to the fact that Lutherans were often of recent German origin, and hence likely to be isolationists in the years preceding World War II. As will be noted subsequently, the Protestant groups differed similarly among themselves with respect to McCarthy.

TABLE 3
ATTITUDES TOWARD COUGHLIN AMONG DIFFERENT PROTESTANT GROUPS—DECEMBER, 1938
(GALLUP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to Coughlin</th>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(147)</td>
<td>(293)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excess of approval over disapproval in per cent
-14 -9 +8 -7 -24 -22 -21
The second major factor that differentiated supporters of Coughlin from opponents was economic status. Among both Catholics and Protestants, the lower the economic level, the greater the proportion of supporters to opponents (see Table 4).

**TABLE 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS TO ATTITUDES TOWARD COUGHLIN—DECEMBER, 1938 (GALLUP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Attitudes Toward Coughlin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Choice</th>
<th>attenuates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>Protestants and No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above av.</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>+4 (40)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-35 (264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>+13 (121)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-16 (609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>+21 (48)</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-8 (209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>+19 (77)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>+1 (277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Relief</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+21 (98)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0 (245)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Per cent difference between approval and disapproval

Among Catholics of above average means, the proportion approving was only slightly more (4 per cent) than those disapproving, while among poor Catholics, many more (19 per cent) favored Coughlin than opposed him. The same relationship with economic status held among Protestants. Protestants of above average economic level indicated great disapproval, while the proportion approving and disapproving was about the same among poorer Protestants. Occupational variations (not presented here) showed about the same pattern. Manual workers, those on government public works (W.P.A.), and the unemployed were most likely to be Coughlin supporters among both Catholics and Protestants, while in both religious groups, professionals and those in business revealed the least approval and the most opposition.

For some reason, the relative position of white-collar workers differed according to religion. Catholic white-collar workers were among the high-support groups, as high or higher than the manual workers. Among Protestants, white-collar occupations resembled the professionals and businessmen, giving little support to Coughlin. Farmers,
both Catholic and Protestant, tended to be high on the Coughlin side. Although the number of cases in each analytic cell becomes small, the pattern holds when three variables—religion, occupation, and income—are held constant: within a given religious and occupational group, approved of Coughlin increased as economic status decreased.

The combination of socio-economic position and religion explain much of the difference between supporters and opponents, but other factors, of course, played a role. Age was important as a source of differentiation; older people were more likely to back Coughlin than others, holding both religion and income constant. Also, men seem to have been slightly more favorable to Coughlin than women.

Rural areas and small towns have traditionally been identified as centers of conservatism, populism, and anti-Semitism in the United States and other countries. This pattern held true regarding attitudes toward Coughlin. The ratio between support and opposition was most favorable for Coughlin in rural areas and small towns. Only 6 per cent of Catholics living on farms disapproved of Coughlin, as compared with 28 per cent opposed among those living in urban areas. Regionally, Coughlin’s support followed the pattern one might expect from a spokesman in the populist and social-credit tradition, and his greatest support came from the West Central region of the country (Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas). New England, with its high concentration of Irish Catholics, was second highest. The areas of least Coughlin support were the West Coast and the South.

Although public-opinion surveys did not secure information on ethnic background during the 1930s, and hence it is impossible to relate these findings to ethnicity, other sources suggest that the regional support for Coughlin may have reflected his specific ethnic appeal to German and Irish Catholics. An ecological analysis of the 1936 vote for Coughlin’s presidential candidate, Lemke, indicates that it was concentrated in areas that were disproportionately Irish and German Catholic.

Outside of North Dakota [his home state], Lemke got more than 10 per cent of the vote in thirty-nine counties. Twenty-one of these counties are more than 50 per cent Catholic. In twenty-eight of these thirty-nine counties the predominant nationality element is German.

The only four cities where Lemke got more than 5 per cent of the vote are also heavily German and Irish Catholic.  

15
The analysis of the demographic background factors suggests clearly that Coughlin was strongest among Catholics and Lutherans in contrast to other Protestants and to Jews, among the less well-to-do, among farmers and those living in small communities, among older people as compared with young ones, and among those living in the Midwest and New England, as contrasted with the Far West and the South.

The surveys permit some limited specification of the attitudes of Coughlin's supporters. The best available measure of opinion on foreign policy at the time is the attitude toward the protagonists in the Spanish Civil War. Religious affiliation played a major role in affecting the opinions of both supporters and opponents of Coughlin. Catholics as a group favored the Rebels (40 per cent for Franco, 20 per cent for the Loyalists); Protestants backed the Loyalists (40 per cent to 10 per cent). Among both Catholics and Protestants at each economic level, Coughlin supporters were more disposed to favor Franco than were those who disapproved of the radio priest. However, in spite of Coughlin's repeated concentration on the Spanish Civil War issue, only 43 per cent of his Catholic supporters and a mere 8 per cent of his Protestant followers espoused his position regarding Franco. Seemingly, concern with the Communist issue in the Spanish Civil War was not a major source of Father Coughlin's popular appeal.

Analysis of attitudes toward domestic issues suggests that, religious identification apart, Coughlin's support was due in large part to economic dissatisfaction. Coughlin backers at every economic level were much more discontented with their lot, with the economic state of the country, and with prospects for the future than were his opponents. For example, two-thirds of his supporters felt their personal economic situation had been declining, while among those opposed to Coughlin slightly less than one-half felt that their situation had worsened.

The antagonism expressed by Coughlin to the existing business system, to exorbitant profits, to bankers (Jewish and others), and the fact that his support came largely from the lower class would lead one to expect that Coughlinites would express greater antipathy to Republicans and conservatism than to Democrats and liberalism. The data do not bear out this assumption. Those who approved of Coughlin in 1938 were more likely to support the G.O.P. than the Democratic Party, and conservatism rather than liberalism. Sup-
porters of Coughlin were only slightly more favorable to a third party than his opponents (11 per cent as compared to 8 per cent). The party preferences of Coughlin supporters may be inferred from responses to a question posed in the April, 1938, survey: "If you were voting for a Congressman today, would you be most likely to vote for the Republican, the Democrat, or a third party Candidate?" Among Coughlin supporters who expressed a partisan choice, 40 per cent preferred the Democrats, while 55 per cent of Coughlin's opponents backed the Democrats. These differences are evident within each economic category as well (see Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Approve of Coughlin</th>
<th>Disapprove of Coughlin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938 Vote Intention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor+</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On relief</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approval of Coughlin may have meant sharply different things to those of differing economic position. Though at every level Coughlin backers were more often for the Republicans than were those who opposed him, the percentage of those who preferred the Democratic Party and also endorsed Coughlin increased with lower income. The same pattern occurred with respect to attitude toward President Roosevelt; that is, most of the poor and those on relief who approved of Coughlin supported Roosevelt.
The data on party support and opinion of Roosevelt presented in Table 6 suggest that many poor people who backed Coughlin did so in spite of, or without knowledge of, his attitude toward Roosevelt. It is likely that among the less educated and the underprivileged both Coughlin and Roosevelt were viewed in similar lights. Those who felt friendly to Father Coughlin were clearly not of one political persuasion, and he failed to get more than a small minority of them to back his third-party candidate. It seems evident that his well-to-do supporters were a different group ideologically than his lower-strata backers. The former may have found him to their liking because of his antagonism to Roosevelt and the New Deal, his opposition to the rise of the C.I.O. unions, and his advocacy of militant action to block the rise of Communist forces at home and abroad. For his lower-class supporters, Coughlin’s attacks on capitalism, the banks, Jewish financiers, and inept government handling of the depression may have been crucial. Though he failed to build his own party or movement, he did reach a large audience every Sunday on the radio and was regarded favorably by a considerable section of the populace, many of whom were traditional Catholic and working-class Democrats. One might speculate, therefore, as to whether the issues raised by Coughlin may have contributed to the drop-off in Democratic support, particularly among Catholics, in 1938 and 1940. Coughlin may have been instrumental in transferring support from the Democratic to the Republican Party.

Evidence tending to confirm this hypothesis may be found in comparisons between the 1936 Presidential vote and 1938 opinion on parties and candidates. In the latter year, Coughlin supporters who had voted for Roosevelt in 1936 were more likely to have changed...
their opinion concerning the President than were Roosevelt voters who disapproved of the radio priest.

The same relationship holds in a comparison of the 1936 vote with the party choice of voters in the 1938 Congressional elections. Among those who voted for Roosevelt in 1936 and approved of Coughlin in 1938, only 50 per cent said they would vote Democratic, while among Roosevelt voters who disapproved of Coughlin, 64 per cent remained faithful to the Democrats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Toward Coughlin</th>
<th>1936 Presidential Vote</th>
<th>1938 Party Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROOSEVELT</td>
<td>LANDON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coughlin has often been considered a prototype of American fascism. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 15 or 25 per cent of the population who in 1938 and 1939 supported him did not actually believe in Fascism. There may be some question as to whether most of Coughlin's supporters agreed with his anti-Semitism. Unfortunately none of the surveys inquiring about attitudes toward Coughlin solicited opinions about the Jews. Other surveys made during this period did, however, contain questions on anti-Semitism, and these permit some estimate of the relationship of Coughlin support to expressed prejudice, since it is possible to examine the beliefs of Union Party voters. As expected, most of those who reported in 1938 that they had voted for Lemke in the previous Presidential election indicated approval of Coughlin. Lemke voters were more likely to indicate anti-Semitic beliefs than the rest of the population, but the difference was not large. The data from two 1939 Gallup surveys that asked whether respondents would support "a campaign against Jews" indicate that 21 per cent of 1936 Lemke voters, 12 per cent of Roosevelt supporters, and 8 per cent of Landon voters were overtly anti-Semitic. Further, in national surveys both before and after Coughlin began his anti-Semitic attacks, the same proportion (12 per
The Radical Right

cent) reported they would support a campaign against Jews. While these findings suggest that Coughlin's backers were probably more anti-Semitic than the population in general, it is well to keep in mind that the large majority of his Union Party supporters did not give anti-Semitic responses to the survey questions.\textsuperscript{17}

The data concerning the social characteristics of Coughlin's followers challenge the generalizations expressed by some that Coughlinism as a form of proto-Fascism appealed primarily to the middle class.\textsuperscript{18} As contrasted with European Fascist movements, which recruited disproportionately from the middle strata (small business and white-collar elements), Coughlin, religious appeal apart, drew his support from manual workers and the unemployed. The one common link between the class base of the Coughlin movement and that of the European Fascists was the farmers. Populist antagonism toward the bankers together with general anti-elitist and anti-cosmopolitan attitudes may have accounted for this support. If Coughlin's movement was a Fascist movement, then it represented a version of "proletarian" fascism more comparable to that of Perón and Vargas than to those of Hitler and Mussolini.

II

The Social Base of McCarthyism

It is extremely difficult to ascertain from survey data the proportion of "McCarthyites" in the population during the Senator's heyday. Part of the difficulty arises from the varying meanings that might be attached to the questions posed. Some queries centered on general issue of the prevalence and threat of domestic Communism, while others focused more specifically on Senator McCarthy and approval and disapproval of his tactics. Questions phrased in general terms of whether McCarthy's allegations about Communists in government were largely true or not usually produced a rather large proportion of "pro-McCarthy" replies. But questions implying a more direct evaluation of the Senator himself—e.g., how McCarthy's endorsement of a candidate would affect one's vote—produced a very different pattern of response. When attitude toward the existence of Communists in government was not mentioned, somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent were favorable, while about 30 to 40 per cent were opposed to the Wisconsin Senator. Once in existence, McCarthyism became a much more salient issue to the liberal enemies
of the Senator than to his conservative or militantly anti-Communist friends. The Communist issue apart, many more people reacted negatively to the mention of his name than positively. His seeming popularity was a result of his riding the existing powerful anti-Communist bandwagon, whose popular influence he may have ultimately reduced rather than enhanced by alienating the militant anti-Communists who believed in due process.\(^9\) This conclusion does not mean that McCarthyism did not exist as a political force. There was a significant minority of Americans who strongly identified with the Senator from Wisconsin, and who approved of any and all methods he used to fight the Communist enemy. Some of them presumably were attracted to, or at least accepted, his attack on the Eastern upper-class elite and on internationalism. But this group of "McCarthystes" was probably always a minority, much smaller than the "anti-McCarthystes," who saw in him and his followers a basic threat to the democratic process once the symbol of McCarthyism had been created as a political issue.

Many of the political policies discussed in the original edition of this book as aspects of McCarthyism clearly have to be differentiated from the symbolic role the Wisconsin Senator played in American political life. The original essays were generally concerned with the sentiment for anti-Communist controls in government, university, and private life. However, sources of support for such policies have always existed independently of the activities of Senator McCarthy. Many, if not most, of those who have favored strong internal security measures have not differentiated as to which agencies should have primary jurisdiction. Many have felt that any public, legitimate anti-Communist activity is worthwhile; every time a crisis brings the issue of Communist subversion to the fore, they indicate their approval of anti-Communist activities if interviewed or called upon to vote in a referendum.

Even in the New Deal period, survey data indicated that the bulk of the population supported the outlawing of the Communist Party and approved of the original House Un-American Activities Committee, led by Martin Dies. In November, 1937, 54 per cent of a national Gallup sample favored a law permitting the police to "pad-lock places printing Communist literature"; only 35 per cent opposed such a measure. In June, 1938, 53 per cent of a national sample indicated they were against allowing Communists to hold meetings in their community, while only 35 per cent were willing to give
Communists this right. In November, 1939, 68 per cent were opposed to allowing "leaders of the Communist Party [to] make speeches to student groups" and only 24 per cent approved. In June of 1942, at a time when the Soviet Union was a military ally of the United States, 50 per cent favored a law preventing membership in the Communist Party, while 36 per cent were against the proposed act. A number of surveys that inquired in 1938 and 1939 whether respondents approved of continuing the Dies Committee reported that approximately three-quarters favored the committee.20

Popular awareness of the international Communist threat undoubtedly increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the advent of the Berlin blockade in 1948, the fall of China in 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, but public acceptance of civil liberties for Communists neither increased nor decreased.

McCarthy differed from other anti-Communist investigators in a number of ways. He was more successful in gaining personal attention through his claims to specific knowledge of numerous Communists in government agencies. His attack on the Eastern elite groups as the major source of Communist infiltration was unique. And he was probably more identified than other anti-Communist politicians with efforts to link Democratic international policies with the growth of international Communism. Consequently, he appealed to the isolationists and other antagonists of American foreign policy. Like Father Coughlin, he was an Irish Catholic and may have also had symbolic significance to the Catholic Irish, and other ethnic groups, which felt resentment in a society dominated by an old American Anglo-Saxon elite. These groups have tended to be isolationist as a result of ethnic identifications with "old-country" issues, and, as Catholics, have been especially sensitive to the Communist issue.

A number of quantitative analyses of the sources of McCarthy's support have been published since the original edition of this book appeared. A summary of the findings of many of these studies is contained in an article by Nelson Polsby.21 His report indicates that McCarthy received disproportionate support from Catholics, New Englanders, Republicans, the less educated, the lower class, manual workers, farmers, older people, and the Irish.

These findings coincide, on the whole, with the original assumptions of the authors of these essays, but Polsby suggests that the
evidence from these surveys and from an examination of the results of different election campaigns in which McCarthy, or McCarthyism were issues indicate that most of McCarthy's support can be attributed to his identification as a Republican fighting Democrats. In other words, the vast bulk of his backing came from regular Republicans, while the large majority of Democrats opposed him. And Polsby notes that while survey results do sustain the original hypotheses, "this relatively meagre empirical confirmation is unimpressive when set against comparable figures describing the two populations [pro- and anti-McCarthy] by their political affiliations."

Undoubtedly Polsby is correct in stressing the linkage between party identification and attitude toward McCarthy. Some confirming evidence was reported in a study of the 1954 election by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, which showed the positive relationship between degrees of party commitment and attitude toward McCarthy.

### TABLE 8
**RELATIONSHIP OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO ATTITUDE TOWARD McCARTHY—OCTOBER, 1954**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Toward McCarthy</th>
<th>Strong Commitment</th>
<th>Weak Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-McCarthy</td>
<td>10% Dem.</td>
<td>9% Dem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>37% Dem.</td>
<td>44% Dem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-McCarthy</td>
<td>50% Ind.</td>
<td>40% Ind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Responses</td>
<td>3% Rep.</td>
<td>7% Rep.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on replies to question: "If you knew that Senator McCarthy was supporting a candidate for Congress, would you be more likely to vote for that candidate, or less likely to vote for that candidate, or wouldn't it make any difference to you?"


The association between McCarthy support and Republicanism does not, of course, tell us how many former Democrats and Independents may have joined Republican ranks prior to 1954, because their social situation or personal values made them sympathetic to McCarthy's version of radical right ideology. As has been noted, a
considerable section of Coughlin's 1938 backing came from individu- 
als who had supported Roosevelt in 1936, but had later rejected 
him. There is no reliable means of demonstrating the extent to which 
Coughlin or McCarthy contributed to a move away from the Demo-
crats, but the available evidence is at least compatible with the 
 hypothesis that they were to some extent influential. A 1954 study 
by the International Research Associates (I.N.R.A.) inquired as to 
the respondent's votes in 1948 and 1952. A comparison of the re-
lation between 1948 voting, attitude toward McCarthy, and 1952 
Presidential vote indicates that over half of those who voted for 
Truman in 1948 and subsequently favored McCarthy voted for Ei-
senhower in 1952, while two-thirds of the anti-McCarthy Truman 
voters favored Stevenson (Table 9). A similar relationship between 
supporting McCarthy and shifting away from the Democrats is sug-
gested in a study by the Roper public-opinion organization.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1952</th>
<th>Truman</th>
<th>Dewey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Pro-McCarthy</td>
<td>Anti-McCarthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevenson</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(506)</td>
<td>(1381)</td>
<td>(563)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more detailed analysis of the sources of McCarthy's support, 
conducted along the lines of the analysis of Coughlin's backing, how-
ever, belies the suggestion that party affiliation had more bearing on 
approval or disapproval of McCarthy than other explanatory variables. 
The 1952 Roper study and the 1954 I.N.R.A. survey both suggest 
that the most important single attribute associated with opinion of 
McCarthy was education, while a 1954 national study conducted 
by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center indicated 
that religious affiliation was of greater significance than party. Table 
10 below shows the relationship between education, party identi-
fication, and attitude toward McCarthy.23
The relationship between less education and support of McCarthy is consistent with what is known about the effect of education on political attitudes in general; higher education often makes for greater tolerance, greater regard for due process, and increased tolerance of ambiguity. The less educated were probably attracted, too, by the anti-elitist, anti-intellectual character of McCarthy’s oratory, replete with attacks on the “socially pedigreed.”

The findings from the surveys with respect to occupation are what might be anticipated, given the preceding results. Those non-manual occupations that require the highest education—i.e., professional and executive or managerial positions—were the most anti-McCarthy (Table 11). And as was suggested in my original essay, independent businessmen were the most favorable to McCarthy among middle-class or non-manual occupations. Workers (including those engaged in personal service) were more favorable to McCarthy than were those in the middle-class occupations, with the exception of independent businessmen.

Farmers were also a pro-McCarthy group, according to three out of the four surveys and the many studies summarized by Polsby. When viewed in occupational categories, McCarthy’s main opponents were to be found among professional, managerial, and clerical personnel, while his support was disproportionately located among self-employed businessmen, farmers, and manual workers.

In the I.N.R.A. survey, it was possible to examine the attitudes of two groups not in the labor force—students and retired persons. Students were overwhelmingly opposed to McCarthy, while retired
TABLE 11
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD MCCARTHY

Per Cent Difference Between Approvers and Disapproversa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>(731)</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>(219)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. &amp; Manager</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>(511)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>(387)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>(1144)</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>(317)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>(235)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind. Bus.</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>(583)</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>(235)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor &amp; Foreman</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>(405)</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>(178)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>(2323)</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>(184)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>(1019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Serv.</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>(677)</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>(163)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>(824)</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>(154)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>(709)</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>(188)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>(237)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan—1954d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. &amp; Bus.</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>(246)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cler. &amp; Sales</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>(337)</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>(165)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>(144)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Cell entries represent per-cent difference between approval and disapproval of McCarthy.

b Occupation of respondent recorded, or of chief wage earner if respondent is a housewife.

c Occupation of respondent recorded; housewives omitted from table.

d Occupation of head of household recorded.

Thus far, the analysis suggests that McCarthy’s support was in many ways similar to Father Coughlin’s. Both men derived strength from the lower classes and the rural population. They differed only in the relatively greater appeal of the Senator to self-employed businessmen. These results would suggest that the differences in the ideologies of the two men are not paralleled by differences in the character of persons were among the groups least opposed to the Senator. These findings presumably reflect the combined influences of age and education. The attitudes of the retired may have been influenced by several factors associated with age—e.g., particular sensitivity to the rise of Communism and the decline of American prestige; greater political conservatism; and greater rigidity. Moreover, retired persons probably feel most acutely the effects of status deprivation because of both their decline in social importance and their disadvantageous economic position in a period of moderate inflation.
their support. However, when socio-economic status rather than occupation is taken as an indicator of class, differing patterns of support emerge for the Senator and for Coughlin. The Coughlin analysis indicated a high correlation between socio-economic status (a measure of the style of life of the respondent, largely reflecting income) and approval of the priest. Those of low status were much more likely to approve of him than those of high status. When the corresponding comparison is made for McCarthy, we find a much smaller, almost insignificant, association. Lower-status persons were slightly less likely to support McCarthy than the more privileged ones. This result is initially quite surprising, since both education and occupation, themselves highly correlated with socio-economic status, were, as we have seen, related to attitudes toward McCarthy. The solution to this apparent puzzle lies in the finding that when either education or occupation is held constant—that is, when we compare those high or low on socio-economic status within the same educational or occupational categories—the data show that the higher the socio-economic-status level, the greater the proportion of McCarthy supporters. This finding holds true particularly among Republicans; in general, the socio-economic-status level had little effect on attitude toward McCarthy among Democrats of a given occupational or educational level. Thus, while lower educational and occupational status were associated with support for the Wisconsin Senator, within either category higher socio-economic status made for greater receptivity to his message among Republicans. Perhaps the higher-income people within lower occupational or educational strata were precisely those who were most drawn to an ideology that attacked as pro-Communist both liberal lower-class-based politics and moderate, conservative old upper-class-elitist groups.

Some of the original essays suggested that McCarthy's strength reflected the frustrations inherent in status discrepancies. In periods of full employment and widespread economic opportunity, some who rise economically do not secure the social status commensurate with their new economic position. Conversely, others, whose financial position has not improved at a corresponding rate (or has worsened), find their social status relatively higher than their economic position. Such status incongruities were presumed to have created sharp resentments about general social developments, which predisposed individuals to welcome McCarthy's attack on the elite and on the New Deal. Efforts to test these hypotheses with the data now available
proved unfruitful. For the most part, these analytic efforts took the form of contrasting persons whose status attributes were discordant—e.g., high education and low occupational status—with those whose status determinants were consistent, both high or both low. Seemingly, either the original hypotheses were inadequate or these indicators are not refined enough to reflect serious status tensions.

One as yet unpublished study, however, did find some empirical support for these assumptions. Robert Sokol attempted to see whether the subjective perception of status discrepancy ("felt status inconsistency") was related to McCarthyism. The analysis indicated that conscious concern with status inconsistency and McCarthyism were related: "The more strain, the greater will be the tendency to be a McCarthy supporter; with 62 per cent of the high-strain men being pro-McCarthy, in contrast with 47 per cent of those feeling a little strain and 39 per cent of those without any concern about the relative ranks of their statuses." These findings held within different analytic sub-groups. While much more work remains to be done to analyze the relationship between status strain and political protest, and between objective discrepancy and subjective strains, Sokol's research suggests that the general assumptions about the relationship of the status strains of an open society and the type of political protest represented by McCarthy may have some validity.

The findings concerning the relation of education and occupational status to support of McCarthy seem to confirm the hypothesis presented in the original essays concerning stratification factors and McCarthyism. Another hypothesis was that McCarthyism also reflected strains inherent in the varying statuses of different ethnic and religious groups in American society. It was assumed that Catholics and other recent immigrant groups with relatively low status, or with ethnic ties to neutral or Axis nations, were disposed to favor McCarthy, while those of high status or with ethnic links to Allied nations opposed the Senator. These generalizations also tend to be supported by survey data. It is clear, as has already been noted, that Catholics as a group were more pro-McCarthy than Protestants, who in turn were somewhat more favorable to him than were Jews. The strong relationship between religious affiliation and attitude toward McCarthy among supporters of the two parties may be seen in Table 12, taken from the University of Michigan study.

Within the Protestant group, the ranking of the different denominations with respect to sentiment toward McCarthy corre-
TABLE 12
ATTITUDES TOWARD McCARTHY ACCORDING TO RELIGION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION—1954
(MICHIGAN SURVEY)

Protestants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes on McCarthy</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Ind.</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess of Anti over Pro</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (184) (213) (173) (128) (123)

Source: Campbell and Cooper, op. cit., p. 149.

Catholics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes on McCarthy</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Ind.</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess of Anti over Pro</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (51) (58) (55) (25) (18)

sponded on the whole to their socio-economic status. As Table 13 shows, the higher the status of the members of a denomination, the more antagonistic the group was toward the Wisconsin Senator.

TABLE 13
PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONAL SUPPORT FOR McCARTHY—1952
(ROPER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Toward McCarthy</th>
<th>Per Cent of Group High in SES</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Difference Between Agrees and Disagrees</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Episcopalians</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregationalists</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodists</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterians</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutherans</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptists</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methodists constitute an exception to this generalization: although a relatively low-status group, they were more anti-McCarthy than the Lutherans or Presbyterians. The rank order of denominations in terms of McCarthy support is, with the exception of the Baptists, identical with that reported earlier for Coughlin (see Table 14). Baptists ranked relatively high in opposition to Coughlin and in support for McCarthy. It is difficult to suggest any plausible explanation for this change in the position of the Baptists other than that they may have been particularly antagonistic to the Catholic Church, and hence unwilling to approve the political activities of a priest, yet not deterred from supporting a Catholic Senator.

**TABLE 14**

**RANK ORDER OF DIFFERENT PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS IN SUPPORT OF COUGHLIN AND McCARTHY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Support</th>
<th>Coughlin—1938</th>
<th>McCarthy—1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lutherans</td>
<td>Baptists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterians</td>
<td>Lutherns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodists</td>
<td>Presbyterians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptists</td>
<td>Methodists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregationalists</td>
<td>Congregationalists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Support</th>
<th>Episcopalian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Both the I.N.R.A. and Roper surveys contain information concerning the ethnic origins of respondents which permits an elaboration of the relationship between ethnic and religious identification and McCarthy support (see Table 15). Unfortunately, the two studies differed greatly in the wording of questions on ethnicity. Because I.N.R.A. asked for the country of ancestors, while Roper asked for the country of the respondents' grandparents, the Roper survey reported many more Protestants as simply "American" in background. Among Catholics, too, the Roper survey reported a smaller proportion with German or British ancestry than did the I.N.R.A. survey. On the other hand, I.N.R.A.'s request for country of ancestors produced a large "don't know" or "no answer" group. About 20 per cent of the whites did not reply to the question.

Differences in attitude between the ethnic groups were more pronounced among Catholics than Protestants in both the Roper and the I.N.R.A. studies. In the Roper survey, Irish Catholics were 18 per cent more favorable to the Senator than unfavorable, while "old American" Catholics were 11 per cent more negative than positive.
Among Protestants, on the other hand, those of German origin were the most pro-McCarthy (2 per cent), while those of British ancestry were most opposed (—8 per cent).

### TABLE 15
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDES ON MCCARTHY

**Per Cent Difference Between Approvers and Disapprovers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Generation Amer.</td>
<td>(198)</td>
<td>—11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>+18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>—6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Generation Amer.</td>
<td>(1190)</td>
<td>—2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>(172)</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>—8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>—3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>—6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>(252)</td>
<td>—7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>(252)</td>
<td>—2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>(545)</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(393)</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany &amp; Austria</td>
<td>(424)</td>
<td>—6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>(272)</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>(246)</td>
<td>—2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>(1037)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>(487)</td>
<td>—21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany &amp; Austria</td>
<td>(1266)</td>
<td>—19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>(1814)</td>
<td>—25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scand. &amp; Holl.</td>
<td>(851)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>(245)</td>
<td>—54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>(438)</td>
<td>—13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Too few cases for stable estimates

Results from both surveys show that Irish and Italian Catholics were among the most pro-McCarthy groups. The Roper data indicate that Germans, both Catholic and Protestant, were disproportionately in favor of McCarthy, but the I.N.R.A. materials do not confirm this finding. The explanation for this seeming inconsistency may lie in the differing formulation of the questions on ethnicity. It may be that McCarthy appealed successfully to the "Roper" Germans whose family had emigrated to the United States within the past three generations, and consequently retained emotional ties to Germany that made them receptive to McCarthy's isolationist appeal. "I.N.R.A." Germans are likely to have been old-stock Americans and, like other "old American" groups, predisposed to disapprove of the Wisconsin Senator.

In summary, it appears that the findings concerning ethnic and religious factors agree with the hypotheses suggested in the original
essays—that is, McCarthy was generally opposed by descendants of old American Protestant families, and he drew disproportionately from Catholics of recent immigrant background. The two minority groups whose circumstances have led them to identify with liberal Democratic groups and leaders, the Jews and the Negroes, were among those most strongly opposed to McCarthy.

Thus far, the discussion has centered on the relationship between attitudes toward McCarthy and various background characteristics. Many of the original interpretations of the Senator also posited certain attitudinal and personality characteristics as being linked to support for or opposition to McCarthy. It has been argued that he appealed to isolationists, to those who were most hostile to international Communism, to ardent economic conservatives, to "authoritarian personalities," and to the bigoted. To specify the exact relationship between such attitudes and McCarthy support would require a more detailed analysis than is possible in this preliminary report. At this stage, I would like to summarize the relationships found between certain attitude items and opinions concerning McCarthy.

There seems little doubt that isolationists—i.e., those who opposed aid to foreign countries, disliked support of the United Nations, and favored strong measures in dealing with the Russians—were more disposed to back the Wisconsin Senator than those who took a more internationalist position on such issues.

McCarthy also drew disproportionately from economic conservatives. Measures of such attitudes as position on liberalism in general, laws to prevent strikes, a federal health program, and support of private development of national resources all indicate that the conservative position on these issues was associated with greater support for McCarthy.

Perhaps more significant than the fact that support of McCarthy correlated with conservative and isolationist political attitudes is that these relationships are on the whole so weak. Clearly, many persons who opposed the Senator's views on important issues reported that they approved of him, his committee, or his charges. Referring to the December, 1954, Gallup survey, completed after McCarthy was censured by the Senate, we find that many still supported him while holding opinions contrary to his. For example, one-third of those who preferred a peaceful-coexistence policy or who favored
### TABLE 16

#### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPINIONS ON VARIOUS FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD McCARTHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude Toward McCarthy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break Off Diplomatic Relations with Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I.N.R.A.—1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>(3641)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>(2550)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw from the United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I.N.R.A.—1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(870)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>(6291)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Coexistence Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallup— Dec. 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>(694)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(399)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>(1042)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>(231)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to Handle the Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roper—1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive War</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>(274)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep Strong</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>(1923)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Settlement</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>(343)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War Policy for U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roper—1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do as we did</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(577)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep trying for peace</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>(665)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go further militarily</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>(1284)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be tough</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>(1585)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pull out of Korea</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(378)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give Economic Aid to Under-Developed Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I.N.R.A.—1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(5343)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>(1620)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockading the Coast of Communist China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallup— Dec. 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>(495)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(550)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw Foreign Aid From Nations Which Refuse to Co-operate with U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallup— Dec. 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(1059)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>(258)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the United Nations were opposed to the Senate censure. With respect to domestic matters, thirty per cent of those who described their political views as liberal rather than conservative were favorable toward McCarthy at the end of 1954. Thus a significant minority of liberals and internationalists were for the Senator throughout his brief career as a leader of the radical right. Conversely, most of those who took conservative and isolationist positions on these issues were opposed to or had no opinion concerning his political activities, though on any given issue they supported him more than did liberals or internationalists.

A more complex relationship between opinion on domestic issues and McCarthyism than is indicated by this preliminary analysis of national survey data has been suggested by a study of attitudes toward McCarthy in a Vermont city. Martin Trow has suggested that the support of McCarthy by small businessmen reflected their perception of him as an opponent of the power elite as well as of unions and the liberal welfare state. He argued that those who fear the "growing concentration of economic power in government, unions, and business enterprises" saw these as "McCarthy's often thinly concealed targets."

To test this assumption, Trow divided his respondents into four political categories on the basis of their attitudes toward big business and trade unions. These were: (1) labor-liberals—those who were favorable to trade unions and hostile to large corporations; (2) nineteenth-century liberals—those who were opposed to trade unions and to large corporations; (3) moderate conservatives—those who supported trade unions but were also favorable to large business; and (4) right-wing conservatives—those who were hostile to unions and favorable to big business. In terms of this typology, the "nineteenth-century liberals"—anti-big business and anti-trade unions—should be most pro-McCarthy. Trow's data indicate that this combination of attitudes was in fact held more widely by small businessmen than by any other occupational stratum, and that those who held it, whether businessmen or not, were most likely to favor McCarthy. Three-fifths, or 60 per cent, of the "nineteenth-century liberals" approved of McCarthy's methods, while among those in the other three categories, between 35 and 38 per cent indicated approval for McCarthy's methods. Efforts at partial replication of Trow's analysis with the I.N.R.A. data did not yield comparable results since the labor-liberals were the most anti-Mc-
Carthy group, while the other three groups, though somewhat more pro-McCarthy, were almost identical in their degree of support.

At the moment, all that can be said is that two surveys made at different times in different places, and using different indicators of McCarthy sentiment and political attitudes, yielded differing results. The hypothesis must be placed in the category of the not proven.

Efforts to account for adherence to extremist political ideologies, and to McCarthyism in particular, have suggested that such groups cannot be explained solely or even primarily by an analysis of the values and interests of their supporters. Rather, it has been argued that the support for extremist ideologies and conspiracy theories of politics is also related to personality structure—i.e., that certain types of people find such politics congruent with their psychological needs. These hypotheses have often been linked to the findings in *The Authoritarian Personality,* which suggested there is a definite personality type that is oriented toward strong leadership, is intolerant, dislikes ambiguity, and so forth.

Some of the essays reprinted here speculated along these lines with regard to the sources of McCarthy's support, suggesting, as I did, that he drew disproportionately from those with "personality frustration and repressions [that] result in the adoption of scapegoat sentiments." One of the earliest analyses of McCarthy support, Harold Hodges' study of a Wisconsin town, reported that "the statistically typical McCarthy supporter . . . is more conformistic, agreeing that there are too many 'oddballs' around, that the 'good' American doesn't stand out among his fellow Americans, and that children should not develop hobbies which are rare or unusual. . . . He expresses a more misanthropic social outlook, concurring with the statement that 'people are out to cheat you' and that there is 'wickedness, cheating and corruption all about us.'" The Sokol community survey, discussed earlier, also reported a strong relationship between personality traits and support of McCarthy. Those who were more intolerant of ambiguity were also more pro-McCarthy. This relationship held even when examined within the categories of education and religious affiliation, two variables that have been shown to affect such attitudes. To test these hypotheses on a broader scale, data taken from a national survey made by the National Opinion Research Center (N.O.R.C.) in 1953, which con-
tained items taken from the original Authoritarian Personality scale, have been reanalyzed here.\textsuperscript{34}

Propensity to agree with items designed to measure authoritarian predispositions correlated highly with attitudes toward McCarthy within educational, occupational, or religious groupings. For example, within the three educational categories of college, high school, and grammar school, those high on the Authoritarian Personality scale were much more likely to have approved of the McCarthy committee in June, 1953, than those with low scores (Table 17). Seemingly, reactions to the Senator were not only a function of social position, perception of self-interest, or party identification, but were also affected by that component of "character" that the Authoritarian Personality scale measures.

It is significant to note that the largest differences in response to McCarthy occurred within the category of the college-educated. Those among them who were low on the Authoritarian Personality scale were least likely to approve of the Senator, but the college-educated who were high on the measure of authoritarianism gave more support to the McCarthy committee than any segment of those who had not gone beyond grade school. Since various studies have indicated that propensity to give an authoritarian response is inversely related to education, this finding suggests that the Authoritarian Personality scale serves best as a predictor of attitude predispositions among the well educated. Among the less educated, a high authoritarianism score reflects in some part attitudes common to the group and that are also subject to modification by more education. If someone is well educated and still gives authoritarian responses, then the chances are that he really has a basic tendency to react in an authoritarian fashion. However, as Table 17 indicates, there is a relationship between propensity to give "authoritarian" responses and support of McCarthy within the three education groups.

Although McCarthy never attacked minority ethnic groups and seemed to have consciously tried to avoid linking Jews to Communism, many of his critics have felt certain that McCarthyism appealed to religious and racial bigots. Liberals have generally believed that anti-Semitism and rightist politics are associated, and have therefore assumed that, while any given form of right-wing extremism may not be overtly anti-Semitic, such movements attract anti-Semites. With respect to McCarthyism, there has been the further assumption that those who believed in Jews as a hidden source of social ills
would also be disposed to believe in a hidden domestic Communist conspiracy that had infiltrated the government. The evidence available from the various studies bearing on this issue, however, does not bear out these assumptions.

The I.N.R.A. pre-election study in 1954 asked respondents whether they would be more or less likely to vote for a Congressional candidate if they knew he was Jewish. About 3 per cent said they would be more likely to vote for a Jewish candidate; 17 per cent gave an anti-Semitic response, saying that they would be more likely to oppose a Jewish candidate; while the remaining four-fifths of the sample said knowledge of Jewish background would not affect their vote decision. Comparing the relationship between sentiments toward Jewish Congressional candidates and attitudes to candidates who were pro- or anti-McCarthy produced the startling result that the small group of philo-Semites—those who were favorable to Jew-

### TABLE 17
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MCCARTHY COMMITTEE AND SCORE ON AN “AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY: SCALE WITHIN EDUCATIONAL GROUPINGS”—1953 (N.O.R.C.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education and Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Difference Between Approvers and Disapprovers</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grammar School</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Authoritarian</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High School</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High equals an authoritarian response on at least four items; medium means an authoritarian score on two or three items; low indicates no or one authoritarian response out of the five items.
ish candidates—were much more likely to be pro-McCarthy than those who were against Jewish Congressional candidates. The latter were also much more likely to be anti-McCarthy than those who said their vote would not be influenced by the candidate's being Jewish.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to McCarthy</th>
<th>More Likely to Vote for Pro</th>
<th>More Likely to Vote for Anti</th>
<th>Difference between pro and anti responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(234)</td>
<td>(7557)</td>
<td>(1640)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This result is so surprising as to suggest the existence of an intervening factor associated with one or the other attitude so as to produce a spurious result. To check on such a possibility, the relationship between McCarthyism and anti-Semitism was analyzed within education groups, religious groups, and party-identification groups. The finding, however, still occurred in all. Among the college-educated, as among the high-school- or grammar-school-educated, the same pattern held up—the small percent of those who were philo-Jewish were more pro-McCarthy. Catholics were less anti-Semitic than Protestants, but within both religious groups McCarthy support and anti-Semitism were inversely related. The relationship was also sustained within the three political categories of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.35

If we assume that there is some reliability in this result, that it truly measured popular attitudes at the time, it is conceivable that the result is a product of McCarthy's association with various minority ethnicities including Jews. The I.N.R.A. study was made after McCarthy's association with Roy Cohn and David Schein, two men publically identified as Jews, had become a matter of public discussion and controversy. This identification may have led many rank-
and-file supporters of the Senator to perceive Jews as being on their side. All this is highly speculative, but the fact remains that the I.N.R.A. results do produce a result that reverses any assumptions about a positive relationship between McCarthyism and anti-Semitism.

The finding that McCarthy supporters were not prone to accept anti-Semitic beliefs is reinforced by a report of a November, 1954, N.O.R.C. study based on a national sample of 1200 Christian respondents. This survey found no relationship between attitudes toward McCarthy and willingness to accept Jews as next-door neighbors. When educational differences were controlled, no consistent linkage between the two attitudes could be observed. (However, since writing this article, my own further analysis of the data of this study has indicated that there is a slight relationship between rejecting Jews as neighbors and being pro-McCarthy in the total sample.)

The lack of a positive relationship between McCarthyism and anti-Semitism may reflect a more general absence of any relationship between ethnic prejudice and McCarthy support. A 1954 Gallup survey inquired, “Would you object to having your children attend a school where the majority of pupils are Negro?” Over half of the sample (about 55 per cent) indicated they would object. When the sample was divided between followers and opponents of McCarthy within educational categories, there was no consistent relationship between the willingness to send one’s children to a predominantly Negro school and attitudes toward McCarthy. The followers of the Senator were no more and no less liberal on this issue than his opponents.

But if these surveys challenge the liberal intellectuals’ belief that McCarthyites were generally intolerant people, there is some evidence to suggest that at least one type of anti-Semitism may have contributed to a small part of McCarthy’s support. Data from the 1953 N.O.R.C. survey suggest that those individuals who believed that Jews were disproportionately apt to be Communists were somewhat more likely to approve of the McCarthy committee than those who did not mention Jews. This survey, taken early in the Senator’s career as chairman of the Senate investigating committee on government operations, found that a majority (60 per cent) approved of his committee. Of the 8 per cent in the sample who mentioned Jews
as being disproportionately Communist, 69 per cent approved of the committee, while among respondents who did not list Jews, 59 per cent reacted favorably to McCarthy. While these results differ from those found in the other surveys, further specification of the relationship within social categories reduces their significance as indicators of greater anti-Semitic sentiments among McCarthyites. When elementary-school-, high-school-, and college-educated respondents are examined separately, the relationship holds among those who did not go beyond elementary school. Of this low-educated group, those who were pro-McCarthy more often mentioned Jews as being Communist than did those who were anti-McCarthy. Within the category of the high-school-educated, there was no relationship between propensity to identify Jews with Communists and attitudes toward the McCarthy committee, while among the college-educated the relationship was reversed. In this stratum, presumably the best informed of the three, the anti-McCarthy group more often saw Jews as disproportionately Communist.

The four surveys are not, of course, directly comparable, for many reasons. Cohn and Schein were not an issue when the 1953 N.O.R.C. interviews were taken, but had become a major source of controversy by the time of the 1954 studies, at which period McCarthy had lost considerable support. More important perhaps is the fact that the studies were asking very different questions. The 1954 surveys were touching on general attitudes toward Jews, while the 1953 poll was tapping the reactions of the very small group who see Jews as more Communistically inclined than non-Jews. Most of the respondents felt that “only a few” Jews are Communists. In fact, studies of the social base of American Communism indicate that while the overwhelming majority of Jews have opposed Communism, Jews have contributed disproportionately to the support of the American Communist Party. Those, therefore, who mention Jews as Communists may be reflecting greater knowledge and concern about Communism rather than anti-Semitism as such.

Analysis of other data in the 1953 N.O.R.C. survey tends to sustain the interpretation that the fact that McCarthy supporters were more likely to mention Jews as disproportionately Communist reflects concern with the Communist issue rather than anti-Semitism. Respondents were asked whether they had heard any criticism of Jews in the last six months. About one-fifth, 21 per cent, reported
that they had heard such criticism. Those whose acquaintances included critics of Jews were proportionately less favorable to McCarthy than those who did not report hearing anti-Semitic remarks. The respondents mentioned the specific types of attacks they heard. These break down into a variety of criticisms of Jews as having too much political or economic power, being unscrupulous in business, being socially clannish, and those involving charges that Jews are more likely than others to be Communists, or spies and traitors. Most of the anti-Jewish criticisms reported, however, did not concern Communism or spying. Individuals who mentioned hearing anti-Semitic comments not involving Communism were most likely of all to be anti-McCarthy, while the small group that mentioned having heard that Jews were Communists tended to show a larger than average support for the Wisconsin Senator. These results suggest that “normal anti-Semitic” stereotypes—that is, those concerning presumed negative Jewish economic or social traits—were more common in the social environment of people who were against the Senator than of those who were for him.

Given the limitations of the measures of anti-Semitism and the varying results in the three surveys, it is impossible to draw any conclusions about a relationship between anti-Semitism and propensity to support or oppose McCarthy. The available evidence clearly does not sustain the thesis that McCarthy received disproportionate support from anti-Semites.

The findings from the various surveys reported on in this section tend to sustain many of the generalizations made in the original essays. McCarthy's support was differentially based on the lower strata of manual workers, the less educated, and, within the middle class, farmers and self-employed businessmen. From a political standpoint, he recruited more heavily from the conservative groups, from Republicans, backers of right-wing policies on domestic issues, isolationists, and those most concerned with the need for a "tough" anti-Russian policy. In terms of religious and ethnic characteristics, he was disproportionately backed by his Catholic co-religionists, by members of lower-status Protestant denominations, and by those of recent immigrant stock, particularly Irish and German Catholics.

The evidence does not bear out any assumptions about a link between ethnic prejudice, particularly anti-Semitism, and McCarthy-
ism. It does, however, argue for the thesis that McCarthy drew disproportionate support from those whose personality traits or social background led them to give "authoritarian" responses to items from the Authoritarian Personality scale—that is, persons who were generally intolerant of ambiguity, approved of strong leadership, and favored harsh punishment for violations of social norms.

It is difficult to state whether these and other results reported earlier sustain the generalization that the appeal of McCarthyism reflected the status strains endemic in an open, prosperous society in which many individuals change their relative economic status. Sokol's study, specifically designed to test these hypotheses, does bear them out on a subjective level. In the Massachusetts community studied, those most concerned with the problem of status discrepancy were more favorable to McCarthy. However, his data and the studies analyzed here do not validate the assumption with respect to "objective" sources of status strain (high education and low economic position, for example). The evidence bearing on the belief that McCarthy appealed to traditional "populist" ideology, directed against organized labor and big business, also produces contradictory or ambiguous results.

In concluding the discussion about McCarthy, it may be worth noting again that the evidence indicates that McCarthy did not have widespread support either in 1952 or in 1954. Only 10 per cent of those questioned by Roper in 1952 felt that most of those accused by McCarthy were actually Communists. More significant, when asked in the same survey who among a list of names had done the best job of handling the Communist problem "here in America," only 7 per cent mentioned McCarthy, while from the same list 19 per cent singled him out for unsatisfactory handling of the problem. Thus, long before Eisenhower's election, intense negative feelings about McCarthy were seemingly much more common than strong favorable sentiments. And in the 1954 pre-election I.N.R.A. survey, 32 per cent gave anti-McCarthy responses on an index based on three questions about McCarthy, while only 15 per cent gave favorable answers. It seems clear from these and other surveys that the form of radical rightism represented by McCarthy, while more politically palatable than that of Coughlin or the John Birch Society, nevertheless, like them, aroused much more hostility than support.
III

The Supporters of the John Birch Society

The analysis of the supporters of the John Birch Society presents some special problems, requiring that it be handled differently from the way in which the two earlier "radical-rightist" tendencies were treated. Because it lacks a nationally known leader, espouses a virulent and extremist ideology which gives rise to attacks on the moderate leaders of both major parties as Communists, and upholds an economic program promoting the interests and values of the small stratum of moderately well-to-do businessmen and professionals, it has appealed to a much smaller segment of the general public than did Coughlin or McCarthy. Further, the Society is only dimly known to many people. For example, a Gallup Survey that inquired into attitudes toward the John Birch Society in the beginning of 1962 found that over two-thirds of those interviewed had not heard of it, or else had no opinion of it (Table 19). Among those who did express opinions, negative judgments outnumbered positive ones by five to one: 5 per cent favored the Society and 26 per cent opposed it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPINION OF A NATIONAL SAMPLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable to the Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Not Heard of the Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results were obtained four years after the Society was first organized, and over a year after it began to receive widespread attention in the general press, as well as sharp criticism from liberal political leaders and journals.

Because the bulk of the national sample had no opinion on the Birchers, certain limitations are imposed in drawing conclusions from the data. Comparisons between population sub-groups, as presented...
## The Radical Right

### TABLE 20
ATTITUDES TOWARD BIRCH SOCIETY BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN PER CENT—FEBRUARY, 1962 (GALLUP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Haven't Heard</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>(787)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>(368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>(444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELIGION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>(1108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>(390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>(460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>(538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>(359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>(259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>(428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>(889)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>(294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCOME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>(509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>(605)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>(483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>(784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>(820)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OCCUPATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, executive</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>(176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>(193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>(258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled, serv.</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>(381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>(173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-labor force</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>(235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>(535)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>(639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–29</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>(232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–49</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>(700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>(623)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL SAMPLE</strong></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>(1616)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
for the Coughlin and McCarthy data, must be interpreted with extreme caution, since they may at times be quite misleading. In analyzing support for the Birchers in terms of such categories, it is necessary to compare such small percentages as three per cent pro-Birch among Democrats and seven per cent among Republicans. Such comparisons are made all the more difficult because the proportion of respondents without opinions varies widely from sub-group to sub-group, following the pattern typically associated with political knowledge, opinion, and participation.

As Table 20 shows, the proportion without an opinion is 44 per cent among those who went to college, but 85 per cent among the grammar-school-educated. Further examination of the table discloses that the college-trained have a higher proportion of Birch supporters—and also Birch opponents—than do the grade-school-educated. To take another example, professionals appear much more pro-Birch than farmers, if one looks only at the percentage of the two occupations that is favorable to the Society; however, 60 per cent of the professionals expressed an opinion, as contrasted with 15 per cent of the farmers. (To emphasize the differing contributions of various population sub-groups to opinion, both pro and con, on the Birch Society, Table 21 is included, based on the same data as Table 20, but showing the relative contribution of sub-groups to the pro-Birch and anti-Birch groups, rather than the opinion distribution of the sub-groups on the Birch issue.)

The low level of opinion on the Society has additional implications for an analysis of Birch support. These concern the extent of possible latent support. One cannot assume that, because the low-income element (family income under $4000) of the population divided 4 to 1 against the Birchers in 1962, the same division of opinion would obtain at a time when, perhaps, a majority of these persons will know of, and have views regarding, the Birchers. At the time of the Gallup Survey, only 20 per cent of low-income respondents had an opinion on the organization. One cannot guess whether the balance of judgment would remain the same if 50 per cent—or 80 per cent—of this group had opinions to offer. In short, under different conditions arising either within the country or outside it, and with different policies and techniques pursued by the Society itself, the Birchers may come to the attention of segments of the population they are not presently reaching, and the relative
TABLE 21
CHARACTERISTICS OF BIRCH SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS
IN PER CENT—FEBRUARY, 1962 (GALLUP)

*Attitude Groups*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Pro-Birch</th>
<th>Anti-Birch</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
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<td>Men</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Women</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Professional</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, executive</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-labor force</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled, serv.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–49</td>
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<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(1616)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(416)</td>
<td>(1124)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
distribution of supporters and opponents within different analytic categories may become quite different.

Given these difficulties in interpreting the results of the national survey, I shall not discuss them in great detail. It is possible, however, to specify some of the factors that are associated with opinion toward the Society by concentrating on an analysis of attitudes within the one state in the Union in which the Society has become an important election issue and source of controversy—California. The California Poll, a state-wide survey organization, reports that in January, 1962, 82 per cent of a sample of 1100 Californians had heard of the Society. The national Gallup Survey, cited earlier, which was taken at about the same time, indicates that among respondents in the three Pacific Coast states, 79 per cent had heard of the Society as contrasted with 58 per cent in the nation as a whole.42 The salience of the Birch issue in California in 1962 can hardly be disputed: at the time, two California congressmen were avowed members of the organization; the Attorney General of the State issued a detailed report on the Society that was extensively reported and discussed in the newspapers; the Republican Assembly, meeting to endorse candidates for the 1962 primaries, spent considerable time debating the Party's position with respect to the Society; and both gubernatorial candidates, Governor Edmund Brown and former Vice-President Nixon, vied in attacking the Birches.43

Given the salience of the Birch issue in California politics, and the high degree of public knowledge of the organization, findings for the state of California may be interpreted with somewhat greater confidence than the national data. The January, 1962, California Poll permitted the construction of a measure of Birch support and opposition similar to that used for McCarthy in the I.N.R.A. Survey. The Poll inquired first whether respondents would be more or less likely to vote for a gubernatorial candidate who welcomed Birch Society support, and second whether they would be more or less likely to vote for a candidate who rejected the Society's endorsement. From responses on these two questions, respondents were divided into three groups: those who were sympathetic to the Birch Society on at least one question; those who said that the Birch issue would not affect their vote; and those who were unsympathetic to the Birch Society on one or both questions. A fourth group contained those who did not have an opinion on either question, together
with persons who had never heard of the Society. Table 22 gives the
distribution among California respondents in these four categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Heard</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\begin{array}{l}
\text{N} \\
(1186)
\end{array}\]

*No Opinion includes 2 per cent who gave contradictory responses.

It is clear that in California, as in the nation as a whole, the
bulk of those with opinions about the Birchers were hostile. Among
the national sample, as we have seen, unfavorable replies outnum-
bered favorable by a magnitude of five to one (26 per cent to 5
per cent); in California, the negative exceeded the positive by seven
to one (41 per cent to 6 per cent). Exact comparisons are, of
course, impossible since the questions posed were so different. More-
over, it might be argued that the neutral category in California, those
who reported that it made no difference whether a candidate was
pro-Birch Society or not—the anti-anti-Birchers, so to speak—were
"soft on Birchism." In spite of the propaganda emphasizing the
anti-democratic propensities of the Birch Society and its attacks on
Eisenhower and other major figures as Communists or dupes, these
persons were still willing to say that a candidate's involvement in
the Birch Society would not prejudice them against him.

An examination of the data reported in Tables 23 and 24 point
up a number of factors associated with Birch support in California.
A supporter of the Society is more likely to be a Republican than
a Democrat, to live in Southern California, to be better educated, and
to be in a higher economic category. Occupational variations as
such do not seem to be significantly related to attitudes toward
the Birchers, with the exception of the fact that the small group of
farmers in the sample seem to be the most strongly pro-Birch among
the vocational categories. Differences between religious groups are
## Three Decades of the Radical Right—1962

### Table 23

**Attitudes Toward Birch Society by Selected Characteristics in Per Cent—January, 1962 (California Poll)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Neut</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>DK/HH</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>PARTY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
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<td>RELIGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. California</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So. California</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade School</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 Coll./Trade</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+ College</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECON. LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>595</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cler/Sales</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
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<td>Skilled</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>203</td>
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<td>Unskilled &amp; service</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<td>258</td>
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<td>Ret’d, etc.</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>492</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>21–29</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–49</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 24
CHARACTERISTICS OF BIRCH SUPPORTERS CONTRASTED WITH BIRCH OPPONENTS IN PER CENT—JANUARY, 1962
(CALIFORNIA POLL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Pro-Birch</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Anti-Birch</th>
<th>DK/HH</th>
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<td>PARTY</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>RELIGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
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<td>Catholic</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. California</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td>So. California</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade School</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>3+ College</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cler/sales</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled &amp; service</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ret’d, etc.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–29</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Pro-Birch</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Anti-Birch</th>
<th>DK/HH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (1186)  N (73)  N (176)  N (488)  N (449)
small, although Catholics are somewhat less likely to back the Birch Society than are Protestants.

Since party identification appears so crucial in determining attitude toward the Birch Society, it is possible that some of the above-mentioned relationships are indirectly a consequence of political affiliation. For example, the political commitment of Protestants and Catholics varies greatly. In California, Protestants divide 50–50 in allegiance to the major parties, whereas among Catholics, Democrats outnumber Republicans 4 to 1. These results suggest that the Democratic commitment of Catholics may account for their slightly greater opposition to the Birch Society. And in fact we find that when religious groups are compared within party categories Catholics are slightly more likely to favor the Birch Society than are Protestants (Table 25).

**TABLE 25**

RELATIONSHIP OF PARTY AFFILIATION AND RELIGION TO ATTITUDE TOWARD JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY IN CALIFORNIA IN PER CENT—JANUARY, 1962 (CALIFORNIA POLL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party and Religion</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Don't Know or Never Heard</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the effect of education on attitudes toward the Birch Society is analyzed within party groups, the data suggest little difference among Democrats according to education. If anything, better-educated Democrats are more likely to be more anti-Birch. Among Republicans, however, greater education is associated with being pro-Birch. To a considerable extent these variations would seem to be a product of socio-economic status. That is, with increasing economic level, Republicans are more disposed to support the Birch Society, while Democrats at higher-status levels are somewhat more inclined to oppose the organization than their less-privileged party brethren (Table 26).
TABLE 26
RELATIONSHIP OF PARTY AFFILIATION AND ECONOMIC LEVEL TO ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BIRCH SOCIETY IN CALIFORNIA, IN PER CENT—JANUARY, 1962 (CALIFORNIA POLL)

Attitude on Birch Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party and SES</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Never Heard</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(68 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data clearly reflect the strong connection between attitudes toward the Birch Society and basic party commitment—a relationship that is hardly surprising, given the tenor of the organization. Basically, the Birch Society appeals most to well-to-do Republicans, and somewhat more to the Catholics among them than to the Protestants. These findings suggest that the Society's appeal is most effective among those to whom economic conservatism and fear of Communism are crucial issues.

Evidence for this interpretation may be drawn from an analysis of attitudes toward the Birch Society as related to preferences among likely contenders for the G.O.P. Presidential nomination in 1964, and as related to opinions on the importance of the threat of internal Communism. (The first comparison is made only for Republicans.) Among Republicans who supported the Birch Society, almost three-fifths (59 per cent) favored Senator Goldwater for President in 1964 (Table 27). Conversely, while former Vice-President Nixon was the leading candidate among the other categories, Republicans who opposed the Birch Society contained a larger proportion of Rockefeller backers than did any other opinion groups. Examined in terms of the attitudes of the supporters of the different candidates, the data show that 71 per cent of the Rockefeller partisans were anti-Birch, as contrasted with 56 per cent of the Nixon supporters, and 45 per cent of the Goldwater advocates. Clearly, Birchism and general political conservatism were strongly related among California Republicans in 1962.
TABLE 27
OPINION TOWARD THE BIRCH SOCIETY ACCORDING TO PREFERRED REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE IN 1964 AMONG CALIFORNIA REPUBLICANS (CALIFORNIA POLL)—JANUARY, 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Candidate</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Don’t Know or Never Heard</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldwater</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N) (48) (96) (170) (154) (468)

Among followers of both parties, attitudes toward the Birchers are influenced by views on the importance of internal Communism as a threat to the nation. Three-fourths of Birch supporters see the danger of domestic Communism as great, as contrasted with slightly more than half of the neutral group and a little less than half of the anti-Birch element. Those perceiving minimal threat from internal Communism constituted 4 per cent of the pro-Birchers, 14 per cent of the neutrals, and 20 per cent of the anti-Birchers (Table 28). (The same relationship between Birch opinion and perceived threat holds when Republicans and Democrats are taken separately, although Republicans more often than Democrats perceive the threat as high.)

There is also a difference between supporters and opponents of the Society who agree that the internal Communist threat is great in their opinion of the adequacy of existing agencies dealing with the problem. Approximately three-fifths of the Society’s opponents who agree that domestic Communism is a major problem feel that it is not being adequately dealt with, as compared with four-fifths of the Society’s supporters. Thus, those who like the Society differ sharply from those who dislike it in their evaluation of the extent of the threat and the way it is being handled. Considering both opinions together, we find that twice the proportion of the former group (60 per cent) feels that the threat is great and that it is being inadequately handled, compared to the latter (30 per cent).
BIRCH OPINION RELATED TO PERCEPTION OF DOMESTIC COMMUNIST THREAT AMONG CALIFORNIANS—JANUARY, 1962
(CALIFORNIA POLL)

Opinion on Birch Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Communist Threat</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Don't Know or Haven't Heard</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (67)</td>
<td>N (173)</td>
<td>N (471)</td>
<td>N (407)</td>
<td>N (1118)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neither the national Gallup Survey nor the California Poll included questions concerning attitudes on issues other than those reported above. However, a questionnaire study conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area in the spring of 1962, primarily for the purpose of studying opinions on peace issues, included a question on the John Birch Society and other attitudes relevant to this investigation. Though designed to secure a representative sample of the Bay Area population, the survey suffered from defects not uncommon in surveys utilizing self-administered questionnaires as opposed to interviews—that is, a heavy bias in the direction of responses by the better educated. Forty-seven per cent of those who answered the questionnaire had at least some college education and two-thirds were engaged in non-manual occupations. It is impossible, therefore, to draw any reliable conclusions from this survey as to the social characteristics of Birch supporters in the San Francisco region. But since the study did contain a number of attitude items on a variety of issues, and because the social characteristics of Birch supporters and opponents corresponded on the whole with the findings of the California Poll, a brief report on its results seems warranted.

Of particular interest in this survey were a number of questions dealing with attitudes toward minority ethnic and religious groups. Respondents were asked, "In choosing your friends and associates, how do you feel about the following types of people?" Response categories were, "Would rather not deal with," "Feel some reservations about dealing with," and "Feel the same about them as others." It was found that those approving the Birch Society (9 per cent)
tended to be more prejudiced against Negroes and Mexicans than those who opposed the organization. The pro-Birch group was also somewhat more hostile to Orientals and Jews than the opposing element, but the differences were relatively minor. The findings held when respondents of differing educational attainment were treated separately, indicating that, despite the greater prejudice of the less educated generally, Birch supporters tended to show more prejudice than Birch opponents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prejudiced Toward:</th>
<th>Pro-Birch Group</th>
<th>Anti-Birch Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexicans</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientals</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah's Witnesses</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics b</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(193)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Data presented through the courtesy of Robert Schutz of the Northern California Lobby for Peace and Thomas Tissue, graduate assistant in sociology.
b Only responses by Protestants are presented—N=26 Pro-Birch, N=193 Anti-Birch.

Supporters of the Birch Society were less willing to grant civil liberties to Communists, atheists, and pacifists than those unfavorable to the organization; they were also less likely to feel that search warrants should be required of police entering a house, more likely to favor censorship of "crime comic books," and more likely to deny the right of public meetings to those opposing "our form of government." However, it is important to note that degree of education tended to have a much greater effect on attitude than did opinion of the Birch Society. For example, college-educated Birch supporters were more inclined to allow Communists to speak in their community than were Birch opponents who had not attended college (38 per cent versus 28 per cent). Supporters of the Society also exhibit more prejudice toward Negroes and Mexicans, although they do not register a significantly higher degree of anti-Semitism than the population at
large. In all likelihood, more refined and comprehensive analysis of various sorts of ethnic and religious prejudice will be necessary before definitive conclusions may be reached regarding the relationship, or relationships, of these phenomena to current forms of right-wing extremism.

Thus far, I have omitted any discussion of the fact that the Birch Society is much stronger in Southern than in Northern California. In fact, the data from the California Poll survey discussed here and a later one completed in May, 1962 (too late to be analyzed and reported in detail here) indicate that California support for the Society is largely a phenomenon of the south. It has even less backing in Northern California than in most other sections of the country.

The explanation for the variations between the two sections would seem to lie largely in certain differences in their community structure. Northern California, centered around San Francisco, is the old, established part of the State. It was the original dominant center of population. Los Angeles and Southern California have emerged as major population centers only since World War I, and their really rapid mass growth occurred after 1940. Although Northern California has continued to increase in population, its major center, San Francisco, has grown little for many decades. There are many old families in the Bay Area who represent four and five generations of wealth, the descendants of those who made their money in mining, commerce, or railroads in the first decades after statehood, from 1850-80. Wealth in Los Angeles, on the other hand, is almost exclusively *nouveaux riches*, and the well-to-do there possess the attitudes toward politics and economics characteristic of this stratum. They are more likely to back the rightist groups that oppose the welfare state, the income tax, and trade unions, and, lacking political and cultural sophistication, are more prone to accept conspiracy interpretations of the strength behind liberal or welfare measures. There is little that is stabilized or institutionalized in Southern California. New, rapidly expanding centers of population lack a traditional leadership structure accustomed to the responsibilities of running community institutions and supportive of the rights of various groups to share in community decisions and authority. Ethnic and racial tensions are high in the south, and whereas in the north community leaders co-operate to repress any potential conflict, in the south there is little co-operation to ease such tensions.
Some evidence for the hypothesis that the strength of the Birch Society in Southern California (and in Arizona, Texas, and Florida, as well) is related to the tensions of population growth and community integration may be found in the second (May) California Poll. This survey inquired among those not native to the state as to when they moved to California. When respondents are divided between those who have been in the state more, or less, than 15 years, the data indicate that a larger proportion of the supporters of the Society (39 per cent) are among those who migrated to the state since World War II than is true among opponents (29 per cent). Unfortunately, there are no available data that bear directly on the political effects of social mobility; that is, the extent to which the experience of a change in socio-economic position, up or down the social hierarchy, is related to these political issues. The California Poll data do clearly suggest, however, that respondents whose educational and occupational attainments are not congruent—e.g., manual workers who went to college, or those in high-status positions with little education—are more likely to be pro-Birch than others within their strata whose statuses on these two stratification dimensions are roughly similar. These findings (based unfortunately on far too few cases of Birch supporters to be significant) are in line with the assumption that social mobility and/or status discrepancies predispose those involved in such experiences to accept extremist forms of politics.

The support the John Birch Society has received is seemingly somewhat different from the radical-rightist movements discussed earlier. As compared to them, it has drawn more heavily from ideological conservatives, those committed to the Republican Party, and, within the ranks of the Republicans, from among the more well-to-do and better educated. As twenty-two per cent of high economic level, college-educated Republicans in the California Poll were favorable to the Birchers, as compared with 6 per cent in the sample as a whole. As a group advocating economic conservatism, the Society naturally has little appeal for the economically deprived. It is difficult to see a movement with so little popular appeal—and with so conspiratorial a view of the American political process—making headway among the general population. But the considerable progress it has made among well-to-do Republicans who can afford to support their political convictions financially may mean that the Birch Society will be able to maintain the impression of a powerful mass-supported group for some time to come.
IV

Conclusions

In this preliminary report on an analysis of the social bases of the three major "radical-rightist" movements in the thirties, fifties, and sixties, I have deliberately avoided any detailed effort to interpret the data in terms of general sociological theories of political behavior or to analyze them in relation to the larger tensions in American life. This is in large part because I have already written extensively on these matters, both in the original "Radical Right" essay reprinted here, and in the book Political Man. The data reported here have been analyzed so as to test the validity of the hypotheses presented in these earlier discussions of the sources of extremist political beliefs. In addition, these quantitative findings represent only the first step in an effort to understand the factors underlying recurrent support for "right-wing radicalism" in this country.

The popular support given to right-wing extremism must be separated into a number of components. Many of those who backed Coughlin, McCarthy, and the Birch Society may have done so in ignorance of their attacks on the democratic process as such. Conversely, of course, many who are basically intolerant of democratic pluralism and diversity have been hostile to each of these political tendencies. As I have noted elsewhere, prior attachments to specific organizations or values have often led intolerant people to "contradict themselves" and oppose specific forms of intolerant politics. Thus, Southern racial bigots, committed to the Democratic Party and opposed to Catholics, may have opposed Coughlin or McCarthy, as Catholics and opponents of "their party."

Although there may be some individuals and social groups who have been attracted to all three rightist tendencies—Peter Viereck suggests the not unlikely possibility that many Coughlin followers later became McCarthy supporters—and there is some evidence that the more well-to-do, conservative supporters of McCarthy have appeared again as backers of the John Birch Society, the three "movements" do differ considerably in their predominant appeal. Coughlin was primarily successful in attracting a following among Catholics and among the economically deprived. Although he gained much rural support, his main base was among the unemployed and
the poor workers. Negroes, though heavily for Roosevelt, were also quite favorable to Coughlin. While Senator McCarthy, too, was supported disproportionately by Catholics and the lower classes as contrasted with Protestants and the urban salaried middle class, the differences were less significant. As contrasted with Coughlin, McCarthy had more success among the traditional sources of Republican and conservative strength, among Protestants, and particularly among the urban and the rural self-employed. Negroes tended to oppose him. As I noted in Political Man and have in some part documented here, his following was more comparable to that of the classic European Fascist movements. He appealed to those who were outside the major centers of contemporary power in American life—that is, those opposed to the social and big-business elite and to the organized liberal and trade-union forces.

Finally, the Birch Society, with the least popular appeal of the three, has had its primary success with the more well-to-do segments of conservative political opinion. Unlike its two predecessors on the "radical right," the Birch Society does not seem to have any distinct appeal to Catholics as such, although within the ranks of the supporters of each party, Catholics are slightly more likely to favor the Society than are Protestants. This absence of heavy Catholic support may reflect a number of factors, such as the fact that a Catholic Democrat is now in the White House and consequently the current "radical right" is engaged in denouncing the most important Irish Catholic in the country; or the lack of appeal of the Birch Society's conservative program for a Catholic population that as a group must still be counted as among the economically less privileged denominations. The Society is also the only one of the three "movements" not headed by a Catholic, and it has been vigorously denounced by many Catholic leaders and magazines. But whatever the reason, it is certain that in the early 1960s at least, Catholics can no longer be numbered as among the significant backers of rightist extremism. (Parenthetically, it may be noted that many of the groups, other than the Birch Society itself, that have taken the lead on the radical right in the 1960s are led by fundamentalist Protestants.)

Although it is too early to make any definitive statement on the matter, opinion data on these movements suggests that, contrary to the suppositions of many, extreme-rightist tendencies do not seem to be systematically associated with anti-Semitic attitudes. Even Father
Coughlin, though as avowedly anti-Semitic as any figure in American political history, does not seem to have been able to unite most anti-Semites behind him or, conversely, to have increased the level of anti-Semitic sentiment in the country. Feeling against Jews, though much stronger in the 1930s than it has been since, does not appear to have been an important influence in popular political alignment. Class position, ideological values, party commitment, and many other factors have been much more powerful determinants of how people lined up politically. Thus, Coughlin supporters, who were not anti-Semitic, could be favorably disposed toward the priest because they liked his "leftist" economic program.

As I noted in my original essay, McCarthy's relationship with Jews was extremely friendly. In his original essay for this collection, Peter Viereck noted that at one McCarthy mass meeting, "a rabbi accused the opposition to Roy Cohn of anti-Semitic intolerance. Next Cohn's was called 'the American Dreyfus Case' by a representative of a student McCarthyite organization, Students for America." Viereck went on to suggest a new phenomenon of "transtolerance," a concept that I think should receive more attention than it has:

Transtolerance is ready to give all minorities their glorious democratic freedom provided they accept McCarthyism or some other mob conformation of Right or Left. . . . "Right" and "Left" are mere fluctuating pretexts, mere fluid surfaces for the deeper anti-individualism (anti-aristocracy) of the mass man. . . . Transtolerance is also a sublimated Jim Crow: against "wrong" thinkers, not "wrong" races. . . . It is the Irishman's version of Mickbaiting and a strictly kosher anti-Semitism. It very sincerely champions against anti-Semites "that American Dreyfus, Roy Cohn"; simultaneously it glows with the same mob emotions that in all previous or comparable movements have been anti-Semitic.

If I understand Mr. Viereck correctly, he is saying that the object of intolerance in America has never been as important as the style, the emotion, the antagonism and envy toward some specified other who is seen as wealthier, more powerful, or particularly, as a corrupter of basic values. The Jew, like the Wall Street banker, has been a symbol on which the intolerant could hang their need to hate what is different, or what is powerful, more wealthy, or better educated. Basically there is some undefined segment of the population that responds to the need to hate, not to the specific
target. In the American context, anti-Semitism has not been a particularly stable sentiment. European anti-Semitism has had its roots in religious antagonism to the Jew, which was later associated with social conflicts stemming from the special economic position of the Jews in the middleman and money-lending sectors of the economy. Religious and cultural anti-Semitism, however, have never played important roles in the United States. The cultural values have approved of religious pluralism almost since the beginning of the Republic. And while anti-Semitic feelings and stereotypes have existed, it is doubtful that they have ever been as salient for a large part of the population as they have been in most of the European Continent. Hence, it might be argued that a right-wing movement that found other sources of hate and other conspiracies, and that also defined the Jews as among their supporters and leaders, could actually serve to lower the state of anti-Semitism in the country. It is interesting to note that a recent study of the British Fascist movement led by Mosely indicates that as soon as he became openly anti-Semitic, he lost almost all of the significant sources of upper-class support he had obtained when he first started. Apparently, many prominent British conservatives were willing to support Fascism in the early 1930s but balked at anti-Semitism.

Anti-elitism oriented toward groups that cannot be regarded as oppressed minorities or victims of bigotry, or anti-Communism directed against the agents or dupes of an evil foreign power, can serve as much more palatable outlets for those who require a scapegoat than "un-American" attacks on minorities. To attack Communists in high places, even within the White House or the top circles of the Republican Party, may be nonsense, may be stupid or clever politics, but it cannot be driven beyond the pale of Americanism as racial or religious bigotry.

The current crop of radical rightists seems to understand this difference between religious prejudice, anti-elitism, and anti-Communism. Most of them consciously and explicitly abstain from expressing anti-Jewish prejudice or other traditional forms of bigotry. If they attack a religious group, it is the National Council of Churches and its relatively liberal and high-status Protestant affiliates. To criticize such groups does not lay one open to the charge of prejudice. Robert Welch, the head of the John Birch Society, has followed very clearly in the footsteps of Senator McCarthy in seeking to limit his followers to attacks on Communists and sections of the
elite; for Welch, it is the political “power elite,” the heads of the Democratic and Republican Parties. He has devoted much of one issue of his Bulletin, and parts of others, to bolstering the image of the Birch Society as including many Jews and being opposed to anti-Semitism.

Evidence that Welch’s efforts actually coincide with the behavior of his followers may be found in the analysis of mail to senatorial critics of McCarthy and of the Birch Society cited earlier. This study, whose findings coincide with survey data, reports that:

... only a small fraction of the McCarthy mail was anti-Semitic, but the absence of anti-Semitism is even more striking in the Birchite mail. Only five pieces [out of 600] revealed anti-Semitic attitudes. ... This is, of course, a much lower quotient of anti-Semitism than is to be found in the general population—and particularly among ultranationalists and super-patriots. It suggests that the Birch program has the effect—at least for the time being—of discouraging, sublimating, or diverting open anti-Semitism.56

All this does not mean, of course, that right-wing anti-Semitism may not arise in the 1960s. There is much journalistic evidence that anti-Semites have tried to attach themselves to the Birch Society. The fundamentalist Protestants do exhibit more religious anti-Semitism than any other segment of American Christendom, and a number of right-wing fundamentalist groups have arisen.57 But, on the other hand, the dominant leader of the sensible wing of right-wing conservatism, Barry Goldwater, by descent, is half-Jewish, and is the scion on his father’s side of a fourth-generation American family of German-Jewish origin, a fact that he emphasizes rather than conceals. Although Goldwater is much too moderate for the Birch Society or other segments of the radical right, he is still the leader of the one major conservative tendency the Birchers see as appropriate to the American tradition and properly anti-Communist.58 Hence, it is possible that the phenomenon of “transtolerance” will continue as part of the radical right in the 1960s.

Political intolerance has always been an endemic part of the American political process. From the 1790s to the 1960s, various groups have been attacked as “traitors,” “agents of foreign powers,” “un-American,” and the like. It seems evident that at all times many Americans have been in favor of denying basic civil liberties
to beliefs that they find abhorrent. Intolerant movements, while often powerful, have never been able seriously to endanger the normal processes of American democracy. The involved structure of the constitutional system, the division of powers, the juridical protections, the complex and diverse sources of opinion and interest differences, and ultimately the good sense of the large majority have frustrated them. As I wrote in my original essay, it is relatively easy to build a new extremist movement in this country; it is difficult if not impossible to build a party. But if such movements cannot come to power, they can damage the democratic process for short periods of time, and they can and have injured innocent people. Hopefully, a more thorough knowledge of the elements in society responsible for their persistence should contribute to more effective action in restraining them.

1 This paper is a first report of an effort to investigate the sources of political extremism in American life, and its possible relationship to forms of religious and ethnic prejudice, which is now under way at the Survey Research Center of the University of California under a grant of funds from the Anti-Defamation League. I am especially grateful for assistance in the analysis of the quantitative data to Charles Gehrke, Natalie Gumas, Louise Johnson, Gary Marx, and Nancy Mendelsohn. The analysis of the materials dealing with the support of Father Coughlin is reported in greater detail in Gary Marx, The Social Basis of the Support of a Depression Era Extremist: Father Charles E. Coughlin (M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of California at Berkeley, 1962). I am particularly indebted to a number of research agencies for providing the data from various surveys for use in this analysis. These include the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College, the American Institute of Public Opinion Research (Gallup Poll), and the California Poll.

2 Coughlin, of course, was antagonistic to conservative Republicans of the Hoover variety, while the Birch Society sees treason present among liberal Republicans.


6 At one point he threatened to fight "in Franco's way if necessary." (Shenton, op. cit., p. 372.) An analysis of Coughlin's speeches may be found in Alfred McClung Lee and Briant Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939). Coughlin is also discussed in John Roy Carlson, Under Cover: My Four Years in the Nazi Underworld of America (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943).

7 Coughlin actually gave voice to various anti-Semitic statements while he was still backing Roosevelt in the early years of his administration. "[His] hatred of the moneylenders spilled over to an identification of bankers with Rothschilds, Warburgs, and Kuhn-Loeb. . . . Mentioning Alexander Hamilton, he would casually add, 'whose original name was Alexander Levine.' He freely attacked those 'who, without either the blood of patriotism or of Christianity flowing in their veins, have shackled the lives of men and of nations with the ponderous links of their golden chain.'" (Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 26–27.) Another historian cites a speech in which Coughlin criticized Roosevelt as early as 1934 and attacked "godless capitalists, the Jews, Communists, international bankers, and plutocrats." (Walter Johnson, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue [Boston: Little, Brown, 1960], p. 85.) During the 1936 Presidential campaign, in a speech discussing Christian Brotherhood, he said, "I challenge every Jew in this nation to tell me that he does or doesn't believe in it." And his paper, Social Justice, editorialized in October, 1936, "If certain groups of politically-swayed Jews . . . care to organize against Father Coughlin or the National Union they will be entirely responsible for stirring up any repercussions which they will invite." (Cited in Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 628.) He insisted, however, that he was not anti-Semitic at this time. In a private interview he said, "Jew-baiting won't work here. Fascism is different in every country." (Loc. cit.) A detailed description of Coughlin's anti-Semitic activities from the summer of 1938 to his withdrawal from politics after Pearl Harbor may be found in Gustavus Myers, History of Bigotry in the United States (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), pp. 375–415.

8 For a discussion of these ideological components of European fascism, see S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 131–76. In this book, I have also elaborated on the similarities between the ideologies of McCarthyism, Poujadism, and variants of Fascist movements without suggesting that either McCarthy or Poujade were Fascists.

9 I have elaborated the thesis of three different types of "rightist" movements—those oriented to the lower strata, to the centrist middle classes, or to the privileged conservative strata—in Political Man, pp. 131–76.

10 A latter survey conducted by the Gallup Poll in July of 1939 indicated that Coughlin's support declined in that year. Only 15 per cent stated that they agreed with his ideas, or with what he said, while 38 per cent stated they disagreed with his ideas, and 31 per cent indicated disagreement with what he said. See Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935–1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 148.

11 Such contradictions between the opinions of leaders and followers may, of course, be reported for almost every major figure and political party. In some European countries, survey data indicate that 10–15 per cent of those who vote conservative believe in nationalization of most industries, while a much larger proportion of Socialist voters in these nations opposes such measures.
Most of the American hierarchy and the Vatican were in fact deeply troubled by Coughlin’s political activities. (See Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 628–29, and Shenton, op. cit., pp. 364–66, 371.) One Catholic estimate of the politics of the hierarchy reported that at least 103 of the 106 American bishops voted for Roosevelt in 1936. (Ibid., p. 367.)

The April, 1938, study did not inquire as to respondents’ religion.

In reading these tables, it should be noted that the important measure of support or opposition is the difference in per cent between those opposing and supporting. The presence of a large and varying group with “no opinion” makes reliance on the proportion supporting alone misleading.


In an interview with a journalist in 1936, Coughlin stated that this was the last free election that the United States would have, that the country would have to choose between Communism and Fascism, and he said, “I take the road of Fascism.” (Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 629.) He also “praised Mussolini and Hitler over the radio . . . .” (Johnson, op. cit., p. 114.) As has already been noted, he ardently backed Franco during the Spanish Civil War, and after war broke out in Europe, he supported Japan in Asia and the Axis powers in Europe. (See Shenton, op. cit., p. 372.)

It seems clear also that many anti-Semites were also anti-Catholic and thus may have been anti-Coughlin. A Gallup Survey conducted in November, 1938, asked a national sample whether they approved of the Nazis’ treatment of Jews in Germany, and similarly whether they approved of the treatment of Catholics. Among non-Catholics who approved of the persecution of the Jews, almost half, 43 per cent, also favored the Nazis’ attacks on Catholics, 45 per cent opposed them, and 12 per cent had no opinion. This finding suggests that about half the extreme anti-Semites were also anti-Catholic.

Schlesinger, for example, wrote that the “followers of the demagogues [Coughlin, Townsend, and Long] mostly came from the old lower-middle classes, now in an unprecedented stage of frustration and fear, menaced by humiliation, dispossession, and poverty . . . . They came, in the main, from the ranks of the self-employed, who, as farmers or shopkeepers or artisans, felt threatened by organized economic power, whether from above, as in banks and large corporations, or from below, as in trade unions.” (Op. cit., p. 68.)

Victor Ferkiss also described the movements led by Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and Gerald L. K. Smith as “designed to appeal to a middle class composed largely of farmers and small merchants which feels itself crushed between big business—and especially big finance—on the one hand, and an industrial working class . . . on the other . . . .” It appealed also “to those members of the urban lower-middle class (especially the white-collar workers) who were unwilling to identify themselves with organized labor and feared its power almost as much as they feared that of big business.” (Op. cit., pp. 350, 360.)

A contemporary account of Coughlin described him as having a program which “appeals simultaneously to agriculture, the middle class, and the big employer.” Raymond Gram Swing, Forerunners of American Fascism (New York: Julian Messner, 1935), p. 51.

These observers all clearly have been unaware that Coughlin’s mass base came largely from the urban working class and the very poor, particularly
the unemployed and those on relief. Although it may have seemed logical to assume that the urban self-employed were among his supporters, the evidence does not justify this assumption. However, Gustavus Myers did point out that public-opinion data indicated that "Coughlin's followers were mostly in the stratum of low incomes." (Op. cit., p. 388.) This work was first published in 1943.

A related point was made in the original edition of The New American Right in urging the need for a distinction between "the intolerant—those who will say 'Kill the Communists' as easily as they will say 'Jail the sex deviants' and 'Fire a teacher who is a free thinker'—and the concerned—those who are sincerely worried about Communism, and think strong measures are necessary to deal with it." See Nathan Glazer and S. M. Lipset, "The Polls on Communism and Conformity," in the original edition of The New American Right, p. 152. A somewhat similar differentiation among McCarthy supporters has been drawn by John Fenton, an editor of the Gallup Poll. He reports that the Poll's data from two 1954 surveys suggest "two separate wings" of McCarthy supporters. The first "was based primarily on the fact he was anti-Communist," and often disliked his "high-handed and ruthless tactics," while the "second wing liked McCarthy as much for his methods as they did for his anti-Communism. These . . . admired McCarthy because he was 'a fighter' and 'had the guts to stand up to them.'" According to Fenton, as McCarthy lost support in 1954 as a result of his fight with the Army, he "lost ground generally with voters across the country. His sharpest losses, however, tended to come from persons who would fall in the first, or anti-Communist wing. He lost fewer friends among the second wing—when the hearings were over, Joe was still the fighter who had 'stood up to them' to many in this wing." (In Your Opinion [Boston: Little, Brown, 1960], pp. 135–37.)

Similar results are indicated by a study of mail to Senator Flanders, a prominent critic of McCarthy's. As McCarthy came under severe attack and lost public support in 1954, there "is a significant decline in the literacy quality of the pro-McCarthy mail. . . . The decline in literacy quality of the pro-McCarthy mail is accompanied by an increase in the number of emotionally toned and unsigned letters. . . ." Stanley C. Plog, "McCarthy and Democracy," unpublished paper (dittoed, Neuropsychiatric Institute, U.C.L.A. Medical Center, 1962), pp. P2–P3.

See Cantril, op. cit., pp. 130, 164, 244.

Nelson W. Polsby, "Towards an Explanation of McCarthyism," Political Studies, 8 (1960). Polsby lists as his sources various published Gallup surveys and the results of his own re-analysis of one 1954 Gallup Poll. See also Louis Bean, Influences in the Mid-Term Election (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Institute, 1954); and Louis Harris, Is There a Republican Majority? (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954). In reporting Harris's findings, Polsby states that Harris found that the Irish were not disproportionately pro-McCarthy. In my judgment, he misinterpreted Harris's finding. Harris reports that the Irish in his 1952 sample divided evenly between support and opposition to McCarthy. Since, however, McCarthy was only supported by a minority of the entire sample, a group that was evenly split on him was more favorable than most other ethnic groups, and hence Harris should be recorded as finding the Irish predisposed to back McCarthy.

A 1952 Roper survey that was taken in May, before either party had nominated their Presidential candidates, indicates this clearly:
1952 VOTE INTENTION ACCORDING TO TRADITION, PARTY ALLEGIANCE AND ATTITUDE TOWARD McCar�HY

Traditional Party Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1952 Vote Intention</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Pro-McC.</th>
<th>Anti-McC.</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Pro-McC.</th>
<th>Anti-McC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(389)</td>
<td>(524)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(344)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 The analysis of McCarthy's support in the remaining part of this section is largely based on the data from four surveys: a Roper study of 3000 respondents made in May, 1952; an eleven-state survey taken by International Research Associates (I.N.R.A.) in August-September, 1954, three months before the Senate censured Senator McCarthy; the 1954 election survey of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, cited earlier; and a study conducted by the Gallup organization in December, 1954, after McCarthy had been censured by the Senate, asking a national sample its opinion of the censure. The I.N.R.A. survey presented the analytic advantage of furnishing the largest sample, since it had been designed to report on opinion in 11 states—California, Michigan, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Mexico, Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. The total sample was 9852. While this survey cannot be considered as representative of the national population, there seems no good reason to assume that sub-group variations (e.g., religion, education, party, etc.) within these 11 states were not characteristic of reactions to McCarthy generally. One of its questions concerning reactions to McCarthy was identical with that of the University of Michigan's national study, and the distribution of replies was almost the same.

24 John Fenton's analysis of Gallup data indicates that those among McCarthy's supporters who approved of his anti-Communism, but were "sometimes repelled by the Senator's high-handed and ruthless tactics," were "often professional or business people with college educations." Those who approved of his methods, who admired him for being tough in his fight against an unspecified "them," who felt that "you can't use kid gloves for that kind of stuff," were disproportionately "from the working classes and with grade-school education." (See Fenton, op. cit., pp. 135-36.)

25 These differences among occupational categories continue to hold when Democrats and Republicans are examined separately. Thus, Democratic businessmen in the I.N.R.A. survey were less anti-McCarthy than Democratic professionals, executives, or even manual workers. On the other hand, they were much more anti-McCarthy than businessmen who consider themselves Republicans or Independents. Republican workers, the "Tory workers" in my original essay, were the group most favorable to McCarthy within their party.

26 The evidence underlying this analysis is not presented in this preliminary report, since it would involve presenting a larger number of complicated analytic tables. The Coughlin studies did not include a question on education, but they did have information on both occupation and socio-economic status. And as was noted in the discussion of his support, within occupational categories, higher socio-economic status was associated with antagonism to Coughlin, the opposite of its effect on McCarthy sentiment.
The Radical Right

27 See Robert Sokol, Rank Inconsistency and McCarthyism: An Empirical Test (unpublished paper, Dartmouth College). This was done by asking respondents, "Does the money you receive for your job seem higher, the same or lower than what you'd expect a person with your education to receive?" Those who answered higher or lower were then asked, "How much have you thought about this difference between your income and your education—a great deal, sometimes, or never?" Based on answers to these questions, men were ranked on a scale with seven positions.

28 With but one exception, all the surveys reported by Polsby, op. cit., and those examined here agree on variations in religious backing for McCarthy. The survey that indicates little difference is the 1952 Roper study.


30 These materials are also reported in Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), pp. 277–78. I have previously discussed Trow's findings in the context of a general analysis of right-wing movements in Political Man, op. cit., pp. 167–70.


34 The 1953 N.O.R.C. study used the following items as a measure of "authoritarian" predisposition:

1. The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.

2. Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their respect.

3. Prison is too good for sex criminals. They should be publicly whipped or worse.

4. There are two kinds of people in the world: the weak and the strong.

5. No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage.

35 The possibility that the relationship is a function of a response set is challenged by the fact that one of the three questions that measured sentiment toward McCarthy was worded so that a pro-McCarthy sentiment required a "no" answer. On the whole, those who said "No," they would not support a candidate who opposed McCarthy, replied "Yes," they would back one who favored the Senator.

36 Charles H. Stember, Education and Attitude Change (New York Institute of Human Relations Press, 1961), pp. 109, 118. Since this paper went to press, I have secured a set of the I.B.M. cards of this survey for further analysis. This indicates that in the sample as a whole, those favorable to McCarthy are somewhat less willing to accept Jewish neighbors than were his opponents.

37 Ibid., pp. 136, 143.

38 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

Such evidence cannot be taken as supporting the thesis that anti-McCarthy people were more anti-Semitic than pro-McCarthy people since positive replies to this question do not necessarily indicate greater anti-Semitism. Rather, it has been argued that those individuals who know more people, who have more contacts with others, are more likely to hear more of every kind of attitude. And since increased social relations outside of one's intimate family circle are associated with higher education and status, the fact that opponents of McCarthy are higher on these social attributes may account for the finding. To investigate this possibility, these replies were compared among people with varying amounts of education, and the relationship still held. Among the grammar-school-, high-school-, and college-educated, those opposed to McCarthy were more likely to report having heard anti-Semitic comments than those who were pro-McCarthy.

Hodges, in his study, based on a sample of 248 in a small Wisconsin town, reports that those who were pro-McCarthy were more likely to subscribe "more frequently to anti-Semitic statements," but also tended "to reject statements which are anti-Negro in content." (Op. cit., p. 3.)

The wording of the question in the two surveys was similar but not identical, since the California Poll item read: "Have you heard anything about a political group called the John Birch Society?" The Gallup query did not include the word "political."

It should be noted, however, that this does not mean that Californians are more in favor of the Birch Society than those in other parts of the country. Actually, among those with opinions, there are proportionately more pro-Birchers in the Midwest and in the South than in the Far West.

The survey indicated that Bay Area Birch supporters are more likely to be Republicans than Democrats, college-educated rather than less schooled, and white Christians rather than members of racial or religious minorities. Thus, of the white, Christian, college-trained Republicans in the sample, 16 per cent reported themselves generally favorable to the Birches. No Jews or Orientals and only 4 per cent of the Negroes queried were pro-Birch.

Only white Christians were included in these comparisons, since the findings would presumably have been distorted by the inclusion of the minorities in ratings of their own groups.

Stories reported in the California press concerning internal conflicts within the Republican Party and the attitudes of wealthy Republicans toward contributing to Nixon's campaign suggest that the Party is troubled by the fact that support for the Birch Society is much greater among Party activists and wealthy contributors than among the Republican electorate. Recent evidence from analysis of national data indicates that local Republican leaders around the country tend to be considerably more conservative than the rank and file of the G.O.P. See Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," American Political Science Review, 54 (1960), pp. 406-27; see, especially, pp. 422-24.

Similar conclusions concerning differences between the support of McCarthy and of the Birch Society drawn from survey data have recently been suggested in a report of a comparative study of mail attacking Senatorial critics of the radical right (Senator Fulbright for his opposition to McCarthy and Senator Kuchel for his attacks on the Birch Society). The report states
that "only 15 per cent of the McCarthyite mail could—charitably, at best—be described as reasonable in tone, substance, or literacy." However, the "Birch mail is much more moderate in tone than McCarthy mail, even though it may be as extremist in objective. It is better written and better reasoned. . . . The great bulk of the mail came from people who acknowledge membership in the Birch Society or from sympathizers. . . . Many of the writers seem genuinely concerned over the rise of Communism. . . . But many of them seem more aroused over social-welfare legislation, income taxes, and foreign aid than they are over Communism." (See Herman Edelsberg, "Birchites Make Polite Pen Pals," The A.D.L. Bulletin, April, 1962, pp. 7–8.)

Presumably the differences in style and tone of the letters reflected the variation in the class and educational levels of the supporters of both tendencies.

Various journalistic accounts indicate that the Birch Society includes among its members the heads of a number of medium-size corporations, such as independent oil companies, and manufacturing concerns. Such men, as I noted in my original essay, also supported McCarthy, and they are often willing to back up their antagonism to "creeping Socialism" with heavy contributions.

50 Various journalistic accounts indicate that the Birch Society includes among its members the heads of a number of medium-size corporations, such as independent oil companies, and manufacturing concerns. Such men, as I noted in my original essay, also supported McCarthy, and they are often willing to back up their antagonism to "creeping Socialism" with heavy contributions.


52 Ibid., pp. 97–131.


54 A somewhat related set of ideas on the psychological and personality level is presented in Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), especially pp. 132–68. As Rokeach states his hypothesis, "The basic principle governing the way in which we organize the world of people is not in terms of abstract ethnic or racial categories as such but in terms of how congruent or incongruent others' belief systems are to our own. The more significance we attach to another's agreement or disagreement with us as grounds for reacting to him, the more the intolerance [or tolerance]. . . . In short, then, we hypothesize that insofar as psychological processes are involved, belief is more important than ethnic or racial membership as a determinant of social discrimination. Our theory leads us to propose that what appears at first glance to be discriminations among men on the basis of race or ethnic group may turn out upon closer analysis to be discriminations on the basis of belief congruence over specific issues." Pp. 134–35 (emphasis in original).


56 Edelsberg, op. cit., p. 7.

57 For a description of one of the most important, see Harold H. Martin, "Doomsday Merchant of the Far, Far Right [Billy Hargis]," Saturday Evening Post, 235 (April 28, 1962), pp. 19–24. Hargis, too, tells his followers, "We cannot tolerate anti-Semitic statements, anti-Negro statements. . . ." (p. 22). However, it should be noted that in the past "he has acknowledged he received inspiration from the late Reverend Gerald Winrod, a notorious anti-Semite. In addition, Hargis promoted the American Mercury at a time
when it was blatantly anti-Semitic.” (Arnold Forster, “Clamor from the Far Right,” The A.D.L. Bulletin [November, 1961], pp. 2, 6.)

58 The Young Americans for Freedom, which has broader right-wing and conservative support than any other organization, is headed by a Jew, as is the Committee of One Million, established to support Nationalist China.

59 The reasons why a new or third party has never been able to succeed in this country are discussed in S. M. Lipset, “Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups,” European Journal of Sociology, 1 (1960), pp. 50-85.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


Of the essays written in 1962, those by Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadter, David Riesman, Talcott Parsons, and S. M. Lipset were written for this volume. Herbert Hyman's essay was adapted from a longer report on the climate of intolerance in England, based on a Guggenheim Foundation fellowship, and is published here for the first time. Alan Westin's essay is a revised version of two earlier essays, "The John Birch Society" and "The Radical Right and the Radical Left," which appeared in Commentary, August, 1961, and Harper's, April, 1962.

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shapes political attitudes today.

Six of the fourteen essays in this volume first appeared in 1955 as a book, *The New American Right*, which first propounded the concept of “status politics” as a means of explaining the social tensions of American life—a book, incidentally, that first coined the term “radical right.” Those essays, a pioneering approach in American social science, are here reprinted in full. To them each of the six authors has added a new chapter applying his analytical scheme to the politics of the 1960’s. In addition, this volume contains a special study of the John Birch Society by Alan F. Westin, and a comparative analysis of the political climates in Britain and the United States by Herbert H. Hyman.

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